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A NOTE ON TEXTS AND TRANSLATIONS OF
SCHLEIERMACHER'S WORKS
Since the dissertation is written in English, I quote the English translations of the
primary works of Schleiermacher wherever possible. If one wishes to consult the German
originals of such works as the Glaubenslehre and the Brief Outline, I also add the
paragraph and section numbers in endnotes. This also applies to the quotations from the
basic works of other thinkers, such as Kant, Husserl, and others. I also may occasionally
insert some original German words into these quotes from the translated books. As for
Schleiermacher's Dialektik, one of the basic texts for this investigation, since the full
translation is not available in English, I have had to use the German texts. Basically, I use
the original, most comprehensive, Jonas edition of 1839, but next to that I also refer to
Odebrecht's 1976 edition of Schleiermacher's lectures of 1822 and Tice's English
translation of the 1811 lectures (see bibliography). All translations of the quotations from
Jonas and Odebrecht are mine, but the German originals of all direct quotations are
supplied in endnotes or, in cases of shorter phrases, in parentheses. I do not do so,
however, when translating and quoting other German authors writing on Schleiermacher.
In addition, in cases where I do not quote Schleiermacher directly, but rather summarize
larger fragments in my own words, I may insert the original German for some ambiguous
terms in parentheses. Mostly I do it in order to point out a specific term or word or to
show when my translation of a term or word intentionally differs from the plain and most
direct translation.
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INTRODUCTION
General Remarks on Motivation, Arguments, Course,
and Significance of the Dissertation
I have chosen the problem of the overcoming of metaphysics as the main theme of
my dissertation. This theme is important today inasmuch as metaphysical foundations in
philosophy, as well as in theology, are challenged as never before. Different
nonfoundational philosophies and theologies have emerged that claim to have left
metaphysics behind. Have they always succeeded? In my opinion, as the dissertation will
show, this leaving behind is not as easy as it might seem. Metaphysics has, like the
proverbial cat, nine lives, or even many more than nine.' Sooner or later, every
metaphysics is challenged and overcome. Yet, every new overcoming of metaphysics has
its own implicit metaphysical presuppositions, which may be challenged in tum. The
always discernible implicit metaphysics appears to make the overcoming of metaphysics
impossible. Is the situation hopeless then? Is there no way out? I think that despite the
perseverance of metaphysics, there are some ways out of it.
As the title of the dissertation indicates, I am going to contend for a particular
position in regard to the problem of metaphysics. My position will be somewhere in the
middle between the two ways of overcoming metaphysics. The first is when one
metaphysics overcomes another, less adequate metaphysics. The second is when
nonmetaphysical thinking leaves metaphysics behind. On the one hand, my position,
caJled metaphysical insideoutness, remains inside the game of metaphysics insofar as it
acknowledges the impossibility of leaving metaphysics completely behind.2 Therefore, to
some extent, it opts for the overcoming of metaphysics in the first sense. On the other
hand, my position at the same time calls for the overcoming of metaphysics in the second
sense and acknowledges at least some ways of stepping outside metaphysics. This
stepping outside takes place while remaining inside the first overcoming. Thus, it is a
vacillating middle position between the two. Insofar as this position includes both ways
of overcoming, I believe it is a finer way to address the problem of metaphysics.
Accordingly, the figure whose thought I would choose as the main object of
investigation should have been conscious of both the need of going beyond metaphysics
and the impossibility of its final overcoming. Likewise, this thinker would had to have
accomplished some overcoming of metaphysics in both senses presented above:
proposing some more adequate metaphysics in contrast to the existing ones and also
leaving metaphysics behind. In fact, there are many famous philosophers or philosophical
schools to which I could apply this philosophical tactic of metaphysical insideoutness as
a hermeneutical key, and I will demonstrate it in the first part of the dissertation.
However, as the main object, I chose the thought of Friedrich Schleiermacher, a thinker
from nineteenth-century Germany who is not so notable as a philosopher or
metaphysician, although he is famous in such other fields as theology, pedagogy,
hermeneutics, religious philosophy, and others. However, he also addressed metaphysical
questions in the lectures on dialectics, which were edited and published posthumously.
Moreover, he also worked to overcome metaphysics in theology.
In any case, Schleiermacher fits all those requirements. His lectures on dialectic
represent a serious contribution to metaphysics and its overcoming. As I will present in
the dissertation, Schleiermacher appropriated the most current metaphysics of his time,
Kantian transcendental philosophy, at the same time striving to overcome it with, in his
view, a more appropriate metaphysics. Besides, Schleiermacher's dialectics as logic
overcomes metaphysics. He also insisted on the independence of theological discourse
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from that of metaphysical speculation. As is well known, he saw Christian dogmatics as
an area of reflection that overcomes metaphysics and considered metaphysical categories
to be inappropriate for expressing the Christian beliefs. Yet, despite this claim, knowing
the inevitability of metaphysics, he hesitated to exclude metaphysics from his dogmatics
altogether, but retaining it in certain forms. But above all, I will also find some elements
in both Schleiermacher's philosophy and theology that unexpectedly fall outside
metaphysics, outside the rule of one overcoming another. Using Heidegger's expression,
I call these elements "meta-metaphysical," for they reach even beyond metaphysics,
which itself is supposed to go beyond (meta).
Before discussing Schleiermacher, in the first part of the dissertation I outline the
development of metaphysics until its relatively late self-determination. I also address
some key metaphysical problems during this presentation. I continue with some selected
examples of overcoming metaphysics from modem philosophy. Although this overview
will mainly show the overcoming of metaphysics in the first sense, there will be some
instances in which my proposed position comes into view as well. I need this account not
only in order to establish my position, but also to show that my approach may indeed be
almost universal. It can be applied to most leading philosophers in the history of
philosophy after the arising need to overcome metaphysics, which, by the way, coincides
with metaphysics' coming to its clear definition in the eighteenth century.
The overview of the first part will culminate in a chapter on the thought of a
recent French thinker, Jacques Derrida, whose work I also approach according to the
aforementioned double pattern. My interpretation of his thought will delineate my stance
toward overcoming metaphysics most expressly. There is a certain reciprocity in my
account of the history of philosophy. I consider Derrida's thought to be a peak in the
history of overcoming metaphysics from which I look back at previous thinkers. Having
this standpoint helps me to see that the other thinkers in the development of overcoming
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metaphysics, including Schleiermacher, themselves in one way or another exemplify
similar double positions, only related to the philosophical context of their time.
My position of metaphysical insideoutness integrates two one-sided
interpretations of Derrida' s relationship to metaphysics. On the one hand, some
interpreters consider Derrida to be the ultimate metaphysician who has discovered the last
quasi-Kantian transcendental presuppositions of metaphysics. This interpretation only
helps others to hold that Derrida himself is deeply involved in explicit and implicit
metaphysics, unable to overcome it. On the other hand, there are others who believe that
his stylistically creative literary writing has left metaphysics behind after its
deconstruction. I interpret Derrida from the viewpoint of an oscillating middle position
that tries to bring together these two extremes but without synthesizing them. This
interpretation will help to arrive at a third, richer, and more complex tactic of overcoming
metaphysics. I interpret Derrida's science of writing, grarnmatology, as further
completion of metaphysics in my first sense of overcoming, and I argue that this first
overcoming is so fashioned that it opens up possibilities to glimpse from the inside some
of what is outside of metaphysics while still remaining inside. It means to reach outside
(meta of metaphysica) from inside, remaining inside (in physica) the finite economy of
empirical aposteriority.
One might ask about the point of interpreting Schleiermacher-an "old
fashioned" nineteenth century's German theorist-in the light of later thinking, especially
today's French neo-structuralism? For one thing, Schleiermacher may have influenced
Derrida indirectly at least by his hermeneutics through Dilthey and Heidegger, the latter
also influenced by Schleiermacher's Speeches in arriving at his idea of "being-in-the-
world.") For another thing, the point is not that Schleiermacher could have exactly
produced today's philosophical arguments. However, certain similarities between
unrelated figures of different times may indicate that the present problems are implicit in
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the past, and, indeed, the problem of overcoming metaphysics has been present in the
history of philosophy for centuries. This fact is related to another quite obvious insight,
namely, that rarely is something invented completely anew. The implicit or explicit
resources from the past heritage have always been used for the shaping of thought in
every present. In my opinion, the texts of all great thinkers from the past, more or less
distant, as well as from the present, always return us to the beginnings of the questions
that thinking asks. Derrida, for example, acknowledges that even he has not invented
anything, but only delved into the marginalized resources in the texts written by others. I
also agree with Derrida's acknowledgement that all great texts are still before us, still to
be disclosed. There is an inexhaustible reserve or residue, the abundant surplus of
meaning in the margins or in the gaps of the great texts.
Hence, neither do I claim to invent something new in this work. I only want to
reappropriate what already exists in some old German texts and lecture notes. Yet, I hope
to discover some uncommon and intriguing elements in these texts by looking from
today's perspective throughout this investigation. That can truly make Schleiermacher a
historical "figure," similarly to Rajan's claim about deconstructive and phenomenological
motives in Schleiermacher, "in the double sense that he is not an imaginary construction
but is at the same time a 'figure,' produced through the intertextual inscription of
contemporary theory in an earlier critical discourse.:" Although I will not provide point-
by-point comparisons, there can, indeed, be both some schematic and detailed parallels
constructed between Schleiermacher and Derrida. The process of discovery is no less
important than the goal. Although there will be no point by point comparisons, there will
be many intriguing discoveries in the process of its making, discoveries that might have
their own individual scholarly significance. All that will serve to make Schleiermacher
contemporary, and I think it is enough reason to justify this dissertation project.
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What Is Metaphysics and Its Overcoming?
Since the dissertation deals with the problem of overcoming metaphysics, first I
need to define metaphysics. In addition, I need to give some more exact definitions-
although still preliminary-of the overcoming of metaphysics that I briefly outlined
above. To start with, the etymology of the word "metaphysics" speaks for itself. Literally
it means "beyond physics." I give the first most general definition of metaphysics, in
terms of this literal meaning, as a discipline that inquires beyond physical reality itself
into its underlying structures. In this sense, metaphysics is ontology, the science of being.
Some sort of congruence between mind and reality is presupposed in this case of
metaphysics. Philosophers have been practicing this kind of metaphysics throughout the
history of philosophy unti·l our own day. One can mention Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, the
Medieval scholastics, Leibniz, Wolff, Whitehead, and others.
However, already during the Renaissance, but especially during the
Enlightenment, a different branch of metaphysics emerged. Its focus shifted from being
as such to the mind of the knower. Hence, another meaning of metaphysics is
epistemology, the science of knowledge. According to this second meaning, I give
another preliminary definition of metaphysics as a discipline that inquires into the
presuppositions of knowledge. This metaphysics, instead of dealing with the structures of
being, concentrates on the conditions of knowing that being. This kind of metaphysics
appears explicitly in Descartes, but culminates in Kant. These and other first modern
thinkers started to question the ability of the human mind to comprehend objective being
and, instead, concentrated on the mind itself, an entity more proximate to the subject, and
therefore, supposedly better knowable. There could also be a subsection under this
second meaning of metaphysics that can be very broadly called intuitionism. This
epistemology appeals to a direct grasp of reality differently from grasping its ontological
and mental structures. I mention it because Schleiermacher could fit in this group. Others
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who develop this type of metaphysics include Bergson, Husserl, as well as the early
Heidegger.
However, giving these two tentative definitions does not mean that the question
about the nature of metaphysics can be answered easily and unequivocally. These are
only the two most general definitions. Variations are endless, and classifications could be
made in many other different ways. Moreover, these two approaches have been
combined, especially after Kant, for example, as in Hegel. In truth, almost every thinker
who has struggled with metaphysics has his or her specific and peculiar understanding of
metaphysics, usually different from that of others. Certainly, as the above two definitions
also show, metaphysics always assumes different forms; every metaphysician of
importance has tried to reshape metaphysics, to bring it to a new level of validity.
In my perspective, precisely this reshaping is one meaning of overcoming-the
surpassing of previous metaphysics, which has purportedly lost its credibility, with a new
and more adequate metaphysics. The above mentioned shift from ontology to
epistemology is one of the most distinct examples of this overcoming. Notably, the
phrase "overcoming of metaphysics" is taken here in subjective genitive; it is
metaphysics overcoming itself. Again, in case of the preceding example, epistemology-
as critical philosophy, intuitionism, phenomenology, etc.--overcomes metaphysics as
ontology. In any event, in this first sense of overcoming, it is another metaphysics that
overcomes metaphysics; it is overcoming as replacement and fulfillment.
My second meaning of overcoming refers to the attempts of setting metaphysics
aside altogether, leaving it behind by means of different ways of thinking. In this case, the
phrase is taken in objective genitive. This leaving metaphysics behind is important
inasmuch as every metaphysical foundation sooner or later becomes suspect, but thinking
outside metaphysics remains outside the sphere of metaphysical validations and
refutations. Mention must be made of schools and individual philosophers who saw
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themselves in this light, but whom I include in the first group. Thus, British empiricists
and their heirs, logical positivists, might have assumed that they left metaphysics behind
for the sake of another, instrumental philosophy, content with the problems of logic and
experiential verification alone. According to my definitions of metaphysics, their thought
remains metaphysical in the second sense, that is, they provide alternative systems of
supposedly more credible principles of knowledge.
One of the first true overcomers of metaphysics in my second sense is Nietzsche,
despite Heidegger's evaluation of Nietzsche's notions of the will to power and the eternal
recurrence of the same as the completion of the Western metaphysical tradition. There is
enough textual evidence that Nietzsche wanted to say something beyond his critique of
Western philosophy and that this something does not constitute a new metaphysical
system, despite appearances. Nietzsche wanted to say what he said differently from
metaphysics. The same applies to other thinkers who attempted to circumvent the
foundations of knowledge later, such as Foucault, the later Wittgenstein, and others.
The next problem-already present in Nietzsche, as well as in other non-
foundationalists-is whether metaphysics can be left behind in the second sense of
overcoming at all. Indeed, it is always possible to find some metaphysical principles in
the thought of the aforementioned non-foundationalists and, thus, to include them in the
group of implicit metaphysicians, like empiricists and positivists. Yet, I want to resist this
conclusion. The thought of these overcomers of metaphysics contains another, playful
side, which eschews metaphysical categorizations and conceptualizations. To underscore,
this doublesidedness of the overcoming of metaphysics is very important to my
dissertation. As noted above, I want to uphold a more gainful stance of metaphysical
insideoutness that combines the two positions simultaneously and overcomes the one-
sidedness of each.
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NOTES
1. There is a section titled "The Nine Lives of Metaphysics" in Frederick Sontag, Problems of
Metaphysics (Scranton, Pa.: Chandler, 1970),3.
2. Although I use it differently, the word "insideoutness" may also be found, for example, in the
title of a subchapter of John Llewelyn's Derrida on the Threshold of Sense (New York: St. Martin's, 1986).
Llewelyn uses this word in regard to Derrida's unusual resolving of the surface contradiction between two
opposite terms. Derrida does not make explicit an ambiguity between the terms, as metaphysical discourse
is used to, but brings out a deeper structural "contradiction" by making explicit an ambivalence in the
superficially oppositive relation between the terms (p. 99). The markers of this ambivalence are Derrida's
own catachreses, like differance and others.
3. See the remark on Schleiermacher's influence on Heidegger via Speeches in editor's
introduction to Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics and Criticism and Other Writings, trans., ed.
Andrew Bowie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), xvi.
4. Tilottama Raj an, The Supplement of Reading: Figures of Understanding in Romantic Theory
and Practice (Ithaca, N.Y.; London: Cornell University Press, 1990),6.
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PART ONE
THE PROBLEM OF OVERCOMING METAPHYSICS
IN THE HISTORY OF WESTERN THOUGHT
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this first part is to establish my position regarding overcoming
metaphysics and to set the contextual stage for my investigation into Schleiermacher's
thought and its contemporary significance. Inasmuch as the subject matter of the
dissertation, broadly speaking, is metaphysics, the account of the general Introduction is
not sufficient, and a further clarification of the origins and nature metaphysics is a
prerequisite. Since there is no generally accepted definition of metaphysics and its tasks,
but different philosophical schools and individual thinkers have their own distinctive
understandings of metaphysics, I tum to the history of philosophy for particular
examples. So, in chapter 1, I start with the origins of metaphysics in Aristotle and follow
its development until a precise definition is reached. Then, I continue with expounding
some crucial cases of overcoming metaphysics in the modem period in chapter 2. The
most detailed account in this section will be on Kant because Kant's philosophy is not
only the most important turning point for metaphysics but also Schleiermacher's
immediate context. Chapter 3 of will focus on Derrida and his approach to overcoming
metaphysics, which influences my position most.
Before that, however, I should acknowledge that, as in the foregoing case of the
interpretation of epistemology as metaphysics, I present the following discussions of
concrete philosophers and schools as my own preferred readings, certain readings among
other possible readings, without claiming the final interpretative truth. It is possible to
argue against them. In principle, it is also possible to provide even more solid and
extensive scholarly arguments for these interpretations. However, that would exceed the
scope of the dissertation and would hardly leave any space for the main investigation into
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the thought of Schleiermacher. Therefore, I leave the scholarly defense of my approach to
the history of philosophy quite limited and, perhaps, narrowed for my own purposes. On
the other hand, I do need to include this material inasmuch as it develops and supports the
main presupposition of the dissertation itself.
Another thing that should be mentioned from the outset is that I am not going to
trace the whole sophisticated conceptual development of metaphysics. Although I will
refer to the concept of being often and mention some metaphysical categories here and
there, I will mostly examine the nature of metaphysics as such. The specific purpose of
this preparatory part is to show the problematic nature of metaphysics in regard to its
overcoming from the very beginnings until today. This part would illustrate why the
overcoming of metaphysics at all, which can only be answered by concrete examples
from the history of metaphysics. It may even tum out that metaphysics has appeared in a
well-defined form only for a very short time in the history of philosophy. The "death" or
the "end" of metaphysics is a kind of catchphrase today, but in many cases it is not even
specified what kind of metaphysics it is that has "died." I want to make sure that it does
not happen here. Moreover, all too often, those who use loud polemics against
metaphysics do not delve into the history of the overcoming of metaphysics, perhaps to
discover that the overcoming happened the very moment metaphysics established itself,
or even before. Yet another thing, which should be clarified from the outset, is that I do
not intend to disparage metaphysics. It is the most serious discipline in any of its forms. I
leave the judgement to metaphysics itself, for it always surpasses itself in its own
development. Even if I partly endorse the need to overcome metaphysics in the second,
objective, sense, I acknowledge my own metaphysical presuppositions at least in the form
of the need to go beyond (meta), whatever that means, even if it is going beyond
metaphysics itself. This "metaphysical" spirit of transgression, this propensity of self-
surpassing, as I see it, is the driving force of philosophy.
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CHAPTER 1
THE WAY FROM AMBIGUITY TO THE RELATIVELY LATE
DEFINITIVENESS OF METAPHYSICS 1
The Problematic Origins of Metaphysics: The Aristotelian Puzzle
In the Introduction, I defined metaphysics as a science that inquires into the
structures of being. Principally, the Western philosophical tradition, from its pre-Socratic
beginnings to Plato, may then be considered metaphysical. However, I want to be more
exact and start with Aristotle, for it is precisely with him that the beginnings of the
science of metaphysics, albeit most ambiguous, are associated.
The Librarian Origins of the Term
The first ambiguity is that there is no documented usage of the word
"metaphysics" in Aristotle's known works. Simply, the first-century BCE editors
(Andronicus of Rhodes et al.) of Aristotle's works found it difficult to classify fourteen
assorted treatises and so put them in their classification ta meta ta physika, "the (books)
after the (books on) nature," natural philosophy or physics. They could possibly notice
the connection to physics in these more theoretical and general books that deal with such
topics as form and matter, being and entities, the eternal and temporal, substance and
accidents, movement and immutability, potentiality and actuality, unity and diversity,
identity and difference, and so forth. To be sure, these topics became the subject matter of
metaphysics. Yet, the "librarian" origin of the title of this collection of Aristotle's books
does not reveal whether those ancient editors applied the title of metaphysics to the
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content as well. One knows not if these adherents of Aristotle considered, like Thomas
Aquinas, meta ta physica as "trans-physics" (trans physica scientia), that is, as a science
that goes beyond nature meta ta physis, the treatises located after physics as at the same
time knowledge reaching beyond the sensible, physical reality."
Which Science Is Metaphysics?
The second ambiguity is that, in these books, Aristotle probes at least two
different sciences with names different from metaphysics. True, as I will show later, both
will have become part and parcel of metaphysics, but confusion none the less, especially
because it was perhaps only Heidegger who first found a legitimate conceptual
unification of these different aspects of metaphysics. So, in the Book Gamma (IV),
Aristotle compares special sciences with a science he is looking for: the first philosophy,
or the first science (episteme prate). The special sciences deal with particular attributes of
being, but never with being in general. But then he defines the science he is trying to
establish: "There is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes which
belong to this in virtue of its own nature.t" It is a science that does not study particular
beings but being as such (to on hei on), not as what beings are but insofar as they are,
insofar as they all share being.
In the Book E (VI), Aristotle likewise weighs the particular sciences against the
rudimentary science he is in search of, but in this case, it is theology instead of the
science of being qua being. All sciences, including the first philosophy, seek the
principles and the causes of the things that are. But the particular sciences "mark off
some particular being-some genus, and inquire into this, but not being simply nor qua
being ... ,,4 On this account, according to Aristotle, there are particular theoretical sciences
that are rudimentary as well. There is natural science, physics, dealing with things not
immovable and inseparable from matter, that is, things embodied and having the principle
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of movement in themselves. Then, there is mathematics, also dealing with things
inseparable from matter, but immovable. The difference of the first science, theology, is
that it deals with things both separable from matter and immovable. Since all principles
and causes are eternal, Aristotle's argument goes on, but especially those pertaining to
these sciences, insofar as they represent "so much of the divine as appears to us," these
are the three basic theoretical sciences superior to all others: physics, mathematics, and
theology." Yet, theology stands apart from the other two, for it deals with the highest
genus, the highest of existing things. And Aristotle concludes this section with the
contentious statement that identifies the first philosophy with theology, the statement
most controversial, though hypothetical only: "[I]f there is an immovable substance, the
science of this must be prior and must be first philosophy, and universal in this way,
because it is first (katholou houtos hoti protei?" Ultimately, it is this science that is the
first philosophy (theologike episteme prote). The science of theology considers "being
qua being - both what it is and the attributes which belong to it qua being."?
The Problem of Being
This second ambiguity of the origins of metaphysics in Aristotle is much bigger
than the librarian derivation of the name of that science. There are at least two huge
interrelated problems: (1) the problem of the status of the science of being as being and
(2) the two incompatible sciences in Aristotle's metaphysics. The phrase "being as being"
appears to be a tautology. It may be the most empty abstraction, with no content. How
can there be a science of it?! The phrase to on hei on appears to contain a completely
redundant adverb hei (qua), "as." One can only consider something particular as "as." In
fact, that is the function of special sciences: to infer properties from something by means
of "as" and then to determine its genus. But how can one think of such unqualified being
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as a common property of everything there is, even of that which is not, and, moreover,
establish a science upon it?8 That would be a science without an object.
In fact, what happens with the phrase to on hei on is that being as being thus
inadvertently becomes reduced to a special kind of being. Even more, Aristotle himself is
not clear about this issue. On the one hand, he admits that being cannot be a genus of
things." On the other hand, he equates the question of what is being with the question of
what is substance (ousia).IO Substance can only be particular. But in the same section
where he makes the shift from the first philosophy of being to theology, he raises the
question "whether first philosophy is universal, or deals with one genus, i.e. some one
kind of being ... ,,11 Precisely in this place, Aristotle makes the move from being in
general to the highest being, which is a particular being. In any case, the difficulty is
obvious: how can one and the same science be abstract and concrete at the same time?
How can it be universal if it is the first due to the highest being as its object?
The Middle Ages: The "Golden Age" of Metaphysics?
It is so surprising that throughout the Middle Ages, supposedly the "golden age"
of metaphysics, metaphysics as a concrete discipline did not achieve any more clarity
than in Aristotle himself. In fact, the great thinkers in that period, for example, Thomas
Aquinas, on whom I will elaborate more, but also William of Ockham, Duns Scotus,
Averroes, and others, referred to metaphysics only when commenting on Aristotle.
Although they extensively wrote about subjects now understood as metaphysical, they
themselves did not consider them as metaphysical, at least not in the specific meaning of
the word. Paradoxically, metaphysics was still not defined during the so-called "golden
age of metaphysics."
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Thomas Aquinas: Metaphysics More Confused
In any case, it was also only after fourteen centuries of oblivion that the term
"metaphysics" reemerged, and it was only in the context of the rediscovery of Aristotle in
the Middle Ages. The first to mention the term was Thomas Aquinas in his commentary
on Aristotle's Metaphysics. Unfortunately, Thomas's interpretation effects even more
confusion in the discipline than the randomly arranged treatises from different points of
Aristotle's career themselves. Thomas already gives three names to what he thinks is one
and the same primary science of Aristotle's Metaphysics: the divine science or theology
(scientia divina sive theologia), metaphysics (metaphysica), and the first philosophy
(prima philosophiat.t" The proper name of metaphysics is thus only one name of the
three, and it refers to the science that "considers being and the attributes which naturally
accompany being (for things which transcend the physical order are discovered by the
process of analysis, as the more common are discovered after the less common)."l3
Aristotle's first philosophy in Thomas' hands becomes the science that "considers the
first causes of things."!" This is the way Thomas divides Aristotle's original science of
being qua being. But the Aristotelian theology, according to Thomas, is such insofar as it
considers substances separate from matter, which means non-sensible, immaterial
substances.
Thomas derives his threefold division from what he calls "the most intelligible
objects." He understands this phrase in three ways: first, the knowledge of the first causes
from the viewpoint of the order of knowing. Second, the knowledge of the most universal
principles from the viewpoint of comparing the intellect with the senses that give
knowledge of particulars only. These principles are both being and what accompanies it,
such as unity and diversity, potentiality and actuality. Third, things altogether separate
from matter from the viewpoint of the intellect's own knowledge, which, according to
Thomas, is proportionate to its object insofar as they "belong to one and the same genus,
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since the intellect and the intelligible object are one in actuality."IS Those separate things
include God and the intellectual substances.
Thomas unites the three meanings of his interpretation of Aristotle's fundamental
science in this way. First, he considers the aforementioned separate substances as both
the universal principles and the first causes of being at the same time. Second, he
proposes that since it pertains to one and the same science to consider both the causes of
a genus and the genus itself, it is the function of one and the same science to consider
separate substances and being in general (ens communei'" But this unification does not
seem to bring more clarity into the original ambiguity of the definition of metaphysics.
And this situation goes on throughout the Middle Ages.
It is worth noting that Thomas' unification does not interpret Aristotle's first
theological science as dealing with God as the highest being. God, according to Thomas,
comes into view of this science only insofar as God is the first cause of the subject of
metaphysics because of being the cause of being as being.l ' Regarding the divine things
as they are in themselves, Thomas refers to Aristotle's metaphor of the sun and its light.
Being the principles of everything, the divine things, "though supremely intelligible in
themselves, are in relation to our intellect as the light of the sun to the eyes of the owl; so
that we cannot by the light of natural reason attain to them except as we are led to them
through their effects."ls God as the external cause and the principle stands outside
metaphysics itself. For most great scholastics of the Middle Ages, God is the condition of
the possibility of metaphysics, but not contained in metaphysics itself. To Thomas, this is
a totally different science that includes God as its object, the divine things as they
manifest themselves, not through their effects only. This knowledge does not come from
metaphysical theology as the philosophical science of reason; it is the sacred doctrine, the
theology of revelation. 19 It is the science communicated in the sacred scripture that
considers divine things on their own account as its very subject.i''
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Metaphysics Finally Defined
The First Clarity of Metaphysics: Francisco Suarez
When one hears about the overcoming of the millennia-long metaphysical
tradition, it may be useful to note that the exact defining of the scope and subject of
metaphysics emerges relatively late. It occurs at the end of the sixteenth century in
Suarez's Metaphysical Disputations (1597). In fact, it is the first systematic and
comprehensive work on metaphysics in the West that is not simply a commentary on
Aristotle's metaphysics, even if Suarez's main sources of inspiration are still Aristotle
and Thomas. It instantly becomes the standard text on metaphysics in continental Europe,
and it has decisive influence on Descartes and the further development of the so-called
school-metaphysics, which peaks in the systems of Leibniz and Wolff, and then finally
takes shape as an accurately defined science." Even Schopenhauer and Brentano
acknowledge the influence of Suarez's metaphysics, whereas Heidegger sees it as the
main mediating source that ushers Greek philosophy into the metaphysics and
transcendental philosophy of modem times.22
Suarez marks a bridge in the development of metaphysics from scholasticism to
modernism in the sense that he is the forerunner of the subsequent split of metaphysics
into idealism and empiricism. In the first place, for Suarez, the proper object of
metaphysics is the formal concept of being (conceptus entis). It may sound ordinary, but
it was not so in Suarez's time. In fact, it marks the self-overcoming of metaphysics as
epistemology, for its object is no longer being as thing itself (res ipsa), but its formal
concept as the act of mind.23 The concept of being is universal, comprising all
metaphysical contrasts related to concrete entities. All concrete concepts are derived from
the most abstract concept of being, which is implicit in all other concepts. Suarez calls it
"the objective concept of being," objective in the sense that it is immediately intended by
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the act of mind. It is not reality itself that is the object of metaphysics, but its mental
representation, "the act of understanding (conceptus formalis) whereby the mind
understands.,,24 In any event, it is the first significant step toward the primacy of
subjectivity over being whereby metaphysics becomes theory of knowledge, the science
of the first principles of knowledge-epistemology. Full fruits of this first self-
overcoming of metaphysics will be reaped with Descartes and Kant.
In the case of the singulars instead of being, this stance in tum means that
knowledge takes place through "a proper and separate concept. .. without having to
resort to reflection.,,25 This is the second point that marks the transition from the old to
the modem style of metaphysics. Metaphysics, accordingly, becomes the science of
"being insofar as it is real being" (ens in quantum ens reale).26 Suarez opposes the
inclusion of accidental and conceptual being, as well as God, immaterial substances, or
substantial entities, in the object of metaphysics. Again, Suarez supports his view by
means of the univocal concept of being, analogically derived from the similarity among
things.27 In any event, these theses lead to an empiricist viewpoint, undermining the
prevalent position that singulars are known indirectly, that is, through universals. The
British empiricists will fully develop this second position of (self- )overcoming
metaphysics.
The last, but not the least, point I want to point out about Suarez is the definition
of metaphysics he gives at the beginning of the first disputation: "This science makes
abstract palpable or material things ... and it contemplates on the one hand things that are
divine and separated from matter, and on the other common reason of being, which can
[both] exist without matter.,,28 Although this definition calls to mind the two sciences of
Aristotle, Suarez is the first who conceptually unites them into a twofold system and
provides a systematic elaboration.
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Metaphysics in Its Zenith
Suarez's definition of metaphysics is further refined in the so-called school-
metaphysics of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The principal task of
metaphysics becomes to define, corresponding to Suarez's distinction, what is universal
on two levels: that of "common being" and "essence. ,,29It is according to this distinction
that metaphysics reaches its twofold canonical shape of general metaphysics, dealing
with being and its general features, insofar as it is shared by all entities, and special
metaphysics divided in three sub-disciplines: the rational sciences of God, souls, and
bodies. Thus, Christian Wolff, the last most prominent school-metaphysician before
Kant's devastation of this discipline, distinguishes general metaphysics or ontology
tmetaphysica generalis) and special metaphysics (metaphysica specialist. He also,
correspondingly, among many others, writes four separate books, one on each part of
metaphysics: general metaphysics or ontology (metaphysica generalis sive ontologia),
natural theology (theologia naturalist, rational psychology (psychologia rationalisy; and
general cosmology (cosmologia generalis).30 Wolff defines the first, ontology or first
philosophy, as "the science of being in general, or insofar as being is.,,3] But the other
three are rational (vemiinftige) speculations about the nature of God, the human being,
and the world. These standard divisions of metaphysics are also reflected in Kant's
Critique of Pure Reason. According to Kant, the architectonic of pure reason demands
this division.32 But in Kant's book itself, the transcendental analytic as theory of pure
conceptual understanding stands for general metaphysics, while the possibilities of all
three parts of special metaphysics are refuted in the transcendental dialectic.
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CHAPTER 2
THE OVERCOMING OF METAPHYSICS IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY
I turn now to the overcoming of metaphysics. It is striking that it has taken two
millennia for metaphysics to achieve its clear definition and scope, and now that it has
finally happened, its overcoming simultaneously commenced. There are authors today
who behave as if "the end of metaphysics" is something new, something freshly invented
and proclaimed at the end of a long unchanged subsistence of metaphysics. In view of
that, I think it is instructive to go back to the turning points in the history of metaphysics
and its overcomings. Today's overcomers could point out that, unlike recent overcoming
of metaphysics, these past overcomings were not final. I think that precisely these past
instances could be taken as a lesson for not taking any final overcoming of metaphysics
for granted. I think that the wisest philosophers of today and the recent past (e.g.,
Heidegger, Levinas, Derrida) are those who do not take it for granted, take metaphysics
most seriously, delve into its very depths, push its language to the limits, trying somehow
to reach out from the inside, knowing that it is possible only by means of transformation
from the limits of inside.
The First Decisive Overcoming of Metaphysics: Descartes
Subjectivity Overcoming Metaphysics
Although the epistemological overcoming of metaphysics is already implicit in
the scholasticism of the Middle Ages and becomes more determined with Suarez, it
becomes unavoidable with Descartes. In many respects, Descartes' legacy is also obvious
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in Schleiermacher's thought. It is precisely Descartes who was the founder of modem
philosophy, as Hegel already noticed, by being the first to identify being with thought,
making thought the first principle.' Descartes' best known contribution in the history of
philosophy is the shift from objectivity to subjectivity, making the ego the foundation of
metaphysics. Metaphysics as the knowledge of objective being is overcome by
knowledge of being that can only be known subjectively as thinking in the mind of the
knower. As Descartes discovers in the second Meditation, thinking is the only unfailing
reality to the one who thinks as long as slhe thinks? Everything is subject to doubt except
thinking, for doubt itself is a thought that cannot be doubted while doubting everything
else.'
The Fulfillment of the Beyond of Metaphysics
Thus, in the first place, Descartes fulfills metaphysics understood in its basic
sense as reaching beyond the sensible. Descartes brings metaphysics to a level of
abstraction never reached before, "because in the act of the cogito, the mens is itself
perceived for the first time before and without the body.?" For Descartes, too,
metaphysics begins when matter disappears, first of all, in the process of doubt, which for
right reason is called metaphysical. "Doubt does not make possible just the ego, being
inasmuch as thinking; it first makes it possible to open the entire horizon of metaphysics,
in that, through it, the ego thinks purely the insensible beings in general"
The Epistemological Self-Overcoming of Metaphysics
Second, from Descartes on, metaphysics irreversibly overcomes itself, becoming
epistemology, the science of the first principles of knowledge instead of being. In his
Principles of Philosophy, Descartes writes that metaphysics "contains the principles of
knowledge," including those of the attributes of God and the nature of souls, but most
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important, of "all the clear and distinct notions which are in US.,,6 Being, or beings as
such, are thus dismissed in favor of being known. Being now means "I think" (cogito) or
being thought (cogitatio). As Marion aptly states, "Descartes abandons ontology-
science of the ens in quantum ens - because he tries first to fix the conditions for the
representation of beings - ens in quantum cognitum."
Descartes himself expresses this new transition of philosophy in the well-known
text from his letter to Mersenne, dated November 11, 1640, in which he informs
Mersenne about sending him the manuscript of the Meditations: "I think that. .. it could
be called Meditations on First Philosophy tMeditaiiones de Prima Philosophia); for in
the book I deal not just with God and the soul, but in general with all the first things that
can be discovered by philosophizing in an orderly way."
The first thing that should be noted in this quotation is Descartes' choice of title.
Although in the beginning of the letter Descartes refers to the Meditations as his work on
metaphysics, nevertheless, he uses the term first philosophy in the title. There are enough
indications that this choice is not arbitrary but rather indicates the overcoming of
metaphysics. The book deals not only with such objects of metaphysics as God and the
soul, but, as first philosophy, with all the first things, which basically means substances,
things that can be known without reference to anything else outside the mind, things
known by means of philosophizing in an orderly, methodical way. Marion summarizes
the significance of Descartes' choice of the title this way: "Here primacy passes
decisively from the first being (to be known) to knowledge itself (eventually fixed in a
being); inversely, being as such (and even as first) disappears.':"
The second point of immense importance in the quotation from the letter to
Mersenne concerns philosophizing in an orderly way. What does that mean, and why is it
so significant? First of all, according to the Principles, the first and most certain thing
that takes place when one is philosophizing in an orderly way is the knowledge of ego
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cog ito, ergo sum through doubt. 10This knowledge, once again, confirms the reduction of
being to cogito under the metaphysical authority of the ego. In any case, "the question no
longer bears on esse, but on knowledge in and through the order." I I In fact, all of
Descartes' works, including the Discourse and the Meditations, manifest this unfolding
of knowledge through order. Descartes contributes to all sciences by ordering their
objects by means of structured knowledge. As one commentator says, the originality of
Descartes' philosophy "consists primarily in its logical coherence as a system of
interdependent and interlocked truths worked out in the 'order of reasons' in which the
truths are found logically.,,12 One of the rules of Descartes's Discourse consists of
directing "thoughts in an orderly manner, by beginning with the simplest and most easily
known objects in order to ascend little by little, step by step, to knowledge of the most
complex, and by supposing some order even among objects that have no natural order of
precedence.t'':' All of Descartes' system, accordingly, consists of "a logical nexus of
truths in an interrelation and order of proofs, based on a structure of intuition and
dcduction.l''" Thus, the first philosophy as logic grounds the whole system of sciences,
providing the universal structure of knowledge. The famous Descartes' metaphor likens
metaphysics to the roots of the tree of philosophy, with the trunk representing physics,
and the branches-all other sciences. IS
Next, Descartes' first philosophy as knowledge through order overcomes the
tradition that originated with one of Aristotle's understandings of first philosophy,
namely, that of the science of being qua being. This trend, which later acquired the name
of ontology, overcomes the other prima philosophia, which originated with Aristotle's
theology and culminated in rational theology. The ontological overcoming takes place
through the primacy of being as such, to on hei on, ens in quantum ens, considered
universally. Descartes breaks with this traditional ontology. To Descartes,
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the universal instance that surpasses the metaphysics reduced to rational theology
is no longer the science of being as such (the ontologia of the future), but
arranging in the order of knowledge, that is to say, knowledge according to the
order in which evidence is brought to light. 16
As it will be seen later, metaphysics has a very similar orderly role in Schleiermacher's
system.
A Note on Ontology
I have already mentioned ontology several times above. But, there is something
else important that should be pointed out. The first part of the fully defined metaphysics
is special metaphysics or the science of being as ontology. Encountering this word, one is
likely to associate it with the ancient Greek metaphysics, for it is derived from the Greek
word "to on," which means being. But it seems needful to remark that the term ontology
is, in fact, a neologism coined not much earlier than the aforementioned early
clarifications of metaphysics. To be more precise, it first appears in 1613, in the Lexicon
philosophicum of the German Protestant scholastic Rudolphus Goclenius (Rudolf
Gockel), in which he titles one paragraph "Ontology and the philosophy of being"
(ontologia [Gr.] et philosophia de ente).17 He gives the name "ontological" (ontologike)
to mathematical abstraction, but without further defining of ontology. Of course, even
more time was needed for the word to enter into wider circulation. In any case, this first
mention of the term occurred shortly after Suarez's Disputationes, whereas its wider
acceptance occurs perhaps even after Descartes. Consequently, ontology, from the time it
appeared under that precise name, has been the science of the formal concept of being
rather than the science of being as SUCh.18It is also evident in the first definitions of
ontology by a contemporary of Descartes, Johannes Clauberg (1622-65). In his definition,
being (ens) as the object of ontology, "... denotes all that can be thought (on account of
which it is called intelligible)." (" ... denotat omne quod cogitari potest [distinction is
causa vocatur intelligibile]")19 Or, alternatively: "Being is, in whatever way it might be
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whatever it might be, that which can be thought or uttered" (Ens est quicquid quovis
modo est, cogitari ac dici potest)?O So, ontology has always been overcoming
metaphysics, for it never really claimed to be the knowledge of being as such, or in the
Aristotelian sense of being as substance. Instead, being in the original sense of ontology
is considered in terms of cogitatio as ens cogitabile, "of beings inasmuch as they are
thinkable, conceived, and represented, not inasmuch as they are beings.T"
The Second Decisive Overcoming of Metaphysics: British Empiricism
Experience Overcoming Metaphysics
Descartes and some other continental thinkers, such as Spinoza and Leibniz, are
usually considered as representing the rationalist tradition in metaphysics. It is
metaphysics that actually corresponds to the primary technical meaning of the word
"metaphysics," going beyond physics, beyond experiential realities, and having its main
foundations in the various operations of reason alone, such as grasping self-evident truths
and the deduction of logical conclusions from them. At the same time, that is, in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a different philosophical trend emerged on the
British Isles. It is usually called British empiricism, and its main representatives are
Locke, Berkeley, and Hume This philosophy is also epistemological, that is, it does not
deal with being, but with the conditions and possibilities of human knowledge and
understanding. The titles of the main works of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume speak for
themselves: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, The Principles of Human
Knowledge, and An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. But it is different from
rationalist epistemology. These philosophers reject the possibility of purely rational
knowledge and, influenced by the development of modern natural science, advise that
philosophy also subjects its propositions to experiential verification. If rationalism is a
metaphysical tendency in which the experientially unverifiable apriori considerations
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dominate, then empiricism rejects rationalist metaphysics as unwarranted and overcomes
it by appealing to sense experience as the most reliable source of knowledge. For
empiricists, real knowledge comes through or is inferred from the data of sense
experience.
The Relativity of Classifications
True, this classification of rationalism and empiricism is only a generalization,
and it is hard to find either in a pure form. It is only a tendency to emphasize one aspect
over the other. And one should also remember that every metaphysics has the seeds of its
own overcoming and that no form of metaphysics can be completely overcome. Usually,
the thinkers who are deemed to be rationalists also have different experiential or
empirical aspects in their philosophy. So, Descartes' central metaphysical postulate
appeals to the perception of ideas, which is one of the basic tenets of empiricism as well.
Also, the Discourse admits that the further one advances in knowledge, the more need
there is for observations (experiences). The first principles call for further examination of
their effects. The experiential observations are the only means by which to discover the
ways in which the vast array of effects depends on the principles.r' Even the Meditations
do not start with clear and distinct metaphysical ideas, but instead subject all
preconceived notions to doubt. The sense experience itself is needed in order to know
that senses deceive, as Descartes' observations of the piece of wax show.23 And it is
similar with most philosophers generally viewed as rationalists.i" Some rationally
indubitable empirical propositions are part of Spinoza's system. Leibniz, very much like
Hume, distinguishes between the truths of reason and the truths of fact. Above all, these
rationalists all also make significant contributions to the natural sciences based on
empirical observations, although they would separate these endeavors from the
metaphysical ones. They would simply insist on the difference of methodologies in
30
physics and metaphysics. The latter, they would say, by definition is supposed to
transcend the empirical realm, which is reserved for the investigations of natural sciences.
In the same way, the empiricists also trust the faculties of reason even if they put
certain limitations on them. Here and there, they also propound apriori metaphysical
principles, such as the principle of efficient cause and the existence of God endorsed by
both Locke and Berkeley. Most striking, as I will show below, is that Berkeley's
empiricism, in fact, results in idealism, the most metaphysical doctrine. As does Leibniz,
Berkeley believes that there are no material substances and that only the active minds or
spirits are real beings.
Locke's Breakthrough
Although Locke still believed in the powers of reason, especially in the
mathematical apriori knowledge, he laid the foundations upon which the subsequent
empiricists would build. Locke's epistemological inquiry starts with the examination of
the origin of ideas. Since ideas, according to him, is the only source of knowledge, the
rejection of the rationalist conviction that ideas are innate leaves one with the only
possible alternative, namely, that they derive from experience. In Locke's own
summary:
... EXPERIENCE. In that all our knowledge is founded; and from that it
ultimately derives itself. Our observation employed either, about external sensible
objects, or about the internal operations of our minds perceived and reflected on
by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of
thinking"
Notably, as the quotation shows, valid epistemological experience includes not only
sense perception, but also introspection into the subjective states and operations of mind.
Some of them are perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing,
willing.i" In any case, those two-sensation and reflection-are the only windows
illuminating the originally "dark room" of the mind." These are the "two fountains of
31
knowledge" that, inscribing the void of the "clean slate" (tabula rasa) or the "white
paper" of the original mind, fill it in with ideas, the materials of reason and knowledge."
Reason is nevertheless distinct from the sense experience itself, which only provides the
raw data. Ultimately, it is reason that arranges the material of sense experience into
knowledge. Locke's motto could well be this expression from a different context:
"Reason must be our last judge and guide in everything.,,29
In Locke's view, there are different kinds of ideas: some are simple, basically
acquired via external perception, while others are complexes that mind arranges from the
simple ideas in endless different compositions and abstractions. In contrast to the
complex ideas, rationally constructed from the simple, the simple ideas are not subject to
analysis and definition. This view is closely related to Locke's theory of language,
according to which, the linguistic signification of the complex ideas does not refer to the
corresponding classification in the real world, but rather it is constructed in human
interests and for their convenience and "are the inventions and creatures of the
understanding, made by it for its own use, and concern only signs, whether words or
ideas.,,3o
Actual knowledge, according to Locke, takes place as the intellectual perception
of the connections between the ideas. Some of them are immediate and perceived
intuitively, while others are mediated through other ideas and thus subject to
demonstration. What is left upon the lack of demonstration is at best probability, resulting
in belief or opinion rather than the certainty of knowledge."
There is an important consequence of the empiricism of Locke, accepted by the
subsequent empiricists and even Kant. As already mentioned, one of Locke's main
postulates, most likely arrived at through Descartes, is that what can be experienced is not
things as they are in themselves, but only ideas. This consequence, indeed, eventually
makes this empiricism strange, for it becomes idealism at the same time. Although the
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origins of ideas are perceptual, their relation to the things themselves is
incomprehensible. If knowledge consists, as in Locke's case, of demonstrations of the
theoretical relations of ideas, it is the knowledge that Kant names analytical. This
knowledge does not reach reality beyond ideas and their interconnections; it technically
remains metaphysical. Although Locke also acknowledges knowledge by sensation, it
does not reach far. First, it does not extend to those objects that are not present to the
senses here and now. Second, although this knowledge may show that there are objects,
very little can be known about their true nature; it is knowledge about the existence of
things without knowing their essence.Y As Schacht concludes about Locke's theory of
knowledge:
Because he holds that what we have before our minds are not things themselves,
however, but rather ideas whose exact relation to things is beyond our
understanding, and because of his high standard of certainty in determining what
does and does not count as knowledge, he winds up-very much like the
rationalists-deniing that most of scientific and empirical knowledge is really
knowledge at all. 3
Paradoxically, from these Lockean beginnings, empiricism leads to idealism and
skepticism in regard to the very possibility of empirical knowledge itself. The empirical
overcoming of metaphysics immediately becomes trapped in a different metaphysics.
Berkeley's Metaphysical Pinnacle and Backlash
This metaphysical backlash is most obvious with Berkeley. On the one hand,
Berkeley most clearly formulates the main metaphysical principle of empiricism in a
nutshell: "esse is perciptr'" As Berkeley thinks, "all the choir of heaven and furniture of
the earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have
not any subsistence without a mind - that their being is to be perceived or known ... ,,35
There can be no question of being as such, being insofar as it is being, in empiricism.
Instead, for Berkeley, the being of a being is to be perceived (percipi) or, alternately, to
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perceive (percipere), to be "that which perceives," that is, the real substance that may
be-mind, spirit, soul, or the ego.36 Here Berkeley completes the Cartesian metaphysics
of the ego.
On the other hand, Berkeley drives Descartes' and Locke's insight of the ideal
nature of knowledge and the following inability to distinguish between the ideas and real
objects to its extreme consequence, that is, the denial of the existence of material
substances and, indeed, the material world itself. Thus, Berkeley writes: "It is indeed an
opinion strangely prevailing ... , that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible
objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the
understanding.T" Berkeley finds "a manifest contradiction" involved in this realist
principle when he asks: "For, what are the forementioned objects but the things we
perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is
it not plainly repugnant that anyone of these, or any combination of them, should exist
unperceived'F''" If the ideas and sensations exist only in minds, it must follow, according
to Berkeley, that the sensible objects of the external world exist only in minds. This is
Berkeley's ingenious solution to avoid both non-empirical speculation and skepticism
about the knowledge of the nature of things. Knowledge is entirely possible for Berkeley,
and there can be no other knowledge than that of the ideas, because there is simply
nothing else to know about: mind-dependent ideas and the minds perceiving them is all
there is on this side of metaphysics. On the other side, there is the second real substance
besides mind, that is, God, who produces sensations and ideas in the finite minds. This is
the highest point of the empiricist overcoming of rationalist metaphysics, albeit with a
metaphysics no less unsettled than the one it overcomes.
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Hume's Completion
The empiricist tradition reaches its full growth with Hume. Although Hume does
not invent anything radically new that is not already present in Locke, perhaps he just
gives clearer formulations and accents of empiricism and rids himself from the remnants
of idealist metaphysics found in Locke and Berkeley. Hume elaborates on Locke's theory
of ideas, accepting the basic empiricist claim that it is all one can know. For him, as with
Locke's sensations and operations of minds, perceptions with their corresponding
impressions and thoughts with their corresponding ideas are the two basic pillars of
knowledge. The latter, ideas, derive from the impressions that can have either sensory or
emotional experiential origins. But those metaphysical ideas that cannot be traced back to
impressions are false or imaginary. Hume writes: "When we entertain ... any suspicion
that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea ... , we need but
enquire,from what impression is that supposed idea derived?,,39 If this proof cannot be
produced, the idea is suspect.
Thus, Hume also undertakes the most outspoken attack upon speculative
metaphysics. His Enquiry ends with the famous statement:
If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for
instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or
number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of
fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing
but sophistry and illusion.l''
Referring to abstract reasoning and matters of fact, this statement includes the well-
known empiricist epistemological division called "Hume's fork." According to Hume,
corresponding to Locke's internal and external sensations and Hume's own
aforementioned theory of ideas, there is twofold valid knowledge: "All the objects of
human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of
ideas, and Matters of fact?" The first is the only constituent of rationalism that all
empiricists accept to be true knowledge, most clearly exemplified in mathematics, but
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also "every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstrably certain ...
Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without
dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe.,,42 The former will later be
called analytical truths, the truths of purely logical or mathematical certainty. Matters of
fact also give certainty, but of a different kind. While the relations of ideas are
completely abstract and do not refer to any substances, such as physical objects, minds,
or states of mind, etc., matters of fact do refer to them. It is experimental certainty that
accompanies them, and it is all the more needed because logical certainty does not apply
in this case.
Although "Hume's fork" pierces the rationalist metaphysics, it is also the
foundation of Hume's own metaphysics. Notably, Hume only opposes metaphysics that,
in his view, does not adhere to scientific criteria but arises "either from the fruitless
efforts of human vanity, which would penetrate into subjects utterly inaccessible to the
understanding, or from the craft of popular superstitions," namely, religious beliefs.43 But
Hume is not against metaphysics as such. Although Hume believes with other empiricists
that there can be no real knowledge either of immaterial substances or the things in the
world as they are behind their immediate ideal representations in mind, he is not against
abstract and profound metaphysical reasoning. In fact, Hume's own intention is to
overcome the existing deficient metaphysics with a proper one. As he states, "[we] must
cultivate true metaphysics with some care, in order to destroy the false and adulterate.T"
And this true metaphysics, of course, is epistemology, discovering "the secret springs and
principles, by which the human mind is actuated in its operations.v" This is a very
modest "metaphysics," just establishing the limits of reason that prohibits not only the
knowledge claims of speculative, but also of empirical sciences. The question is, can it be
considered metaphysics if it does not reach the beyond that metaphysics is supposed to
reach? Yes and no. The inquiry into the abilities of reason to reach metaphysical
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knowledge may not be metaphysics itself. It may be some kind of prolegomenon to
metaphysics. Yet, it may also be considered as metaphysics insofar as it provides
theoretical foundations of knowledge. Even if it concerns experience as well, it is the
theory of experience beyond experience itself. Hence it may be metaphysics: metaphysics
overcoming metaphysics.
Kant and Metaphysics
It is Kant who most decisively determines the further development of
metaphysics. He carries further the demolition of the tradition of the school-metaphysics
initiated by the British empiricism. In Kant's view, that metaphysics, which he called
"dogmatic" or "transcendent," was untenable because it is constructed by pure reason
alone without reference to experience in the form of empirical cognition - the insight
gained from the empiricists, especially Hume, who, according to Kant's own avowal,
awakened him from the "dogmatic slumber.T'" Perhaps it is the destruction of
metaphysics with which Kant's name is associated in the first place.
However, it must be emphasized that Kant was not an anti-metaphysician. He
always held metaphysics in high esteem. Even in the critical period, he affords to lecture:
Metaphysics is the spirit of philosophy. It is related to philosophy as the spirit of
wine <spiritus vini> is to wine. It purifies our elementary concepts and thereby
makes us capable of comprehending all sciences. In short, it is the greatest culture
of the human understanding"
Kant believes that human reason, due to its dialectical nature, can "never dispense" with
the "indispensable discipline" of metaphysics.i" It is only a question of what kind of
metaphysics it is that Kant approves of. To be sure, he maintains that such metaphysics
has not yet appeared until him. He avows that "there is, as yet, no such thing as
Metaphysics.?" The aim of his whole project in the Critique of Pure Reason, like that of
Hume, is not only to dissolve the false and illusory metaphysics, but also to conceive a
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proper "critical" or "transcendental" metaphysics. It is just the return to metaphysics on a
different level, as to "a beloved one with whom we have had a quarrel.T"
Critique Overcomes Metaphysics
First, the critical, negative aspect of metaphysics, in Kant's own words, does not
mean "a critique of books and systems, but of the faculty of reason in general, in respect
of all knowledge after which it may strive independently of all experience/t" It is
important that this knowledge cannot be derived from empirical experience. Of course,
the knowledge independent of experience is the main aspiration of metaphysics according
to its primary meaning of reaching beyond physicality. And it is important that Kant does
not deny the very possibility of such metaphysics. He only wants to ascertain how far
such knowledge is possible. It is the question of how much one "can hope to achieve by
reason, when all the materials and assistance of experience are taken away.,,52 In Kant's
view, before using reason in the constructive enterprise of metaphysics, its own internal
limits and credentials must be examined. The reason itself undertakes its most difficult
challenge ever, that is, of self-knowledge, "a tribunal which will assure to reason its
lawful claims.,,53 Accordingly, Kant's project examines "the possibility or impossibility
of metaphysics in general, and determines its sources, its extent, and its limits-all in
accordance with principles.v'"
Transcendental Philosophy Fulfills Metaphysics
Secondly, the positive, transcendental aspect of metaphysics means to Kant laying
the principal foundations or presuppositions for that new purified and proper
metaphysics. Transcendental, to Kant, means "knowledge which is occupied not so much
with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects insofar as this mode of
knowledge is possible a priori," that is, before any experience.f The epistemological
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conditions of the possibility of knowledge are transcendental, in contrast to transcendent
knowledge of objects beyond experience.
Initially, Kant had plans to write a complete system of metaphysics, which,
according to his definition consists of
the whole of pure philosophy, inclusive of criticism, and so as comprehending the
investigation of all that can ever be known a priori as well as the exposition of
that which constitutes a system of the pure philosophical modes of knowledge of
this type - in distinction, therefore, from all empirical and from all mathematical
employment of reason.56
The Critique of Pure Reason would be a propaedeutic (preparation) to this system tracing
a complete outline of it, marking out "the whole plan of the science, both as regards its
limits and as regards its entire internal structure.t' " The propaedeutic was supposed to be
followed by the metaphysics of nature, or of everything there is.58 Even if Kant did not
succeed in writing the complete system, he believes that the first Critique accomplishes
enough by itself, so that the initial plan may even become superfluous. Kant even
ventures to assert that "there is not a single metaphysical problem which has not been
solved, or for the solution of which the key at least has not been supplied.r " For this
reason, in his correspondence, Kant calls it "the metaphysics of metaphysics.t''"
In any case, one can say that Kant not only overcomes metaphysics with critique, but also
fulfills metaphysics as pure reason's examination of its own possibilities.
The Dilemma of Metaphysics in Kant's Time
In Kant's time, after Descartes, there were basically two options regarding the
possibility of objective knowledge: Scilla and Haribdis of rationalism and empiricism.
Most of his professorial career, Kant himself, through his teacher Baumgarten, was a
proponent of Leibnizian-Wolffian rationalist metaphysics, monopolizing the university of
his time. This tradition held that it is pure reason, the innate ideas, that can provide an
objective knowledge of the world, uncontaminated by the subjective appearances. On the
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other hand, a time came in Kant's life-sometimes called a critical tum-when he
accepted the claims of British empiricists, who held that reason does not have objective
knowledge. Knowledge is subjective, and it is confined, not to the innate ideas, but to the
ideas acquired from individual sense impressions. Since this knowledge reaches
appearance only, ultimately, it is deceitful. Another outcome of this epistemology is
extreme idealism that denies the existence of objective being altogether.
Kant's Synthesis
Kant's great achievement was his attempt to complement what he thought to be
true in these two conflicting approaches, while thus avoiding their individual one-
sidedness. For him, neither experience or sensibility, nor reason or understanding alone
can provide knowledge. Without sensibility, no object could be given, without
understanding, no object would be thought. His famous dictum follows: "Thoughts
without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.,,61 Conceptual form and
empirical content must supplement each other. Such a synthetic knowledge is objective.
Yet, it is objective not with regard to the world as it is in itself, but objective as it appears
through perceptions. This knowledge reaches phenomena or appearances only, while the
things themselves as noumena always remain unknown. Also, the phenomenal world
does not depend on the presence of someone perceiving it, as in Berkeley's case.
Nevertheless, inasmuch as perception occurs only through one's individual conceptual
lenses, the world as it appears gets ordered by the perceiver, while remaining unknown as
it is in itself. The objects in the world are objective, while their character is determined by
the forms and the concepts, constituting the conditions of the possibility of experiencing
them at all. Even if the objects in the world are independent, the assigned character
belongs to them only because they are objects of human knowledge. It is Kant's famous
"Copernican revolution.,,62 The contrary case, namely, deriving perceptions and concepts
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from the objects of experience, would by default make metaphysics impossible, for then
the metaphysical criterion of the independence from experience would not be satisfied.
So, in his search for the objectivity of knowledge, Kant comes to the possibility of
the apriori propositions that must be true prior to, and independently of, any experience.
This is Kant's due to rationalism. But then, Kant also acknowledges true propositions of a
different kind. Those can be verified only through experience and, therefore, can be true
only a posteriori. This is Kant's due to empiricism. Apriori propositions, in tum, can be
of two kinds: analytic and synthetic. The former propositions are self-explicative, adding
nothing to their content, whereas the latter add new knowledge. Actually, Hume already
knew this distinction. He only rejected metaphysics based on synthetic apriori
propositions, while, according to his "fork," the analytical apriori and the empirical,
synthetic a posteriori propositions constitute the only true knowledge.
Kant's Key to the New Metaphysics
Kant is not satisfied with Hume's legacy, which forbids the possibility of true
metaphysics. The key question of Kant's whole enterprise is: "How are a priori synthetic
judgments possible?,,63 Kant wants to found a legitimate apriori knowledge, but without
falling back into stark rationalism purporting to have knowledge unrelated to any
experience. It is illegitimate, in Kant's view, to separate the object of knowledge from the
experiential perspective of the knower. There is no way to know the things-in-
themselves. His ingenuous resolution (or contradiction in terms?) is to lay a foundation
for a possible apriori knowledge, which, being apriori, must ultimately be independent of
experience, but at the same time closely related to experience. In Kant's view, this is the
only way to direct metaphysics along the path of a true science. Kant's solution limits the
apriori knowledge to the knowledge of the world of experience. He confines non-
empirical apriori knowledge to the knowledge of the forms of experience. Kant
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concentrates on propositions that, though not established on the basis of experience, must
be presupposed in or provide the conditions of interpreting every experience. As such,
these truths must be universal and objective. In this way, Kant's legitimate form of
metaphysics is indeed metaphysics insofar as it goes beyond experience, but it still
remains related to experience insofar as it ascertains the conditions under which any
experience is possible. Precisely these conditions provide the synthetic factor that belongs
to the realm of metaphysics, for it is outside the given economy of concepts as their
uniting factor. This metaphysics, in contrast to rationalism, is not a science transcending
the realm of experience. It is a theory of experience. But in contrast to empiricism, it is
not an empirical, but a transcendental theory of experience.
Now, what are those forms and concepts that govern all experience? Kant argues
that there are two peculiar forms of pure intuition without which no experience is
possible, namely, time and space. Their being forms of intuition means that all
sensations-inner and outer-must always have temporal and, in case of outer sensations
only, spatial structure. Time is the inner form of states of mind. There can be no mental
state that is not in time, but time itself is made known through its being the condition of
possibility of experience. Space is the outer form of perceptions from an independent
world appearing to the mind. Every outside can appear as such only if it is perceived as
spatially related to the subject. Therefore, space likewise structures one's sensibility.
Both space and time are universally valid synthetic apriori presuppositions. The other
kind of universal and necessary synthetic apriori presuppositions of every experience, but
related to the forms of intuition insofar the latter must permit their application, are the
categories of understanding. Although the name is the same as Aristotle's categories,
actually Kant derives them from his own analyses of the act of judgement based on the
four primary categories-quantity, quality, relation, modality-and their subcategories.f"
42
Something can and must only be thought by means of these forms. They mold all
intuitions.
The Failure of Special Metaphysics
While the aesthetic and analytic parts of the first Critique establish the new
legitimate metaphysics, the dialectic part contains the famed deconstruction of the alleged
synthetic apriori knowledge in the traditional dogmatic metaphysics. Reason in its
illegitimate use produces ideas that cannot be connected to experience. It uses ideas in
order to achieve systematic unity, but this unity is intrasystemic; it makes coherent the
use of its own maxims of understanding. It is determined to fail because, striving for
more and more basic conditions, it reaches out for the unconditioned beyond any possible
intuitions. Having no recourse to a possible experience, having no corresponding
intuitions (perceptions), the ideas of psychology, cosmology, and theology about such
non-spatial and non-temporal entities as soul, infinite universe, and God, can be nothing
but metaphysical illusions. So, putting Kant's Critique in the classical division of
metaphysics, one can say that he reestablishes general metaphysics as a legitimate apriori
science of understanding, but rejects special metaphysics.
Back to Metaphysics: Regulative Use of Metaphysical Ideas
Despite his having destroyed the threefold classical metaphysics, Kant cannot put
it aside altogether; he reintroduces its basic ideas through the backdoor, so to say.
Although the soul, the world in its totality, and God can never be known as things in
themselves, Kant holds that it would be unreasonable not to inquire about them. It is at
least possible "to think them as things in themselves.,,65 Although these ideas, according
to Kant, can never be used constitutively, as descriptions of reality as it is in itself, they
still can have a regulative or practical use.66If one considers these ideas hypothetically,
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"as if' they were true, making no constitutive knowledge claims about their concrete
reality, they still may guide one to formulate true hypotheses." The transcendent ideas of
reason are significant for the unity of knowledge. As regulative principles, they grant the
completeness of the use of the concepts of understanding in experience. That is their
proper immanent application in contrast to the illusory transcendent one. Similarly, these
ideas are necessary in order to provide a scope for the universal, practical principles
required by reason from a moral point of view. Moreover, Kant believes that only the
idea of the immortal soul can save one from materialism, the cosmological idea of the
complete world-from naturalism, but the idea of God-from fatalism.
Mention can be made that the regulative use of the ideas of reason seems to be not
entirely coherent with the basic principles of the first Critique. The problem lies in Kant's
assertion that there are things in themselves at all. Their existence cannot be known in
principle. In fact, the distinction between noumena and phenomena itself can never be
verified experientially. Moreover, even the "as if' principle may not help. Even to act "as
if' something were true, one must know something about that something. In other words,
a regulative idea must to some extent be constitutive.
Ethics As Metaphysics
In any case, the first Critique, the disclosure of the synthetic apriori conditions of
the possibility of experience, is not the only metaphysics of Kant. Another way to pass
beyond the limits of all possible experience, to Kant, is the apriori knowledge from a
practical, that is, a volitional point of view. Kant writes:
But when all progress in the field of the supersensible has thus been denied to
speculative reason, it is still open to us to enquire whether, in the practical
knowledge of reason, data may not be found sufficient to determine reason's
transcendent concept of the unconditioned, and so to enable us, in accordance
with the wish of metaphysics, and by means of knowledge that is possible a priori,
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though only from a practical point of view, to pass beyond the limits of all
ibl . 68pOSSI e expenence.
Thus, the second true metaphysics is ethics. Admittedly, Kant occasionally remarks that
practical reason is not allowed to imagine that it has transcended the empirical conditions
of its sphere and risen to the immediate cognition of the things in themselves, that a
regulative "what ought to be" may, after all, be different from "what is." Yet, texts like
the "Canon of Pure Reason" of the first Critique and the second Critique give an overall
impression that ethics must be about noumena as they are, for appearances cannot
provide a sufficient source for the unconditional duty. Hence, the knowledge of ethics
must be objective and apriori. This practical knowledge is different form that of pure
reason. In this sense, it is not knowledge proper. Nevertheless, it is a kind of cognitive
attitude. Kant calls it faith. That is the meaning of Kant's claim to deny (speculative)
knowledge in order to make room for (practical) faith.69
In any case, what I want to emphasize is that, as the qu~tn above shows, even if
practical reason functions in the sphere of experience, it also somehow reaches that which
speculative reason failed to do: the realm beyond experience, the realm of metaphysics.
Therefore, those interpreters of Kant who argue that he himself never got really free from
the "dogmatic slumber" of his rationalist origins are to a certain extent right. How else
can one interpret the distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal selves in the
second Critique? It is the latter self only to which transcendental freedom applies. This
freedom has no application in the empirical world. In order for the moral law to be
efficient, it must go beyond the categorial realm of causality and enter into the realm of
metaphysics, "beyond nature." In addition, it is precisely this metaphysical aspect of
Kant's thought that creates another problem in his system: the problem of the relation of
the transcendental self to the empirical world. The gap between them remains unbridged
in the first two Critiques.
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The Metaphysical Solutions of the Third Critique
However, as I will show in the chapter on Schleiermacher and Kant, there are
some interpretations claiming that precisely the third Critique answers the metaphysical
problem of the gap in Kant's system. In this light, the aim of the third Critique is to solve
the problem of the unity of reason, which remained split into theoretical and practical
parts. Kant's theory of reflective judgment, in accordance with which the contemplation
of the idea of a moral Designer of the world as a necessary principle of both theoretical
science and practical morality, supposedly solves the problem of the bifurcated reason. In
this way, religion becomes the agent that bridges the worlds of theory and praxis and
constitutes a necessary presupposition for the unity. According to this interpretation of
Kant, religious cognition is neither theoretical nor practical, but contemplative. This
discovery led Kant to reformulate his ideas of the highest good and contemplative hope
as the transcendental conditions of the unity of reason. In any case, Kant's solution is not
to invent a third domain between that of nature and freedom. The solution is to invent a
third cognitive faculty besides understanding and reason. It is the faculty of judgment.
Judgment, because of its contemplative mode, participates in both principles-that of
empirical deduction and that of moral decision. Just as from the logical viewpoint
judgment makes possible the transition from understanding to reason, it also makes
possible the transition from the concepts of nature to the idea of freedom. Judgments of
taste imply the thought (not objective reality) of a supersensible substrate as a
transcendental ground uniting reason and nature.
In addition, this interpretation allows the possibility that the third Critique may
contribute to the contemporary problem concerning the relations between the various
symbolic universes that humans have constructed for themselves. Kant's attempt to
establish the unity of reason is claimed to bring the different constructions into a unified
worldview by means of religious consciousness. On this account, religion regains its
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constructive significance as a particular mode of cognition. Being confined within the
bounds of reason, religion establishes itself as the fundamental rational ground uniting all
the constructions of reason.
The Boundary to the Beyond of Metaphysics
In the conclusion to the Prolegomena, Kant introduces what he calls "the
metaphor of boundary." I would like to end the exposition of Kant's metaphysics with it
because it fits that same pattern of overcoming metaphysics that I find in recent
philosophy, and which I also read back into Schleiermacher. Moreover, Schleiermacher
also uses it in his Dialectics. This metaphor of boundary is a truly nonmetaphysical
element. Being a boundary, it does not any longer belong to metaphysics. Moreover, it
does not yet reach beyond metaphysics either, for it just occupies the elusive middle
space between the two.
Kant first distinguishes between the boundaries and the limits of reason.
Mathematics and physics deal with the latter. His philosophy, as metaphysics, deals with
the former. Limits are quantitative, and they show that something is not absolutely
complete within the system itself. But a peculiar characteristic of boundaries is that they
"always presuppose a space existing outside a certain definite place, inclosing it. .. ,,70
That outside space is nothing else but the space that metaphysics always strives to
occupy. While limits are merely negative, boundaries are positive. A surface, for
example, being a boundary of corporeal space, is itself a space. Boundary belongs to both
spaces within and without. Boundaries of reason are places or nonplaces where the
experientially occupied space touches the noumenal void. Kant himself summarizes:
But as a boundary itself is something positive, which belongs as well to that
which lies within, as to the space that lies without the given complex, it is still an
actual positive cognition, which reason only acquires by enlarging itself to this
boundary, yet without attempting to pass it; because it there finds itself in the
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presence of an em~ty space, in which it can conceive forms of things, but not
things themselves. I
Transcendent ideas of reason, insofar as they "do not admit of evasion, and are never
capable of realisation," are such boundaries.i'' They cannot reach beyond themselves;
they can only conceive the forms of things beyond them, not their essences. Although
reason is bound to cognize appearances only, its ability to reach the boundary must entail
a formal knowledge that noumena exist, even if not knowing what they are. On the
boundary, reason is neither confined to the sense experience nor completely detached
from it. What remains is the relation itself of what we know to what we do not know: the
outside of the boundary. The ideas of reason must show that relation. How can they?
Nonmetaphysical Theory of Analogy
Kant's striking solution is the theory of analogy, which somehow endorses natural
theology. Pure ideas of reason, of course, being devoid of experience, cannot present
anything definite. Nevertheless, Kant concedes that they can be referred to by means of
properties borrowed from the sensuous world. In this way, noumena may be conceived of
in the forms of appearances. For example, Kant allows that properties like understanding
and will can successfully be attributed to the supreme being, while at the same time
avoiding dogmatic anthropomorphism. Kant thinks that it is possible to attribute these
properties not to the supreme being as they are in themselves, but to the relation of that
being to the world, which we are part of. It is a "symbolical anthropomorphism" which
concerns language only, not the thing in itself.73 On this account, to say that the world is a
work of the understanding and the will of the supreme being, for example, is to say
nothing more than that a watch has a similar relationship to its maker. It is analogical
cognition that signifies the similarity of relations between two incongruous things. In any
case, analogy sufficiently defines the supreme being for us, while letting it be intact in
itself. Consequently, this analogy of relation overcomes metaphysics: it "does not signify
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· .. an imperfect similarity of two things, but a perfect similarity of relations between two
quite dissimilar things.,,74 More than that, relation itself becomes a boundary, the space
outside metaphysics, itself belonging neither inside, nor outside.75 This element in Kant's
metaphysics, applied to the ideas of pure reason, I argue, allows one to look from a
different angle at the implicit metaphysics of Kant's appendix to the Transcendental
Dialectic. It gives another nonmetaphysical or outside-metaphysical twist to it.
Husser!: Phenomenology Overcomes Metaphysics
One of the next most important overcomings of metaphysics after Kant is
phenomenology. Its inaugurator is Edmund Husserl. There is also a special reason why I
include a discussion on Husserl's phenomenology in this section. As I will show below,
in several respects, Schleiermacher can be seen as a precursor of Husserl's
phenomenology of consciousness.
Phenomenological Self-Overcoming of Metaphysics
On the one hand, Husserl's phenomenology may be considered as a metaphysical
overcoming of metaphysics. To say the least, it is a kind of Kantian metaphysics insofar
as it tries to define the apriori structures of every possible human experience. It is no
coincidence that Husserl calls one of his phenomenological procedures of reduction
"transcendental." However, in opposition to any rationalist metaphysics and to Kant,
Husserl denies that there is a special faculty of reason or understanding that is able to
identify these truths. Husserl overcomes this metaphysics, concentrating instead on a
special "seeing" or intuition. Notably, the latter is not Kantian sensible intuition. Rather,
it gives the necessary truths of both empirical facts and reason. This intuition joins the
sensible intuition with the intuition of essences and the intuition of categories. In
addition, Husser! radically differs from Kant in his claim that one "must go back to the
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'things themselves. ",76 The things themselves, though, for HusserI, are not Kantian
noumena. Just the opposite, Husserl posits phenomena as things themselves, though not
phenomena in the Kantian sense of "appearances."
HusserI's phenomenology aims simply to describe how the world appears
(phaino) to human consciousness. Phenomenon is what is immediately evident by means
of giving itself to consciousness. Or rather, it is intuition itself that gives, according to
HusserI's "principle of all principles" stating: "that very primordial dator intuition is a
source of authority ... for knowledge, that whatever presents itself in "intuition" in
primordial form (as it were in its bodily reality), is simply to be accepted as it gives itself
out to be, though only within the limits in which it then presents itself,,77
In a way, HusserI follows Descartes starting with cogito, the transcendental
subjectivity. Phenomenology, unlike metaphysics, does not begin with the world and
thinking about it, but with the analysis of one's consciousness of the world, the intuition
through which phenomena enter into consciousness. In this sense, phenomenology is
similar to Cartesian metaphysics of subjectivity overcoming the traditional objective
metaphysics. Only it should be noted that it is not correct to say that phenomenon is
simply an intuition in the same way as it is incorrect that it is simply an object. The
phenomenon is an object as intuited. This factor helps HusserI to eliminate the subject-
object distinction. The meaning is located in the intentional relationship between the two,
not in either of them separately, as in rationalism and empiricism.
HusserI's phenomenology also resembles the empiricist overcoming of
metaphysics insofar as it holds on to the given data of experience and rejects metaphysics
that goes beyond that data. Yet, in contrast to the empiricist skepticism, he maintains that
knowledge is possible, but not by way of rationalists and Kant. Instead, Husserl arrives at
the truths through that special intuition, capable of grasping the essences of things
directly." As far as the essences are concerned, phenomenology may appear to be an
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essentialist metaphysics. Albeit, they are, so to say, inessential essences. Phenomena are
essences "as if of' objects given in intuition." According to HusserI's theory of
intentionality, following Brentano, consciousness is always consciousness of something.
But while Brentano's objective intentionality fails to account for cases when real object is
missing, such as hallucination or imagination, HusserI's theory may also include the
latter, for it focuses on the intentional consciousness itself, which in all cases is "as if of'
something. What matters is not whether there is or is not an object, but what are the
features of consciousness that make it always to be as if of an object. It is consciousness
itself that constitutes objects. Not that consciousness creates objects, as in the idealism of
empiricists, but that the components of consciousness are interconnected in such a way
that the experience is as if of one object.
Nonmetaphysical Metaphysics or Metaphysical Nonmetaphysics?
Although HusserI's phenomenology carries out the aforementioned metaphysical
aims, as the account above already shows, it rather does so in a nonmetaphysical way.
The metaphysical formula of beings as such, for Husserl, becomes plain "being-as-given"
(ens in quantum datum), being only insofar as it is given in mtuition.t" Phenomenology is
also nonmetaphysical inasmuch as it, first of all, claims to be presuppositionless in the
theoretical regard. Husserl formulates this requirement as "the principle of freedom from
presupposition" that seeks "to express strict exclusion of all statements not permitting of
a comprehensive phenomenological realization.,,8\ It means that phenomenology
excludes all statements that involve something else besides what is experienced in direct
seeing. Husserl also calls this procedure phenomenological reduction.V It suspends all
attitudes of the subject, be they natural commonsense or scientific. Husserl insists that
phenomenology consists solely of reconfirmable descriptions of experience and,
accordingly, does not advance metaphysical theories. The phenomenological description
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makes void the metaphysical constructions that philosophers impose upon experience. As
Husserl claims, phenomenology as "theory of knowledge, properly described, is no
theory. ,,83
Second, as mentioned above, phenomenology describes the world even without
presuming whether it is real or imagined. It is simply beside the point whether
phenomena really exist. Husserl states that phenomenology never involves "the slightest
reference to real existence," no metaphysical, no scientific, and no psychological
statements dealing with the existent.f" In fact, the main objective of reduction is to
"bracket" out the existence of phenomena in order to arrive at their essences. Therefore,
the next reductive step is the eidetic reduction ieidos, essence). It is a reduction in which
one passes from the object to its general features or essences not in reality, but in one's
consciousness. In this way, the eidetic reduction leaves behind the natural attitude dealing
with the world around, such as objects, persons, events, actions, and their particular
features. The phenomenological attitude is able to abstract to their essences.
The phenomenological reduction makes possible the givenness of the appearing,
but the eidetic reduction-the essential givenness of objects. But then there is the third,
transcendental reduction that Husserl also calls epoche. While the eidetic reduction
assures that only the pure, nonmetaphysical essences of the objects in consciousness are
described, the epoche is no longer even the reduction to pure consciousness, but to the
transcendental ego and the transcendental realm. So, this third level of phenomenology,
being truly transcendental, in a way fulfills the aim of metaphysics nonetheless. This
reduction brackets the phenomenal self as well, so that, strictly speaking, in this
phenomenology, there is nothing left of phenomenality, not even the self. Yet, it refers to
the transcendental features of the three structures of consciousness: noema, noesis, and
hyle. Phenomenology is the study of these. Noesis is the intuition of essence. Hyle is the
"matter" of experience. It can be not only sensory, but also unreal or imaginary matter.
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Noema, crucial to phenomenology, is the structure itself that makes consciousness
intentional, which is the phenomenon proper. Precisely the noemata collect the "as if of'
structures of intentionality. These three features are transcendental because the ordinary
natural attitude is not aware of them. But they are also, according to HusserI, absolutely
necessary presuppositions for the appearance of the world to consciousness.
On these accounts, Husserl' s phenomenology appears to be a kind of
nonmetaphysical metaphysics, or metaphysical nonmetaphysics, which inevitably fulfills
the aim of metaphysics even if overcoming metaphysics. Even the donative intuition
itself exemplifies this paradox. That is to say, it is only half-true that phenomenology
presents apriori principles of understanding. In fact, the phenomenological apriori of all-
preceding intuition, precisely as that of intuition, can only be aposteriori. The paradox is
that intuition is an apriori principle, while it itself can only be aposteriori. As Marion
points out, the principle of intuition, thus, is not another transcendental (i.e.,
metaphysical) principle. Rather, as intuitive aposteriori, it goes beyond or outside
metaphysics inasmuch as it supersedes all anterior principles, stating that there is no
transcendental apriori principle, but only intuitive aposteriori, all-preceding donation,
even without recourse to being-the foremost object of metaphysics.f
The Need of Overcoming Husserl
Later on, HusserI became increasingly aware that the noemata are culture-
dependent, influenced by the intersubjective co-existence of the individuals, their
adaptation to their own created common life-world, experienced only from different
perspectives. A world as pre-given life-world itself becomes phenomenon, and it is
studied not so much by the solitary Cartesian ego as by the ego intimately related to the
world and interrelated with others. However, Husserl never went all the way into this
direction and never abandoned the centrality of transcendental subjectivity. Philosophers
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increasingly started to suspect that the transcendental ego may be too unreliable to be the
last foundation of philosophy as the science of sciences (Wissenschaftslehre). The
immediate intuition may be too subjective, relative, and subject to interpretation, and
hence insufficient for providing metaphysical evidence instead of one's mere subjective
feeling of certainty. One cannot bracket one's existence in the world as the epoche
requires. A human being is not a detachable consciousness able to abstract herself from
the world. A human being is essentially being-in-the-world. It is precisely this existence
and the existence of the world around that is given as the starting point of all
phenomenological description. And this is the point where Heidegger comes in. Despite
his later developments, Husserl could not approve of Heidegger' s turn of phenomenology
to radical historicity and hermeneutics and considered it a betrayal and relativization of
his own transcendental tum. Husserl thought it was a mere relapse into the natural
attitude he himself had overcome. The existential phenomenologists' rejection of the
epoche leads them to the understanding of phenomenology as (fundamental) ontology,
precisely the metaphysics Husserl wants to escape.
Heidegger's Overcoming of Metaphysics
Heidegger's thought is most important in regard to overcoming metaphysics,
which is the concern of his whole lifetime, by means of the different approaches to the
question of being (Seinsfrage). Heidegger's philosophy is a particularly apropos example
for my double-sided interpretative scheme of overcoming metaphysics. On the one hand,
in his early years, Heidegger presents what he believes is the most authentic metaphysics
in the form of his version of phenomenology, overcoming or fulfilling all existing
metaphysics by reaching out to the truth of being itself, in contrast to the old
metaphysics, dealing, in his opinion, only with beings. On the other hand, later on,
Heidegger renounces all metaphysics in favor of thinking that is totally different from
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metaphysics. Yet, this different thinking, although breaking out of metaphysics, to some
extent remains bound to metaphysics. Also, it remains faithful to the true aim of
metaphysics, which for Heidegger is always the attainment to being. So, Heidegger's
thought is an example of "metaphysical insideoutness" which, according to my
demonstration, culminates in the thought of Derrida and is subsequently applied to
Schleiermacher.
The Early Heidegger (I):
From Transcendental to Existential Phenomenology
Being Husserl's student, Heidegger comes to phenomenology through him. He
wants to remain loyal to Husserl's own original intent, which is to let "the things
themselves" be manifest as they manifest themselves when all theoretical or natural
presumptions are put aside. After certain etymological exegesis of the Greek origins of
the word "phenomenology," Heidegger concludes that it means "to let that which shows
itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself," expressing
the same as HusserI's maxim ''To the things themselves!,,86 However, Heidegger soon
finds his teacher's phenomenology going astray and leaving the path of true
phenomenology. Heidegger rejects at least three central facets of Husserl's
phenomenology. First, whereas HusserI does not accept the German "philosophy of life"
(e.g., Dilthey, Scheler), Heidegger, influenced by it, realizes that phenomenology "must
be attentive to historicity, or thefacticity of human living; to temporality, or the concrete
living in time;" and that it cannot "remain content with description of the internal
consciousness of time.,,87 Second, from the hermeneutical tradition initiated by
Schleiermacher, Heidegger understands "that all description involves interpretation," that
description is only its derivative form.88 HusserI's pure description, accordingly, becomes
impossible if it is not situated in "a radically historicised hermeneutics.t''" Third,
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Heidegger rejects Husserl's kind of Cartesianism and subjective transcendental idealism
as "egology" and claims instead that the first concern of phenomenology is being.9o In
other words, Heidegger shifts the phenomenological study of the internal structures of
consciousness to the more fundamental study of the relation between human being and
being itself. It is not the structures of consciousness, but the structures of human
existence itself that are phenomena revealing the being in which they are rooted. To be
sure, not that being is behind the phenomena, but that phenomenological analysis first of
all reveals the being of what is being analyzed. Thus, Heidegger's metaphysics is
ontology, but ontology that is possible only as phenomenology." But, to repeat, unlike
Husserl, Heidegger never uses such phenomenological concepts as intentionality, noema,
and reduction. For him, there are no such things as a solitary "I," the transcendental ego,
or pure consciousness. Rather, this "I" is always a part and a product of a larger world
that includes others. Therefore, Heidegger's phenomenology is existential analysis of the
concrete phenomena of the experience of historical, factical, and involved human life,
with its fundamental moods, predicaments, and yearnings. Accordingly, Heidegger's
phenomenology overcomes not only Husserl's primarily cognitive approach, but also any
metaphysics as epistemology, especially as developed after Kant.
The Early Heidegger (II): Being and Metaphysics
If Descartes considered philosophy to be a tree whose roots are metaphysics,
trunk physics, and branches all other sciences, Heidegger's concern is with the ground
itself in which metaphysics is rooted-i-being" As the roots forget themselves in the
ground, Heidegger thinks that metaphysics throughout its history has forgotten being as
such (Sein) and dealt only with beings or entities (Seiendes) and their being. Heidegger
believes that he is the first one in the history of philosophy who realizes the simple truth
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that it is precisely being as such that allows the phenomenological manifestation of what
is, of entities. Being as such lets everything that is show itself as what it is.
Certainly, Heidegger knows that being cannot be approached directly. As shown
above, it is the emptiest of concepts and cannot be filled with any content. Being is the
same as nothing, it cannot be, cannot exist.93 As seen from Aristotle's on hei on, being
cannot be represented. As soon as the representation takes place, as in metaphysics, being
is reduced to an entity, one among others. Therefore, metaphysics has always eluded the
question of being." Metaphysics may deal with entities, such as God, the world, and
soul, and ask such metaphysical questions as, "Do they exist?" and "What kind of entities
are they?" But questions of this type do not apply to being.95
However, there is a different way of questioning, which is neglected by
metaphysics. For example, instead of metaphysical questions, "What is the world?" and
"Does the world exist?" one can ask "What does it mean to be in the world?" Instead of
asking "What is the mind?" one may ask "What does it mean to be thinking?" But instead
of asking "Does God exist?" one may ask "What does it mean to be under God's
authority?" The alternate questions in these sets escape the approach of metaphysics. Yet,
it leads to being at the same time, for all these questions involve the infinitive "to be."
One can also approach the question of being this way. Although there is no way to
approach being metaphysically, there is something one can ask about being: "What does
it mean?" To Heidegger, it is the question of the meaning of being (Die Frage nach den
Sinn von Sein). For this reason, Heidegger names his phenomenology "fundamental
ontology.t''" The meaning of being as such underlies all true metaphysical interrogation
in contrast to traditional ontology dealing with statements (logos) about the being of
entities (onta).97
Accordingly, in face of the ineffability of being, Heidegger's unique approach to
it is through the mode of being that human being itself is, being the only entity able to ask
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about the meaning of being, even the only entity able to say "is," necessarily exposing
being to pre-understanding." This entity, the "there" (Da) among entities, is best
expressed as Dasein. Dasein signifies the involvement of being in human nature and the
relation of the human being to the openness ("there") of being as such." Dasein is the
human being in its everyday facticity of being-there, being-in-the-world, or ek-istence-
an ecstatic openness to being. Heidegger even states the "essence" or "substance" of
Dasein, which is existence.i " Only Dasein can "exist" in Heidegger's sense, standing out
in openness to the presence of being. Things, angels, even God, are, but do not exist.
Being Dasein entails transcendence, for its nature is ek-static, "stepping out,"
achieved by means of care (Sorge). It is another moment of true metaphysics. Whereas in
traditional metaphysics the mind-world relationship is conceived as mind's generating
concepts that interpret the data of the world, to Heidegger, Dasein' s relation to the world
is expressed in a nonobjectifying, nonmetaphysical way, as caring being in the world.
Another related thought is out-braving the utmost, which is being toward death. The
latter, I suggest, is also a metaphysical moment. When Dasein accepts its finitude in the
authenticity of resoluteness, it raises itself beyond entities toward being. However, it
takes place in a finite manner, for ek-stases have temporal horizons. In fact, it is
temporality itself that makes transcendence possible. Dasein's temporality is manifest as
future in its openness to being that is its coming-to-be itself. But this future comes to a
Dasein already existing from its past. Then, Dasein' s coming-to-be lets every entity,
including itself, be present as showing itself as what it is. It is the present of Dasein. As
such, Dasein stands out in all three ek-stases of time. Heidegger's phenomenological
analysis shows how that takes place. Therefore, as the subtitle of Being and Time
explains, this work is about the interpretation of Dasein in terms of temporality and the
explication of time as the transcendental horizon of the question of being. Time as
presence (Anwesen) is absolutely necessary to this project insofar as it belongs to the
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truth of being. Being conceals itself in the same way as every present moment. 101In any
case, Heidegger understands Dasein' s temporality, therefore, historicity, as the
prerequisite in questioning the meaning of being as such in its relation to time. Time is
not something other than being, as in such metaphysical opposites of being as becoming,
thinking, seeming, etc. Being as einai and both par- and ap-ousia contain the present
time and duration, therefore, time as such. "Being as such is thus unconcealed in terms of
time."J02 But time points to unconcealedness or truth (a-letheia) of being. 103
Here is Heidegger's earlier project in a nutshell: what is asked about, the content
of the question (Gefragtes), is being; what is interrogated, to whom the question is asked
(Befragte), is a particular being or entity, the human being, Dasein; but what the question
wants to know (Erfragte) is the meaning of being, which always manifests itself in
time. 104
Metaphysics As Ontotheology
One of the metaphysical key concepts of Heidegger is called ontological
difference. This difference is already implied in Aristotle's formula to on hei on. On is a
participle, and as such can be used as a noun or an adjective. In the first case it means that
which is, i.e., an entity (Seiende). In the second case, as an adjective (seiend), it denotes
the process by means of which an entity (as noun) is, i.e., its being (Sein). In short, on can
mean both being as such and an entity. The ontological difference is between the two.
Heidegger thinks that the ontological difference is not only in Aristotle's formula, but is
also implied in the whole metaphysical tradition. But most important of all, precisely
because the tradition itself has not recognized the ontological difference, the oblivion of
being prevailed. As indicated above, traditional metaphysics, in Heidegger's opinion, has
always concentrated only on on as noun, on entities as such and their being. But it is not
the fault of metaphysics itself. It is our need for representation, even in the case of being,
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to know it as something. But, there is a total difference between being and entity, the
ontological difference.
Further thinking through this difference between being and entities leads
Heidegger to one of the most forceful and influential recent definitions of metaphysics. It
is his famous denotation of metaphysics as double-grounded ontotheology, in effect at
least since Aristotle. 105 Only that Aristotle never managed to unite the two meanings of
on that resulted in different and unrelated kinds of metaphysics, such as the first
philosophy and theology. Heidegger for the first time unites them, thus uniting
metaphysics. On the one hand, metaphysics is ontology insofar as it deals with the being
of entities as their common ground. On the other hand, metaphysics is theology insofar as
it deals with the ground that lets entities to be revealed as self-grounding (ergriinden) and
self-accounting (begriinden) ground (ratio, logos). This ultimate ground finally leads to
the concept of the first ground as causa sui, the supreme among beings, the metaphysical
concept of the divine (theion), or God. This ontotheological nature without knowing
gives metaphysics its unity insofar as the ontological difference between being as the
ground and entities as what is grounded remains. It is precisely the ontological
difference-the difference that keeps being as the ground from beings as the grounded-
where the ontotheological nature of metaphysics arises from. As a result, metaphysics
forgets what it is constituted of: the ontological difference itself. In this way, being is put
into oblivion. However, the forgetfulness is not metaphysics' fault. The ontological
difference can not be thought within metaphysics. It requires a stepback out of
metaphysics into its essential nature unconcealing (a-letheuein) itself in the unthought of
the ontological difference.
The ontotheological unity of metaphysics, in Heidegger's view, is yet unthought
by the tradition. The task of true metaphysics, accordingly, is to make a stepback into the
tradition into its metaphysical unthought. The overcoming of metaphysics is needed
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because metaphysics does not reach being as its ground. The purpose of Heidegger's
Destruktion has never been the annihilation of the tradition. Rather, it means the un-
building (de-struere) of the constructed layers of metaphysics covering up being. This
destruction is an attempt to dismantle the overlays of the tradition in order to disclose the
manner of questioning in the origins of its rise. To reach these grounds of metaphysics, a
true metaphysics, a meta-metaphysics is needed. And it must be different from
Heidegger's own early metaphysics.
Die Kehre and the Nonmetaphysical Thinking of Being
Somewhere in the 1930s, a shift of emphasis or tum (Kehre) occurred in
Heidegger's approach to the question of being. 106 This shift, however, does not mean the
rejection of the aforementioned views. It only means approaching the question of being
from a different perspective, changing direction in the communication between Dasein
and being. Whereas the early Heidegger inquired how Dasein discloses being, after the
tum, he believes that it is being that reveals itself to, at the same time concealing itself
from, Dasein. The term Dasein itself gradually disappears from Heidegger's vocabulary,
giving place to the clearing (Lichtung) of being. Thus, metaphysics no longer originates
with Dasein's act of thinking; it is being itself that brings about true metaphysics insofar
as it presents itself to Dasein as worthy of thought. Nothing but the old metaphysics can
originate from Dasein.1f it is to be overcome by true metaphysics, it occurs from being's
self -mani festati on.
For this reason, metaphysics is no longer Heidegger's preoccupation. Now
Heidegger wants to go beyond metaphysics directly into its ground, thinking the question
of being differently. Hence, there is an even more important an aspect of the tum, and
also more elusive. It is Heidegger's tum from the critique of the metaphysical oblivion of
being to the preservation of being's self-presencing or unconcealment. Whereas the
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oblivion of being was total-it was even forgotten that something has been forgotten-
the later Heidegger holds that in the process of concealment/non-concealment the truth of
being could release itself from the oblivion. And that happens not through a new
metaphysics, but through poetic thinking, by virtue of the primordial fourfold (Geviert),
retrieved by Holderlin, disclosing itself in world's worlding as sky, earth, divinities, and
mortals. 107 The fourfold is not a thing or a being in any sense of the metaphysical word
"is." It can only presence itself in being, at the same time itself being not. This is the
overcoming of the overcoming metaphysics itself.
Meta-Metaphysical Character of Language
Next crucial point of the tum consists of Heidegger's different understanding of
language. The early hermeneutical views are replaced by the understanding of language
as an independent ontological reality. Whereas in Being and Time, language is the formal
expression of the existential manner of Dasein' s relation to the world, later on, Heidegger
no longer believes in prelinguistic intelligibility that only uses language. Now it is
language itself that speaks, as expressed in his famous tautology "die Sprache spricht."
As Heidegger maintains in his "Letter on Humanism" (which also contains the first
published mention of "the tum"), thinking is the mediator of being, and it is in thinking
that being comes to language.!" Since thinking can only take place in language, being
manifests itself in language. In Heidegger's words, language becomes "the house of
being," and it is in this house that human beings find their home, their dwelling place.109
They need to guard it, for it is the way to belong to the history of being. "Everything
depends upon this alone, that the truth of Being come to language and that thinking attain
to this language." 110 Taking such a part in being, language even becomes something
unfathomable, one could even say metaphysical, in the proper sense of the term, for it "is
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only in this mysterious and yet for us always pervasive way," raising itself into the
lighting of being. III
Furthermore, the characteristic trait of the language of being for Heidegger is
simplicity, a trait hardly applicable to Being and Time. This different thinking (das
andere Denken) or different saying (das andere Sagen) is not even philosophy any
longer, for it thinks more originally than metaphysics. This thinking, as Heidegger
asserts, just "gathers language into simple saying. In this way language is the language of
Being, as clouds are the clouds of the sky."II2 It is so simple; the truth of being in "the
splendor of the simple" of poetic sayings.
It is important that Heidegger never claims to go beyond being, be it
metaphysically/phenomenologically or by means of thinking differently from
metaphysics. To think being always remains Heidegger's end, whether thinking reaches
it, or being itself reaches thinking. In this regard, I would like to stress something that I
consider to be significant. That is, Heidegger's metaphysics, even if metaphysics
overcome, always remains a metaphysics of finitude, from Being and Time to his late
poetic thinking. If it is metaphysics in the exact sense of the word, then it is not a
metaphysics going beyond being, but it is a transgression from inside, within the
boundaries of being, on this side of being. Heidegger writes: "Thinking does not
overcome metaphysics by climbing still higher, surmounting it, transcending it somehow
or other; thinking overcomes metaphysics by climbing back down into the nearness of the
nearest." I13 Both the transcendences of Dasein and of language are immanent
transcendences. To elaborate such metaphysics is an undertaking "more arduous and
more dangerous than the ascent" beyond being. 114
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Heidegger's Later Overcoming of Metaphysics
The later Heidegger tries to overcome metaphysics differently. Seinsfrage as such
becomes impossible. In view of the unrepresentability of being, Heidegger admits that all
that is left for a philosopher is to keep the ontological difference. Now this is the highest
point thinking can reach, in contrast to going beyond entities to being. In addition,
besides metaphysical keeping the ontological difference, another alternative is to
philosophize otherwise than metaphysically, which means poetically. On the other hand,
Heidegger repeatedly acknowledges that metaphysics cannot be left behind even if
superseded by a different discourse. Even if overcome, metaphysics does not disappear,
but always returns transformed and remains in dominance, precisely because of the
continuous ontological difference. IIS
In any case, the problem of overcoming metaphysics is that it happens when
metaphysics heightens itself through itself. To express it, Heidegger uses the same phrase
as Kant, "the metaphysics of metaphysics.v'I" A regard for metaphysics remains in the
very intention to overcome metaphysics. Therefore, at the end of the lecture "Time and
Being," Heidegger aims "to cease all overcoming, and leave metaphysics to itself."II?
Beyond its self-overcoming, metaphysics reveals its essence to thought, which eventually
may precipitate the overcoming. But the task, in Heidegger's view, has never been
definitely accomplished. He himself felt like Moses on the threshold of the promised
land, never entering it. As a result, metaphysics in Heidegger is less overcome than
assigned limits. ''Transgressing so as to delineate-such might well be the lesson to be
learned from this overcoming.t'{"
The difficulty of overcoming metaphysics lies in the nature of language itself. As
Heidegger acquiesces, "the difficulty lies in language" (Das Schwierige liegt in der
Sprache).119 The difficulty is that Western languages have been the languages of
metaphysical thinking and, therefore, are permeated with metaphysical connotations. On
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this account, the essay where this utterance appears remains open-ended. The destiny of
the overcoming of metaphysics is not yet decided. It is an open question to Heidegger
whether language is only metaphysical and, accordingly, determined by ontotheology, or
whether it contains other possibilities of saying and at the same time telling not-saying. 120
There are many things that Derrida, whom I approach in the next chapter, has
overtaken from Heidegger. However, there is one crucial difference-precisely in the
ambivalence of the question of the overcoming of metaphysics. In Derrida's opinion,
there is no way to approach the overcoming of metaphysics otherwise than with the aid of
these same concepts of the metaphysics that is overcome. Heidegger agrees, referring to
his own earlier thought: "But in order to make the attempt at thinking recognizable and at
the same time understandable for existing philosophy, it could at first be expressed only
within the horizon of that existing philosophy and its use of current terms."!" However,
he realizes that such an approach is "bound to lead immediately and inevitably into
error." 122 In fact, Heidegger calls this same attitude "grotesqueness," when referring to
his own work: "It is hardly possible to surpass the grotesqueness of proclaiming my
attempts at thinking as smashing metaphysics to bits and of sojourning at the same time,
with the help of those attempts, on paths of thinking and in conceptions which have been
derived ... ,,123 He says it despite his own acknowledgements of the persevering return of
metaphysics. In Heidegger's view, such an overcoming, dealing with the materials of
what is to be overcome, would be useless. There is no point in fighting against
metaphysics, while at the same time holding fast to it. However, what Heidegger does
accept, very much like Derrida, is the fact that metaphysics does not disappear
completely, even if it is overcome. The problem is that metaphysics always reappears in
different forms and disguises. That is the reason why the later Heidegger wants to cease
all overcoming and leave metaphysics to itself.
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Ultimately, however, there is no final answer in Heidegger as regards the
overcoming of metaphysics. One always needs to keep in mind the questioning character
of Heidegger's thought. It can never be frozen into unequivocal assertions and denials,
such as, "metaphysics is overcome" and "metaphysics cannot be overcome," or
correspondingly, "Heidegger escapes the closure of metaphysics" and "Heidegger
remains a prisoner of metaphysics." 124 Yes and no. Heidegger's questioning assumes its
own weakness, that is, uncertainty, in the face of the apodicticity of modem philosophy
(empiricism, Descartes, Kant, et. al.). But today apodictity is not such a philosophical
virtue any more. Rather, it is undecidability that has appeal. Heidegger has it, and that
may be one of the reasons today's thinkers still draw on his thought.
The Prevalence of Metaphysical lnsideoutness:
Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Positivism, Pragmatism, Levinas
The foregoing accounts on overcoming metaphysics dealt with a few selected
thinkers from the history of philosophy. From the modem period, thus far I have chosen
Descartes, British empiricists, Kant, Husserl, and Heidegger. But I could also have
chosen different philosophers, applied the proposed hermeneutical tactics to them, and
reached similar results. Some of those I missed in the more detailed and consecutive
expositions above could, among others, be Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, the positivists,
pragmatists, process philosophers, Wittgenstein, Levinas, Foucault, Habermas, and
others. I will conclude this chapter with shorter insights confirming the compatibility of
my approach to some on this list as well.
Hegel
Hegel is notorious for allegedly building a system of metaphysics, completely
ignoring Kant's rendering impossible any such attempt.125 It is a widespread view on
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Hegel, and perhaps it is this view that is responsible for the oblivion of Hegel in times
when metaphysics has supposedly come to its end. Of course, Hegel's own systematic
works may give justification to this view. But his work is also full of obscurities,
metaphors, and allusions that may give a different perspective. In fact, Hegel can also be
interpreted as an anti-metaphysician. Definitely, Hegel is the last one who would ignore
Kant's critique of metaphysics. Rather, Hegel would say that Kant himself is caught up in
traditional metaphysics as a result of his insistence on the existence of a world in-itself,
beyond experience, and unknown. I agree with Solomon, who points out:
It is Hegel who is the great anti-metaphysician, purging philosophy of every
vestige of "the thing-in-itself," the world behind, or beyond, the scenes. It is
Hegel who reduced all questions of being (or ontology) to questions about the
structures and forms of human experience, and he did so not by going back to the
ancients but by carrying modem philosophy - that is, Kantian philosophy - to its
logical and radical conclusions. To say that Hegel is an idealist is to say that, at
every tum, he argues that the world is thoroufflly knowable, and it is nothing
"beyond" the realm of conscious experience. 26
At least Hegel's Phenomenology may be viewed not as a metaphysical treatise on how
the world really is, culminating in the ultimate ontological assurance of the absolute, but
as a tentative collection of different worldviews, rejecting any single metaphysical
perspective. Or, it presents a kind of "meta-view, a view about the correctness of views,
rather than a view as SUCh.,,127One can even say that, rejecting the duality of experience
and reality, Hegel is not even an epistemologist. If there is a befitting designation for
Hegel, it is not that of a metaphysician, an ontologist, or an epistemologist, but rather a
"conceptual anthropologist," or better, a "phenomenologist," according to the title of his
most controversial book, a phenomenologist one century before Husserl appropriated the
word as if it were his invention.I28 Although Hegel's phenomenology is not exactly the
same as Husserl's, it is at least phenomenology as a nonmetaphysical science of the
manifold forms of experience, showing which conceptions of experience are more
plausible.
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Kierkegaard
Kierkegaard is a very elusive writer. It is difficult to classify his writing genres or
styles: sometimes it is philosophical, sometimes literary, sometimes polemical,
sometimes religiously devotional, etc. He is controversial, iconoclastic, ironic,
fragmentary. More than that, Kierkegaard is also ambiguous regarding the issue of
overcoming metaphysics. According to him, it is ultimately faith that overcomes
metaphysics. To put it precisely, the object of faith is the other of philosophy that may
not depend on philosophy for its determination. However, faith must be distinguished
from theology, which is also a kind of metaphysics that Kierkegaard wants to avoid.
Instead, religion is based on a subjective commitment of faith maintained in a situation of
theoretical uncertainty and rational paradox or absurdity.
On the other hand, Kierkegaard could also be discussed under the heading of the
overcoming metaphysics in philosophy insofar as his struggle against metaphysical
grounds for religion is extended to philosophical matters. As is well known, Kierkegaard
spent most of his energy and talent refuting Hegel. Kierkegaard does not believe that
Hegel succeeds in unifying the Kantian dualism of being and thinking; he thinks that
conceptual thinking can never possess the category of reality. He himself distinguishes
thought from concrete reality, the reality of the thinking individual's personal existence,
and is, therefore, commonly acknowledged as the father of existentialism (Heidegger has
borrowed from Kierkegaard more than he explicitly acknowledges: the notions of
nothingness, death, anxiety, boredom, etc.).
Yet, despite his disdain toward system, traces of an alternative metaphysical
system (though unfinished and always developing) can be discerned in Kierkegaard's
thought, particularly as a speculative analysis of being as existent and existence as
becoming. 129 The Hegelian necessity of history, for example, is reversed by the
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contingency and freedom of existence as the key metaphysical concepts. Furthermore, as
always with the overcoming of metaphysics, it can only be carried out by rational and
logical inferences and arguments. Kierkegaard, to be sure, uses reason, though not in
metaphysical and epistemological senses. He uses it in the logical sense, using categories,
the rules of discourse, logical inference, etc. Hence, Kierkegaard is only able to oppose
metaphysics, directing its own means against itself, relying on the same logic that he
wants to destroy. Thus, Sartre already observed that Kierkegaard stole the language of
knowledge in order to use it against knowledge. No doubt, he pushes the power and
inventiveness of reason to its utmost in order to demonstrate its own powerlessness. The
question remains: is reason in a position to accomplish its own suicide?
Nietzsche
Nietzsche, similarly to Kierkegaard, is not always accepted as a serious
philosopher by academicians. Like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche is more like a passionate
writer or poet. Perhaps precisely that is a factor that carries both of them outside
metaphysics. Still, like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche is also involved in sweeping philosophical
confrontation, though not so much with Hegel particularly, as with the whole Western
tradition traced back to Plato's distinction between the true and the apparent worlds and
resulting in nihilism as devaluation of the latter. Nietzsche holds, somewhat like Kant,
that many metaphysical convictions and concepts cannot be justified if taken
independently from the perspective of the knower. But there is no question that Nietzsche
cannot accept Kant's "thing in-itself," for Nietzsche thinks that every entity is relational
and its knowing-interpretative, which is Nietzsche's so-called perspectivism. According
to the latter, both factual and metaphysical realisms are untenable, for there are no
uninterpreted facts, while metaphysical concepts result from improper use of language
beyond its basic communicative function. Metaphysics and its truth are but a mobile
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army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms, created because of a
psychological instinct to ascribe meaning and purpose to the harsh world, thereby
achieving security. That is how the fiction of the true world emerges, making philosophy
decadent, against real flesh and blood life. Instead of being the love for knowledge and
truth, philosophy becomes the battlefield of particular authors' power struggles. It is a
very powerful destruction of the metaphysical tradition.
On the other hand, despite his antimetaphysical fervor, many interpreters have
discerned an alternative metaphysical system in Nietzsche's works. The first chief
exponent of Nietzsche as metaphysician is Heidegger.F" Heidegger sees in Nietzsche's
thought the end or consummation point of Western tradition, but not so much as its
overcoming--except the overcoming of nihilism-as its completion by uniting
Parmenidean (being as permanent presence) and Heraclitean (being as becoming)
traditions. Heidegger thinks that Nietzsche's metaphysics only puts new values in place
of the old ones devalued by the history of metaphysics as nihilism. Nietzsche gives two
final answers to the main question of metaphysics, what is being: the will to power and
the eternal recurrence of the same. The former concerns the constitution of being, the
latter,-its mode or way to be. The supreme will to power consists in stamping becoming
with the character of being, which is the meaning of the eternal recurrence of the same.
As to Heidegger's own main concern, he believes that in Nietzsche's thought being is
debased to or equated with a value, therefore, still forgotten as such.
Besides Heidegger, there are many other interpretations that see Nietzsche not
only as destroying the metaphysical tradition, but also building his own alternative and
more adequate system.131 The most obvious elements of this system, tentatively, may be
(1) the metaphysical principle of the will to power, replacing the traditional concept of
will, (2) the cosmological theory of the eternal recurrence of the same, replacing the
dualism of the ideal and the real, (3) the ideal of the self as an integrated superman,
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replacing the dualistic Cartesian model of subjectivity, (4) the ontological primacy of
becoming over being, and (5) a kind of pragmatist coherence or perspectivist theory of
truth instead of the representational one.
I believe that there is a third interpretation of Nietzsche besides regarding him as
either destroying or building metaphysics. According to this reading, Nietzsche is still a
philosopher, though of a special kind. That is to say, Nietzsche is among the first
founders of the tradition in which thinkers like Wittgenstein, Derrida, Foucault, and
Rorty are situated: an alternative philosophic tradition that shows that the so-called
perennial problems of philosophy arise only because of a certain concept of philosophy
that is by no means necessary. 132 His thought may also be seen as a certain "therapeutic"
overcoming of metaphysics. The metaphysical interpretation of Nietzsche, of course,
confirms the inevitability of the return of metaphysics in every overcoming. But I would
also maintain that, beyond the critique, Nietzsche wanted to say something that was not
intended to be a new metaphysical system. Nietzsche wanted to say it differently from the
way metaphysics does.
In this way, the subversion of being with becoming or the celebration of life
amidst appearance may be viewed as not just a metaphysical subversion, but rather as
dismissing any metaphysical polarity altogether-be it between being and becoming or
the ideal and the apparent. What else might Nietzsche's intention to abolish the apparent
world together with the ideal mean? Even Nietzsche's "naturalism," the return to the
immanence of the earth, may mean something other than a mere reversal between the real
and the ideal. To a certain extent, there is metaphysics: a metaphysics that still names
being-as the flux of appearances produced by the will to power. But this "metaphysics"
also cancels itself, leaning toward equalizing everything, the leveling of meaning within
the realm of appearance only. In a word, it is a partial sustaining and a partial overcoming
of Platonism. Appearance is retained without its noumenal counterpart. As such, it loses
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the metaphysical force evolving from the difference between the opposites. Something
must be retained lest one finds oneself in a complete void.
In much the same way, Nietzsche's famous perspectivism is not necessarily a
"theory" of knowledge. Nietzsche's statements like "there are only interpretations" and
"there is no truth" may be sayings of a different kind. They are rhetorical devices
showing a way out of the "ascetic ideal" of the final truth achieved by all means and for
its own sake. Furthermore, the doctrines of the will to power, the superhuman, and the
eternal recurrence are not supposed to be metaphysical truths corresponding to reality,
but a sort of regulative ideals. These "doctrines" may work upon the "as if' principle.
One may make sense of one's life, acting as if these "doctrines" were true. Certainly,
these are not metaphysical theories. At the very least, as Haar remarks, no metaphysics
can be founded on hypothetical propositions. 133 If they have significance, it may be
ethical, but not metaphysical. They may be looked at as a sort of therapeutic or diagnostic
tools.
Consider the "doctrine" of the eternal recurrence of the same. Its point may
actually be in providing a practical directive how to live life affirmatively. It does not
claim to be true in the sense of correspondence, but shows how reality should be
conceived by those who sayan unreserved "yes" to this life. The tentative "truth" of the
recurrence only brings forth a certain affirmative attitude toward life and its abundance. It
illustrates the attitude that overcomes nihilism. This attitude questions one's disposition
toward life: how well disposed one has to be in order to accept the eternal recurrence, to
desire nothing else. But this attitude is in fact impossible, for there will always be things
in everyone's life that nobody can want unconditionally: sufferings, violences, genocids,
etc. This attitude would be possible only in two instances: for the God, whose death
Nietzsche proclaims, and the superhuman.
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Nietzsche's remarks about the superhuman may be viewed in a similar way. It
may not be yet another ideal to strive for. Notably, there are no specifiable behavioral
norms given. It may be a general symbol for that same attitude that considers life worthy
of infinite repetition. It is a pluralistic and nonobjective counterpart of Kant's unifying
and universal categorial imperative: just to become aware of many things that are worthy
of infinity in our lives. And then, to have such an attitude toward life as to want to live it
again. It is Nietzsche's existential imperative.l " But it should not be confused with
another fundamental principle. Nietzsche does not give an alternative theory of morality,
a new set of values. He wants to go "beyond good and evil," to overcome both morality
as well as as its contrast, immorality. That is why Thus Spoke Zaratustra is a book for
"everyone and no one." Everybody may claim to have understood it. Yet, no one has. The
ideal of Zaratustra can not possibly be achieved. No one has realized that it, too, is a
mockery. Nietzsche's glad tidings may consist precisely in the realization that liberation
occurs when one realizes that the superhuman is impossible, that there are no glad tidings
after all, and that there is even no need for them.
Logical Positivism
The findings of British empiricists are very far reaching, not only through Kant,
but also in the twentieth century, particularly in the school of logical positivism. The old
"Hume's fork" is the cornerstone of this school, even if it is supplemented by the modem
developments of logic that helps to determine the meaningfulness of statements. 135
Because of the emphasis on this determination, it does not falsify metaphysics, but
simply renders it meaningless.F" Metaphysics can at best be an artistic expression of the
attitude toward life, similar to poetry, only with the difference that metaphysicians, unlike
poets, live under the illusion that they deal with matters of ultimate truth and falsity,
while in fact they do not assert anything, but merely express something, like artists. 137
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The uniqueness of the positivist approach to overcoming metaphysics in comparison to
other approaches is that, instead of being negative, making the impossibility of
metaphysics depend on the nature of what cannot be known, they would rather try to
fulfill Hume's impetus to build a credible, though modest, metaphysics. That is why it is
positivism: because it determines the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics
according to what can be meaningfully said or verified in certain contexts. Method itself
precedes doctrine. But since the method depends on radical empiricism or linguistic
analysis, it falls back into crude implicit metaphysics: either into foundationalist
empiricism, recognizing only sense-data as the proper objects of knowledge, or linguistic
idealism, dealing with the inner connection of language only. Moreover, there are
positivists who themselves recognize and analyze all kinds of implicit metaphysics of
logical positivism in order to consciously build their own "metaphysics of logical
positivism," as the title of Bergmann's book expresses. 138 His metaphysics examines the
relationship of the ideal language of logical positivism to the ordinary language and the
possibilities to render the former into the latter.
Pragmatism
Pragmatism, in a nutshell, overcomes metaphysics insofar as it, according to
Peirce's formulation, seeks the meaning of a concept or a theory in the practical
consequences of its application.F" This is its new "metaphysical" principle. Pragmatism
insists on relating theory to praxis. The isolated correspondence theories of truth,
characteristic to both rationalism and empiricism, are rejected in favor of truth found in a
social context in which its practical implications can be discerned. Knowledge is
"common knowledge." Truth is changing together with the social contexts. Truth is
forged in the midst of agreements and disagreements of the community of those who
pursue it. Practice, as the criterion of truth, takes place in the social, but not in the mental,
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realm. Truth emerges from the network of beliefs shared by the community of inquirers
and is justified by practice. According to Pierce's analogy, genuine knowledge emerges
not by virtue of chainlike reasoning in individual consciousness, but rather from a
cablelike interconnectedness of diverse knowledge claims.
But pragmatism is also so diverse that it is difficult to determine its exact
relationship to metaphysics. Yet, it is this diversity itself that allows me to apply the
scheme of metaphysical insideoutness to pragmatism as well. Although there are varieties
of pragmatism that repudiate speculative metaphysics, there are also kinds of pragmatism
that offer alternative speculative metaphysics. In this regard, the generalizing division of
pragmatism into reformist and revolutionary types is helptul.l'" Reformist pragmatism
(Pierce, James, Dewey, et al.) still contains many metaphysical principles and concepts. It
only connects knowledge with experience, social context, and action. Revolutionary
pragmatism (Schiller, Rorty, et al.), in contrast, abandons any epistemological inquiries
for objective truth besides those of relative and contingent cognitive conventions. This
pragmatism, in my opinion, is one of the cleanest overcomings of metaphysics.
Perhaps these two approaches are best exemplified by Pierce and Rorty. On the
one hand, Pierce wants to rule out propositions of ontology as metaphysical "gibberish."
On the other hand, he constructs his own metaphysics, supplied with a set of categories
and doctrines. Pierce only wants to differentiate the illegitimate apriori metaphysics from
the legitimate, scientific metaphysics that uses observation and reasoning. Rorty, in
contrast, completely redefines the task of philosophy, renouncing altogether its role as a
form of inquiry. If conceptual thinking has any useful function, it may provide tools for
coping with reality, certainly not mirroring it. In Rorty's view, the nature of philosophy
ought to be hermeneutical instead of epistemological, or, alternatively, therapeutic
instead of constructive, literary instead of scientific. To philosophize, for Rorty, instead
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of digging for grounds, simply means to maintain conversation that would lead toward
agreement.
Nevertheless, despite these neo-pragmatic moods, metaphysical pragmatism does
not belong only to the past. Sandra Rosenthal, for example, proposes a new,
pragmatically reconstructed speculative metaphysics that is supposed to go beyond both
foundationalism (absolute grounding of knowledge) and non-foundational ism (total
scepticism) by virtue of a speculative extrapolation from experience instead of a direct
grasp of being as SUCh.141This metaphysics deals with the hypothetical generalizations
from experience, not with the necessary conditions of experience. Rosenthal and other
pragmatic metaphysicians want to combine these two seemingly incompatible
approaches: they want to create philosophy without mirrors that nonetheless is
systematic, does not jettison metaphysics, and is a sort of ontology, but does not lose
touch with reality. Although metaphysical inquiry is bound to be linguistic, although it
can begin only by examining already existing formulations, pragmatic metaphysics, it is
claimed, may still lead beyond textuality and linguistic conventions to the subject matter
of experience, to the reality experienced, to the context in which reflective experience
takes place.
Levinas
Levinas is one of the philosophers who best exemplify my preferred approach to
overcoming metaphysics, resolutely struggling with metaphysics and striving to true
metaphysics beyond the inherited metaphysics, and at the same time remaining aware of
the predicament of overcoming. Here I can only give a most general account, bypassing
Levinas' vocabular intricacies in trying to wrest language out of ontology and also
avoiding detailed quotes from his inspiring texts.
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Like most other great philosophers, Levinas has his own peculiar critique of
Western philosophical tradition. Whereas Heidegger indicted the tradition for the
oblivion of being and Derrida for the debasement of writing, Levinas charges it for the
suppression of the Other, reduction of it to the same. In contrast to that, for Levinas, the
Other is something totally alien, something totally incomprehensible, which should be
preserved and protected as it is from the invasions and reductions of the same. So, to
Levinas, metaphysics must be recuperated by the idea of the Other. One can say that, for
Levinas, the Other is the locus of metaphysics proper, that really goes "beyond." His core
metaphysical question would be: how to think the Other as such, as Other? The Other is
mystery, not known, not knowable, beyond epistemology, beyond ontology. This Other
may appear in various ways: other persons may reveal it when they are not conceived
merely as mirror images of one's own self, it may emerge in ethical experience, it may
come about as death, and the like. Philosophy informed by the Other is a philosophy of
darkness, of enigma, as opposed to traditional metaphysics that always retains its familiar
ground as being, truth, the same, and so forth.
Like other great philosophers, Levinas starts with the overcoming of his own most
decisive philosophical influences, particularly those of Husserlian and Heideggerian
phenomenology. Unlike Husserl, Heidegger gives Levinas the understanding of human
being as constitutively engaged in time and history. Yet, Heidegger does not oppose
phenomenology and ontology. Instead, he poses the ontological question anew from the
perspective of Dasein. No doubt, the most important question of Heidegger's whole
project is that of being. Levinas thinks that in this respect Heidegger is unable to surpass
classical ontology with its problem of the relationship between being as such and entities.
Both Husserl and Heidegger, in Levinas's understanding, are guilty of subsuming the
Other under the same, understood as consciousness by the former and as being by the
latter. At this point, Levinas feels compelled to depart from phenomenological tradition.
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Both Husserl's phenomenology and Heidegger's fundamental ontology entail the
imprisonment of the subject. Levinas questions the ambition of that philosophy to be the
only way to express the relationship of a human being to being. There must be something
that exceeds it; and it is the ethical. The ethical relationship between the self and the
Other goes beyond solipsistic, monad-like intentionality and the ontological difference.
Phenomenological transcendence must be replaced by "excendence"-an irrevocable
exiting from being. Subjectivity, in Levinas' view, must be directed outside, to the
nonself, which is free from the categories of representational knowledge.
My special interest in discussing Levinas here is that he is conscious of the
paradox to think outside the metaphysical tradition to which one inescapably belongs.
The task is immensely difficult, because the means for expressing the Other remain those
of traditional ontology insofar as we are bound to use language. Using language by
default reduces the Other to the same, the known, the familiar. The Other brought to
language becomes a part of being that it is supposed to exceed. The challenge is to bring
the Other to thought and language, and at the same time retaining its otherness. On this
account, Levinas' texts are utterly ambiguous, they oscillate between the same and the
Other, totality and infinity. Will the former be capable to reveal the latter, which it
principally cannot contain? The problem is similar to that of apophatic theology. And
while Levinas, like any other thinker, is bound to fail explicating the Other, his work at
least shows the necessity of addressing the question of the Other.
Insofar as the question of the Other is an ethical question, for Levinas, the first
philosophy becomes ethics-true metaphysics going beyond traditional metaphysics. In
principle this approach is not new. Levinas himself refers back to the good beyond
essence (epekeina tes ousiasi of the Republic of Plato. Already Plato's to agathon does
not belong to the totality of being. It is the starting point of the separation of the ethical
from the ontological in philosophical tradition. Then, of course, Kant proposes ethics as
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proper metaphysics. But Levinas cannot accept Kant's grounding of ethics in universal
reason, for the latter only produces the same. Levinas rather draws on phenomenological
tradition: his ethics, if considered as ethics at all, is not prescriptive but descriptive. It is a
"phenomenology" of the relationship between the same and the Other. In Levinas' words,
"ethics is an optiCS.,,142But, this "optics" is different; it even does not have image,
characteristic of totalizing and objectifying virtues of vision. Another of Levinas's
resources is the idea of excessive infinity from Descartes' third Meditation. In view of
that, Levinas does not interpret Descartes in the traditional way of subjectivity. The
Cartesian self reaches its subjective self-understanding through its relation to the infinite
nonself (the Christian God for Descartes). But it is not self's metaphysical reaching out to
the infinite, rather, the location of metaphysics for Levinas is on the "hither side" of
essence or being.143 It is subjectivity beyond metaphysics insofar as formed in the
encounter with the Other-a motive also present in Schleiermacher. On this note, I would
like to end this chapter and proceed to Derrida, before coming to grips with
Schleiermacher.
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CHAPTER 3
DERRIDA AND METAPHYSICAL INSIDEOUTNESS
With Derrida's approach to metaphysics, I come to the end of this part dealing
with the overcoming of metaphysics in the history of Western philosophy. As I already
mentioned above, it is Derrida from whom I acquire the main stimulus for the approach
of metaphysical insideoutness.
Derrida's Understanding of Metaphysics
First of all, it is important to determine Derrida's understanding of metaphysics so
that it is clear what he wants to overcome. Since Derrida, despite using the word
metaphysics, nowhere defines it exactly, his understanding needs to be inferred from
texts in which he concentrates on something else (e.g., structuralism, semiology, etc.). In
addition, there are many other terms that Derrida uses interchangeably, while, in fact,
meaning metaphysics. Some of them are:
logos, logocentrism, the 'name of god,' positive infinity, onto-theology, infinitist
theology, all monisms, all dualisms, indifference, infinite being, classical
rationalism, the desire for a transcendental signified, the opposition between
sensible and intelligible, the proper, the history of Reason, and language itself.'
I will here, for brevity's sake, reduce Derrida's subtle and often incalculable discussions
to simply pointing out his use of the word metaphysics and some of its synonyms.
The Metaphysics of Presence
In Derrida's writings, the word metaphysics usually appears in a phrase
"metaphysics of presence," where presence-in the form of the universal basic concept
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of being and its counterparts-is understood as an underlying factor characteristic of the
Western philosophical tradition. Derrida writes: "It could be shown that all the names
related to fundamentals, to principles, or to the center have always designated an
invariable presence-eidos, arche, telos, energeia, ousia (essence, existence, substance,
subject) aletheia, transcendentality, consciousness, God, man, and so forth."z According
to this underlying presupposition, all concepts and objects of metaphysics, including both
ontology and epistemology, can be, or are, only if they are present, therefore, presentable
as entities. They are supposed to appear in truth as self-identical and present immediacy.
Many philosophers impose sweeping generalizations on philosophical tradition, like
Nietzsche's "otherworld," Heidegger's "being," Levinas' "same." In this sense, Derrida
is no exception, subsuming all philosophical tradition under a single concept of presence.
Logocentrism and Phonocentrism
Derrida's invented synonyms for the metaphysics of presence helps to explain
further the metaphysics he wants to overcome. The most important term is
"logocentrism." It means the rationalistic tendency of metaphysics to privilege a favored
conceptual scheme by virtue of grounding it in some source of meaning as extralinguistic
"word" (logos) or thought. Logocentrism is intimately related to "phonocentrism," which
means the privileging of voice or speech (phone) over against writing in the Western
philosophical tradition. Phonocentrism relates to the determination of the meaning of
being as such as presence, including such sub-determinations as presence of the thing to
sight as eidos, presence as substance/essence/existence (ousia), temporal presence of the
now, the self-presence of the cogito, consciousness, subjectivity, the co-presence of the
self and the other, inter-subjectivity as intentional phenomenon of the ego, and so forth.
But logocentrism relates to the determination of entity's being as presence.' Derrida
maintains that, to metaphysical tradition, it is precisely speech that has the role of
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bringing to immediate presence that which within thought as logos relates to meaning;
voice has immediate proximity to the mind; voice signifies mental experiences which, in
turn, mirror being in mind. Translation between mind and logos takes place in speech
where the speaker and the listener in possession of meaning are supposed to be present to
one another, to be pure, immediate presence. From this perspective, writing is regarded as
subversive, for it creates a spatial and temporal distance between the author and the
addressee. Writing brings about plurality and ambiguity of meaning as opposed to the
single present one.
The Transcendental Signified
Another metaphysical element criticized by Derrida is what he calls the
"transcendental signified." Derrida formulates this notion from his critique of the concept
of the sign, especially as developed by Saussure. Ordinarily sign (usually a word or
sound) is supposed to signify an object or thing. For example, the sound "tree" is
supposed to be a sign referring to a real tree, a referent. Saussure, however, instead of
concentrating on the relationship of the sign to its real referent, focuses on the sign itself
in which he distinguishes two elements. One is a material element-a phonetic entity, a
word. Saussure calls it signifier. Another is a mental element-an image, a concept, a
meaning. This element he calls signified." Saussure's observation is that the signifier is
never motivated by the signified. That is to say, there is nothing in the concept of a tree
that motivates it to be signified by the word "tree." In principle, any other word would
perform the same function. Moreover, that actually happens, for the concept of a tree is
signified by different words in different languages. The upshot of this theory is that the
signifier gets its identity not because of its relation to its meaning, the signified, but
because of its difference from other signifiers.' More than that, even though a difference
generally implies positive terms between which it is set up, to Saussure, "in language
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there are only differences without positive terms.,,6 This idea is very important, for
Denida makes it his own as well. But he also goes beyond Saussure. Omitting Derrida's
critique of Saussure's privileging sounds over written words, suffice it to point out here
Denida's observation that the lack of the signifier's presence to the signified entails a
possibility of their cutting loose from each other. One consequence of this possibility is
the emergence of tanscendental signified: a meaning that lies beyond everything,
therefore, is no meaning at all.? Supposedly, the whole Western metaphysics, philosophy,
and also theology, semiology, and so forth, operate with such signifieds, independent of
language. Being and God, for example, are such signifieds. Derrida, of course, questions
the possibility of transcendental signified and requires that one recognizes that every
signified is also in a position of signifier. Precisely this move leads to Derrida's notorious
claim that everything may be a text. The other consequence of the signifier-signified
release is just the opposite of the first, and it is Derrida's subversion of the vertical
signifier-signified relation with the horizontal signifier-signifier relation. It is his theory
of textuality as unlimited play of signification.
The Impossible Overcoming
One could expect that after his critique of Western metaphysics, Derrida would
instantly have to commence its overcoming. Instead, he is cautious not to follow so many
preceding radical overcomings that unknowingly deluded themselves about the success of
overcoming. As the most radical examples, Derrida mentions the Nietzschean critique of
the concepts of being and truth, for which he substituted the concepts of play,
interpretation, and sign (without present truth); Freudian critique of self-presence as the
critique of consciousness, of the subject, of self-identity and of self-proximity or self-
possession; and Heideggerian destruction of metaphysics, of ontotheology, of the
determination of being as presence.f Although Derrida also wants to outline the closure
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of the epoch of Western metaphysics, he knows that it can be done only without leaving
it. He presumes that the aforementioned authors were not fully aware of the fact that their
destructive discourses, as well as all their analogues, are trapped in a kind of circle
describing the form of the relation between the history of metaphysics and the destruction
of this history. Derrida himself, in contrast to this supposed ignorance of being trapped,
states very clearly:
There is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to shake
metaphysics ... We have no language-no syntax and no lexicon-which is
foreign to this history; we can pronounce not a single destructive proposition
which has not already had to slip into the form, the logic, and the implicit
postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest."
For example, Derrida's horizontal reinterpretation of the concept of the sign would have
to entail the rejection of the word and concept "sign" itself. The critique itself would not
be possible then.1o
Although Heidegger is also included in the foregoing Derrida's list, it is, on the
other hand, easy to notice a similarity to the later Heidegger's own pronouncements
regarding the impossibility of overcoming metaphysics and of overcoming metaphysics
by its own means. Derrida also makes an acknowledgement very similar to Heidegger's
das Schwierige liegt in der Sprache, namely, that even language itself, that is to say,
everyday language, is not innocent or neutral. The Western language has evolved
together with the development of Western metaphysics. Consequently, it carries within
itself not only a considerable number of presuppositions of all types, "but also
presuppositions inseparable from metaphysics, which, although little attended to, are
knotted into a system."!' Everyone who uses language becomes a metaphysician without
knowing it, even against one's will. Derrida reminds us that in fact there is no
transgression, that is, no transgression as "a pure and simple landing into a beyond of
metaphysics," landing at a point which would not be a point of language and writing. 12
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The three aforementioned master thinkers also worked within the inherited
concepts of metaphysics, and since these concepts are not elements or atoms, and since
they are taken from a syntax and a system, "every particular borrowing brings along with
it the whole of metaphysics.Y':' If the history of philosophy, as one great and powerful
discursive chain, is immersed in a reserve of language, into the systematic reserve of a
lexicology, a grammar, a set of signs and values, cannot that history not be limited by the
resources and the organization of that reserve? Derrida thinks that "whoever alleges that
philosophical discourse belongs to the closure of a language must still proceed within this
language and with the oppositions it fumishcs.t'" Derrida even goes so far as to state "a
law that can be formalized, philosophy always reappropriates for itself the discourse that
de-limits it."IS Moreover, precisely this immersion in one common system allows the
great destroyers of metaphysical tradition to destroy each other reciprocally. For instance,
Derrida thinks that just as Heidegger criticized Nietzsche for being the last
metaphysician, the last Platonist, with "as much lucidity and rigor as bad faith and
misconstruction," one could do the same for Heidegger, for Freud, and for everyone else.
In fact, Derrida himself successfully practices that over against Heidegger, Husserl,
Saussure, and others. And, strikingly, there are critics of Derrida who try to do the same
to him. Abrams, for example, writes:
But it seems to me that Derrida reaches this conclusion [of the infinite play of
signification] by a process which, in its own way, is no less dependent on an
origin, ground, and end, and which is no less remorselessly "teleological," than
the most rigorous of the metaphysical systems that he uses his conclusions to
deconstruct. His origin and ground are his graphocentric premises ... 16
But Derrida already made himself invulnerable to these criticisms, for he never claimed
escaping metaphysics.
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The Impossible Possibility: Overcoming without Leaving
Deconstructive Construction of Metaphysics
Provided that there is no simple way out of metaphysical tradition, Derrida turns
to that tradition itself in order to work diligently from within, from its inside.
Deconstruction is this tum to the tradition. Deconstruction is not negative; although it is
not positive either; it is affirmative. Faithful to Heidegger's Abbau or Destruktion, it is
de-construction: constructive destruction, construction after the analysis and dismantling
of traditional structures within their historical context.V Deconstruction constructs upon
the unthought possibilities uncovered during that dismantling. It breaks down the
tradition itself, but in order to bring to light its own effaced and marginalized elements.
Usually these elements are the repressed poles in the traditional metaphysical
oppositions, such as speech-writing, intelligible-sensible, male-female, spirit-matter,
culture-nature, time-space, and so forth. Although these elements are opposite to those
upon which tradition is based, Derrida shows that they still condition those explicit and
privileged presuppositions. In a word, deconstruction does not intend to destroy the
tradition. It only asks questions about the logic of the traditional hierarchy of concepts; it
thinks the tradition through anew. Only then the limits, or rather, the boundaries of
metaphysics, be envisioned-the divisible boundaries between yet another opposition:
the inside and the outside of metaphysics. The boundaries of all great texts from the
tradition bear the scars of those effaced elements. The scars should be reopened so that
the repressed elements could be set free. Even if these elements belong to that same
tradition, because seen anew, they reveal themselves as wholly other. The aim of
deconstruction is to delve the boundaries in order to bring about that other. In any case,
the intent of deconstruction is not to leave metaphysics behind. For this reason Derrida
even presents deconstruction quite metaphysically: "Deconstruction ... is also a thinking
of Being, of metaphysics, thus a discussion that has it out with ... the authority of Being
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or of essence, of the thinking of what is, and such a discussion or explanation cannot be
simply a negative destruction.,,18 Of course, deconstruction is no metaphysics in the
traditional sense. Nevertheless, it strives to fulfill the task of metaphysics as going
beyond, that is to say, going beyond metaphysics to meta-metaphysics. As Derrida
acknowledges discussing the Platonic epekeina tes ousias: "... the issue of moving
beyond being, is something which interests me greatly. I think that deconstruction is also
a means of carrying out this going beyond being, beyond being as presence, at least." 19
Derrida thinks that the whole tradition of going beyond being from Plato's Republic to a
certain Heidegger lies behind the notion of deconstruction.
Quasi-Metaphysical Grammatology
Definitely, Derrida's overcoming of metaphysical tradition from within, based on
the previously suppressed principles, may even appear as new metaphysics. The most
telling example is his so-called grammatology, the science of writing, supposedly prior to
any speech and independent of the logos and presence. Derrida brings to light writing as
the repressed other of speech. Being detached from the author, it is grounded not in the
presence but in the absence of univocal logos; it is disseminated in the multiplicity of the
different textual meanings referring to and differing from each other.
The appearance of grammatology as another metaphysics has caused many
misunderstandings about Derrida and deconstruction. The most common of them, based
on Derrida's phrase "there is nothing outside the text,,,20 claims that Derrida's reversal of
the tradition establishes a new metaphysical principle, namely, that all there is in the
world is inter-referential words and texts. Derrida maintains that this allegation is
incorrect and replies that "to distance oneself thus from the habitual structure of
reference, to challenge or complicate our common assumption about it, does not amount
to saying that there is nothing beyond language.t''" Not that there is no reference, but
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simply that there is no reference unrelated to linguistic systems, Eke the transcendental
signified. Grammatology only holds that there is no reference without difference, no
reference outside textual chain.
But that does not mean that grammatology would fall back into some kind of
realist metaphysics whose language is supposed to refer to the "things themselves"
outside textual and contextual Ernits.z2 If it is metaphysics, then it is only in the sense of
going beyond metaphysics. Derrida maintains that deconstruction as "the critique of
logocentrism is above all else the search for the 'other' and the 'other of language. ",23
That is a meta-metaphysical element. What is true, to be sure, is that deconstruction
shows that the question of reference is much more complex than traditional
hermeneutical theories suppose. Deconstruction may even ask whether the term
"reference" itself is adequate for designating "the other." The other, which is beyond
language and which summons language, which is the alterity by which language itself is
claimed, is, for Derrida, perhaps not a referent in a normal linguistic sense. This other of
language is neither this nor that: neither reducible to language and free play of signifiers
nor something free of the constraints of language as if fallen from the sky. It is neither
this nor that. It is the other.
In any case, Derrida himself is very careful not to equate his grammatological
effort with establishing an alternative privileged metaphysical hierarchy. That would be
another "centrism," graphocentrism this time. Therefore, as soon as the concept of
writing is established, it becomes just as suspect as that of speech. It is only a temporal
overthrow of the hierarchy. Above all, Derrida wants to question the very idea of
hierarchy. Therefore, grammatology is not a new science; it is only a question about the
possibility as well as impossibility of such a science. Derrida acquiesces that, ultimately,
this science of writing itself is not possible precisely because it is inevitably conditioned
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by the metaphysical concepts. For example, the unity of the concepts of science and
writing is itself determined by this historico-metaphysical epoch.
Insideoutness
Some Opposing Interpretations of Derrida
Derrida's double strategy of overcoming metaphysics is reflected in different
reactions to his thought. Schleiermacher has received similar opposing reaction about his
overcoming of metaphysics in theology. These reactions help with understanding the
intrinsic undecidability in these authors themselves and to realize the advantages of the
combined position of insideoutness in contrast to the unilateral approaches that these
reactions represent. Simplifying to the extreme, one can say that Derrida is regarded
either as the last metaphysician or as the wittiest author, as one who has managed to leave
behind the discourse of philosophy in favor of another, unclassifiable genre of writing.
Even if some acknowledge both of these sides, they tend to privilege one of them while
depreciating or neglecting the other.
Rorty exemplifies this attitude. No doubt, he clearly distinguishes between the
two aspects of Derrida's work, observing that Derrida himself proposes not to go between
the horns of the dilemma of reinstating or leaving metaphysics, "but rather to twine the
horns together into an interminable elongated double helix.,,24 Yet, Rorty himself favors
only one of these "horns." One of them is Derrida "at his best," and it is the aspect Rorty
admires and admits to sharing with Derrida, He ascribes to Derrida his own neo-
pragmatist view of language and textuality that conscientiously blurs the literature-
philosophy distinction and promotes "the idea of a seamless, undifferentiated "general
text."Z5Language, according to this view, is a tool rather than a medium, while meaning
is a function of the context in which a word or concept is used. Language is just the use
of marks and noises, made by human beings to get what they want. Philosophy and
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metaphysics, according to this view, constitute just one more literary genre, albeit
distinguished, "but which now survives largely in the form of self-parody.v" So, this
"good" Derrida, according to Rorty, like Nietzsche and Heidegger at their "best," does
not make surprising philosophical discoveries for the old metaphysical problems, but
instead forges new ways of speaking, displaces one intellectual world with another, gives
a substitute for previous beliefs. This new way of speaking does not say anything about
philosophy, but instead practically shows "what literature looks like once it is freed from
philosophy.Y' What remains after that is what Rorty calls "a kind of writing." It is
delimited, as any literary genre, not by form or matter, but by tradition-"a family
romance involving, e.g., Father Parmenides, honest uncle Kant, and bad brother
Derrida.,,28 What connects Derrida with the philosophical tradition is that he uses past
philosophers to obtain topics for his own "most vivid fantasies.,,29 "Private fantasy" is the
fairest of Rorty's compliments to Derrida's style.3o He refuses to play by the rules of the
"final vocabularies" of the others; he creates himself in the process of writing by creating
his own language game." Derrida has composed incredibly rich texts, with astonishingly
wide allusions, which unbelievably overlap intertextually with other texts, which allude
to other thinkers of all sorts, which misrepresent creatively, which mime and play, which
make linguistic puns and tremendously funny jokes. In a word, Rorty's "good" Derrida is
not a master of metaphysical thought, but a master of writing, of texts, of invention.V
But then, there is Rorty's other Derrida, Derrida "at his worst," betraying his own
project. This is a completely different Derrida, "the latest and largest flower in the
dialectical kudzu vine of which the Phenomenology of Spirit was the first tendril.,,33 This
side of Derrida' s work looks to Rorty "unfortunately constructive.v" It appears to Rorty
as "yet another transcendental idealism.t''" It is Derrida who, like Heidegger, wants to
find words that could carry him beyond metaphysics. Derrida's weakness in this
perspective is his adherence to the tradition. He tries to outdo the great philosophers of
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the tradition at their own game. He makes arguments. But this project, for Rorty, is
hopeless. It will only produce one more philosophical closure, one more metavocabulary
claiming superior status. Rorty thinks "that Derrida cannot argue without turning himself
into a metaphysician, one more claimant to the title of discoverer of the primal, deepest
vocabulary.v" In other words, Rorty sees Derrida as caught in a dilemma that he has
consistently not managed to surpass. Rorty thinks that insofar as Derrida remains faithful
to nominalism, transcendental arguments should not permit him to infer the existence of
such quasi-entities as differance, trace, arche-writing, and others (see next section). On
the other hand, insofar as he does not remain faithful to it, "he is just one more
metaphysician.t'" Rorty's own solution of Derrida's "dilemma" is to stick to the "good"
side and jettison the "bad" one, the "rigorous argument" part, the "false youthful
b . . ,,38egmnmg,
Of course, Rorty is right in detecting this side of Derrida's work. There is also a
number of thinkers who defend Derrida as the most rigorous argumentative thinker.
Perhaps the strongest cases in this direction are made by Norris and Gasche, who have
also engaged in a debate with Rorty. Norris' chief statement appears to be that Derrida's
deconstruction is basically a Kantian transcendental enterprise, only making writing (or
arche-writing) the precondition of all possible knowledge. Norris states that Derrida's
"claim is a priori in the radically Kantian sense: that we cannot think the possibility of
culture, history or knowledge in general without also thinking the prior necessity of
writing.v" Contra Rorty, Norris believes that "it is mistaken to suppose that
deconstruction gives some kind of warrant for dispensing with all the vexatious problems
of traditional philosophy and embracing a fuJI blown pragmatist creed.T"
Perhaps it is Gasche who has produced one of the most rigorously argumented
books about the constructive side of Derrida's work. But he also acknowledges the meta-
metaphysical elements in Derrida's thought, thus representing my approach between the
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two extremes. Unlike Norris, he does not regard Derrida's arguments transcendental, but
rather quasi-transcendental, belonging inside and outside metaphysics at the same time. I
include some aspects of Gasche's interpretation of Derrida that will later resemble
Schleiermacher's approach to the contrasts of metaphysics. The title of his book, The
Tain of the Mirror, comes from Derrida's text in Dissemination:
The breakthrough toward radical otherness (with respect to the philosophical
concept-of the concept) always takes, within philosophy, the form of an
aposteriority or an empiricism. But this is an effect of the specular nature of
philosophical reflection, philosophy being incapable of inscribing
(comprehending) what is outside it otherwise than through the appropriating
assimilation of a negative image of it, and dissemination is written on the back-
h . f h . 41t e tam-o t at rrurror.
Tain is the tinfoil, the lusterless back of the mirror. The title of the book is chosen in
keeping with the objective, to relate Derrida's thought to transcendental philosophy,
which Gasche identifies as the philosophy of reflection. Unlike Norris, however, Gasche
does not include Derrida's work in this philosophy because of his questioning reflection's
unthought, and thus the limits of its possibility. Gasche writes:
Derrida's philosophy, rather than being a philosophy of reflection, is engaged in
the systematic exploration of that dull surface [the tain] without which no
reflection and no specular and speculative activity would be possible, but which at
the same time has no place and no part in reflection's scintillating play.42
Deconstruction, rather, is supposed to break through the tinfoil of the mirror of reflection,
demonstrating the uncertainty of the speculum. In the deconstruction of reflection and
speculation, the mirroring is made excessive in order that it may look through the looking
glass toward what makes the speculum possible: its reverse side, the dull side doubling
the mirror's specular play, the tain. On this lining of the outside surface of reflection one
can read the mold that commands the mirror's play and determines the angles of
reflection.43
So, the transcendental resources sought by deconstruction are not a positive part
of metaphysical conceptuality, but are given in metaphysics in a negative manner or,
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rather, in a manner which is at the same time more, and less, than negativity. Less than
negativity because there is no meaning, no signification; it is "a negativity without
negativity." More than negativity because it still is the non-mediating "medium" in which
philosophy carves out its dialectical contradictions.l" These "foundations" are, in a
certain way, exterior to metaphysics.V' Though taken from the "inside," they do not
properly belong to it. At least not in a way as "outside" belongs to "inside" as its
opposite.
Gasche gives these "foundations" the name of "infrastructures," a word
occasionally used by Derrida himself. With this, Gasche refers to the same names that I
will analyze in the next section, like difference, trace, khora.46 These infrastructures help
deconstruction to avoid the metaphysical operation of the annulment of the conceptual or
discursive opposites or differences. That is to say, "deconstruction attempts to "account"
for these "contradictions" by "grounding" them in "infrastructures" discovered by
analyzing the specific organization of these "contradictions.,,47 The invention of the
infrastructures-the formal rules that regulate the play of the contradictions each time
differently-in Gasche's opinion, is Derrida's most original contribution to philosophy, a
contribution that displaces the logic of philosophy and inscribes it within a general
heterology. The infrastructures, on Gasche's account, have pre-ontological and pre-
logical status. They cannot be of the nature of the opposites for which they account.
Otherwise they would belong to the order of what they account for. The infrastructures
must precede in a non-temporal way the alternatives of being and nothing, presence and
absence, and the ontico-ontological difference as well. As a "ground," an infrastructure
must be a radical alterity in excess of that which it accounts for. For the same reasons, the
infrastructures must be pre-logical. The laws that it formulates must be laws that account
for the difference between the philosophical logos and the other of philosophy. Therefore,
they govern the possibility of every logical proposition. Yet, they cannot have the
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simplicity of a logical principle or a categorical a priori condition. As Derrida himself
puts it, the pre-logical possibilities of logic "are not 'logically' primary or secondary with
regard to logic itself. They are (topologically?) alien to it, but not as its principle,
condition of possibility, or 'radical' foundation.,,48
In other words, the infrastructure is not in a relation of opposition to that which it
makes possible. It is not the ontotheological relation of opposition between the ground
and the grounded. Instead of being a ground in traditional philosophical language, the
infrastructure is "a nonfundamental structure, or an abyssal structure, to the extent that it
is without bottom.'.49 Furthermore, although the infrastructures are the spaces of
inscription of the function of origin, they do not simply represent transcendentalia that, as
a priori conditions, rule over origins. Infrastructures are not deeper, supraessential
origins. Equally important, if they ground origins, they unground them at the same time.
"Infrastructures are conditions as much of the impossibility as of the possibility of origins
and grounds.t'" In summation, for one thing, infrastructures maintain a foothold in the
old conceptual order from which they are taken or derived. They must continue to do so
if they want to intervene in it effectively. For another thing, as the open matrix of the
conceptual differences, the infrastructures function as their grounds of possibility. For yet
another thing, "since these infrastructures are a sort of repressed reserve, they also by
virtue of their encompassing power delimit the concepts of metaphysics, making them,
rigorousl y speaking, impossible. ,,51
There is some discussion in Gasche's book that is significant for this project
because it enlarges upon the position I defend as metaphysical insideoutness. First of all,
as it is clear from numerous utterances of Derrida, deconstruction cannot be an attempt to
reach a simple outside or beyond of metaphysics. To recapitulate, deconstruction is
neither neutralized by the annulling force of the concepts it borrows from the tradition it
deconstructs nor deluded by the illusionary possibility of simply stepping outside of
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philosophy. For one thing, Gasche maintains that deconstruction, as an attempt to step
outside the always historical closure of philosophy, itself produces this "outside" in a
finite fashion. For another thing, since deconstruction is also the deconstruction of the
genuinely metaphysical opposition of inside and outside, "the operation by which it must
produce this 'outside' of the discourse of philosophy can no longer be understood as a
passage from an interior to an exterior.,,52 Equally important, neither can such an outside
be itself an outside with regard to an inside. In order to affirm itself as transgression,
deconstruction must conserve and affirm in one way or another what it exceeds, for it is
only with respect to the limit it crosses. For that reason, it can only consist of a sort of
displacement of the limits and closure of the discourse. Hence, to "exceed the discourse
of philosophy cannot possibly mean to step outside the closure, because the outside
belongs to the categories of the inside.,,53 "The excess or transgression of philosophy,"
Gasche goes on, "is, therefore, decided at the margins of the closure only, in an always
strategical-that is, historically finitc-s-fashion.Y" It is a transgression or excess without
transgression. The tain is always concealed from the gaze by its lustrous front side,
which, nonetheless, receives its brightness from the lusterless back. Therefore, the
outside is always a finite construction, which yet transgresses the inside in the very
process of production.f
Insideoutness As between In- and Outside of Metaphysics
Amidst all of these ambiguities, the question may arise, is it then a vicious circle,
neither remaining within, nor overcoming metaphysics? Not necessarily, and Gasche's
interpretation already provided a glimpse of the way out of the dilemma. Clearly,
although Derrida himself acknowledges that there is no clear path outside metaphysics,
he also denies that "we are incarcerated in it as prisoners or victims of some unhappy
fatality.,,56 Derrida refuses to accede that "we are 'locked into' or 'condemned to'
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metaphysics, for we are, strictly speaking, neither inside nor outside.,,57 Hence, writing
can still function from inside as an exemplary figure of otherness. Therefore,
grammatology may be necessary, I would say, as a quasi-Kantian regulative idea, not as a
proper figure of metaphysics. In effect, some overcoming occurs. Not overcoming as a
finished accomplishment, but as a never accomplished process of writing in which one
never knows whether s/he is inside or out. One "is never installed within transgression,
one never lives elsewhere.t''" Even the "thought-that-means-nothing"-the
grammatological thought, which exceeds meaning-as-hearing-oneself-speak-"is given
precisely as the thought for which there is no sure opposition between outside and
inside.,,59 "Deconstruction goes to the hinge between the two, at the place of interface
between that which writes itself as outside and that which it delineates as inside.,,6o It
works "on the slash inserted between all the binary schemes on which metaphysics feeds.
And that place is of course neither (wholly) inside nor outside of philosophy, which
means that it is (in part) both inside and outside philosophy."?' Only the limit is always at
work. "But," Derrida's says, "by means of the work done on one side and the other of the
limit the field inside is modified ... ,,62And it is such a modification that itself produces
the other of the outside, even if in a finite fashion, belonging to the categories of inside.
Even being so, the task of metaphysics is satisfied at least to the extent that "the non-
place or non-lieu" is discovered, which is the other of philosophy.f Ultimately, since
there is neither inside nor outside of metaphysics for Derrida, the space of the meta of
metaphysics, of meta-metaphysics, is not even somewhere outside or beyond. It rather is
another space or nonspace in an undecided between inside and outside, mirror's tain.
Hence, it is insideoutness.
On this account, Derrida sees deconstruction as "a double gesture or double
stratification" that is simultaneously faithful and violent circulation between the inside
and the outside of metaphysics." On the one hand, it overturns the old hierarchies, at the
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same time bringing up paradoxes, disparities, heterogeneities, and aporias that crack and
fissure the old discourse. On the other hand, it must safeguard the results of the previous
move from being reappropriated metaphysically. The second part of the gesture
eventually leads out of the metaphysical appropriation to the new paths of thinking the
unthought from the inside, within inside. Something that I would call new and
interruptive quasi-concepts emerge in this phase. Although appearing to be like concepts,
they no longer fit into the previous regime. But working through them-marking the
conditions, the medium, and the limits of their effectiveness, designating their
relationship to the machine whose deconstruction they permit-might create a crevice, as
Derrida says, through which "the yet unnameable glimmer beyond the closure" of
metaphysics can be glimpsed.f I tum to some of these quasi-concepts next.
Outwitting Metaphysical Language with Words:
Some Figures of Insideoutness
In Derrida's perspective, as shown above, the rapport between the inside and the
outside of metaphysics is related to the finitude and the reserve of language. This inside-
outside rapport, for Derrida, can be seen from another topos, space, or rather, a-topos, or
nonspace (utopia), glimpsed through that crevice of deconstruction. This is the other of
philosophy through which philosophy appears to itself as other than itself, so that it can
"interrogate and reflect upon itself in an original manner.,,66 Derrida tries to disclose this
other, this nonspace of insideoutness through a special use of certain words that are
recovered from the forgotten margins of philosophical texts, re-invented, or taken from
ordinary language. These words belong neither to inside nor outside; they just hang in the
between-space from which they can help to catch that glimpse of the unnamable, at least
the first times they are used." Insofar as these transgressive words may be immediately
conceptualized by "the philosophy of deconstruction," Derrida always changes them. In
104
fact, one word works only for one particular Derrida's text. After that, they wear out and
become part of the ever-new kinds of metaphysics. Here are some of these words:
differance, trace, khora, arche-writing, spacing, dissemination, pharmakon, supplement,
iterability, hymen, cinders, and others. Here I will only briefly explain the first three.
Difference
The most popular is Derrida's neographism difference. Differance is pronounced
the same way as the word difference, which means "difference," a keyword to Hegel,
Nietzsche, Freud, Saussure, and Heidegger. The difference is in spelling only: there is an
"a" instead of the "e." The ending with "a" is used in French to produce noun forms
from verbs. Since the French word differer means both to differ and to defer, the meaning
of differance is both a differing and a deferring of meaning. It is the imperceptible
difference marked in the "differ( )nce" between the "e" and the "a" that makes the
insideoutness possible, that produces the strange space in-between, the space neither
inside nor outside the metaphysical opposition, in this case, between speech and writing
and, accordingly, between the sensible and the intelligible-the founding opposition of
philosophy.f Furthermore, the "a" of difference also recalls that this spacing is at the
same time temporization. Since the sign is always a deferred presence of the signified,
always represents the present in its absence, differance also marks "the detour and
postponement by means of which intuition, perception, consummation-in a word, the
relationship to the present, the reference to a present reality, to a being-are always
deferred.T" This deferring takes place by virtue of the principle of difference itself,
according to which an element functions and signifies only by referring to another past or
future element in the economy of traces. By the same token, the ending -ance remains
undecided between passive signification, as in Saussure's theory, and active differing or
deferring. Because of its ambiguity, difference is not. It is not a concept, because there is
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no vertical signification in the play of differences.I" It is not a word because it cannot be
represented as the unity of a concept and the phonic material. Difference is not, is not a
present-being (to on) in any form, however excellent, unique, principal, or transcendent.
It has neither essence nor existence. It derives from no category of being, whether present
or absent. When one says that it "is," the "is" should be crossed out, like later
Heidegger's "being." As a consequence, it eludes the metaphysics of presence, for it
cannot even be before the differences in a simple present. On the contrary, when
differance intervenes, together with the chain of differences attached to it, all
metaphysical oppositions become nonpertinent because of their referring to something
present.i'
There is the question of whether this same refusal to bring differance into the
game of metaphysics does not "simply cast it into the beyondness of the metaphysical'Z'f '
At the very moment "when differance is conceived as being outside the metaphysics of
ontological difference it becomes metaphysical; hence it is both outside and inside
metaphysics.t'{' Therefore, it is not surprising that Derrida says that as the condition of
possibility of signification, differance is "older" than the truth of being and older than
ontological difference. It is so precisely because being itself cannot have meaning except
by dissimulating itself in entities.i" Difference rather is "a bottomless chessboard" on
which being itself is put into play. Being "older" than being itself, it has no name in
human language, even if it is called by a quite metaphysical name. Difference "not only
precedes metaphysics but also extends beyond the thought of being.,,75 Derrida also
claims: "Differance is not only irreducible to any ontological or theological-
ontotheological-reappropriation, but as the very opening of the space in which
ontotheology-philosophy-produces its system and its history, it includes ontotheology,
inscribing it and exceeding it without return.r" However, as Derrida stresses, differance
should not be taken as some hyperessential being of negative theology. Differance does
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not belong to the hyperessentiality of the beyond, for it occupies the nonspace in-
between. Difference is "older" in a linguistic sense, not mystical. It only means that God,
or being, or anything else, can only be named in the linguistic system of differences.
Trace
Perhaps Derrida's word most closely related to differance, even its synonym, is
"trace." "The (pure) trace is differance," Derrida states.77 The trace is the difference that
opens appearance and signification. Generally speaking, the trace in Derrida's
understanding designates the minimal structure required for the existence of every
difference or opposition of terms, for any relation to alterity.i" In metaphysics, the
difference between two terms is perceived from the perspective of one of them, the term
of plenitude, from which the second term derives. The first term remains supposedly
unaffected by the fact that it appears in opposition to another, less valorized term.
Deconstruction, in contrast to metaphysics, holds to the trace stemming from an insight
into the constituting function of difference, the holding-against-another. The privileged
term in a difference of opposition would not appear as such without the difference or
opposition that gives it form. Consequently, the trace is a reflection on the form that a
term or entity of plenitude will have to take, insofar as it can appear only in oppositions.
The trace can be reflected as the indissociable appearing of what comes to the fore with
the other, lesser term or entity.
Actually, the word trace is borrowed from Heidegger's "early trace" (die friihe
Spur), namely, the already erased trace of the forgotten ontological difference.
Commenting on Heidegger, Derrida writes that in order to exceed metaphysics it is
necessary that its trace be inscribed within the text of metaphysics, "a trace that continues
to signal not in the direction of another presence, or another form of presence, but in the
direction of an entirely other text.,,79The determination of the trace belongs to the text of
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metaphysics that shelters it; it does not belong to the trace itself, because there is no
proper trace itself. Such a trace, goes on Derrida, cannot be thought in a metaphysical
mode, and no philosopheme is prepared to master it. Trace is not presence, which only
can be mastered. The mode of inscription of such a trace in the text of metaphysics is so
unthinkable that it must be described as an erasure of the trace itself. ''The trace is
produced as its own erasure.t''" It is the characteristic of the trace to erase itself, to elude
what might maintain it in presence. As Derrida says, the trace, this "almost nothing of the
unpresentable.t''" which has always been erased by philosophers, is neither a ground, nor
a foundation, nor an origin, and in no case can it provide for a manifest or disguised
ontotheology.Y Trace is that which is not yet language, or speech, or writing, or sign, or
even something "proper to mankind." It is neither "presence nor absence, beyond binary,
oppositional, or dialectical logic.t'V It is the point at which it is even no longer a question
of opposing writing to speech. ''The trace," Derrida asserts, "is nothing, it is not an entity,
it exceeds the question What is? and contingently makes it possible.,,84 "Articulating the
living upon the nonliving in general, origin of all repetition, origin of ideality, the trace is
not more ideal than real, not more intelligible than sensible, not more a transparent
signification than an opaque energy and no concept of metaphysics can describe it. ,,85
Khora
Another of Derrida's favorite correlate for differance is khora (Derrida uses kh
instead of ch). Khora is a "sur-name" for differance, a sort of "allegory" of differance'"
There is a certain stereotype of Platonism-associated with Plato's image of the cave-as
a dualism of the two worlds: the upper world of the intelligible, the realm of unchanging
ideas in the sun of the good, and the sensible likenesses of the ideas in the changing
visible world of becoming. It is this distinction that "carves out the very space of 'meta-
physics. ",87Derrida observes that the so-called "philosophy of Plato," the enterprise of
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the academy, with its neatly arranged theses and philosophemes, is challenged by the
transgressive moments of Plato's texts themselves. One of such moments is khora in
Timaeus, "an unpredictable, dark, and remote spot in the vast and gleaming architecture
of Platonism.,,88
In khora, Derrida finds a third element that does not correspond to either of the
two poles, "some untruth, or barely true remnant, which falls outside the famous
distinction ... ,,89This element is khora, which is the immense and indeterminate spatial
receptacle, kind of a nurse or a mother, a sort of tabula rasa, in which the sensible
likenesses of the eternal forms are engendered, inscribed by the Demiurge, thereby
providing a "home" for all things. Derrida writes:
Khora marks a place apart, the spacing which keeps a dissymmetrical relation to
all that which, "in herself," besides or in addition to herself, seems to make a
couple with her. In the couple, this strange mother who gives place without
engendering can no longer be considered as an origin. She/it eludes all anthropo-
theological schemes, all history, all revelation, and all truth."
The khora is neither a sensible thing nor an intelligible form; it belongs to a "third
genus" (triton genos), as Timaeus declares. To a certain extent, the khora is like the
eternal forms: it is not born, neither does it die; it is always already there, and, therefore,
is beyond temporal coming-to-be and passing away. Yet, it does not have the same
eternity as the forms have; it only has a certain achronistic atemporality. Neither is it the
same as the other intelligible objects of the mind, notwithstanding its sensual
impercepti bi lity.
Like differance was older than being, khora is thinkable only by virtue of
returning to a beginning that "is older than the beginning, namely, the birth of the
cosmos .. .',gj Khora is a name that, like differance, defies "the logic of noncontradiction
of the philosophers" and derives from the "logic other than the logic of the logos," the
logic of binarity, of yes and no.92One cannot even say that it is neither this, nor that, or
that it is both this and that. Neither is it intelligible being, nor sensible becoming, rather a
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little like both. Neither is it a subject matter of the true logos, nor a good mythos. Hence,
it is not an oscillation between two poles; it is the oscillation between two types of
oscillation: the double exclusion (neither/nor) and the participation (both this and that).93
Khora is even not the abyss between the sensible and the intelligible, between being and
nothing, between being and entity, being and the existent, between logos and mythos,
between any two oppositions. Yet, it is the abyss, but, increasingly important, "between
all these couples and another which would not even be their other.,,94 Thus, the khora is a
place of insideoutness that is outside metaphysical oppositions, and as such it passes the
abyss between them and the unopposed other, yet unnameable to come.
The Interpretative Scheme of the Dissertation
I have applied my proposed strategy of insideoutness to my chosen instances of
overcoming metaphysics in Western tradition, but my exposition reached its culmination
in Derrida's approach. The following is the summary statement of Derrida's strategy of
insideoutness in overcoming metaphysics, according to my interpretation. First, Derrida
criticizes metaphysics, thus, calling for its overcoming. Second, he overcomes that
metaphysics in my first sense of overcoming-an overcoming of metaphysics with
another metaphysics. That is, he subverts the old metaphysics by means of an alternative
graphocentric theory derived from the elements that the old metaphysics has suppressed.
Insofar as his new theory must be based on metaphysical concepts, it does not overcome
metaphysics as such. Therefore, third, Derrida concedes that, on the one hand, the full
overcoming of metaphysics is not possible. Yet, on the other hand, and fourth, Derrida
claims that overcoming occurs when the repressed antitheses meet the privileged
concepts of the old metaphysics. This encounter releases some indeterminate linguistic
residue that remains after the metaphysical reappropriation of the rediscovered antitheses.
Strange quasi-concepts emerge, which do not belong either to inside, or outside of
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metaphysics, but inhabit the nonspace in-between. From there, Derrida is able to catch a
glimpse of tout autre overcoming metaphysics in my second sense of overcoming-
leaving metaphysics behind. Yet, not in some hyperessential realm, but in the same realm
of finite and empirical signification.
Now, the main task will be to discern these features in Schleiermacher's project.
First, Schleiermacher understands metaphysics as speculation and proposes ways of
overcoming it. Then, although Schleiermacher accepts Kant's critique of traditional
metaphysics, he is not satisfied with Kant's overcoming. Therefore, second,
Schleiermacher elaborates his alternative to Kant's metaphysics in the lectures on
dialectic. Although there are many non-metaphysical moments, here he does not intend to
leave metaphysics as such completely behind, but rather presents what he considers a
more appropriate metaphysics. He also refuses to privilege any pole of metaphysical
contrasts. Third, Schleiermacher claims to overcome metaphysics in his dogmatics in the
sense ofleaving it behind. Yet, to some extent, he is aware that a full overcoming is not
possible. Therefore, he does not fully exclude metaphysics from his system. Moreover, as
my critique will show, there are instances in which metaphysics implicitly finds its way
back into the dogmatic system. Nevertheless, fourth, there is a way in which
Schleiermacher may be regarded as having overcome metaphysics in a sense similar to
Derrida's. To demonstrate this, I will interpret his notions of Gefiihl, Anschauung,
Ubergang, and "point-zero" as such instances, emerging from the interplay of
metaphysical contrasts, but not of metaphysics themselves. I will then show that they
have a similar function in overcoming metaphysics as Derrida's "infrastructures," like
differance, khora, and others. But, finally, even the contrast between metaphysics and
religious devoutness will produce an experiential-existential outside of both.
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PART TWO
SCHLEIERMACHER'S METAPHYSICS:
UNDERSTANDING AND CONTEXT
CHAPTER 4
METAPHYSICS AS SPECULATION
There are two chapters in Part Two. This chapter will deal with Schleiermacher's
understanding of metaphysics, but chapter 5 will explore his relationship to Kant. Kant's
philosophy is the main context for any metaphysical undertaking in Schleiermacher's
time. Schleiermacher is not only decisively influenced by Kant's thought, but also
challenged to overcome it.
Like most philosophers, Schleiermacher must have his own peculiar
understanding of what metaphysics is. In the Dialektik, for instance, he gives an
important and peculiar definition of metaphysics as "the insight about verification of
correlation between thinking and being in general.": But, if one wants to obtain a more
comprehensive outlook of Schleiermacher's understanding of metaphysics, merely using
those texts in which he mentions the term itself do not suffice. That would greatly limit
this discussion, for Schleiermacher rarely calls metaphysics by its proper name. When he
does, it is typically in connection with dialectics as a science that comprises both logic
and metaphysics.i
Fortunately, at least to my understanding, Schleiermacher talks about metaphysics
under different names, and his understanding of metaphysics also comes forth, or at least
is presupposed, in many other contexts of the Dialectic and other works. In truth, most of
the remaining work below will be an elaboration of his understanding of metaphysics.
Even more important, some distinctive features of Schleiermacher's metaphysics will be
the main points of this dissertation.
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In this project, metaphysics in its broadest sense is defined to be a theoretical
attempt of going beyond physical reality either to its structures or to the mental
conditions of knowledge, or both simultaneously (as in Schleiermacher's definition
above). Schleiermacher most often used term for these things is "speculation"
(Spekulation). As a matter of fact, it may be considered as Schleiermacher's synonym for
the word "metaphysics." Therefore, I commence with expounding Schleiermacher's
understanding of metaphysics under his use of the term "speculation." The two terms are
used interchangeably in this chapter.
In addition, the exposition of Schleiermacher' s understanding of speculation will
also provide a convenient introduction to his understanding of metaphysics; in that sense
this chapter is still introductory. Several themes touched upon here will be elaborated in
greater detail later. For this same reason, I will defer discussions of many nuances related
to Schleiermacher's understanding of metaphysics. I will only concentrate on those texts,
in which Schleiermacher discusses speculation, and will avoid wider connections, saving
them for later discussions.
Besides this general introductory purpose, this chapter will also introduce a
crucial facet of Schleiermacher's metaphysics that will emerge in all further chapters.
This facet has to do with Schleiermacher's consistent rejection of pure speculation and
his requirement that speculation be complemented by real knowing. This requirement
already shows an important aspect of Schleiermacher's overcoming of metaphysics, an
empirically grounded metaphysics overcomes the abstract metaphysics.
Speculation Defined
Since Schleiermacher often uses the term "speculation" without explaining what it
means, I begin by adding my own interpretation to clarify the term. Admittedly, I do not
know whether Schleiermacher himself was aware of such an interpretation. Maybe he
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was, for it is based on a plain etymological level of Latin. Perhaps it simply did not occur
to him to point it out. Be that as it may, there is another purpose for my own clarification;
it will help with my argument in this chapter. My interpretation of speculation will
conform to Schleiermacher's understanding of what true and viable speculation ought to
be. So, even if Schleiermacher was not aware of such an interpretation, I believe that it
conforms to his spirit.
I should also note that the interchangeability of metaphysics and speculation is not
something that I understand as taking place only in Schleiermacher's thought.
Speculation is a science that shares its objects with metaphysics. Speculative philosophy
encompasses insights from the different branches of metaphysics-such as cosmology,
psychology, and theology-in a unified system.
Metaphysics itself has gone through a lot of disgrace in both popular thinking and
philosophical critique. To say the least, both often agree in identifying metaphysics as
some idle, abstract, unreal, and futile fancy that has lost any connection to reality. Being
so close to metaphysics, speculation, by extension, receives a similar treatment. In many
cases, however, that skepticism may be oversimplified. As shown in the Introduction,
metaphysics is the most serious science of the first principles of being and knowing,
which, in reaction to criticisms, often revises these first principles, trying to make them
viable in new situations. The same is true for speculation.
Even the etymology of the word "speculation" may lead in directions different
from the popular attitudes as well as from the cliches created by the philosophical
critique. The Latin word specere on the most basic level means "to see, observe," as well
as "to watch over, to keep an eye on.,,3 Also, one of the meanings of speculari-a
derivative from specere-is "to see by observation, to descry."? Obviously, the verb "to
speculate" is derived from these words; it also means "to look or gaze at (something); to
examine, inspect, or observe closely or narrowly.T Most often, however, its meaning is
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already extended: it means "to observe or view mentally; to consider, examine, or reflect
upon with close attention; to contemplate; to theorize upon.?" It may also mean "to
exercise spiritual contemplation" or "to engage in thought or reflection, esp. of a
conjectural or theoretical nature, on or upon a subject.:" The physical object of
speculation has been replaced with a theoretical subject. In fact, the possibility of this
extension of meaning made it possible to use the Latin speculatio to translate the Greek
concept of theoria. It refers to abstract or hypothetical reasoning. Since then, speculation
has been regarded as the highest form of contemplative activity that pursues knowledge
for its own sake. According to this determination, speculation is identical with philosophy
itself. Insofar as speculation, like philosophical activity as such, transcends the factual
givenness in order to achieve its ultimate grounds, it is a synonym to metaphysics. That
Schleiermacher's usage of speculation proceeds in these lines is seen from his references
to speculation as scientific activity related to "the unity and common form of knowing"
or as "pure philosophy" concerned with "the unity and interconnectedness of all
knowledge and with the very nature of coming to know.,,8
Although this may be true, I would like to enter a different claim in regard to the
meaning of speculation. I want to return to the original meaning of specere. Based on
this, speculation ought to be contemplation about or reflection upon that which is being
seen. It means that speculation is a kind of phenomenology, at least in the sense that it
can re1lect only on something that appears to immediate sight. Simply stated, even
theoretically one cannot look at or observe something beyond the observable, beyond
phenomena. Therefore, speculation should have empirical ground. Otherwise the gaze
runs into the mirror of nothing and returns its own empty self-reflection. And, most
important, as I have already mentioned and as I will show below, it is precisely
Schleiermacher's requirement for speculation-to have this empirical or
phenomenological ground. Schleiermacher's understanding of true speculation, as I will
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demonstrate, conforms to my understanding of speculation inferred from the etymology
of specere.
Empirical Speculation as the Proper Speculation
First of all, it is clear that Schleiermacher indeed opposes speculation. In certain
cases, he has a derisive disposition towards it. For instance, in the Dialektik, he calls
speculative theology or theosophy "unconscious brooding" (bewusstloses Briiten) or
"gymnosophistic navelgazing" (gymnosophistische Briiten iiber die Nasenspizei.' This
speculative theology seeks knowledge of God's self, isolated from human God-
consciousness. However, that is not the whole story. Schleiermacher denies only a certain
kind of speculation, while supporting another. Schleiermacher's early thinking in his
1808 publication of Occasional Thoughts on Universities and in his 1811 lectures on
dialectic is already programmatic with regard to his true understanding of the role and
meaning of speculation.
In his observations about the situation in the academy, Schleiermacher also
notices that exploration in the particular areas of "real," empirical sciences has become
the main focus of scientific activity. He further observes that speculation as pure
philosophy, in contrast, has been put all the way in background, so that it does not
interfere with a healthy development of culture. 10 It is noteworthy that this time
Schleiermacher does not accept the devaluation of speculation. On the contrary, I would
say that he subverts this conventional hierarchical opposition of empiricism and
speculation. He raises the element of speculation from its suppressed position.
Schleiermacher insists that all particular knowing rests on that general knowing that only
speculation can provide. "Accordingly," Schleiermacher claims, "there is no such thing
as a scientifically productive capacity without a speculative spirit." 11 He continues that
both spirits of speculation and exact science cohere in such a way that an individual who
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has not cultivated the speculative mode of thinking will not be able to produce anything
with real scientific worth. Speculation gives systematization and overall perspective of
the entire domain of knowledge.
But at the same time, Schleiermacher's subversion of the empiricism-speculation
opposition in favor of speculation is not so simple and unequivocal. He says: "Only
through acquaintance with the first principles is there an escape from the empirical and
the beaten path, on the one hand, and from arbitrariness, on the other."Il At the first
glance, this sentence seems strange. Its first part is already familiar. It is speculation and
its first principles that help one escape from obstinate, one-sided empiricism. But how
can speculation save one from arbitrariness? After all, pure speculation itself is usually
regarded as the culprit of arbitrariness. Is there a contradiction? Not necessarily.
If I understand this text correctly, the clue lies in Schleiermacher's understanding
of speculation as empirically grounded science. The first principles are indeed developed
speculatively, but from the material provided by empirical sciences. The arbitrariness, in
Schleiermacher's opinion, is not the fault of speculation as such. The actual error is its
being isolated. Speculation alone definitely does not suffice, "but must be embodied at
the same time in "real" knowing.,,13 It is empirical knowledge that provides speculation
with the material to be organized theoretically. Ultimately, speculation arises from the
specificities of reality, and it is a tool that aids discovering more about the concretions of
reality. 14 The deductive reasoning of speculation by itself does not have the power to
produce concretion. It can merely lift out a posteriori given structures, although to the
extent that these structures are given, they are a priori. IS Hence, the scientific spirit
(Empirie) and the talent for the first principles (Speculatio) are not at all disparate.
Rather, they "are always to be practiced only cooperatively." 16 Both together are
indispensable. As Schleiermacher states:
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Although it rests on sense impressions, no common consciousness is really one
and determined without participation in the higher process; likewise, no formula
becomes alive if we do not keep in mind the extent of its application in the field
f . . 17o sensuous impressions,
Common here means empirical consciousness, but higher means speculative process.
Noteworthy, according to Schleiermacher, is that even the abstract forms of thought, such
as formula "aea" and the highest metaphysical concept of thing, ens, must have their
organic side. The former expresses either the identity of thought and being, thus being the
form of knowledge, or the identity of the subject, thus being the condition of knowledge.
Without organic facticity it is only empty repetition. The latter, in tum, must include the
organic element insofar as ens is something that affects organization and subsists by
virtue of the multiplicity of impressions. 18
Thus, Schleiermacher's subversion of empiricism-speculation hierarchy is not
final. When either speculation or real science works alone, the result is an unnecessary
opposition, like that between rationalist and empiricist philosophical traditions.
Moreover, each of them separately causes skepticism toward each other-a stance so
hated by Schleiermacher.19 His intent is to abolish any opposition between reason and
experience, speculation and empirical base, apriori and a posteriori.i'' He asserts instead:
''There is truth in each of these acts of thinking, and therefore being is also represented in
them, and indeed the same being in both; however, the becoming of knowing takes place
only insofar as one is related to the other."zl One should only note that this relating does
not mean that an identity of speculation and empiricism is reached. To Schleiermacher,
only in the knowledge of the totality of being could there be the identity of speculation
and empiricism. Although it is the same being represented in both, its totality is not given
as knowledge, but only experienced outside knowledge, in immediate self-consciousness.
For knowledge it is only a presupposition. To say more is to give way to poetry or
rhetoric,22 which is equivalent to pure speculation from an epistemological viewpoint.
What can be known, however, according to Schleiermacher, is some particular area of
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being, and it can only be known by means of either speculation or empiricism
separately.r' "The true (eigentlich) philosophy," in which the "interpenetration"
(Durchdringung) of speculation and empiricism could take place, is not possible.i"
Instead, what is possible, in Schleiermacher's view, is "a scientific critique"
(wissenschaftliche Kritik) in which only an accompanying relation of speculation and
empiricism takes place.25 A supposed real philosophy-a metaphysical synthesis of
speculation and empiricism (like that of Hegel, for example)--must be overcome by
critical philosophy in which both run parallel to and influence each other. Philosophy as
critique cannot claim the synthesis of speculation and empiricism, yet it needs both for its
task to sort out the sound principles of philosophizing from the fallacious ones.
On this account, Schleiermacher also defines philosophy as "establishing
knowledge in reference to being and arranging the linking of all knowledge, wherein all
knowledge that has not turned into the real field of knowledge [i.e., pure speculation]
must be dissolved.v"
In any event, as will be seen many more times in the course of this work,
Schleiermacher's metaphysical position concerning the contrasts prefers the state of
parallel balance to that of opposition. Also in this case, knowledge can only be produced
when both poles of the contrast work together, when reason and sense experience
cooperate. The speculative or intellectual function of thinking and the organic or
empirical function of thinking are always closely interrelated, but they never completely
merge into each other. These conclusions will be important when I return to further
analysis of Schleiermacher's Dialectic in the next parts, including the analysis of
Schleiermacher's treatment of such metaphysical contrasts as thinking and being, concept
and judgment, intellectual and organic, ideal and real, God and world, and others.
Equally important, returning to etymology, the word speculation can also have
connotations to mirror, speculum, inasmuch as the latter is derived from the word
125
specere. Again, since reflection in ancient metallic mirrors was fuzzy, this allusion may
lead to the popular meaning of speculation as an abstract and obscure meddling in the
realm beyond verification. Or, alternatively, it may point to the long-standing Western
philosophical tradition that considers the human mind as a mirror reflecting the whole
reality. Noteworthy, whereas Schleiermacher goes hand in hand with Kant, endorsing his
critique of rationalist metaphysics and its overcoming with the requirement of unification
of reason with sense experience, he differs from Kant in regard to the relationship of
thinking and being. That is to say, Schleiermacher's approach is totally opposed to
Kantian subjective idealism - the modulation of being by reason. (I will return to
Schleiermacher's relationship to Kant below, especially in the next chapter.)
Schleiermacher himself represents this long-standing speculum tradition with the
metaphysical principle of the identity of thinking and being in its apex. In the Dialectic
he states: "Knowing is the congruence of thinking with being as what is thought. .. , the
pure coinciding of reason with being."n Notably, this congruence is inevitable because of
a simple reason. That is, pure, formal thinking, in Schleiermacher's view, is not possible
at all. It would be an instance of thinking about nothing. The nothing, in
Schleiermacher's view, can never be present as referring to something that precedes it-a
requirement for thought to take place.28 The nothing cannot be thought. Thinking can
only take place under the form of being.29 Inasmuch as speculation requires the empirical
basis, thinking itself requires the organic element.
To add to that, the organic element must be present even in cases where thinking
is sheer arbitrariness, fantasy, or error. Pure speculation could also very well fit in this
group. In Schleiermacher's perspective, some organic element must be present even in
these kinds of thinking, but only as form.3D It is thinking without question-only thinking
that cannot qualify as knowing. For one thing, as Schleiermacher says, all knowing is
thinking, for another, not all thinking is at the same time knowing. First of all, knowing is
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present only in the process of thinking, not in having been thought. Second, and this is a
very important point made by Schleiermacher to which I will return several times,
knowing is a process of thinking that can be validated as identical in a community of
thinkersr" This claim anticipates the pragmatist non-metaphysical theory of truth as
agreement. It means that truth is acquired neither through the empiricist conformity of
mind to reality nor through the rationalist conformity of reality to the mind. Instead, truth
is established inter-subjectively by means of the "communicative action" within the
community of thinkers, if I may use Habermas' term here. Anyway, as Schleiermacher
holds, the individual reason is only fantasy, but the individual organization of sense
experience-e-error.Y But above all, knowing is thinking that corresponds to being; it is
thinking "that is pure absorption of reason in being.,,33 Although arbitrariness, fantasy,
and error have their organic side, they cannot produce knowledge despite their reference
to being, for they do not correspond to objective being.i" Schleiermacher states: "But
thinking to which no corresponding being is posited-like fairies, centaurs, and so
forth-is no knowing at all.,,35Although those creatures have their phenomenal images,
one cannot know them because no actual being corresponds to them. I hold that the same
happens with speculation. Words that designate its abstract concepts, being signs, have
their material form to which, yet, no corresponding real being can be established. As for
the error, Schleiermacher points out that it does not proceed from being, for being cannot
err. Error proceeds from the subjectivity of reason, from its finitude, inability to grasp the
true being. And paradoxically, this finitude is the very reason why even the congruence
of thinking with being cannot actually be known. It can only be hypothetically
presupposed.
So, if Schleiermacher indeed opposes speculation, one must keep in mind that it is
only a certain kind of speculation. There is no question that he rejects pure, unverifiable,
unsubstantiated speculation that has lost the necessary experiential reference.
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Transcendental philosophy, in Schleiermacher's opinion, is an example of such a useless,
one-sided philosophy that has lost its necessary counterpart. His contempt toward pure
speculation and its separation from real knowing can very well be felt from this passage:
Indeed, the scientific spirit as the highest principle, as the immediate unity of all
knowledge, cannot be represented and exhibited for itself alone - in ghostlike
fashion - in sheer transcendental philosophy. Unfortunately, many have tried to
accomplish this, carrying sundry phantoms and strange concerns into the effort.
Probably no more vapid a philosophy is thinkable than one that extracts itself so
purely and expects that real knowing, as something lower, should be given or
taken from a totally different source."
Such a philosophy is a waste of time and energy. Or, as Schleiermacher indicates, it is
like a disembodied spirit, with no influence on scientific knowing. In contrast to this,
"only with its body, with "rea]" knowing, does its spirit admit of being grasped.v" Or,
alternatively, as Schleiermacher elsewhere puts it succinctly, "one can know only what
h . d ,,38one as expenence .
On the other hand, increasingly important, there is also a legitimate speculation,
and Schleiermacher admits it. It is a speculation that has retained its provisional,
empirical ground. Only the "love for the real" conquers "merely empty speculation.v "
The real element fills its emptiness and makes speculation warranted. Even more
important, as shown above, it is precisely speculation in this correct understanding that
supports Schleiermacher's version of the principle of identity of thinking and being. Only
one thing has to be kept in mind, namely, that speculation, in Schleiermacher's
understanding, does not produce actual knowledge itself. Instead, it is grounded in actual
knowledge. Its task is "the discovery and the description of the structures and processes
inherent in the acquisition of actual knowledge.?" So, Schleiermacher's metaphysics as
speculation is a theory of knowledge, not knowledge of knowledge."
Indubitably, Schleiermacher himself practices this kind of legitimate speculation,
especially in his Ethics and Dialectic. The latter is a speculative endeavor from both
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philosophical and theological points of view. In this case, Schleiermacher's dogmatics
(the Glaubenslehre) could be considered as the necessary empirical counterpart of his
speculative theology (the Dialectic). And this is not just an arbitrary assertion, for the
necessity of both speculation and empiricism appears even in Schleiermacher's division
of science into two branches, ethics and physics.42 And even the Glaubenslehre itself
may be considered a speculative work according to the true meaning of speculation, for it
reflects upon the concrete expressions of actual Christian faith for the benefit of the
church government.f Furthermore, as will be shown in more detail in the chapters below,
Schleiermacher remains faithful to his principle of complementarity in his philosophical
theology. His rejection of the knowledge of the metaphysical attributes of God and his
requirement of the complementarity of God and world in the Dialektik, for example, is
one indication of that. This is precisely the case where only the right philosophical
speculation can help, bringing to application its "principle of reflection," which allows
expressions about the transcendent ground to develop only in correlation to the world.44
Furthermore, it is worth noting in this connection that there are several instances
in which Schleiermacher likens religious life with empiricism. For example,
Schleiermacher presents an imagined analogy between religion and speculation.Y Indeed,
from the first glance they have one thing in common. Traditionally, the new religious life
is not supposed to begin from something previously given, for that would negate the
freedom of the Spirit. Similarly, the beginning of philosophy or speculation may be
considered to be ensuing purely from nothing. If followed more closely, Schleiermacher
goes on, the analogy is bound to fail. His conviction is that the spiritual life can only be
realized if it intertwines with the sensuous life. In a similar way, the higher speculative
consciousness cannot be separated from the common, experiential knowledge. Otherwise
the former could not even be communicated. Instead, there would be two separate truths
pertaining to each kind of consciousness: speculative and real. This acknowledgment
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already leads the discussion to one of Schleiermacher's clues of relating speculation and
empiricism, which, in tum, leads to one of his main solutions concerning the relationship
of religion and speculation.
Schleiermacher's clue is that he transfers the whole metaphysical discussion of
the empiricism-speculation relationship to the level of psychology or phenomenology of
consciousness. Therefore, it is understandable why Schleiermacher in his psychology
lectures also distinguishes between two ways of the knowledge of the soul: "the a
posteriori and the a priori, the empirical and speculative.T" The former knowledge,
according to Schleiermacher, comes from outside and presupposes something externally
given, whereas the latter is purely internal and as such has its origin and sufficient ground
in the act of thinking itself.47 Accordingly, the ancients already distinguished the
empirical and the rational psychologies. Schleiermacher's point, however, once again, is
that both are absolutely necessary and complement each other. Self-consciousness or ego-
positing (Ich-setzen), as both self-reference (Auf-Ich-beziehen) and going-out-of-oneself
(Von-Ich-ausgehen), is an act of "pure indifference between givenness and producing
from inside.,,48 The knowledge of the self as such is achieved in an undecided state of
balance between these two movements. This state will be very important in the closer
investigations into Schleiermacher's theory of "feeling" (GejUh[) in the chapters below.49
In the early dialectics lectures, in tum, Schleiermacher tries to determine how
general empirical consciousness in a person relates to higher speculative consciousness.
Schleiermacher addresses, in his view, an erroneous bifurcation of human nature,
resulting from one-sided concentration on one of these forms of consciousness. This one-
sidedness results in a differentiation between those who are in possession of
speculation- scholars, I suppose-and those who are not-the ordinary people.
Schleiermacher argues that if such discrimination were possible, "the unity of life is
annulled, pure knowing moves only parallel to common knowing, and it is not possible to
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construct one from the other."so As it will be seen later, it is questionable whether
Schleiermacher himself is able to avoid this fault. In fact, his latter thought is subject
precisely to the criticism of a similar bifurcation.
Be that as it may, after pointing out the impossibility of the bifurcation of
speculation and empiricism in consciousness, Schleiermacher introduces the third level of
knowing-if it can be called knowing at all-which perhaps corresponds to his concept
of immediate self-consciousness, or God-consciousness, "an original knowing wherewith
the laws of all construction of knowing are given at the same time.?" After certain
logical acrobatics, Schleiermacher concludes that this ultimate knowing is attainable
through both speculative and empirical ways of knowing. He avows that this third level
of consciousness, the level of original knowing is, in a form of some pre-understanding,
already posited even in a consciousness that has not yet reached beyond the ordinary,
empirical way of knowing. Schleiermacher states that "it exists in all our knowing but
previously in an unconscious way and only under the form of activity."s2 Hence, in
Schleiermacher's view, only a relative contrast exists between speculative and general
knowing, for even in speculative knowing there are elements of the subordinate form and,
vice versa, the elements of common knowing bear the more complete form within
themselves. Once again, something coming ex nihilo, in Schleiermacher's view, is
inconceivable. There always must be at least some minimum onto which the higher
procedures of speculation could be tried. Therefore, there is no way that one person could
be predestined to speculative knowing by virtue of nature while another is excluded from
it. Schleiermacher recapitulates: "In everyone speculation exists as a power that can be
raised to consciousness; it is one and the same stuff in everyone, both in what is
crystallized in regularly shaped forms and in the raw crystal."S3 In a word, form this
perspective, every person is a "speculator." Only some are consciously so, whereas others
only anonymously, without knowing it, living it out in the activity of life. The higher
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level of immediate self-consciousness endows everyone with this faculty. For
Schleiermacher, this truth alone prevents conflict between speculation and empiricism. If
consciousness is so constituted, both speculative and empirical functions must be
employed. If one of them is neglected, or if one of them dominates, or if they are set off
against each other, it can only yield a clash in the human being as a unity.
As noted above, Schleiermacher's attempt to transfer the problematic of the
speculation-empiricism relationship to the level of consciousness bears a direct relation
on how he relates speculation to religion or piety. Religion, in Schleiermacher's
perspective, is an empirical phenomenon. Therefore, he constructs his model of
speculation-religion relationship by analogy to the aforementioned model of speculation-
empiricism relationship based on the phenomenology of consciousness. A programmatic
statement appears in §28.3 of the Glaubenslehre:
Those members of the Christian communion through whose agency alone the
scientific form of Dogmatics arises and subsists are also those in whom the
speculative consciousness has awakened. Now as this is the highest objective
function of the human spirit, while the religious self-consciousness is the highest
subjective function, a conflict between the two would touch essential human
nature, and so such a conflict can never be anything but a
misunderstanding[ emphases added]. 54
Here Schleiermacher nominates the speculative consciousness to be the highest objective
function of the human spirit, while the religious self-consciousness is its highest
subjective function. Both functions are necessary insofar as they are the ultimate
expressions of both subjective and objective poles inherent in human nature itself. Their
clash, like that of speculative and empirical modes of knowing, would destroy the
essential unity of human nature. On this account, there is no conflict between speculation
and religion. These phenomena coexist very well in the same person. Hence, to
Schleiermacher, "a true philosopher can be and remain a true believer, and, likewise, one
can be pious with all one's heart and still have and exercise the courage to delve into the
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very depths of speculation.v" Schleiermacher calls this ideal "a prince of the church,"
apparently not without certain ambition regarding himself. This "prince" conjoins both
speculation and piety, objective-speculative and subjective-empirical-religious functions
"in the highest degree and with the finest balance for the purpose of theoretical and
practical activity alike ... "S6 I think, it is this same position that allows Schleiermacher to
write statements like one in his later additions to the Speeches: " ... in my opinion, piety
and scientific speculation share with each other, and the more closely they are conjoined
the more both advancc.Y'
It will be important to return to these subjects later, discussing the relationship of
dogmatics and philosophy in Schleiermacher's thought. Suffice it to say that, to
Schleiermacher, this compatibility on the level of consciousness may be at odds with the
theoretical relationship of these two disciplines. Later on, Schleiermacher's famous
exclusion of speculation from the field of dogmatics will also be examined. However that
may be, all of the accounts above certainly testify to at least one thing, namely, that
metaphysics as speculation is indispensable to Schleiermacher, provided that it is the
right kind of empirically grounded speculation. To be sure, metaphysics as pure
speculation must be overcome, overcome by this proper speculation. Thus, already this
still introductory explication of Schleiermacher's understanding of metaphysics as
speculation clearly shows the first aspect of Schleiermacher's overcoming of
metaphysics: the overcoming of one metaphysics with another more appropriate
metaphysics.
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CHAPTER 5
SCHLEIERMACHER AND KANT'S METAPHYSICS
As explained in the Introduction, Kant inaugurated an entirely new stage in the
development of metaphysics, closing the old classical way that makes truth-claims about
realities beyond finite experience. Starting with Kant, knowledge is confined to the
objects possibly experienced under the apriori spatio-temporal conditions and
apprehended by means of the apriori categories of understanding. Most subsequent
philosophers reacted to Kant's revolution. At the very least, he could not be ignored.
Kant's authority forced even those who disagreed with him to go back to him and show
the deficiencies in his system only to build anew on his foundation. Schleiermacher was
not an exception. His system can be considered from this viewpoint. Although
Schleiermacher sees the need to overcome Kant's metaphysics, he himself, to a great
extent, builds his own alternative metaphysics of knowledge on that same Kantian
foundation. In my opinion, Kant's thought is the main source of Schleiermacher's
metaphysics, even if there are other thinkers who greatly influenced him, such as Plato
and Spinoza. Overcoming Kant is an essential objective of Schleiermacher's lectures on
dialectic. Even if he mentions Kant only a few times in the lectures, his presence can
always be felt. Schleiermacher's requirement for the experiential grounding of
speculation, discussed in the previous chapter is, I believe, motivated by Kant's synthesis
of empiricism and rationalism. As shown above, very much like Kant, Schleiermacher
rejects pure speculation and insists that speculation is substantiated experientially if it
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does not want to be opposed to real scientific knowledge. This is only one example of
Kant's influence on Schleiermacher; there are many more.
Equally important, Kant's delimitation of metaphysics could not but decisively
change the course of the development of theology as well. At least the traditional
metaphysical or natural theology no longer remains an option. To a great extent, modem
anti-metaphysical theologies really begin after Kant and mostly as a result of his
influence. Considerably more, precisely Schleiermacher, "the father of modem
theology," is probably the very first theologian who coins his theological method fully
realizing the limits of scientific knowing established by Kant's critique. Schleiermacher's
criticism of traditional theology and his delimitation of theology to the given data of
possible religious experience can well be considered a theological application of Kant's
critical project.
In short, there are at least two reasons why I cannot avoid devoting a separate
chapter to Schleiermacher's relation to Kant's thought. The first reason is Kant's
unparalleled importance in the history of metaphysics. Second, as I said, despite the fact
that Schleiermacher mentions Kant so rarely, Kant's influence on Schleiermacher is so
tremendous that it comes to surface everywhere. An indication of this influence is that I
will need to refer Schleiermacher to Kant throughout this study, as I also did in the
previous chapter. Needless to say, in one chapter I cannot go into many subtleties or
nuances. Hence, I will only present a general account that is related to the subject matter
of this investigation, that is, metaphysics, simply exploring some of their similarities, that
is, Schleiermacher's use of Kant. Then, I will continue with their differences, that is,
Schleiermacher's overcoming of Kant. After that, the most important part of this chapter
will follow, discovering that the seeds of the basic differences may be found in Kant's
own thought. Hence it will be Schleiermacher's overcoming Kant with Kant's own
means.
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Similarities and Influences
Epistemological Influences
First, to start with the most obvious, there is no question that Kant is
Schleiermacher's major inspiration in overcoming the traditional metaphysics.
Schleiermacher sets his attitude toward Kant's achievement in this area already at the age
of nineteen. "As for the Kantian philosophy ... ," writes Schleiermacher in a letter to his
father, "I have always had a very favourable opinion of it, because it brings back the
reason from the desert wastes of metaphysics into its true appointed sphere.": As is also
seen from the previous chapter, Schleiermacher fully endorses one of Kant's first
Critique's main objectives: to restrict the operation of reason from passing the limits of
possible experience. Following Kant, Schleiermacher restricts rational knowing to finite
forms that are conditioned by space and time.
Second, even Schleiermacher's basic distinction of knowing, discussed in the
previous chapter, can be traced back to Kant, namely, to the "central tenet of Kant's
epistemology," which requires both intuitions and thoughts for knowledge to take place.'
Schleiermacher not only accepts without reserve Kant's strife against rationalism, but
also his opposition to pure empiricism or sensationalism when it is taken alone. Both seek
the interdependence of these two sources of knowledge. Obviously, epistemologically
both Schleiermacher and Kant intend the same; they only use different terms on different
occasions. For example, Schleiermacher's distinction of organization (Organisation) or
organic function of reason (organische Funktion) and intellectual function (intellektuelle
Funktion) of reason means quite the same as Kant's distinction of sensibility
(Sinnlichkeit) and understanding (Verstand). For both, the latter receives its content
through the former, but the former - its form through the latter.' Reason as the source of
unity and plurality determines the form of thinking, while organization as the source of
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diversity furnishes the content. The former remains the same in itself, the latter is the
openness of human being toward other being." Likewise, Schleiermacher's differentiation
between Speculatio and Empirie is equivalent to the distinction Kant makes between
concept (Begrifj) and intuition/sensation (AnschauunglEmpjindung).5 In this regard, Kant
writes about the two "fundamental sources" of mind that originate all knowledge: (1) the
capacity of receiving representations or receptivity for impressions and (2) the power of
knowing an object through these representations or spontaneity in the production of
concepts." The first source gives objects to the mind, while they are thought in relation to
that given representation (a mere determination of the mind) by means of the second.
Kant concludes: "Intuition (Anschauung) and concepts (Begriffe) constitute, therefore,
the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without an intuition in some
way corresponding to them, nor intuition without concepts, can yield knowledge.:"
By the same token, another basic distinction of Schleiermacher between the
organic and the intellectual functions of thinking can be paralleled to Kant's declared
"two stems" of all human knowledge, that is, sensibility tSinnlichkeiti through which the
objects are given and understanding (Verstand) through which the objects are thought." It
is noteworthy that precisely the acknowledgement of the reciprocal indispensability of
sensibility and understanding is followed by Kant's famous dictum: "Thoughts
(Gedanken) without content (lnhalt) are empty, intuitions (Anschauungen) without
concepts (Begriffe) are blind."g Understanding produces thoughts, but senses produce
intuitions. Intuition, according to Kant, gives awareness of particulars, while thoughts
allow the comprehension of those particulars under specific determination. Although
intuitions and thoughts mutually reciprocate, they are irreducible to and irreplaceable by
each other. They have different sources, namely, senses and understanding. As Kant
writes: "These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The
understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing."!" Precisely this
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irreducibility is the reason for their mutual indispensability for having knowledge, as well
as for their careful distinction. I I
The following passage from Schleiermacher, and it is not the only one, bears clear
resemblance to Kant's dictum: "Diversity without unity and plurality is indeterminate;
determinate unity and plurality without diversity is empty. The function of reason in
thinking is therefore determination, the function of organization is enlivening.t'V One can
bring the quote closer to Kant, noticing that "diversity" in its first sentence stands for the
"organization" that appears in the second sentence, but "unity and plurality," for
"reason." So, one could also read the first sentence: "Organization without reason is
indeterminate; (determinate) reason without organization is empty." Repeatedly, for
Schleiermacher, empiricism alone cannot render knowledge in much the same way as
pure speculation cannot provide true knowledge without experiential reference. Only by
means of the critical activity of reason can the sensuous judgments be arranged and tested
as to their truth. Otherwise, there is only endless chaos of random sense impressions not
yielding any kind of analysis leading to knowledge. 13 Moreover, even experience, at least
in the form in which one can be conscious of it, is itself the result of reason's activity of
organizing the objects of experience. 14 The latter can only be recognized by virtue of the
system of concepts. It is what Schleiermacher calls "general schema": sensory
objectification of concepts. Without it, an individual form (Gestalt) of a given appearance
cannot have meaning. The general schema itself, in turn, cannot have meaning without
individual formation.t ' As Schleiermacher characteristically concludes, "both are
simultaneous in oscillating procedure.t''"
Furthermore, it is also very likely that even Schleiermacher's effort to avoid the
conflict between empiricism and speculation; piety and speculation; or subjective and
objective functions of reason-at the level of consciousness, discussed in the previous
chapter-is directly related to Kant's restriction of speculative reason. As Kant states, the
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positive aspect of this restriction is that it gives way to the employment of practical
reason beyond the limits of sensibility. 17 And it is precisely this fact that prevents the
conflict between the two reasons. Kant continues: "Though [practical] reason, in thus
proceeding, requires no assistance from speculative reason, it must yet be assured against
its opposition, that reason may not be brought into conflict with itself.,,18
As a matter of fact, one could even go further into the epistemological similarities
between Schleiermacher and Kant, as Brandt does, and assert that Schleiermacher's
arguments bear a close similarity to Kant's metaphysical deduction of the categories of
understanding. 19 Indeed, Schleiermacher also insists that thought can only proceed by
means of certain forms. Kant deduces these necessary forms or categories from the forms
of judgment. Even if Schleiermacher does not proceed exactly in this way, he agrees that
thought is somehow independent from the world. Schleiermacher looks for these forms
through the analysis of both concepts and judgments. (I will return to these themes in
much greater detail in the chapters below, especially discussing Schleiermacher's
distinction of intellectual and organic functions of reason, as well as his analysis of
concepts and judgments.)
Theological Influences: Philosophical Theology
There is another area of Schleiermacher's thought whose similarity to Kant
cannot be overlooked, and it is theology. It hardly needs saying that there is no place for
speculative knowledge of God in the thought of both thinkers. Yet, precisely for this
same reason, both propose the absolute, or God, as the limiting idea necessary for
knowledge to take place. I cannot overemphasize that both Kant and Schleiermacher
operate with the idea of God, but not with God as an objective reality. It does not appear
conceivable that either Kant himself or Schleiermacher could deliberately trespass the
limits of the first Critique.
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Firstly, it is Kant's rejection of the knowledge of God in the form of the proofs of
God's existence that compels him to hold on to the regulative idea of God, without which
no theoretical knowing can be carried out. So, in a way, there is a place for God in Kant's
thought even from a theoretical viewpoint. Although nothing can be known of God, God
must be presupposed as the idea of the most real being that unites all reality. Secondly,
God is also preserved in Kant's thought from a practical viewpoint, that is, as a postulate
of practical reason. As such, God is conceived as a guarantor of the unity of the moral
and the natural laws, or the unity of duty and happiness. But once again, it is a
hypothetical presumption of practical belief, not a real object.
Schleiermacher also emphasizes that God must be presupposed for knowing as
well as for acting to take place. Especially for the latter, it is through the final unity of
contrasts, which is an equivalent to the idea of God, that the compatibility between reason
and nature is guaranteed.i" While God in God's self cannot be known, either in the form
of concept or judgment, the idea of God is still a necessary condition of knowledge, the
condition under which the unity of thinking and being can be conceived. The idea of God
unites all metaphysical contrasts while God exceeds all contrasts and thinking that is
based on them. Inasmuch as conceptual thinking cannot exceed the contrasts, it never
reaches God. There should be a different faculty that mediates God, or the absolute. This
faculty is Gefiihl. Since it is a prereflective ground of both reason and will, it represents
the unity of human being with the infinite being of God in self-consciousness."
Noteworthy, Schleiermacher's account of religious Gefiihl is similar to Kant's view of
the moral law "in that it accepts it as a given and denies that it can be derived from any
more fundamental principle." 22 On this account, I would say, the idea of God in both
Kant and Schleiermacher appears as an idea that overcomes metaphysics, or at least God
appears there as a truly metaphysical entity, an entity beyond knowledge, whose idea is at
the same time the presupposition of knowledge.f
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Because of this transcendence of God or because of the transcendental character
of its idea, all attempts to assert something about God, according to Schleiermacher, must
be determined by world- and self-consciousness. This conviction is related to
Schleiermacher's belief that thinking can never be pure, but rather must involve some
organic element. And for this same reason, therefore, human God-talk is always
inadequate and anthropomorphic-another implication of Schleiermacher's viewpoint
that is very similar to Kant's conclusions. For the latter too, one cannot know God
because there can be no sensuous intuition corresponding to God. But religion consists of
generally valid practical content of reason, which is brought into religious life in the form
of intuition. It is imaginative, sensuous demonstration of the spiritual. What is supposed
to be understood spiritually is brought to intuition in the form of a sensuous symbol. This
position obviously leads to anthropomorphism in religion, as Hegel had been quick to
point out. Consequently, for both Schleiermacher and Kant, even if they arrive at this
conclusion via different ways, the content of religion can only be presented
anthropomorphically, by virtue of imaginative forms of intuition. Thus, the attributes of
God are subjectively determined, and they do not belong to God in God's self.24
Theological Influences: Dogmatics
Kant's influence on Schleiermacher's theological thought extends even to his
Glaubenslehre. As will be seen in the analysis of the chapter on Schleiermacher's
dogmatics, the Glaubenslehre is full of philosophical influences even if it is supposed to
be free of them." Suffice it to say here that even some of its fundamental presuppositions
can in fact be directly related to Kant's thought. When Schleiermacher does not allow
anything in the Glaubenslehre that cannot become an object of experience, it may
immediately be traced back to Kant's two indispensable elements of knowledge, that is,
understanding and sensibility." Kant's implicit influence also allows Redeker, for
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example, to refer to the Glaubenslehre as "Schleiermacher's modification of Kant's
critical transcendental philosophy.t''" at least in the sense of grounding religion elsewhere
than in rationality.
Even more important, it is precisely Kant who lays the foundation of religion in
subjectivity. To repeat, Kant postulates God from practical reason. On Kant's account,
religion basically means to value and act out the moral law as divine command under
presupposition that deity is attended to for the sake of harmony between the moral and
the natural laws. Religion is also a form of subjective consciousness that serves the
completion of pure moral consciousness.r" Although Schleiermacher opposes Kant's
restriction of religion to morality, he also, to repeat, locates religion in Gefiihl, or
immediate self-consciousness. Paradoxically, this position appears to me at once similar
and opposed to Kant. Schleiermacher locates religion in Gefiihl precisely in opposition to
Kant, and yet it is not far from Kant's own position inasmuch as it also places religion in
subjective consciousness.i" Gefiihl becomes an apriori principle for the sphere of religion
similar to the categories for the scientific cognition and the categorical imperative for
ethica.'"
The fact that both Kant and Schleiermacher originate religion in subjective
consciousness can also be illustrated from a different angle. For Schleiermacher, religious
consciousness does not begin from God but from self-consciousness. Thus, God-thought
is rather an objectification of world-consciousness. To repeat, this finitude of thought
inevitably brings anthropomorphism into theology. There is a similar case with Kant:
God is defined by means of self- and world-consciousness only through moral self-
consciousness and the consciousness of dependence on the world or nature. Precisely for
this reason, Kant posits God as the moral ruler of the world process or postulates God
from practical viewpoint."
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By the same token, I would even claim that Schleiermacher's demand to separate
piety from speculation in dogmatics may itself be grounded in Kant's expulsion of
religion from the sphere of theoretical reason and its restriction to the field of practical
reason. Admittedly, Schleiermacher does not follow Kant exactly, that is, once more, he
does not link religion solely to morality. In fact, Schleiermacher assigns to religion a
much broader, and from morality independent, significance.V But one thing is sure, that
is, religion cannot be subjected to theoretical rationalization for either one. Religion
belongs to the experiential realm, and the latter is unattainable to concept. The similarity
is evident even though Schleiermacher locates this practical experience in Gefiihl or
immediate self-consciousness. Moreover, even the difference between Schleiermacher
and Kant regarding the role of morality in religion is not as big as it may appear from the
first glance, because religion in Schleiermacher's ethics is also morally productive insofar
as it gives impulse to moral action.33 Admittedly, there may be what has been called a
"basic difference" between Schleiermacher and Kant, that is, while one puts the freedom
of practical reason into the foreground, the other puts absolute dependence, therefore,
also the activity of God.34 But even this difference is not as deep as it may appear at the
first glance. That is, Kant also conceives of practical reason as the manifestation of God
in us. Consequently, one could say that the sovereignty of practical reason also
establishes God's supremacy in US.35
The "Hither-Side" Metaphysics
Regarding the subjectivity of religion in Kant and Schleiermacher, it should also
be noted that it is not exactly the same. Rather, in the strict sense, it is only for Kant that
religion has subjective validity. For Schleiermacher, even if religion is grounded in
subjectivity, due to the nature of Gefiihl, one could rather say that it is not so much
subjective as "super-objective" (iiberobjektiv), in the sense of resistance to theoretical
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objectification. 36 Gefiihl is a kind of undivided, undifferentiated depth of the subject
itself. It must be for this reason that Schleiermacher still calls it "subjective." But in fact,
this "subjective" depth "outgrows theoretical objectification just as much as religious-
subjecti ve "meaning. ,,37
Later on, in two separate discussions of Schleiermacher' s theories of Gefiihl in the
Dialektik and the Glaubenslehre, I will probe these issues deeper. In this comparative
connection, mention might be made that even Schleiermacher's choice of the word
"subjective" can be traced back to Kant's transcendental idealism, which ascribes the
categorial system of validity to the "subject of reason" (Vemunftsubjekt).38 In any event,
in both "super-objective" or "subjective" cases, GejUhllies at "this side" (diesseits) of
theoretical objectification inasmuch as the divinity-conveying depth of the subject lies at
"this side" of any particularization.l" It is a "this side" metaphysics, metaphysics that
does not so much reach "beyond," but remains at "the hither side of being.T'" It does not
have anything to do with Kant's noumenal self. Rather, Schleiermacher's self is
phenomenal self, the real, empirical self'." It is a difference, and it brings the discussion
to the next point.
Differences: Schleiermacher's Overcoming Kant
In the beginning of this chapter, I gave some quotations from Schleiermacher's
letters in which he praises Kant's revolution in metaphysics. But that is not the whole
story. Rather, Schleiermacher' relation to Kant is ambivalent, a "love-hate" relationship, I
would say. Schleiermacher is also very critical of Kant. Again in letters, he even speaks
of "the smoky crust" of Kantian philosophy that needs to be broken.Y Without fail, there
are significant points where Schleiermacher really differs from Kant. Even the previous
discussions on the similarities between them encountered some differences. Now, I will
concentrate on the differences particularly. It will be Schleiermacher's overcoming Kant.
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And this is particularly important, for although Schleierrnacher's thought is unthinkable
without Kant's influence, the most essential in it is still his own unique insight.t' It is this
unique insight of Schleiermacher that obliges him to overcome Kant.
Gefiihl Overcomes Kant
As I have already mentioned, perhaps the most important difference between the
two lies in Schleiermacher's theory of Gefiihl. It is one of the main points of
Schleiermacher's overcoming of Kant. There is no question that Kant was mainly
concerned with the apriori presuppositions and limits of knowing. Gefiihl, in his opinion,
belongs to a different area and it is non-cognitive. It is also commonly acknowledged that
Kant assigned a merely subjective-arbitrary role to it. Although Gefiihl has a positive
meaning for Kant as the Gefiihl of respect in the area of ethics and the Gefiihl of the
sublime in the area of aesthetic, it receives its significance only from the content of those
realities it is directed toward.l"
In contrast to that, for Schleiermacher, Gefiihl has its own validity, which is
independent from and not less important than the apriority of reason and its subject
matters of science, ethics, and aesthetics.f Moreover, Gefiihl for Schleiermacher is not
just one faculty among others. Rather, it is the supportive ground of different other
faculties, such as, theoretical, practical, and aesthetic.46 Schleiermacher does not consider
Gefiihl as just noncognitive, like Kant. To him, it is even more than cognitive. It rather is
a pre-cognitive ground of consciousness. In addition to that, Gefiihl cannot be non-
cognitive simply because theoretical reason also could not be cognitive if its ground was
noncognitive.f Hence, Gefiihl to Schleiermacher is not so much beyond than before
rationality, because it precedes all distinctions, including those formulated by Kant, such
as, theoretical and practical. Gefiihl belongs to the "this side" metaphysics also from this
viewpoint. But there is even more to it in regard of overcoming Kant.
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Gefiihl Overcomes the "Gap" In Kant's System
Kant is often criticized for failing to make an adequate connection between
theoretical and practical faculties of reason. In fact, this critique may be grounded in
Kant's own acknowledgement of the problem of the "gap" in his system." The two
somehow remain cut apart and reason, consequently, becomes split. It is worth noting
that Schleiermacher has already made a criticism of that sort from the viewpoint of his
own search for the common ground of all domains of knowledge. A case in point is
found, for example, in Schleiermacher's Outlines of a Critique of the Existing Theory of
Ethics. Schleiermacher's intention there is to establish the "foundation" (Fundament) of
the building of knowledge instead of erecting "partitions" (Zwischenwiinde) between its
supposedly independent and self-sufficient parts-the characteristic oversight of
philosophers, in his opinion, from the ancient times until Kant. 49 That is to say, whereas
the former divided the sciences into logic, physics, and ethics, the latter divided
philosophy into theoretical and practical. Schleiermacher wants to make possible a
"transition" (Ubergangi between the separated systems, to build a "bridge" between
them.5o
This bridge lies in Schleiermacher's theory of Gefiihl in his Dialektik. Inasmuch
as Gefiihl is conceived as a unity encompassing the contrasts of knowing and willing, it
may indeed serve as a bridge that crosses the gulf between theoretical and practical
reasons in Kant's thought. As explained above, this transition between the separated parts
of the system becomes possible because of the absolute, or the transcendent ground, as
the condition of the unity. Therefore, Gefiihl mirrors the absolute to self-consciousness.
Religious Gefiihl becomes a mediating element between the phenomenal self and its
transcendent ground. To Kant, in contrast, the absolute is inaccessible to any faculty and
always remains only a regulative ideal.
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An attempt has also been made to approach the split in Kant's system from a
different, but related, perspective. Thandeka argues that Kant lost the link between the
noumenal and empirical selves in his theory of self-consciousness. The title of her book
speaks for itself: The Embodied Self: Friedrich Schleiermacher's Solution to Kant's
Problem of the Empirical Self It seems that she tries to show that, in his system, Kant
failed to actualize his own empirical requirement. In Kant's first Critique, the origin of
the self, or I, is understood both in thinking, as an original, spontaneous act of
understanding, and in self-consciousness ("I think"). While the first one is pure,
unmediated, pre-conscious activity of thinking with no subject-object distinction, the
second, as the representation of the first, refers to a self that is conscious of itself. It is the
representation of the spontaneous act and it is self-consciousness, the awareness of the
self as thinking." Kant's problem here is, as Thandeka explains, that this "I think"
representation (Kant's pure or original apperception) is empty of any sensible content.
Consequently, in her opinion, Kant fails to demonstrate how the pure self-consciousness
of the "I think" "leads to knowledge of the self as an individuated, sentient, empirical
being in particular, or to knowledge of the objective empirical world in general.,,52 Or, as
Thandeka succinctly puts it, "the self embedded in nature slipped through the gap in
Kant's theory and lost its body.,,53
Although Thandeka considers the gap in Kant's system differently, she finds the
solution to Kant's problem in Schleiermacher's theory of Gefiihl. She sees that
Schleiermacher identifies the gap between the rational mind and the empirical world as
the rupture in consciousness that cannot be known or intuited but only felt.54 Gefiihl is a
precognitive state of the self that is expressed in the moment of reason's cancellation in
its "null-point" (Nullpunkt), when the identity of knowing and willing, intellectual and
organic functions of reason, takes place in the reciprocal transition between them. Gefiihl
as immediate self-consciousness differs from Kant's reflective self-consciousness, the I
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of the "I think.,,55 Even if Gefiihl may seem empty from the viewpoint of knowledge
("null-point"), it actually is full. It fills in the gaping void in Kant's system, and gives the
self its body back. It changes the whole perspective on the thinking-being relationship.
Related to that, as I will show below, is Schleiermacher's determination to establish the
unity of thinking and being, while for Kant they remain separate insofar as the thing-in-
itself (Ding an sich) cannot be known.
Is Pure Apriori Synthetic Knowledge Possible?
Another point of overcoming is Schleiermacher's critique of Kant's not having
achieved the necessary balance between reason and experience. It is noteworthy that
Schleiermacher strikes into the very heart of Kant's first Critique. That is to say, he does
not believe in the possibility of pure apriori synthetic knowledge. He thinks that there can
be either one or another, but not both at the same time. Schleiermacher does not believe
that the system of knowledge can be deduced from the necessary first principles without
reference to sense experience, even if these principles, according to Kant, concern sense
experience. On this account, Schleiermacher considers the categories and forms of
experience as artificial constructs in Kant's system. For example, Schleiermacher asserts
that the formulae of arithmetic and geometry, as well as the logical laws of identity and
contradiction, can only be analytic judgments, or they have to involve reference to sense
experience.i" As mentioned in the previous chapter, according to Schleiermacher, even
universal thought-forms, such as the formula of identity "a=a," must have an organic
side, "insofar as it includes the form of the process or expresses the condition of the
same; but if they contain no organic activity, nothing can be thought in them.,,57 The
formula "a=a," Schleiermacher continues, "expresses either the identity of thought and
being, therefore the form of knowing, or the identity of the subject, therefore the
condition of knowing. Without the organic activity it is no more than mere repetition of
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thought, therefore empty."S8 To be sure, this position does not mean that Schleiermacher
falls into sheer empiricism. As shown above, for him, very much like it is for Kant, the
sense impressions can have meaning only by means of interpretation and organization by
thinking. Experience brings about the activity of reason. The latter organizes the former
into a system. Thinking defines substances, distinguishes the species in the genus, unifies
appearances into objects, and so forth. It moves back and forth from system to experience
in order to fit them to each other. Yet, it is only a partial resemblance to Kant, for the
greater consequence of this Schleiermacher's fundamental critique of Kant is that the
possibility of pure reason itself becomes questioned. It happens on the grounds of
language insofar as it also consists of formal and organic elements. It is precisely
language that blocks the possibility of access to pure reason. The latter would require a
purely formal or general language. But such a language does not exist. If it existed, how
would one even be able to learn it?s9
Moreover, with the rejection of synthetic apriori knowledge Schleiermacher
denies Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments altogether. He
asserts:
The distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments cannot therefore be
maintained; and they indeed are not different, for identical judgments are not
judgments but only empty formulae, if one does not base them on the
(in)complete concept, in which alone that distinction is grounded.t"
At the very least, as Schleiermacher says, the analytic-synthetic distinction is unstable or
"flowing"(jliessender).61 He thinks that it is very difficult to draw a clear-cut boundary
between these two kinds of judgments. That is, the same judgment can be understood
either analytically or synthetically. For example, the judgment "ice melts" is analytic
when beginning with and passing through certain temperature relationships that are
already assumed in the concept of ice. If that does not happen, the judgment is
synthetic.62 In a word, the truth about the relationship of Schleiermacher to Kant in regard
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to the issue of reason and experience appears to be, as Scholtz says, that the very point of
Schleiermacher's closeness to Kant at the same time marks their distance. For both, all
determinate perceptions are already structured through reason's concepts, and all
concepts have the content of perception and experience. Yet, for Schleiermacher, pure
reason in a strong sense cannot be actualized.i"
Thinking and Being
Even if Schleiermacher at least partly agrees with Kant that thought can only
proceed by means of certain universal forms, there is another related crucial difference
between the two. This difference is dictated by Schleiermacher's modified metaphysical
realism. It is this position that makes Schleiermacher, in contrast to Kant, not so much a
critic as a mediator" Schleiermacher wants to rectify Kant's polarized system in which
knowing and being remain separated. Schleiermacher's Dialectic intends to develop a
coherent and universal system under the presupposition, perhaps coming from
Schleiennacher's Greek and Spinozian backgrounds, that being and knowing, although
independent, are united. That is to say, for Schleiermacher, the thought forms must
somehow conform to the structure of the real world. As shown in the previous chapter,
this is the condition of knowing to Schleiermacher. Real knowing cannot take place
unless there is a correspondence between thinking and its objects in being.
Schleiermacher believes that there are real objects in the world and that they can really be
known. The coherence of being informs the system of knowledge and the latter, in tum,
captures being. Contra Kant and British empiricists, Schleiermacher asserts the
possibility of knowing that independent being that causes perception. To add to that,
Schleiermacher also believes that the sense impressions themselves must have an implicit
order responsive to the forms of thought. That is, they are not passively receptive to the
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imposition of alien forms upon them, as if they were utterly formless in themselves, as
Kant assumes.65
Thing-in-Itself
The foregoing difference is closely related to the contrary views of
Schleiermacher and Kant regarding the thing-in-itself. As is well known, for Kant
correspondence between thinking and being is not possible. This is because the world as
it is in itself is not knowable insofar as intuition is bound to the subjective spatio-
temporal conditions. However, while the thing-in-itself cannot be known, it can and must
be thought, for it is the necessary presupposition of phenomena. In any case, the thing-in-
itself always appears through the lens of the subject's manner of intuition as an
appearance, a phenomenon. As a result, to Kant, the correspondence between thinking
and being goes only in so far as the categories of thought conform to the phenomenal
world, which itself is a construct of mind, appearances of the objects in the subject's
. 66consciousness.
In contrast to Kant's subjective idealism, according to which we know only
insofar as we apply our own concepts to the things as they appear, Schleiermacher thinks
that there is always some independent fact or entity to which the thought adjusts itself
and is able to correspond. In a word, the forms of thought must conform to the real being,
that which is not appearance. Or, to be more precise, according to Schleiermacher,
appearance conforms to the thing-in-itself. The combined being, bestowed through the
organic function of reason and apprehended through the intellectual function of reason, is
not an appearance of being, but is one and the same being." As Schleiermacher states,
"there is no separation of the essence of thing and its appearance.Y'"
Schleiermacher also poses several questions in regard to this Kantian problematic
of thing-in-itself in his lecture "Short Presentation of the Spinozian System." First,
154
Schleiermacher asks, "What determines the individuality of appearances?" 69 Is it the
thing-in-itself? His answer is, "Obviously, nothing else than cohesion or the identical
confluence of a certain quantity of powers in one point.,,7o Hence, in Schleiermacher's
view, the individuality of things has an imaginable (vorstellbare) ground. According to
this point of view, Schleiermacher goes on, the ignorance about the plurality of noumena
and the certainty about the plurality of phenomena cannot be referred to that
individuality. Moreover, this certainty is amplified by the fact that a physical entity is
divisible. Now, Schleiermacher continues, if every entity in the sensuous world is
supposed to have one corresponding to it in the intelligible world, it would entail our
ability to increase the number of things-in-themselves, which certainly is in contradiction
to things-in-themselves by definition. So much for the viewpoint of the noumena of
material things.
In addition to that, Kant has a second class of things-in-themselves, namely, those
that ground reasonable beings. Accordingly, Schleiermacher proceeds to the next instance
of transition from sensuous to intelligible worlds, which is human being itself. This
phenomenological tum raises the second question: "Is it certain that every consciousness
has its peculiar noumenon at its basis?,,71 Is this not an instance of the paralogisms of
reason? In fact, Schleiermacher draws similar conclusions to those with regard to
material things. Schleiermacher thinks that the individualizing consciousness is rooted in
receptivity and, therefore, refers only to appearance. To be sure, reason is the
individualizing factor, for it is most closely connected to what really exists in a human
being. On the other hand, it is precisely the reflective activity or observation
(Betrachtung) of reason that "even sooner leads one back from delusion of
individuality.t'f Therefore, Schleiermacher proceeds, if because of the phenomenality of
individualizing consciousness one has no ground to claim a plurality of noumena, "then it
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is already a presumption to express it differently, as The noumenon, The world as
noumenon." 73
Schleiermacher accedes to Spinoza's position of the positive unity of the world
rather than to the dualism of Kant. According to the latter, the temporal development of
human life is the consequence of intelligible and absolutely free acts of self-
determination. Individuality comes forth from that. In effect, the individual subjects are
independent. One can even say that they abide in a kind of "monadic seclusion.t'" This is
an inevitable consequence of Kant's theory of thing-in-itself. Schleiermacher's theory of
thinking and its ground in being, in contrast, makes it necessary to consider individual
subject as unity. What is behind its appearance is not noumenon, but higher power.
Schleiermacher's polarity is not that of noumenon and phenomenon, but power and
appearance. This may even be a point where Schleiermacher comes close to Hege1.75
Individual subjects are interconnected by means of the communal spirit. I will further
elucidate this important aspect in the section about Schleiermacher's intersubjective
theory of language.
Schleiermacher's Early Critique of Kant's Dualism
Even in his early years, Schleiermacher gives a programmatic critique of the
much criticized dualism of Kant. First, the early Schleiermacher approaches it from the
moral point of view. That is to say, according to Kant, the moral law is unconditionally
binding, and yet one can never fully realize it. Schleiermacher rejects this dualism and
argues that the moral goal cannot be other than that which can be actualized. For him,
precisely the removal of the dualism between the real and the ideal in the ethical life is
the highest good. Whereas for Kant happiness is included within practical reason, for
Schleiermacher it must be of an experiential character and therefore excluded from
practical reason. Kant's notion of the highest good as related only to the moral law,
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therefore to practical and rational life, simply does not take into account the sensuous
aspect of human life. For this reason, Schleiermacher must reject Kant's "new
metaphysical system," which is built on the practical postulates."
Second, the early Schleiermacher's criticism of dualism in Kant's system
addresses phenomenal necessity and transcendental freedorn.f In contrast to Kant,
Schleiermacher unites these two opposing elements. They become correlates: necessity
belongs not only to theoretical but also to practical (moral) life, but whereas
transcendental freedom as such is not possible, it is possible when referred to the
theoretical area of experience. Moreover, Schleiermacher crowns his position by
subsuming causal necessity under an absolute origin, the absolute (thing-in-itself).
Of course, the two former contrasts are but manifestations of the aforementioned
primary dualism between phenomena and things-in-themselves in Kant's thought. The
basic dilemma of this dualism is how to relate the appearance to the real object. In Kant's
system, both the thing-in-itself and the synthetic unity of apperception determine the
intuition. Yet, Kant never brings them together in any kind of unity. To perform this
unfinished task of Kant's, the early Schleiermacher turns to Spinoza and his metaphysical
principle of identity." In Spinoza's metaphysics, the principle of causality does not apply
to the noumenon-phenomenon relationship. The principle of causality is valid for the
phenomenal world only, whereas the noumenon-phenomenon relationship is governed by
the principle of identity. Hence, the absolute is no longer a thing-in-itself in Kant's sense;
as object, it is included within the subject. The absolute is determined by the identity of
subject and object that occurs in religious Gefiihl. That is the only way the absolute
receives real content. Otherwise it would remain an empty idea.
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Space and Time
A perfect example of the conformity of the forms of thought to being in contrast
to Kant's inverse view in this regard is Schleiermacher's treatment of space and time.
According to Kant, space and time are not concepts at all, but are the necessary pure
apriori forms of intuition. As such, they cannot be the properties of things themselves.
They are subjective forms of representation by means of which the subject matter of
knowing is approached.i" Schleiermacher only partly agrees with this account: space and
time not only have apriori character but also belong to the real world. Although space and
time are subjective schemata of thought, as for Kant, that is not the whole story for
Schleiermacher. As he says:
Space and time pertain to the way and mode of things themselves, not merely our
representations, [an insight] which follows from our main view of knowledge,
because all real knowing is at the same time quantitative. Both forms are therefore
in representation as well as in things, and the question, to which of both they
pertain, is idle.8o
Moreover, in contrast to Kant, Schleiermacher considers space and time to be mutual
correlates out of which the real being as matter comes to being in its diversity. For Kant,
both space and time stand apart, unrelated.
The Truth of the Categories
Apart from all deliberations about Schleiermacher's metaphysical realism, his
correspondence theory of truth is subtle enough from a different viewpoint as well. That
is to say, it certainly is not metaphysically straightforward. In fact, Schleiermacher shifts
to the coherence theory of truth when he further clarifies how the correspondence can be
confirmed.81 Of course, that can be done only indirectly, within the context of a whole
system of knowledge that makes possible the organization of sense experience. In this
sense, Schleiermacher's argument again resembles Kant's, for it turns out that thought
can proceed only by means of the use of certain forms independent of the perceived
158
world. However, the upshot of Schleiermacher's argument, once more, goes against Kant
inasmuch as it states that the structure of the real world as such, not merely appearance,
conforms to the laws of thought. As one consequence, Schleiermacher, indeed, retains
some of Kant's categories and forms, such as causality, space, and time, but only as the
modes of being of the things themselves.
All of the issues above that basically deal with the relationship of thinking and
being, such as knowing the thing-in-itself, phenomena and noumena, the reality of space
and time, and the reality of categories, could be summarized with Hoyer's statement
concerning the epistemological approaches of Kant and Schleiermacher: whereas Kant
"annihilated the reality of knowing, Schleiermacher saved it.,,82
The Idea of God: Constitutive or Regulative
To some extent, Schleiermacher's views regarding the impossibility of knowing
God are very similar to Kant's. Yet, there are some differences even here. It has been
argued that even if the idea of God is a necessary presupposition of knowing for both
Kant and Schleiermacher, for Schleiermacher it is not so much regulative as constitutive,
at least for the wholeness of reason. 83I could agree, but with some qualifications. I would
say that, to Schleiermacher, the idea of God is both regulative and constitutive. But going
still further, perhaps this difference between regulative and constitutive in the thought of
Kant and Schleiermacher should not be accentuated at all, for it is difficult to make a
clear-cut distinction between regulative and constitutive. For one thing, Schleiermacher
claims that the idea of the divine could not be regulative if it were not constitutive,
"namely, constituting our individual being.,,84 By the same token, Schleiermacher admits
that Kant himself made the regulative ideas of theoretical reason constitutive for practical
reason.85 Noteworthy, this same suspicion against Kant is even stronger today. For
example, as I have already noted in the first part, it is argued, very much as did
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Schleiennacher, that the regulative employment of the ideas of reason implies their being
constitutive as well. If they are not constitutive, they cannot be regulative either, for the
use of the words themselves presupposes knowing their meaning.i"
Putting aside this constitutive-regulative discussion for a moment, I would like to
point out that Schleiermacher and Kant both assign different roles to the divine in their
thought. While Kant, at least according to his own intent, postulates God only from
practical interest, but theoretically considers it only as necessary regulative idea,
Schleiermacher also seeks in the idea of the divine the postulate for knowing.Y
Accordingly, Schleiennacher criticizes both natural theology and Kant for their one-
sidedness of grounding God-consciousness solely in one function--either of thinking or
willing (practical reason)-while ignoring the other." As a result, Schleiermacher thinks,
"Kant failed to demonstrate the place of the idea of the divine as well as the connexion of
its being in reason; instead, he took the idea as given, only not knowing how.,,89 I think, it
is this "practical one-sidedness.T" while at the same time ignoring the cognitive role of
the idea of the divine as the presupposition of knowledge, that allows Schleiermacher to
assert that "Kant's polemic against old metaphysics also is contaminated by
misunderstandings.?" As a matter of fact, Schleiermacher elsewhere likens this polemic
of Kant to that of the critical thinkers who inadvertently end up in atheism.92 This
problem, on Schleiermacher's account, has its roots in confusing the didactic procedure
of religious discourse with the dialectic or the transcendent procedures. The former is
wrongly considered to be the latter and, as such, found inadequate. The atheistic
conclusion of this misunderstanding is that the idea of the divine, which, due to the
finitude of thinking, can always be expressed only inadequately and contradictorily, is in
itself also regarded to be untrue. Schleiermacher cannot subscribe to this view, I think,
precisely because, for him, the idea of the divine is constitutive as well. Schleiermacher
believes that this same misunderstanding is at work in Kant's strife against the special
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metaphysics.Y If I understand it correctly, Schleiermacher suggests that the language of
these disciplines is also didactic or symbolic. Hence, the role of the divine in them is not
constitutive, as Kant assumed, but rather regulative. Because of this misunderstanding,
Kant discarded the baby with the bath water, rejecting the constitutive role of the idea of
the divine in epistemology altogether.
Schleiermacher, in contrast, in a manner characteristic to him, tries to avoid any
one-sidedness and founds the transcendent ground of being in the identity of both
thinking and willing." Whereas, for Schleiermacher, God can also never be known
theoretically, the idea of God must necessarily be presupposed for the identity of both
thinking and willing with being. Not that there can be knowledge of that identity. Rather,
the idea of God is constitutively presupposed as that identity." Hence, it is a limiting
concept that Schleiermacher calls the "transcendent ground."
The Experience of the Divine
Schleiermacher not only conceives of God metaphysically, as the principle of
identity and unity, as oppositionless unity of all contrasts, but also believes that this unity
can be experienced in religious Gejiihl.96 Whereas one can argue about the idea of God in
Schleiermacher's thought in both metaphysical (the idea of God) and nonmetaphysical
(the idea of God) ways, it is the possibility of the experience of God that makes a crucial
difference between Schleiermacher and Kant. For the latter, the supersensible, including
God, can never be experienced. Once again, Kant's bifurcation of phenomenal and
noumenal realms bans not only the knowledge but also the experience of the divine.
Precisely the unavailability of the supersensible makes Kant's ethics metaphysical in the
sense of its independence of experience. Moreover, Kant does not trust to any kind of
"religious experience," for that can be taken as a substitute for morality. It can also be
used for hidden power motives. That is, one can present one's subjective fancy as a "real"
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fact about the divine will in order to impose it on others. Notably, one can say that Kant
was much more radical than were the older negative theologians (the Greek "fathers," for
example) who admitted the mystical experiences of the divine in the ecstasy of reason.
For Kant, this way is no less closed than the speculative one.97
Although Schleiermacher agrees with Kant that God could not be known, in
contrast to Kant, and like the negative theologians, he maintains that the divine could be
encountered otherwise. He agrees with Jacobi and the romantics that this encounter takes
place on some prereflective, intuitive level. A basic characteristic of religion, to
Schleiermacher, is the immediate Gefuhl of absolute dependence. Hence, the proper
object of theology is the study of human states of religious experience in their individual
and common expressions as indirect witnesses of the divine causality. Paradoxically,
even if this aspect belongs to Schleiermacher's overcoming of Kant, it is his theological
analogue to Kant's tum to the subject, Kant's "Copernican revolution" in philosophy.
The Postulates of Practical Reason: Speculative?
In addition to these differences, in those same Outlines of a Critique of the
Existing Theory of Ethics, Schleiermacher questions the very possibility of the postulates
of practical reason. Once again, he tries to strike at the heart of Kant's system-only this
time at the second Critique. Remarkably, Schleiermacher argues that the assimilation of
the ideas of the existence of God and the immortality of the soul in moral theory calls for
a similar critique to the one Kant directed at theoretical reason." Such a critique,
Schleiermacher goes on, would show that these postulates are "unnecessary" for the
theory of ethics and "forced there by misunderstanding.v'" The problem is, in
Schleiermacher's opinion, that there is "a considerable right to imagine that they are
produced upon speculative soil and properly belong there."IOOSchleiermacher concludes:
"And so the building transforms itself only into a child's game, built with flimsy
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materials, tossed back and forth from shore to shore.,,101It means that Schleiermacher
believes that Kant in his second Critique overstepped the very limits set in the first one.
According to Schleiermacher, it turns out that Kant's moral theory of the second Critique
is grounded on speculative reason after all, even if it is pure practical reason. As
Thandeka puts it, Schleiermacher believed that Kant, by relying on speculative reason to
delineate moral consciousness, mistakenly filled with knowledge the place he had
originally cleared for faith.102
Schleiermacher and Kant: Difference in Similarity
I have shown several similarities and even more differences between
Schleiermacher and Kant. Now I want to go further and claim that the differences,
including the basic difference brought about by Schleiermacher's theory of Gefiihl, is at
the same time based on similarities between them. This shows the ambiguity in
Schleiermacher's overcoming Kant. It is an overcoming that uses those same resources
that are supposed to be overcome. It means that it is the overcoming without leaving.
Thus, these differences in similarity will confirm my thesis of the overcoming of
metaphysics without completely leaving the metaphysics that is supposed to be
overcome.
In particular, there are several important traits in the thought of both Kant and
Schleiermacher that may not only mitigate the crucial variance brought in by the theory
of Gefiihl, but even present it as affinity to Kant, difference in/from similarity, so to say.
It can be viewed as Schleiermacher's "Kantian" overcoming of Kant, the overcoming of
Kant with Kant's own means. As will be seen, there are instances in which
Schleiermacher rationalizes Gefiihl, while Kant himself, in tum, attempts to bridge the
gulf between theoretical and practical reasons in a way not too unlike to
Schleiermacher's. The latter's achievement of bridging the Kantian gulf or gap may be
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inspired by some aspects of Kant's own thought quite neglected in Schleiermacher's time
and even later.
The Equivalents of Schleiermacher's Gefiihl in Kant
To start with Schleiermacher, it is worth noting that Gefiihl, according to him, is
not some kind of third entity in addition to theoretical and practical reasons, but is, in
fact, itself an instance of reason. This idea is very Kantian. As I will show later, Kant's
overcoming of the breach between the two reasons, in a way, is grounded in reason itself.
Schleiermacher ponders in his Ethics:
What we call Gefiihl is altogether, just like thinking, expression of reason in
nature. It is an activity of life developing in nature, yet coming to be only through
reason, and that applies not only to moral and religious Gefiihl, but also to
corporeal Gefiihl, when it is posited only as human and as total impetus (Moment)
of Gefiihl. Moreover, Gefiihl is not less an agent as thinking, because it returns
pure in itself. It is therefore a more definite expression of the mode of being of
reason in this particular nature. For Gefiihl also always expresses from the lowest
mode what reason does or does not effect in nature ... However, if it could appear
that hereby the nature that is not united with reason was not at all in game, and
therefore Gefiihl was either overall not moral or at least not for itself, but was
moral only together with other, then every Gefiihl would always express what
reason does or does not effect in nature united with it, according to the
relationship in which this opposes the not united; and just this is the disturbance
that necessarily belongs to every Gefiihl. [Emphases added.] 103
There are several ways in which Kant himself speaks of the unity of reason. For instance,
he presents practical and speculative reasons under a "common principle," because, as he
says, "in the final analysis there can be but one and the same reason which must be
differentiated only in application.v'?' In Kant's opinion, it is only a human predisposition
to distinguish concept and intuition that causes the difference between the two reasons. 105
The reason itself is one, and it is the plurality of faculties that requires the division.
Next, one cannot bypass Kant's cryptic remark about "perhaps a common, but to
us unknown, root" of sensibility and understanding. 106 There is no question that, for
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Schleiermacher, not only the two stems of knowledge, but all functions of reason rest on
a "common root," which in his case is Gefiihl.107 Heidegger's most controversial
interpretation of Kant's passage is that the "common root" is imagination discussed in the
"Transcendental Deduction" part of the first Critique. 108 Putting aside the question of
whether Heidegger's interpretation is accurate, it is worth noting that Kant's
"imagination," very much like Schleiermacher's Gefiihl, is a term "for the unity of
"activities" required, in addition to the objective principles of knowledge, to render
intelligible the actuality of knowledge." 109
Furthermore, mention might also be made of Kant's discussion of the unity of
reason in the context of the regulative employment of the ideas of pure reason. This point
again brings both Schleiermacher and Kant into contact with each other, even if not
straightforwardly. The idea of the divine for Kant is the regulative idea par excellence,
whereas for Schleiermacher, it comes into play together with Gefiihl as the uniting factor
of knowing and willing. In Kant's opinion, although the transcendental ideas are
"illusory," "afocus imaginarius," nonetheless, they are "indispensably necessary," for
they bring to the concepts the greatest possible unity combined with the greatest possible
extension. I 10 It is a metaphysical indispensability insofar as it directs understanding
beyond every given experience. As Kant illustrates, it is like in the case of mirror vision,
where illusion is indispensably necessary if one wants to see not only the objects before
one's eyes, but also those that lie at a distance behind. I I I But, Kant stresses over and over
again, it is only a regulative, "hypothetical" employment of reason, including the case of
its own unity regarded as objectively valid.112Kant writes:
The hypothetical employment of reason has, therefore, as its aim the systematic
unity of the knowledge of understanding, and this unity is the criterion of the
truth of its rules. The systematic unity (as a mere idea) is, however, only a
projected unity, to be regarded not as given in itself, but as a problem only.113
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Thus, the idea of the unity of reason itself is viewed as a regulative idea, insofar as it is
based on the reduction of different faculties-such as, sensation, consciousness,
imagination, memory, wit, pleasure, desire, and others-to one "single radical" or
"fundamental power" (Grundkraft).1l4 Note that contrary to Heidegger's interpretation,
precisely this "fundamental" "radical" or "power" may most likely refer to the
controversial "perhaps (cf. hypothetical) unknown root (cf. radix)" phrase of Kant.115
In the next place, the aforementioned neglected aspect of Kant's own effort to
unite the two modes of reason is found in his Critique of Judgment. There Kant
acknowledges "the immense gulf' (uniibersehbare Kluft) between the realm of the
sensible concept of nature, pertaining to understanding or theoretical reason, and the
supersensible concept of freedom, pertaining to (practical) reason. I 16 Kant himself feels
uncomfortable with this gulf and, for one thing, proposes that the practical reason,
nevertheless, is meant to influence the theoretical one, for the concept of freedom is
meant to realize the ends proposed by its laws in the sensible world.ll7 Thus, Kant's
effort to unite the two reasons, in a way involves subordination of the theoretical reason
to the practical one. Furthermore, it is also here that Kant propounds the supersensible as
the transcendental ground of unity of the two reasons, even if this ground of unity arises
from the practical reason itself:
There must, therefore, be a ground of the unity of the supersensible that lies at the
basis of nature, with what the concept of freedom contains in a practical way, and
although the concept of this ground neither theoretically nor practically attains to
a knowledge of it, and so has no peculiar realm of its own, still it renders possible
the transition from the mode of thought according to the principles of the one to
that according to the principles of the other.i"
Here is how the transition between the two reasons actually takes place. To begin,
supplying the apriori laws of nature, understanding provides a proof that nature can be
cognized only as phenomenon. This same occurrence points to the supersensible, yet
leaving it undetermined. Next enters judgment. By means of the apriori principle of its
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estimation of nature's purposiveness according to its particular laws, it provides the
supersensible with determinability through the intellectual faculty. What is left for
reason, then, is to give determination to the same apriori by its practical law. 119 This
proposition of the transcendental purpose of the supersensible bears resemblance to the
role of the absolute in Schleiermacher's thought even if it has quite different functions in
the systems of both thinkers.
Gefiihl in Kant
Even more important, to Kant, very much as with Schleiermacher, it is precisely
Gefiihl that turns out to be the uniting factor of the two reasons. It appears very striking to
me, notwithstanding that Kant means a different kind of Gefiihl from Schleiermacher's.
This crucial insight appears in the chapter whose title speaks for itself: ''The Critique of
Judgment as a Means of Connecting the Two Parts of Philosophy (theoretical and
practical) in a Whole." By the way, it is there that Kant for the first time calls judgment a
middle term or mediating agent (Mittelglied) between (theoretical) understanding and
(practical) reason. 120Right after, Kant approaches this same issue from a slightly
different perspective. That is, he distinguishes three irreducible "faculties of the soul" that
correspond to three cognitive faculties of understanding, judgment, and reason as their
determining ground. These faculties of the soul are knowing, the Gefiihl of pleasure or
displeasure, and the faculty of desire. 121According to Kant, since the Gefiihl of pleasure
and displeasure is related to the faculty of desire (being prior to its principle, as with the
lower desires, or supervening upon its determination by the moral law, as with the higher
desires), "it will effect a transition from the faculty of pure knowledge, i.e. from the
realm of concepts of nature, to that of the concept of freedom, just as in its logical
employment it makes possible the transition from understanding to reason.,,122To add to
that, although to Kant it is distinctive Gefiihl of pleasure and displeasure, different from
167
Schleiermacher's notion of Gefiihl as self-consciousness, it nevertheless puts both on a
common ground of placing the transition from theoretical to practical in immediate
consciousness. On Kant's account, the Gefiihl of pleasure or displeasure in the aesthetic
judgment of taste, in contrast to theoretical (logical) and practical (moral) judgments,
represent its object immediately, without concept or precept. 123 In a word, Gefiihl is
immediate for both. Moreover, insofar as the purposiveness or teleology
(Zweckmiissigkeit) of nature is the peculiar apriori principle of this judgment, Kant's
understanding of Gefiihl cannot be merely subjective. 124
As I will show in the chapters below, Schleiermacher's concept of Gefiihl has
some kind of unsettling character, that is, it causes disturbance because it does not
properly "belong" into the metaphysical system, to either knowing or doing, but is a
middle-term between them. Kant's concept of Gefiihl also appears disturbing in the
contexts of both his theoretical and practical philosophies. Kant excludes it from the
Critique of Pure Reason as lying outside the whole faculty of knowledge only to return to
it in the Critique of Judgment as a necessary condition of experience. 125 Similarly, Kant
excludes it from the critical practical philosophy only to return to it in the form of the
Gefiihl of the respect for the law .126 In any case, these considerations lead me to agree
with Davidovich who writes:
Gefiihl is one of Kant's most ambiguous and therefore fascinating concepts. Much
of his writing may be read as the attempt properly to situate 'Gefiihl' with respect
to theoretical and practical philosophy, with the concegt shifting continuously
between the margins and the centre of his philosophy. 27
To be sure, after these deliberations, one cannot so easy accentuate this "basic difference"
between Schleiermacher and Kant.
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Kant's Own Bridging of His Gap
My interpretation of the affinity of Schleiermacher and Kant in regard to the
overcoming of bifurcation of reason can be empowered by means of work done on Kant's
third Critique today. Davidovich, for example, draws out and further articulates the
religious implications of Kant's bridging the theoretical and practical reasons with
judgment. She interprets the Critique of Judgment as Kant's attempt to unite the two
reasons on the basis of religious consciousness'Ps--unquestionably, an approach just like
Schleiermacher's. Davidovich links Kant with Otto and Tillich on this point, albeit
without even mentioning Schleiermacher. In my opinion, this omission is not quite fair,
because the influence of Schleiermacher's thought on these two thinkers was as
significant as Kant's. Even more, I think that it was Schleiermacher rather than Kant who
motivated the fundamental role of religious self-consciousness in the thought of Otto and
Tillich. Be that as it may, Davidovich's interpretation of Kant is also very interesting
from the viewpoint of Schleiermacher' s relation to Kant.
Davidovich writes: "I contend that in his last systematic works Kant considered
religion an essential bridge between the worlds of theory and praxis and elevated its
status as such to that of a necessary principle through which alone the unity of reason is
established.,,129 I would say that this same sentence could as well apply to
Schleiermacher's concept of Gefiihl as religious consciousness in the Dialectics. The
similarity of the essential role of religious consciousness in achieving the unity of reason
is remarkable even if, according to Davidovich's interpretation of Kant, the unity of
reason is not established in immediate self-consciousness, but in a moment of
contemplative judgment about a moral designer of the universe guided by the idea of the
Highest Good. 130Indeed, it does not seem to be a coincidence that Kant himself
concludes that this contemplative judgment leads to the possibility of theology and,
subsequently, to religion. 131Notably, the word "contemplative" is important, because it
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itself overcomes the dichotomy between theoretical and practical inasmuch as it does not
imply knowledge, but only a possibility of thinking; not that one could have knowledge
of the unity of nature and freedom, but that it is at least possible to think of it.132 It is a
transcendental proposition of a hypothetically unified reason. That is to say, the
contemplative judgment about the divine purposiveness of nature meditates on reality as
it might be seen from the viewpoint of a reason that is unlike our bifurcated reason.133
Once again, the limits of the first Critique are not transgressed.
Gefiihl and Transcendental Apperception
Furthermore, one can also approach the reminiscence of Kant's thought in
Schleiermacher's theory of Gefiihl from a different angle. Strikingly, for both Kant and
Schleiermacher the union of intuition/empiricism and concept/speculation in knowing
requires a unity which itself is neither sensible nor conceptual, but precedes both as their
condition of possibility. Schleiermacher calls it Gefiihl, Kant-transcendental
apperception, which itself is a kind of GejUhl.134 The term "apperception" originally
appeared in Leibniz's thought referring to pre-reflective inner awareness as opposed to
perception or outer awareness. Kant developed this notion further and understood it as the
possibility to unite the experiences owing to the subject's ability to recognize them as his
or her own. Even more important, although this apperception generates the representation
"I think," it itself cannot be accompanied by any further representation. 135 That is to say,
very much like Schleiermacher's Gefiihl, it is transcendental, because it cannot be derived
either from intuitions or concepts, but rather precedes them as their apriori condition of
possibility. 136 The transcendental unity of apperception is not just categorial. As Kant
states: "We must therefore look yet higher for this unity [of apperception], namely in that
which itself contains the ground of the unity of diverse concepts in judgment, and
therefore of the possibility of the understanding ... ,,137 In short, as Kant puts it in the
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heading of a chapter: "The principle of the synthetic unity of apperception is the supreme
principle of all employment of the understanding.t''r" Putting aside the problem of the
lack of empirical content of Kant's apperception, this discussion, in my view, presents
sufficient grounds for its correspondence with Schleiermacher's Gefiihl.
Summary
In this comparative chapter, I first analyzed some elements important for the
overcoming of metaphysics that Schleiermacher overtook from Kant. For example,
among other things, I examined Schleiermacher's agreement with Kant's own
overcoming of metaphysics, which requires the supplementation of sensibility and
understanding, as well as the resulting rejection of the speculative knowledge of God and
founding religion in the consciousness of the subject. Then, I continued with their
differences-Schleiermacher's overcoming of Kant-such as Schleiermacher's rejection
of apriori synthetic knowledge and the distinction between analytic and synthetic
judgments with that, his opposing views regarding the thinking-being relationship in Kant
and the resulting knowability of the thing-in-itself, the constitutive epistemological role
of the idea of God as opposed to the regulative ideal of Kant, and others.
But most important of all, in this process, I found something in the middle
between these two, between the similarities and the differences. To use Schleiermacher's
vocabulary, there was a transition CUbergang) between them. There are instances where
the overcoming could not be so easily distinguished from the influence. That is to say, it
may indeed be an overcoming of Kant with Kant's own means, an overcoming whose
roots are found in Kant's own thought, an overcoming of Kant without leaving him.
Among others, the most distinct instances of this undecided condition can be found in
Kant's own counterparts to Schleiermacher's attempt to bridge the gap in Kant's
philosophical system with his theory of Gefiihl. In the same way as the transition between
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metaphysical contrasts plays the most important role in Schleiermacher's overcoming of
metaphysics and his own metaphysics, I estimate this undecided transitional part to be
more important than the other two in which everything is clear. Hence, in a way, this
chapter may also represent the element of the basic scheme that I apply to
Schleiermacher's metaphysics. Admittedly, this chapter did not significantly touch upon
Schleiermacher's overcoming of metaphysics in the sense of leaving it behind. Rather, it
basically dealt with Schleiermacher's elaboration of, in his perspective, more adequate
metaphysics than Kant's. Nevertheless, this chapter does illustrate the fact that,
knowingly or not, every overcoming draws its resources from the source it tries to
overcome. Hence, to a certain extent, it exemplifies the neo-structuralist strategy of
reading in the sense of elucidating the elements of Kant's own thought that may have
been suppressed by his readers. It is interesting, for example, that Kant's theory of Gefiihl
turns out to be no less unsettling to metaphysics than Schleiermacher's.
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PART THREE
THE CONSCTRUCTIVE METAPHYSICS OF SCHLEIERMACHER
INTRODUCTION
Now this work finally reaches the stage where Schleiermacher's own constructive
metaphysics is explicated. This metaphysics is overcoming metaphysics at the same time,
at least in the sense of Schleiermacher's struggle to furnish a more proper way of
approaching metaphysics in contrast to the supposedly inadequate previous attempts of
other systems and thinkers. Admittedly, Schleiermacher does not render a finished
metaphysical system himself. He did not manage to prepare an integral book from his
lecture notes on dialectics, although he intended and even started to do it. His terminal
illness halted these plans. To say the least, to systematize Schleiermacher's lecture notes
is itself a formidable task, for those notes are extremely entangled, complicated,
grammatically inexact, and sometimes even contradictory in content, as his thought
develops over the years. Nevertheless, I will try for clarity's sake to be systematic, at
least in the sense that, instead of giving a comprehensive account of the lectures as they
are, I will select some important metaphysical topics that can be inferred from his
lectures and that are relevant to the dissertation theme. In addition, although these topics
will be clearly delineated, they will still implicitly touch Schleiermacher's epistemology,
his understanding of reason, existence, the self, and other metaphysical issues.
Particularly, in separate chapters, I will give accounts of Schleiermacher's grasp of the
discipline of dialectics (chapter 6), his aggregate of contrasting metaphysical categories
(chapter 7), and his attempt to overcome the metaphysics of contrasts by means of the
idea of transcendental ground in his peculiar understanding (chapter 8). Schleiermacher's
understanding of dialectics itself implies a non-foundational overcoming of metaphysics.
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Importantly, metaphysical polarities playa vital role in Schleiermacher's dialectics; his
thinking always evolves around or between them. Therefore, to repeat, I will probe some
of these polarities. Most important in this regard, as I have already indicated earlier, is the
overcoming of polarities, so characteristic to Schleiermacher's thought. As I will show,
this overcoming also contains the seeds of overcoming metaphysics as such. Throughout
this part, I will point out the ways in which Schleiermacher's metaphysics overcomes
traditional metaphysics. But an even more important intention of this work is to
demonstrate that Schleiermacher's metaphysics contains some truly "metaphysical"
elements-the ones that lead beyond metaphysics into "meta-metaphysics." I will start
the demonstration of this "meta-metaphysics" in this part, and continue the discussion in
the part that assesses Schleiermacher's overcoming of metaphysics, as well as in the
concluding remarks, where I sketch the contemporary relevance of Schleiermacher's
approach to metaphysics.
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CHAPTER 6
DIALECTICS:
TRANSCENDENTAL (METAPHYSICS) AND FORMAL (LOGIC)
Nonmetaphysical Dialectics
The main text of Schleiermacher's own metaphysics is his Dialektik lectures,
which is the basic text of investigation for this work. First of all, one may ask, why did
Schleiermacher call this course that in a great extent deals with metaphysical construction
"dialectics"? Addressing this question in this chapter will give a further insight into
Schleiermacher's understanding of metaphysics and its overcoming. In fact, the use of
this title may itself be a sign of the overcoming of metaphysics. It is implicit even in the
primary etymological definition of dialectics as the art (dialektike technei of discourse,
conversation, argumentation, reasoning, disputation, etc. tdia-vlegeinv' As will be seen
below, this is also Schleiermacher's basic understanding of dialectics, and I think that he
consciously chose to title the lectures Dialektik. According to this primary meaning as the
art of discourse, dialectics apparently has more to do with rhetoric than metaphysics. If it
deals with metaphysical concepts, it takes place on a formal, not ontological, level.
Dialectics may employ speech about such metaphysical entities as God, world, and
others. These concepts may be included in the dialectical reasoning insofar as they are
related to the first principles of knowledge. But even if they are indispensable elements in
the interconnected network of knowledge, the dialectical speech about them lacks any
ontological truth-claims. Thus, to say in advance, one should not be deceived by
appearances, seeing Schleiermacher's dialectics as metaphysics. Even if it contains
metaphysics, it may also be a way of overcoming metaphysics, keeping in mind the
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definition of metaphysics and its overcoming that I laid out in the first, general part of
this work.
Dialectics as Transcendental Metaphysics
In one sense, Schleiermacher's dialectics is still metaphysics. Like metaphysics, it
deals with the supreme principles of philosophical knowledge. Schleiermacher first
defines dialectics as "principles of the art of doing philosophy'" or, as his 1811 course
announcement states, Dialecticen s. artis philosophandi principorum summam.' Even
more, according to Schleiermacher, dialectics includes not only the principles of doing
philosophy, but also of all scientific construction. Schleiermacher himself classifies the
sciences into two branches: the sciences of reason or the human sciences (Vissenschaft
des Menschen, viz., ethics) and the natural sciences (Vissenschaft der Natur, viz.,
physics)." Dialectics provides an epistemological foundation for both of them. Here
Schleiermacher holds on to the classical Platonic and neo-Aristotelian division of
philosophy into dialectics, physics, and ethics.' But the first, dialectics, is the greatest of
the three, because it provides the transcendental presuppositions of the other two, which
means of all the existing sciences that they include. As such, Schleiermacher calls
dialectics "the science of science" (Wissenschaftswissenschaft).6
Moreover, dialectics provides transcendental presuppositions for all knowledge,
not only the scientific one, because, according to Schleiermacher, all kinds of knowledge
must have the same common ground. Thinking processes must be the same to all thinking
beings if knowledge is to be communicated. Schleiermacher maintains that one cannot
attribute to philosophical knowing, which is supreme, transcendental knowing, "anything
different than what the form of knowing is for any given knowing ... ,,7 And vice versa,
one always finds the transcendentally and formally supreme knowing in the ordinary
knowing. As Twesteri's notes say: "All knowing becomes knowing through entry of the
principles of knowing, hence there is no instance of knowing to which dialectic would
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not know how to assign its place, for everything belongs within the system of knowing.:"
All kinds of knowing, whether it is philosophical (speculative) or scientific (empirical),
takes place in accordance with common principles that dialectics provides." Of course, in
this sense, dialectics, as transcendental epistemological ground, may be considered
metaphysics.
Logic Overcomes Metaphysics
Non-Metaphysical Dialectics
On the other hand, it can be maintained that Schleiermacher's dialectics is not
metaphysics. At the very least, it should never be confused with substance metaphysics.
Moreover, it also never deduces its propositions from speculative first principles. It does
not establish knowledge. Instead, it can only be a never-ending heuristic trial-and-error
process of discovery that never reaches complete knowledge. It is an asymptotic way to
knowledge that is never reached but only appropriated as to its coherence. Although
dialectics discovers the presuppositions of knowledge, according to Schleiermacher, it
"does not produce information and is thus of itself empty in that respect.:""
It is noteworthy that, in Schleiermacher's view, in the final instance, dialectics
does not even produce the knowledge of knowledge in a transcendental sense. He writes,
"We do not want even to seek the knowledge of knowing, but rather only the method of
knowing, the rules of the production of knowing ... ,,11 As such, dialectics is very much
like the Aristotelian "organon" of all sciences, and by means of it, every piece of
information receives its place within the entire compass of science. 12Accordingly,
dialectics is, as Schleiermacher says, "the architectonic of all know]edge.,,13 As the
organon and the architectonic, dialectics helps in such procedures as assigning to each
individual scientific proposition its place within the system and finding which part of the
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whole that proposition is. Nonetheless, it is only "a supplement to information concerning
the whole.,,14 Schleiermacher's apt summary of this science of science states that,
unlike particular sciences, it can only be thought as unable to base itself upon a
highest principle; instead it can only be thought as a whole from which every part
can take its beginning, and all individual parts, posited reciprocally, are only
based on the whole, so that it can only be accepted or rejected, but not established
and proved. 15
Notably, all this is very similar not only to Aristotle's understanding of logic, but also
Descartes' nonmetaphysical, orderly philosophy.
I have already mentioned the nonmetaphysical aspect of Schleiermacher's
understanding of dialectics conceived as the art of discourse. With this objective,
Schleiermacher calls dialectics "the art to lead and conduct conversation.,,16 Inasmuch as
conversation takes place with somebody, dialectics is the "art of the exchange of
thoughts, art to remain in an ordinary construction of thoughts together with the other, the
result of which brings about knowledge.v'" In this respect, Schleiermacher intentionally
pursues the classical Socratic-Platonic tradition of dialectics while adding his own non-
metaphysical, discursive twist to it.
Note that Schleiermacher holds that this "other" partner in the process of
dialectics may also be one's own self. Dialectics as conversation also includes self-
conversation, the development of thoughts through inner speech. The presence of the
other is not required for dialectics to take place." Hence, according to Schleiermacher's
other definition, dialectics is "the exposition of the principles for the correct conduct of
conversation in the area of pure thought.?" Dialectics also is "the art to come from
difference to agreement in thought.t''" And, it is this same "art of conversation" that also
provides "the highest principles for doing philosophy and for the construction of the
totality of knowledge."?' Dialectics as the art of discourse plays this role because, as
Schleiermacher states, "we can express metaphysical principles only in the form of
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sentences that also are formed from the conduct of conversation.t'r' To repeat, it can also
be an inner conversation.
As I will show later, in Schleiermacher's opinion, thoughts can never be pure but
are always linguistically conditioned. It is also the reason why the dialectical ground of
all knowledge is simply inevitable. It means that there cannot be pure metaphysical
principles. They are always linguistically conditioned. And since language is a finite
system of signs, even the language of metaphysics can never bear the substantial weight
that traditional metaphysics sometimes ascribes to it.
There is another nonmetaphysical aspect of Schleiermacher' s dialectics that I
have already mentioned in the chapter on Schleiermacher and Kant. As the critical
philosophy does for Kant, dialectics overcomes metaphysics for Schleiermacher
inasmuch as it is critique in the sense of its being the analysis of the processes of
knowing. As critique, it contains "the criteria by which one could recognize what was
science and what was not.'.23 These criteria include, as shown in the chapter on
Schleiermacher's understanding of speculation, the necessary speculative and empirical
or experiential elements. Therefore, as one author puts these two elements together,
Schleiermacher's is a "critical realism," in which "the ideal-conceptual (idealbegriffliche)
modus is realized as the intelligible factor in space-time reality tousia.formav't'" The
question of whether the concept can have such a realization is the task of dialectics as
critique. And this is a very important aspect of Schleiermacher's overcoming of
metaphysics. But there are also other aspects of dialectics as critique. For instance,
dialectics also is, as Schleiermacher states, "the art of philosophical critique of any given
fragmented knowledge; therefore, the art of both forms of philosophy.t''" I tum to these
both forms now.
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Non-Metaphysical Dialectics: Logic Encompasses Metaphysics
These "both forms of philosophy," to highlight, are precisely both metaphysical
and nonmetaphysical aspects of dialectics. The first, or transcendental, aspect of
dialectics is metaphysics, but the second, or formal, aspect is logic. These are supposedly
different disciplines. "Metaphysics is science, logic is Kunstlehre," states
Schleiermacher." Metaphysics is "the insight of the verification of interrelation between
being and thinking overall.,,27 Logic is "knowledge of the ground of linking of thinking
viewed for itself.,,28 Dialectics as logic is not the science of metaphysics. Logic, as
"Kunstlehre of knowing,,,29 as non-speculative, dialectical, discursive praxis, overcomes
metaphysics.
Corresponding to these two forms of philosophy, metaphysics and logic,
Schleiermacher divides all sets of his Dialektik into two main parts. He calls them
transcendental part and formal part. Now, does it mean that Schleiermacher deals with
two different subjects of metaphysics and logic in the two different parts of his lectures?
By all means no. Rather, they are different modes of the same pursuit of knowledge. The
task Schleiermacher sets to dialectics as a whole "is simply to analyze the idea of
knowing overal1.,,3oAs a consequence, Schleiermacher renders ineffective the distinction
between the transcendental and the formal aspects of dialectics.31 As a matter of fact,
both these aspects in Schleiermacher's dialectics move on together. They interpenetrate
and complement each other. There are elements of one aspect in the other, and vice versa.
Schleiermacher states: "Logic, formal philosophy, without metaphysics, transcendental
philosophy, is no science; and metaphysics without logic can gain no other shape than
arbitrary and fantastic.,,32 Hence, Schleiermacher's fuller definition of dialectics,
following the classical model of philosophy, must include both elements:
Dialectics ... is a proper theory of thinking, according to which each thought
should be formed so as to correspond with its object and to occupy a certain place
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within the system of total thinking, and which therefore also presents in itself the
rules of the linking of thoughrs.f
Note that this middle position, uniting the transcendental and formal aspects of
dialectics, annuls Kant's corresponding distinction between constitutive and regulative
principles of philosophy. As shown earlier, Schleiermacher believes that they are the
same. '" He also believes that this position even helps to avoid the quandary of the vicious
circle already known to the ancients: in order to know, one must have some prior
knowing of that knowing. Schleiermacher's solution is simply to start from something
that is recognized as real knowing and to seek in this knowing its principle." To reiterate
the first chapter's discussion, Schleiermacher rather infers principles from the given data
than vice versa. It is precisely the untenable metaphysics that starts with the abstract
principles and then applies them to particulars.
Surprisingly, Schleiermacher uses the expression so popular today, "the death of
philosophy.T" He thinks that this occurrence is caused by the isolation of the two aspects
of dialectics in modem times, which was not the case in the classical period. It is this
"death of philosophy," Schleiermacher believes, that has brought about the
unsubstantiated "transcendent" metaphysics as well as logic that has lost its relevance.
This remarkable paragraph is worth quoting in full:
What have been called metaphysics and logic in modem times were nothing other
than these two parts of dialectic in isolation from each other and, on this account,
robbed of their proper life; for this reason, no bridge remained extending from
metaphysics to physics and ethics, and thereby arose the error that people
designate by the term "transcendent." In this separation metaphysics came to be
something quite evanescent. On the other side, logic was just as vacuous and
inconsequential, and so the result of this separation was the death of philosophy.Y
Schleiermacher himself, not separating metaphysics and logic, transcendental and formal
aspects of dialectics, wants to rebuild the destroyed bridge between metaphysics on the
one side and physics and ethics on the other side. Schleiermacher wants to overcome the
"death of philosophy," which is also "the death of metaphysics." Dialectics overcomes
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this "death" as a new, legitimate philosophy or meta-metaphysics that lacks ontological
or even epistemological foundations.
Why so? Because the logical aspect of Schleiermacher's dialectics prevails over
the transcendental one, which is the main reason why Schleiermacher's dialectics is an
overcoming of metaphysics. Although the following Jonas' assertion may be overstated,
it provides an ample support to my argument here. He goes as far as to purport:
"According to its content, [Schleiermacher's] dialectics by all means is logic and
metaphysics, yet not as an aggregate of both, but both in the form of logic.,,38 This
statement says something about Schleiermacher's true intent and disposition. After all,
Jonas was Schleiermacher's student. And even if, keeping in mind the constant return of
metaphysics in its every overcoming, it is impossible to fully accomplish his intent, one
ought at least to agree with something like Thiel's assessment of his dialectics:
The reader must ever be aware that the Dialektik is not first and foremost a
speculative work but a heuristic one devoted to the formal regulation of proper
thinking. Metaphysics does not achieve the status of a self-constitutive discipline
in the Dialekiik but functions instead as a partner in dialogue with logic."
Strange as it may be, but the status of metaphysics in Schleiermacher's dialectics turns
out to be the "handmaid" of logic. It is no coincidence that Schleiermacher designates not
only logic but also the whole project of dialectics as Kunstlehre.40 Even if dialectics
includes metaphysics, as Kunstlehre it overcomes metaphysics.
Dialectics in the Point-Zero between Science and Art
Mention also might be made in this regard that the presence of the transcendental
aspect in the formal one in dialectics brings about a subsequent ambiguity as to the status
of dialectics. Corresponding to the two aspects, Schleiermacher designates dialectics both
science and art (Kunst). Since the two aspects of dialectics are not separated, it also turns
out that science and art in dialectic are in a reciprocal relation to each other. But I start
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this topic mainly because there is an interesting moment in Schleiermacher's discussion
of the origins of dialectics as science and art. I point it out because of an appearance of a
specific term, of what Schleiermacher calls the "point-zero" (Nullpunkt). As it will be
seen later, this term has an important role in Schleiermacher's overcoming of
metaphysics. I consider it to be an indicator of a possible instance of the overcoming of
metaphysics. Similarly to Derrida's approach to contrasts, an undecidability of the
"point-zero" as the transition point between two states of affairs creates a space (or rather
nonspace) outside metaphysics in several instances of Schleiermacher's dialectics. I
think, the usage of this term is also not at all accidental here, and I want to probe if it,
indeed, indicates the overcoming of metaphysics.
Here is Schleiermacher's paragraph: "If art and science run besides each other in
philosophy, then their beginning is where there is a minimum or, properly, the point-zero
of both, which means the point where philosophy is not yet independent but involved in
something other.,,41 Now, if my understanding is correct, Schleiermacher insinuates that
dialectics in its twofold but united sense as both science and art has its beginning from
the point-zero, say, with the classical period of philosophy (Socrates and Plato). Before
that, before the point-zero, philosophy was involved in this something "other." What is
this other? Perhaps the next paragraph may give a clue: "Philosophy is primordially
mingled with the products of fantasy as the other form of highest principle, the blend in
which there is neither science nor philosophical art.,,42Schleiermacher's use of such
words as "primordially," "other," as well as the non-existence of science and art, implies
that my interpretation may be correct. The other that philosophy is involved in before the
point-zero, before Socrates and Plato, is fantasy, whose forms can only be trivial
surrogates of the highest principles. Schleiermacher also calls this pre-Socratic
philosophy "the mere caprice of poetic philosophizing.t'P Fantasy is philosophy out of its
proper delineation, which dialectics would only accomplish later, at the "point-zero,"
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when it attains real independence. But Schleiermacher also believes that this true Platonic
spirit was lost with the Aristotelian separation between art and science." And it was lost
for a long time, up to Schleiermacher's own times. Schleiermacher, as pointed out above,
wants to bridge the separation and bring philosophy as dialectics back to the original
"point-zero" of overcoming of metaphysics.
Dialectics as combination of logic and metaphysics under the overall
custodianship of logic overcomes the previous wrong metaphysics as fantasy, yet without
falling into the equally wrong vacuity of previous sophistics without transcendental
principles. As Schleiermacher sees it:
Dialectics, in its critical use, is in danger that it may be deemed for sophistics.
However, it could only be if it lacked principles. In its constructive use, dialectics
may be deemed for poetic. However, it could only be if it went beyond the rules
of combination.f
Dialectics in its critical use is here meant logic, but in its constructive use-metaphysics.
At any rate, I would say that the "point-zero," the undetermined transition point of
dialectics, may be interpreted as a nonplace or quasi-place beyond metaphysics that gives
birth to dialectics as proper metaphysics that overcomes wrong metaphysics.
Schleiermacher wants to make "a step-back" into this "point-zero" as the condition of
possibility of dialectics." I call it a quasi-place because it is not a place of thinking itself,
but an actually non-existing "place" that is not a place itself but that instead allows
thinking to take place. It is in this way that I understand the following quote about
Schleiermachers dialectics:
Dialectics posits a system of the knowledge of reason, but it posits it for the
purpose of its abolition, its putting aside, and in the moment when it is allowed to
be put aside, it becomes silent and language is given up to a kind of thinking that
does not originate in the realm of thinking, but in the realm of that for which this
thinking has provided room.47
That is the quasi-place, the point-zero beyond metaphysics that provides room for
metaphysics. Because of the methodological procedure of stepping back outside
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metaphysics, of going back to the origins (arche) or conditions of possibility of knowing,
dialectics is not metaphysics but archeology." Dialectics as archeology overcomes
metaphysics.
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CHAPTER 7
THE METAPHYSICS OF CONTRASTS
As I indicated earlier, and as it will also be seen in later chapters,
Schleierrnacher's thought always evolves around polarities, antitheses, opposites, or
contrasts (Gegensatz).1 The impression is that everything he thinks about is contrasted, be
it speculation and empiricism, knowing and Frommigkeit, understanding and Gefiihl,
epistemology and ontology, and so forth. It is the same with Schleiermacher's
metaphysics. It unfolds around contrasts that are interrelated, hence, I would characterize
Scnleiermacher's metaphysics as "the metaphysics of contrasts." And, as I also indicated
earlier, and will show in this and the next chapters, his overcoming of metaphysics
consists of the overcoming of the contrasts. Here is a list of some of these contrasts:
thinking and being, intellectual and organic, concept and judgment, God and world
(chaos), knowing and willing, ideal and real, identity and difference, time and space,
nothing and being, one and many. I start with a more comprehensive, separate account of
the first four of these contrasts. I will refer to the others in the discussion of the four
contrasts as well as in the rest of this work.
Thinking and Being
Epistemological Realism?
The task of Schleierrnacher's dialectics is to reveal thinking that is knowing. As a
reminder, for Schleiermacher, not all thinking is knowing. "Each knowing is thinking, but
not each thinking is knowing.t" With these words, the main part of Schleiermacher's
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Dialektik begins. As shown in the chapter on Schleierrnacher's understanding of
metaphysics as speculation, for him, knowledge can only take place when it is real, that is
to say, when real, empirical knowing complements rational knowing. Schleierrnacher
wants to avoid the one-sidedness of either rationalism or empiricism. As I also indicated
in that chapter, this issue is closely related to one of the main metaphysical issues, that is,
the relationship between thinking and being, between the thinking subject and the object
of thought, the question of adaequatio intellectus et rei. To Schleierrnacher, knowing is
thinking that corresponds to being. To this extent, that part of Dialektik that deals with
this issue may be considered ontology. At least it deals with being. Schleierrnacher
defends a kind of epistemological realism that, as also hinted in the chapter on
speculation, may be viewed as the overcoming of that kind of transcendent metaphysics
that does not require thinking to correspond with what is thought about outside it, with
being. For Schleierrnacher, thinking without being can never be knowing. But it also
cannot be overemphasized that Schleierrnacher does not inquire into the structures or
categories of being. In this sense, his metaphysics is not ontology proper. Mainly, it is
epistemology, and as such, it concerns being only insofar as its categories are related to
and necessary for knowing.
Correspondence Theory of Truth?
It also should be mentioned from the beginning that Schleierrnacher does not have
a naive understanding of the correspondence of thinking with being. His requirement for
the correspondence of thinking with being does not declare a simple correspondence
theory of truth. It also involves a coherence theory of truth.' Schleierrnacher is fully
aware of the hypothetical difficulties of the correspondence position and addresses them."
As I mentioned earlier, he believes that thought is linguistically determined. But since
language is finite, obviously. thought cannot elevate itself to a higher standpoint from
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which the correspondence of thought with being could be verified. For that reason, as I
will show later, Schleiermacher will make the knowledge of the correspondence only
indirect, through the presupposed transcendental ground of the relationship of thought
and being. And even this presupposition is a kind of overcoming of transcendental
metaphysics itself, for it is not a proper ground. It is only a presupposed condition of that
relationship.'
Being in the Form of Thought
(Thinking-Being=Thinking-What Is Thought => Being-What Is Thought)
In the issue of the thinking-being relationship, Schleiermacher's initial
questioning is, "How is an instance of thinking, insofar as it is knowing, thought of in
relation to its objectr'" His main answer is the proposition that I have already quoted
once: "Knowing is the congruence of thinking with being as what is thought."? The
answer may appear simple at first sight, but is it? I think it is yet another evidence that
complicates Schleiermacher's "epistemological realism." It seems needful to remark that
this sentence does not proclaim a simple congruence of thinking with being; it is the
congruence with being "as what is thought.t" What is it that thinking thinks of anyway?
As will be seen below, it always has to be an instance of being. But can it be thought
directly? Evidently, it can not, for the aforementioned statement suggests that thinking
corresponds only to being as it is given to thinking, and thus itself is being thought.
Paradoxically, it appears that, to Schleiermacher, an instance of being can only become a
being or entity by means of its relation to thinking: "Thinking relates itself to being, and
entity is above all the object of thinking, and thus by virtue of that, what is thought
becomes entity for us in the first place."? Consequently, the correspondence of thinking
and being is indirect insofar as being can be known as being only if it is being thought.
Thought itself becomes being by virtue of thinking about being as itself. Or, one could
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say, an instance of thought about being first of all corresponds to its own meaning or
concept, while the correspondence to the real referent poses a different question, the
question Schleiermacher answers by means of dividing thinking into intellectual and
organic functions discussed below.
Thought in the Form of Being
I have already mentioned an important point in Schleiermacher's epistemology
that complements his conception of the correspondence of thinking and being. It is his
belief that thought, insofar as it is linguistically determined, can only take place in the
form of being. Both are inevitably bound together. It means that there cannot be pure
thought. Schleiermacher asserts that even in such instances as fantasy and error, what is
thought assumes the form of being, even if it is a mere form. Yet, the products of fantasy,
such as fairies and centaurs, for example, even if they have the form of being, are just
"specters of truth" (Gespenster der Warheit), not real beings that yield real knowing. '0 It
means that thinking may predicate false attributes to being. The reverse procedure,
however, is not possible; error can never proceed from being. In the instances of error
and fantasy, thinking simply does not relate to its being as supposed in order for knowing
to take place. Obviously, there is a lack of congruence of thinking with being here. It is
clear that Schleiermacher does not hold the extreme idealist belief that appearances
deceive.
The Identity in Difference of Thinking and Being
Already the foregoing account shows that there is something more going on than
correspondence in the relation of thinking to being. As a matter of fact, Schleiermacher
himself asserts that both are identical, or the same, in the process of approximation to
knowing. They are identical, only, as he says, "in a different way."!' It means there is
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identity in difference. This identity is so fundamental to Schleiennacher that he even
declares that if there were something different in reason than in being or in being than in
reason, "both the idea of the necessity and orderliness of being and the reality of reason
would disappear." 12But difference between thinking and being is as important a
presupposition of knowing as their correspondence. 13 Otherwise there would be no
distinction between thinking and what is thought at all. That would result, I suppose, in
pure and circular self-identity. As Schleiennacher says, non-contrasted being would be
"bare negation of real thinking."!"
Interdependence of Thinking and Being
Schleiennacher thinks that knowing is a reciprocal activity of thinking and being
in which both endure. As he holds, at the basis of proper thinking lies "the presupposition
of togetherness of things, comprising the totality of being, and the origins of concepts,
comprising the scope of thinking.,,15 But what turns thinking into knowing is precisely
the element of being that is able to enter thinking only through the filter of human
organism, the organic element. As Schleiennacher states:
The correspondence of thinking and being is mediated through real relationship in
which the totality of being stays together with organization, so that one can say
that all thinking is a knowing that ~roperly expresses the relationships of
determinate being to organization. 6
Also, the foregoing account and the mutual identity of thinking and being imply not only
the correspondence of thinking to being iadaequaiio intellectus ad rem), but also vice
versa, the correspondence of being to thinking (adaequatio rei ad intellectumi.t'
Inasmuch as there is no thinking without what is thought about, thus thinking inevitably
becoming an instance of being, all being must be apprehended by thinking if it is to be
real and known being.
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Thinking is thinking that becomes alike to being, while being gives the universal
impulse to thinking becoming the will to know (Wissenwollen).18 The will to know is not
given as thinking but rather as being.l" This is also a reason why both thinking and being
can be considered the same but in a different way, as identity in difference. In any case,
according to Schleiermacher's system, the contrast of thinking and being seems to be
identical to that of thinking and willing. I will return to this contrast when discussing
Schleiermacher's theory of self-consciousness.
The Ultimate Unknowability of the Identity of Thinking and Being
To recapitulate, on Schleiermacher's account, the correspondence of thinking
with being is the main presupposition of knowing. Its importance for Schleiermacher
cannot be underestimated. In fact, it is the precondition of dialectic itself. This is so
because dispute (Streit) is the characteristic form of real conduct of conversation
iGesprdchfiirungv in the area of pure thinking, which is dialectics, but the relation of
thinking to being is the precondition of all disputes, and thus of dialecrics.i" Moreover, as
I have already noted, Schleiermacher considers the correspondence of thinking and being
as "the transcendent presupposition" of knowing. Here is Schleiermacher's paragraph:
'The transcendent presupposition is the identity of positing and counterpositing = the
identity of thinking and being for being, and the identity of being and thinking for
thinking, both for US.,,21 Once again, the correspondence is reciprocal, but ultimately, one
cannot really know about it except as it is "for us," as it is presupposed. Also, as I have
already mentioned, the transcendent presupposition by definition cannot be a part of
thinking itself. As such, it can be presupposed, but it cannot be known. If one strives to
achieve a proper clarified knowledge of it, one is bound to go astray from the way of
dialectics into either poetic or rhetoric.v' As Schleiermacher concludes, "We cannot
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therefore say that we know the identity of that highest difference, but we instead only
presuppose it for the purpose of knowledge.Y'
The Communal, Inter-Subjective Reason
All this means, as I indicated earlier, that Schleiermacher's correspondence theory
is not so unequivocal. Individual reason alone, to Schleiermacher, is no more than
fantasy, for, as I said, it does not possess a higher position wherefrom one could account
for the truth. But individual organization, letting being manifest itself through one's
personal perception, is precisely the cause of error.i" Hence, and this is an important
point, besides the correspondence of thinking and being, the second essential criterion of
thinking that is knowing is that kind of thinking "in which the identity of thought-process
is co-posited in all who think.,,25 In the same way, from the side of being as it enters
knowing, it is required that there is a communal experience to all who think to know.26
Knowing, according to Schleiermacher, is not that kind of thinking that is based on the
plurality and differences of thinking subjects, but in their identity, sameness, and
similarity instead.t' It is all other thinking that is based on differences of those who think.
But, to Schleiermacher, other thinking is not knowing.i" In case of the identity of
thinkers, the correspondence of thinking with being can be expressed in such a way that
the entire being that thinks is posited in every thinking being." For knowledge to take
place, Schleiermacher requires some kind of universal reason to be applied to being in the
process of knowing, universal thought forms that are the same for everyone. Reason,
accordingly, as I already noted earlier, is not so much subjective as communal or inter-
subjective. As Schleiermacher states, "Knowing is never simply a personal consciousness
but is the totality of all personal existence and is therewith reason itself.,,3o Precisely this
second criterion of knowing, the universality of reason, guarantees "the pure coinciding
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of reason with being.":" This idea of inter-subjectivity is one of important points of
Schleierrnacher's contemporary significance.
Self-Consciousness in the Identity of Thinking and Being
Schleierrnacher also addresses a hypothetical critique of his epistemological
position regarding the relationship of thinking and being. I should note already here the
importance of his resolving these possible criticisms referring to self-consciousness. As I
will explicate later, self-consciousness-as something emerging from the oscillation of
different metaphysical poles, including thinking and being-is also the place of the
overcoming of metaphysics. At this point in this chapter, however, it is a step before the
overcoming, where the two contrasts-thinking and being-just merge there in their
identity in difference.
First Schleierrnacher's hypothetical criticism is that one could say that the notion
of the correspondence of thinking with being is an idle thought because of "the absolute
difference and incommensurability of both.,,32 Schleierrnacher's refutation of this
criticism is that self-consciousness itself gives evidence that we are both thinking as well
as being in terms of what is thought, and that our life proceeds in harmony
(Zusammenstimmen) of both. This is an application of the presupposition of the
correspondence of thinking and being to self-consciousness as comprising both. Second,
one could say that it is "petitio principii to posit being outside of knowing.,,33 In this case,
too, Schleiermacher answers his own posed critique saying that knowing itself is given in
self-consciousness, however, as something different from it, in the form of being. The
assumption of this difference is the very basis for the task itself to seek the distinctive
characteristics of knowing. As Schleiermacher says a few paragraphs below, "our self-
consciousness is only in the relative separation of thinking and being, for our
consciousness first of all is the relation of thinking to what is thought.?" Being for
204
thinking is something relatively separated in general connection, while thinking for being
is the production of determinate forms?S Again, one should keep in mind that it is not the
principle of (simple) identity between thinking and being. It is identity in difference.
Third: "One could say that it is in vain to relate thought to being, for both can only be
absolutely separate.T" Once again, opposing such a view, Schleiermacher claims that
there is a reciprocal formation of both through one another in reflection and willing given
in self-consciousness. On this account, Schleiermacher thinks that it is impossible to
believe that both could proceed side by side unrelated.
I would like to note that, in addition, Schleiermacher's involvement of self-
consciousness in this discussion suggests quite self-evident a fact, namely, that human
beings carry in themselves the identity of thinking and being.37 As Schleiermacher
claims, human beings themselves are the "turning point only from which being can be
viewed under the form of action of the ideal upon the real.,,38To Schleiermacher, human
self-consciousness as thinking being unites in an immediate identity the totality of
thinking as ideal and the totality of being as real. As he nicely summarizes: "The totality
of being that relates to thinking is the real (to which also thinking being belongs); the
totality of thinking that relates to being is the ideal, to which also thinking being belongs,
in which this identity is given immediately.t' "
There are good reasons why Schleiermacher chooses self-consciousness as the
key concept of his thinking. Even on the etymological level, the German word for self-
consciousness (Selbst-bewusst-Sein) itself insinuates that identity: one's self (Selbst) is
the place of the identity of being (Sein) and thinking, which is knowing (bewusst =>
Wissen => Denken).40 Schleiermacher points out how easy it is to relate thinking to being
in one's self-consciousness without even noticing. It simply happens in such an ordinary
event as saying "we are.,,41As Schleiermacher asserts accordingly, human beings
themselves are being and thinking, that is, "thinking being" or being that is thinking
205
(denkende Sein) and "being thinking" or thinking that is being (seiende Denken) at the
same time.42 There is, in fact, a paragraph where Schleiermacher clearly relates this
reciprocal identity of human being as thinking being and being thinking to self-
consciousness:
... the nearest ground of the mutual relation of thinking and being lies in our
selves. Namely, in our selves the identity of being and thinking is immediately
given, which presupposes that we are just as conscious of our being as of the
given being, that is, as something effective. Through that we can regard our being
as a part of the entire being; we appropriate our thinking being (denkende Sein) as
being thinking (seiendes Denken) in the unity of the highest power. That is
exactly the content of self-consciousness.Y
There is also the unity of the highest power mentioned in this paragraph. That already
leads to the transcendental constitution of self-consciousness that I will discuss later.
Suffice it to say here that even in this preliminary respect, for Schleiermacher, self-
consciousness overcomes the duality of being and thinking or, say, of (Cartesian) res
extensa and res cogitans. They both come to light in their reciprocally referring
relation." The identity of being and thinking in self-consciousness excludes the
possibility of each in and for itself. One is only in the relation to another. I will return to
these topics, but meanwhile there are several other contrasts of Schleiermacher' s
metaphysics that need to be discussed before dealing with their overcoming in self-
consciousness, which will be the theme of the next chapter.
The Intellectual and the Organic
The Necessity of Two Functions of Thinking
Corresponding to both speculative and empirical aspects of Schleiermacher's
metaphysics, discussed in chapter 4, and corresponding to the restricted ontologicaJ
relationship of thinking and being discussed above, he distinguishes two indispensable
epistemological aspects or functions of thinking: the intellectual (intellectuelle) and the
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organic (organische). These terms are Schleiermacher's substitutes for reason (Vemunft)
and senses (Sinn).4S The intellectual function represents thinking in the human being as
the thinking that is being (seiende Denken); the organic function represents being in the
human being as being that is thinking (denkende Sein).46 One is formal, the other is
material; one is mental, the other is physical. Without either of them, no thinking can take
place. This division of the functions of thinking answers the basic epistemological
questions of how thinking and being (of that what is thought) as two different conditions
become related, and how yet they remain differentiated. Schleiermacher's answer is "that
every thinking is a joint product of human reason and human organization.v'" It means
that it is only by means of human organism and its senses that one can come to what is
being thought, and it is only through the universal forms of reason that thinking always
remains differentiated from the manifold of what enters thought, the objects." These
objects-keeping in mind the way how being enters thinking as thinking-are not
necessarily material objects. The thought of another person, for example, can be an
instance of being as well. It can also be a different faculty, though in the same thinking
subject, that is related to being rather than thinking, such as, willing and doing, or even
one's own previous thought in reflection. In a word, anything, as long as it is the other of
one's thinking at that moment, can be the object of thought as being.
In any case, according to Schleiermacher, it is the organic function that effects
one's being open to the outer, while the intellectual function-being open to the inner.49
The organic function gives matter or content, while the intellectual gives form.so The
organic function is passive, the intellectual, active. The organic function affects the real
being, the intellectual function-the ideal being. Being corresponds to the real insofar as
being as the object of thought becomes present through the organic function. Thinking
corresponds to the ideal insofar as being becomes internalized through the intellectual
function as that what is thought." It is precisely the two functions that enable the same
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being to be posited in its two different modes: the real and the ideal.52 The organic
function provides the obscure diversity of sense impressions and enlivens it.53 The
intellectual function, in turn, brings this raw material to "determination, division,
therefore, unification, but also at the same time contrasting.t''"
The organic function furnishes images for the reception of the impressions of the
objects, the intellectual function formally determines that matter by means of concepts."
Knowledge can only take place if the organic images can also be represented by means of
concepts. The impression of the objects on the sense organs as images constitute human
experience. Definitely, these organic impressions take part in thinking, not just
perception. After all, the organic function is a function of thinking. It is thinking insofar
as it is will to know (Wissenwollen), which, in turn, results in the openness of the senses
to being.
The Identity of Both Functions
Schleiermacher thinks that if real thinking that brings about knowledge is to take
place, both functions must come to identity, or even to "being-there-for-each-other" (das
Fiireinander),56 or "in-each-other-ness" ilneinanderr." or to "being-related-to-each-
other" (das Aufeinanderbezogensein), 58 or "alternation-relationship" (das
Wechselverhiiltnis).59 Precisely these two functions, when they come to identity in one's
reason, originate the identity of thinking and being that is the first metaphysical
presupposition of knowing.I"
There is another Schleiermacher's basic question concerning thinking and being:
"How does thinking arrives at what is thought"?" I put this question here instead of in
the previous section because the answer to it lies in the two functions:
Through spiritual life's being open to the outer = organization, thinking arrives at
its object or matter; through the activity which is always the same in spite of all
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differences of objects = reason, thinking arrives at its form, due to which it
[reason] always remains thinking.62
The intellectual function is the source of unity and plurality (Vielheit), the organic
function, the source of diversity (Mannigfaltigkeit).63 The diversity of organic sense
impressions would be indeterminate without the unity and plurality that only the
intellectual function can bring, while that determined rational unity and plurality would
be empty without the organic diversity." In their identity, both functions pass into each
other in the "indifference of their priority. ,,65 So, even more importantly, the unity of both
functions is not settled; it is an "oscillating unity" (schwebende Einheit).66 Both functions
can substitute each other" Both can alternately direct themselves to each other.l"
The Limits and Mutual Indispensability of Both Functions
Admittedly, Schleiermacher allows for some kind of knowledge to take place
even from the independent activity of either organic or intellectual functions separately,
because he thinks there is always some element of one in the other. Even if it is at a
minimum, there is always organic function present in thinking, and intellectual function
present in perception.f"
Schleiermacher believes that purely formal thinking without any organic element
is not even possible. That would be an instance of thinking about nothing, which, I
suppose, Schleiermacher would reject together with the possibility of thinking about
being as such.7o Notably, notwithstanding Schleiermacher's use of Sein not only in
reference to being as such, but also to entities, that kind of being that is the necessary
counterpart of thinking, according to Schleiermacher, is not being as such (Sein); it is
rather being as entity (Seiende). In any event, inasmuch as thinking always takes place
under the form of being, pure thinking also needs what Schleiermacher calls "the inner
organization, namely, the inner ear and memory," which are organic." Schleiermacher
even goes so far as to claim that thinking is just the same but "more inner process of
209
perception."n As a matter of fact, the organic function, according to Schleiermacher, is
present in the intellectual simply because thinking takes place by means of language
(Sprache) and inner speech (Rede). Schleiermacher thinks that there is no thinking
without it. But speech as the existence of thinking represents precisely the organic side of
thinking.i" Reason becomes the object for us only through organization, "namely through
language.t'" As Schleiermacher also points out, the organic function, as pure form, is
even adherent in the illusionary thinking of free fantasy.
In a similar way, the intellectual function, as form, is adherent in hypothetical
knowing or unscientific perception." The intellectual function is present in perception as
a result of the simple fact that a particular object is perceived at all, standing apart in its
unity from the chaos of impressions. In any case, the objects of organizational experience
always need to be compared, combined, and differentiated, and only the intellectual
function can do it.
The proportions in which the two functions are involved in thinking are always
different: one can be at a minimum, while the other at a maximum, and vice versa. In
thinking in the narrow sense, which is furnishing the objects of perception with the forms
of thought, the intellectual function predominates. In thinking as perceiving, which is at
the same time effecting images of the objects of thought, the organic function dominates.
One can always start thinking with one of the functions at a minimum. If the
intellectual function is at a minimum, is thought away (heraus denken), the organic
function of thinking reaches its limit at chaos. It is precisely the limit of thinking, and as
such it is not thought itself, for it cannot be either represented or attributed with concrete
features. If, on the other hand, the organic function is at a minimum, the intellectual
function reaches its limit at the concept of thing. Here the organic function is present only
as potentiality, as the ability to affect organically." The intellectual function becomes
"only an empty form of the indifference of being and non-being.t" But if even this
210
potentiality is thought away, the final limit of thinking is reached from the intellectual
side, which is the idea of "pure being without doing.,,78 In this case, the indifference is
between object and non-object. 79
Although there are elements of one function in the other, one side in isolation
does not bring about proper thinking. There is no real thinking in either of these cases of
the limits of thought, for the dominance of one function is too strong. If there is no proper
twofold thinking involved, there is no real knowledge either. Knowing, to
Schleiermacher, is that kind of thinking in which the contrast itself between both
functions disappears.t" "Knowledge," states Schleiermacher, "meaning here foremost real
[knowledge], is that kind of thinking that is posited not with the difference but in and
with the identity of both functions, and that was originally based on its outside as being,
in the same way for both functions."sl Perception of the organic function can only be
considered as knowing if "the objects are fixed as proceeding from similar impressions
referring to an identical system of thought-forms.t'Y Thinking of the intellectual function,
in turn, can only be considered as knowing if "from similar thought-forms proceeding
impressions are recognized as identical and become the basis of it.,,83In any case, to
recapitulate, Schleiermacher's definitive conclusion is that all "real determinate thinking
is, therefore, comprised in the coincidence of the activity of both poles.,,84
The Limits of Real Thinking
Indeterminate chaos and pure being were the ultimate limits of thinking. But there
also are, according to Schleiermacher, four secondary limits of thinking that
correspondingly occupy the lower and the upper ends of the intellectual and the organic
functions. Inasmuch as chaos and being itself are the absolute limits of thought, as such
they remain outside thinking. All real thinking takes place in the oscillation between the
secondary limits.
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The two limits of the intellectual function of thinking are the real and the ideal,
the former, being the lower limit, is closest to the transition to the organic function, but
the latter, being its upper limit, is closest to the absolute limit of being as such.85 The
more the intellectual function abstracts from all form and descends to more and more
inclusive content, the more it "arrives at the absolute limit-concept of the infinite chaos of
possible stimulations.,,86 This is the limit-concept of absolute difference, the idea of pure
content, pure real being. The more the intellectual function abstracts from all given
content and ascends to more and more inclusive concepts, it eventually "arrives at the
absolute limit-concept of the coherent structure of being as a whole.,,87 This is the limit-
concept of absolute identity, the idea of pure form, the ideal being. Whereas pure real
being, that is pure content or pure difference, marks the unity of the lower limit-concepts,
pure ideal being, that is pure form or pure identity, marks the unity of the upper limit-
concepts.
The two limits of the organic function, in tum, are space and time.88 Similarly, in
this case, when the organic function descends to the most inclusive content-filled sensible
form, it "arrives at the pure image of space.,,89 But when all content is abstracted from the
form of the image of the organic function, and it is allowed to ascend to the most
inclusive content-empty sensible form, it "arrives at the pure image of time.,,9o
Schleiermacher himself so summarizes the correspondence of these four limits
according to the functions of thinking to which they belong: "Space is therefore the
organic way to posit what in the intellectual function is posited as the real; and time is
nothing else than the organic way to posit what we posit as the ideal from the intellectual
side.,,91The materialization of space and time (die Raum- und Zeiterfiillung) give the
corresponding images to the concepts of the ideal and the real.92
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Intuition: The Anticipation of the Overcoming of Metaphysics
It is precisely the presence of both intellectual and organic elements in different
degrees in all determinate thinking that differentiates thinking into three areas. " The first
is the real thinking (eigentliche Denken), in which the activity of reason predominates the
organization. It is mostly speculative thinking, concerned with universality. The second is
perception (Wahmehmung), in case of being-open to the outer, or sensation
(Empfindung), in case of being-open to the inner, in which the organic function
predominates the rational. It is mostly empirical perceiving of particulars. The third is
intuition (Anschauung), in which both former elements-the intellectual and the
organic-are in complete equilibrium or balance ivolligen Gleichgewicht) in their
continuous approximation from their individual one-sidedness to the achievement of their
fulfillment in the unity of real thought. Inasmuch as the moments of complete balance are
so elusive and intangible, Schleiermacher says that such a moment is only a passing,
accidental thought iGedankendingv/" So is intuition. It cannot even be located anywhere
else except in "the point of indifference" (lndifferenzpunkt) between the intellectual and
the organic functions.f Even more important, due to its being indeterminately suspended
in the state of oscillation between the two interacting metaphysical poles of reason and
perception on the way to knowing, in intuition the subject-object division disappears and
metaphysics is overcome. I claim that this overcoming happens precisely because,
according to Schleiermacher, knowing cannot really be achieved after all. The identity of
being and thinking can only be progressively approximated, but the inner premise of this
identity remains transcendental." Intuition is outside the sphere of knowledge. It may be
precisely because of their infinite asymptotic approximation that the coincidence of
thinking and being as "thought-thing" (Gedankending) in intuition remains that
inscrutable "accidental thought" (Gedankending) that cannot belong to proper thinking."
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The Premonition of the Overcoming in Self-Consciousness
The unity of both intellectual and organic functions constitutes the transcendental
presupposition for self-consciousness in the same way as it did for the unity of thinking
and being, as something lying outside the area of thought. As Schleiermacher defines the
latter: "Self-consciousness, apart from all determinate content, is nothing else but the
consciousness of the being-one and the togetherness of both functions.,,98 The
coincidence of both functions, to Schleiermacher, in fact, is consciousness itself: "the
organic and the intellectual, posited identical, are self-consciousness, the self (das Ich),
conceived from that which is posited there as historical.,,99 Moreover, Schleiermacher
believes that togetherness of both functions in self-consciousness makes it possible for a
human being to be the mediator of being, being as such that becomes divided in beings or
entities as it proceeds through self-consciousness. At least that is the way I interpret the
following passage: "When the activity of reason derives from the organic: then we are
only the points of passage for the play of divided/fissured being."IOOIn this way, self-
consciousness becomes the border outside metaphysics where the transcendent and the
immanent meet. 101 I will return to this discussion in the next chapter on the transcendent
ground of metaphysics. As it will also be seen there, Schleiermacher's theory of self-
consciousness is another instance in his dialectics in which metaphysics is overcome.
The metaphysical impulse of the will to know not only never ceases, but it also
can never be fulfilled as real knowledge. Yet, as this section showed, it can be fulfilled in
other non-metaphysical ways of (non)knowing, such as intuition and immediate self-
consciousness, for example, that may be instances of the proper metaphysics that
overcomes metaphysics sought for in this paper.
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Concept and Judgment
To the ontological contrast of thinking and being (ontological as far as it deals
with the subject and being) corresponding epistemological contrast of the intellectual and
the organic functions of reason from the logical point of view employs corresponding
concepts and judgments. Inasmuch as all thinking, to Schleiermacher, is linguistically
formed, that thinking that is knowing cannot take any other form than that of the basic
linguistic units that are concept (word) and judgment (sentence or expression). The third,
according to Schleiermacher, simply is not given because the syllogism (Schluss) is not
an independent form of thinking that would add something substantive; it can only
combine the two and their content. 102
Concept
A concept determines being as unity. It is a product of reason. Concepts basically
consist of the combinations of the subject's attributes. A concept formally determines and
brings to the unity the manifold material that has passed through the senses and the
organic function. A concept is an oscillation between the universal and the particular. 103
A concept is a combination and distinction of characteristic marks of a subject into more
inclusive genus and less inclusive specific difference.l'" A concept is related to sensation
as the act that is not yet completed receptivity. 105 It is speculative knowing that dominates
concept, and as originating from inner impulse, it is apriori.l'"
Judgment
A judgment, in contrast, expresses something about the subject already
determined by concept, thus ascribing a predicate to the subject. A judgment is based in
sensibility. Judgments basically consist of concepts, of their combinations with reference
to the given subject. They determine the concepts, contrasting them, denoting their
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differences. A judgment is a synthesis of being and non-being, or the oscillation between
both.107 It happens as a result of the subject's not being that which is attributed to it, but
at the same time remaining as being.108 Thus, being is the subject and non-being is the
predicate. Notably, what Schleiermacher basically has in mind here is synthetic
judgment. The manifold predications of the objects in judgments add to knowledge. A
judgment is a combination and distinction of the subject-concept, denoting an
independent being and a predicate-concept, denoting a determination of being that is not
already contained in the subject-concept.l'" A judgment is related to willing as the act
that is not yet completed spontaneity. I 10 It is changing historical knowing that dominates
judgment, and, as originating from externally given organic affections, it is a
. . IIIpostenon.
The Interdependence of Concepts and Judgments
There is something in the concept-judgment relationship discussion that runs
parallel to the contrasts discussed above. And it is, once again, their mutual
interdependence and indispensability. Very much as it was with speculation and
empiricism; thinking and being; the intellectual and the organic functions of reason;
concepts and judgments, mutually presuppose each other.IIZ Both concepts and
judgments deal with the same being, only posited as power and appearance
correspondingly. 113 One could even say that either concept or judgment is nothing
without the other. As Jonas' summary records, "the absolute knowledge, the source of all
real knowing, is the pure identity of both." 1 14
Concepts need predicative determination given by judgments, but judgments for
their determination need subjects that in tum require concepts for their determination.
Precisely concepts, as the products of the intellectual function, provide the necessary
universal unity of reason, whereas judgments, grounded in the difference of the organic
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sensibility, give the concepts determinations and further qualifications. Inasmuch as
concepts combine genus and specific difference, their unity can only be rendered precise
by means of the predications that judgments contribute. But, to repeat, judgments
themselves consist of the combination of concepts. liS As Schleiermacher states about the
interdependence of the two in their formation: ''The more the concept is based on a
system of judgments, the more complete it is.,,116And vice versa: "Judgments
accordingly become all the more complete, the more the concepts have already been
formed.,,1!7 The more the judgment contains such developed concepts, the more complete
it is. But the completeness of the concept is dependent on the completeness of the
judgments that determine it.
It is noteworthy that, for Schleiermacher, precisely the mutual interdependence of
concepts and judgments overcomes the individual one-sidedness of idealism and
realism."8 But it is also this same interdependence of concept and judgment in genuine
knowing that causes the possibility to isolate one of them, for, repeatedly, the same
knowledge of the same being can occur under either of these two forms. Idealism posits
all knowledge exclusively in the form of concept, but realism exclusively in the form of
judgment. The former considers the sphere of judgment, or the real being, as appearance
that does not lead to genuine knowing. The latter considers the conceptual knowledge to
be empty. Schleiermacher, in opposition to any one-sidedness, maintains that knowledge
is possible only if both concepts and judgments are involved, in much the same way as it
was with speculation and empiricism, thinking and being, the intellectual and the organic
functions.
The Limits of Concepts and Judgments
Schleiermacher also assigns the upper and the lower delimiting boundaries to
concepts and judgments, just as he did for the intellectual and the organic functions of
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thinking.J'" As in that discussion above, I will only be able to give a concise account of
Schleiermacher's intricate and lengthy discussion of the relations between these limitS.120
The limits emerge in the formative process of concepts and judgments from indistinctness
to clearness. At the lower limit, determination reaches its minimum, at the upper limit, its
maximum. These limits also exemplify the interdependence of concepts and judgments
insofar as their lower and upper boundaries are alike.
The lower limit of concept consists of the infinite multiplicity of possible separate
judgments that are only minimally predicated, thus being supremely undetermined. The
upper limit of concept unites that multiplicity into a singular concept of the highest being
in which determination reaches the limit. It is the identity of thinking with being in which
the contrast of thinking and what is thought is eliminated by means of subsuming it under
the concept of the highest being about which nothing more can be predicated outside its
own being. Thus, this limit is "the euthanasia of judgment in concept.,,121 That kind of
knowing, on the one hand, is transcendental; it oscillates between the ethical and the
physical. On the other hand, it is the form of all knowing, for it unites concept and
judgment without itself either being carried out as concept, or being built out of manifold
judgments. 122
The lower limit of judgment, in tum, consists of the infinity of indeterminate
predicates without a determined subject. It is the absolute communality of all being.
Again, that is the limit of indeterminacy. The upper limit of judgment consists of the
multiplicity of predicates that have a single subject, the absolute subject, of which
nothing more can be predicated. That is the limit of determination. 123
As I mentioned, these limits are identical for concepts and judgments. As
Schleiermacher himself summarizes:
The indeterminate multiplicity of possible judgments (the limit of concept) and
the absolute communality of being (the limit of judgment) are the same. The
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absolute unity of being (the limit of concept) and the absolute subject (the limit of
. d ) h 124JU gment are t e same.
In addition, it is this identity of the limits of concepts and judgments that makes possible
the "transition" (Ubergangy from judgment to concept, a term which will become crucial
later, when I discuss Schleiermacher's overcoming of metaphysical contrasts.i"
In the first beginning of consciousness, concept and judgment are mingled in a
state of indifference that can equally well become either concept or judgment. 126But
when the limits of concept and judgment themselves are reached, they cease to be part of
thinking and thus cannot be either concepts or judgments. That is to say, both the
absolute unity of being and the absolute multiplicity of appearance, instead of becoming
thinking, become the transcendental roots of all thinking and knowing. 127But the upper
limits of concept and judgment, as also being the same in their unity, constitute the
transcendent ground of all knowing.128
The Epistemological Significance of the Identity of
Concept and Judgment As the Transcendent Ground
Now, a question emerges for Schleiermacher: How can knowledge arise in this
situation where concepts and judgments mutually presuppose each other? Is it not the
case that this mutual implication of all knowledge creates a circulus vitiosus, a closed
circle without any point of departure? The answer is no, and the answer is concealed in
the identity of concepts and judgments: 'There must be an identity of the two that itself
must be the source of all real knowing, thus its absolute, and this source cannot be either
concept or judgment but must be the pure identity of the twO.,,129Consequently, once
again, the discussion of the identity of concept and judgment in these last paragraphs, as
in the formerly discussed contrasts, point to the transcendent ground in which the
metaphysical opposition is overcome. That will be subject of chapter 8. But first, I want
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to make a point of something in regard to overcoming metaphysics that arises in the
discussion of the interdependence of concept and judgment.
The Irreducible Non-Metaphysical Linguisticality
What I want to point out is that the interdependence of concept and judgment, in
fact, prevents any possibility of a foundational metaphysics. How so? It is because the
conceptual terms cannot once and for all absorb their predicates into themselves. 130
Instead, they remain modifiable in their substance through constant changes brought
about by the activity of the organic function and the judgments passed on them. As a
result, the system of language always remains unstable and changing. There can be no
stable foundation. Everything changes according to individual interpretative judgments.
Hence, the linguistic system itself resists metaphysics, for it "never attains the manner of
being of a foundational Idea which can shake off interpretation and comment from the
outside.,,13l As Manfred Frank interprets Schleiermacher's view of language, it is "the
individual universal.,,132 And it happens in a great deal because of the interrelation of
concept and judgment. Language exists as a universal conceptual system only on the
basis of ever-changing temporary inter-subjective judgmental agreements.r"
God and World
The Two Roles of the Idea of God
As I indicated above, all contrasts of Schleiermacher's metaphysics are
interrelated. The last one I will discuss here is the contrast of God and world. All the
previous contrasts culminate in this one. Before proceeding in this subsection, there is
something that must be noted beforehand about the idea of God in this particular context,
because it has another usage in Schleiermacher's dialectics, and these two should not be
confused. That another usage, in fact, may include the one under consideration here, and I
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will examine it in the next chapter which addresses Schleiermacher's transcendental
metaphysics. While here the idea of God is considered a part of the metaphysical contrast
of God and world, in the other case, it is the ultimate presupposition of knowledge that
transcends even this contrast. In that latter case, it is a truly metaphysical idea of God
above God, if one may say so.
World As the Totality of Being
It is equally important to note before proceeding that the idea of world in this
context should not be confused with the earth. By world Schleiermacher means rather the
universe as the totality of being in its diversity, whereas the earth, as a particular planet, a
particular identity of substance and energy, is only one thing among others and not the
whole world. 134 I think, it may also be noted in addition that in Schleiermacher's view,
world as totality of being or universe is something more than it may appear. That is,
world cannot be confused with inanimate nature. World, to Schleiermacher, means "in-
each-otherness of nature and spirit."m The world is unfathomable not only outwardly,
but also inwardly, for it is charged with spirit.
God and World As Limiting Ideas
I would like to continue with the thought that the contrast of God and world
further expresses the indispensability of both the ideal and the real for thinking that is
knowing. The idea of God represents the former, but the idea of world the latter. This
contrast, in fact, already appeared in the preceding discussion of the limits of concept and
judgment. 136 That is to say, to Schleiermacher, the identity of the absolute unity of being
and the absolute subject, the upper limits of concept and judgment, can also be named
God. It is the primary unity that excludes all contrasts.l " As such, the idea of God is the
presupposition that provides the element of unity for thinking. But the identity of the
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infinity of predicates and the multiplicity of judgments, the lower limits of concept and
judgment, is the same as world. It is the final unity that includes the difference of all
contrasts.138 The idea of God as the identity of upper limits represents pure intellectual
function, the primary principle of the formation of concepts. The idea of world as the
identity of lower limits represents pure organic function, the final principle of the
formation of judgments. The idea of God, as representing the upper limits in their identity
between the highest genus and all particular genera, makes possible the combining of
form with empty content. The idea of world, as representing the lower limits in their
identity between highest being and the infinity of predicates, makes possible the
combining of pure form with full content.
Transcendence of Both God and World
Insofar as both God and world in different ways belong to the domain of limits of
thought, they do not constitute knowledge, and there cannot be knowledge of them.
Instead, they are transcendental ideas that correspondingly constitute the primary and the
final principles or presuppositions of knowledge. Therefore, I cannot reiterate too often
that they do not belong to the sphere of thinking and knowing proper. This sphere is not
ontology, but epistemology, for it does not deal with either God or world as such, but
with the epistemic significance of these ideas. For Schleiermacher, this pair of contrasts
is not related ontologically, but rather logically. This truth should be kept in mind in all
further discussion. As he maintains, in regard to the formula of God as the unity
excluding all contrasts and world as unity including contrasts, it does not express
anything more in reality than that there must be some x in being that corresponds to this
logical expression.l'" It does not express anything more positi ve in reality than a formula
"being is," for example.
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Transcendence of the Idea of God
As to the idea of God and its transcendence, Schleiermacher professes a kind of
via negativa: notwithstanding that the idea of God can be hypothetically presupposed for
the dialectical claim of the possibility of knowledge, not much can be known of God's
being besides knowing God's unknowability. As Schleiermacher maintains, what one can
have regarding the absolute is its "not-having" (Nichthabent.t'" It can be established only
in a negative form.141However, it is a via negativa with some exclusions. Namely,
Schleiermacher believes that there are two things that can be said of God in the area of
knowing. Just two, and in the area of epistemology only, but nevertheless (1) God as
transcendent being is the (material) principle of all being and (2) God as transcendent
idea is the formal principle of all knowing. 142Everything else besides this knowledge is
what God is not. "Everything else," goes on Schleiermacher, "is only bombast or
meddling of the religious, which does not belong here, but insofar as it appears here, has
yet destructive effect.,,143
So, Schleiermacher's Dialektik gives two insights regarding the knowledge of
God: the knowledge of God's unknowability and the knowledge of the impossibility of
knowledge without God. Unknown but necessary: "The dialectics gives us no knowledge
of God; yet it makes the claim: there is no knowledge possible without God."l44
Obviously, the author of this quote may refer to the following sentence of
Schleiermacher: "The deity is just as surely incomprehensible as the knowledge of it is
the basis of all knowledge.,,14s I would claim that this dialectical knowledge of God turns
out to be quite a metaphysical knowledge after all, even if it is the knowledge of non-
knowledge. It still asserts something about God, even if it is God's incomprehensibility.
Yet, it is a different metaphysics from that kind of speculative metaphysics that affirms
the reflection of the divine in human reason, exemplified by Schleiermacher's
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contemporaries, such as Schelling and Hegel. Schleiermacher's realism, which I have
already doubted in his epistemology, does not apply to the knowledge of God either.
The arguments of the unknowability of God should be obvious. Although the idea
of God is a necessary epistemic presupposition, it cannot be identical with the divine
itself. 146The concept of the divine, according to Schleiermacher, cannot exist outside the
divine itself. 147Human thinking can have the divine only insofar as it knows "the
inadequacy of any image of deity we have in the identity of our being and our
concept.,,148There can be no isolated perception of deity. There is no way for its concept
in human thinking to reach the identity with its object, for by definition, there can be no
organic grasp of the idea of God. 149Proper knowing, on Schleiermacher's account, to
remind, must involve the organic function. A human being would have to become God
for the organic function to deliver the sense impression of God as such. It is very clear to
Schleiermacher: "God's being as such cannot be given to US.,,150All representations of
the idea of God-such as, the absolute, the highest unity, the identity of the ideal and the
real, and others-s-can be schemata only. For those schemata to come alive, they must
enter the domain of finitude and antithesis, as in the case when one thinks of God as
natura naturans, or as conscious absolute I.15lBut these options are not for
Schleiermacher. Therefore, to him, the idea of God and its representations do not really
denote its referent, but rather, as Schleiermacher says, have symbolic value, in contrast to
the real value of the idea of world. 152Or else, as Schleiermacher admits, because human
knowledge is finite and deficient, the idea of God is bound to remain mythical.153 In
contrast to the expressions of God that aim at knowing God, Schleiermacher's epistemic
presupposing God does not go any further than naming God by its name, "God." It may
be a nonmetaphysical naming in contrast to metaphysical expressing.
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Transcendence of the Idea of World
The idea of the unknowability of God is not uncommon in philosophy and
theology. But Schleiermacher, in addition, draws similar conclusions regarding the idea
of world. He maintains, "Of the idea of world, there is given to us neither its being in
itself, nor being in contrast to God, rather only being in us and being in things.,,154 It is
interesting that one can replace the terms "world" for "God" and vice versa in this
statement, and obtain a statement Schleiermacher would use about God. In fact, there are
similar statements about God, and I will refer to them in the next chapter.
In any case, in Schleiermacher's opinion, inasmuch as belonging to the limits of
thought, world partakes in thinking that is not proper thinking, it also partakes in
transcendent being.155The first impression can be that the idea of world may be subject to
knowing, for at least theoretically, world may become an object of sense experience. So,
both functions of reason may appear to be involved, thus fulfilling the requirement of
proper thinking. Yet, Schleiermacher thinks that it is not so. Human knowing is finite,
and, despite its constant progression toward better knowing of world, toward better
correspondence of world in thinking with being, it can never embrace the totality of
being. It cannot happen precisely because human knowing is bound to a particular being,
the earth. "We are bound to the earth," as Schleiermacher declares, and consequently so
are aJJ operations of thinking, the whole system of the formation of concepts.P" Or, as
Schleiermacher admits, world "cannot become for us intuition in which speculative and
empirical, ethical and physical ways of knowing pervade, but it always remains an
unfulfiJJed thought to which the organic element is related only in remote analogies.,,157
Also, world as time and space can be infinitely divided into smaller parts, but it cannot be
given in one act of perception. 158Hence, world in its totality can only be thought, but it
cannot be organically given in a way that gathers the continuous process of all
experience. 159Insofar as only one function of thinking is fully involved, the intellectual
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one, the proper knowledge of world cannot take place. It can only be grasped as an idea
with no perceptive counterpart. So, there can be no knowledge of the idea of world and it
must also be transcendental.
Schleiermacher also summarizes his views about the transcendence of world as
follows:
If world comprises in being what corresponds to the limits of thought, so it
belongs to real thinking only from one side, yet it also belongs to real being just
as much. It includes all being, at the same time never including it fully, for it is
always in becoming. Thinking corresponds to the formation of concepts and its
limits, being corresponds to the formation of judgments and its limits. As unity,
world includes being in itself, as communality, it is only becoming. 160
Whereas the idea of God represents unity only, in the dialectics of the one and the many,
the idea of world represents "a quantitative third" that mediates both unity and
plurality.i'" World is unity in plurality.
The Different Transcendence of God and World
Although both ideas are transcendental, the transcendence of the idea of world,
according to Schleiermacher, is not to be understood in the same way as that of the idea
of GOd.162lf the transcendence of world is that of the "other" (das Andere) the
transcendence of God is that of the "wholly other" (der gant. Andere). 163Although the
idea of world also belongs to the limits of concept and judgment, the idea of God is
"more" transcendent. As Schleiermacher says, the idea of world is transcendent in a
subordinated sense. 1MIt is a subordinate, secondary unity binding the ideal and the
real. 165The idea of world can be conceived as unity in two ways: "as a unity pure and
simple (als Einheit schlechthin), but also as a totality made up of a plurality of specially
relativized unities.,,166The latter unities have to do with what is given, while the former
unity is necessary for thinking only. Nevertheless, the unity of world is unlike to the
absolute unity of the idea of God. To remind, the former includes all contrasts, but the
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latter excludes them. In any case, the idea of world, according to Schleiermacher, cannot
be the transcendent ground. This privilege is reserved only for the idea of God which,
being the principle of being, must be not only beyond world as the totality of being, but
also include it.167 But the idea of world, as shown above, is still transcendent, even if in
its special, subordinated way. And it lies outside real knowing precisely because it is
posited as the totality of being in its immeasurable diversity, in contrast to the unity of the
idea of GOd.168
Different Delimitations of God and World: Termini A Quo et Ad Quem
Schleiermacher thinks that these considerations of the relationship of the ideas of God
and world not only bring one back to the identity of transcendental and formal, but also
ultimately take one in the direction of the never-to-be-reached limits of thinking that
express what corresponds to the transcendent ground, or God, in being. In this context,
Schleiermacher ascribes two temporal metaphysical properties to the ideas of God and
world that once more underscore the difference of their transcendence. Those are
formulae of Medieval theology terminus a quo and terminus ad quem.169 "The formulae
that express the terminus a quo are purely negative, therefore void, when related to the
idea of world.,,170For that reason, the idea of world thoroughly expresses only the
terminus ad quem. But the idea of God, for Schleiermacher, allows itself to be related to
both of these limits, a quo and ad quem, interrelated with each other.
While for Schleiermacher, in world is terminus ad quem and God both termini a
quo and ad quem, eight years earlier he had proposed a different formula. I quote it, too,
because it adds a few more nuances to the understanding of the God-world relationship in
its mutual epistemological indispensability as presuppositions of knowing: "As the idea
of God is the transcendental terminus a quo and the principle of the possibility of
knowing in itself, so the idea of world is the transcendental terminus ad quem and the
principle of the actuality of knowing in its becoming."!" Thus, first of all, both ideas
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bring one back to the two functions of thinking-intellectual and organic-corresponding
to God and world. The former has to do with the possible knowing and knowing as such,
in its being, whereas the latter has to do with the actual knowing that is always in
approximation, becoming. Whereas world as terminus ad quem, in contrast to God as
terminus a quo, can only be an object of progressive inquiry, that inquiry cannot take
place without God presupposed. Knowing world does not add to knowing God, the
presupposition. At most, it can only add to knowing God as the transcendental
.. 172presupposrtion.
As a reminder, for Schleiermacher, real thinking must take part in the idea of
world. But this thinking corresponds to the idea of knowing only through approximation,
progression, becoming, by means of continual adding, through the interaction of
speculative and empirical, but never completely. In contrast to that, the idea of God, to
Schleiermacher, has no relation to such progression; it cannot be approximated. It has
meaning only to and for each individual thought in itself, not to the interconnectedness of
thoughts.
The differences between the two ideas go on. I will just mention some of them.
As Schleiermacher also recounts, the idea of God is always posited in thought as unity
without plurality, whereas the idea of world as plurality without unity. Moreover, world
is space-and-time filled, whereas God is spaceless and timeless. Even more, world is the
totality of antitheses, whereas God is the negation of all antitheses. 173 God is the absolute
unity of the contrasts, world is their relative unity. God is necessary, but not directly
given, world is conditioned and directly given.174
Similarity between God and World
All of the above differences notwithstanding, Schleiermacher is convinced that
there is no way to think the idea of world in opposition to that of God. Why so? The
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answer already lies in the same foregoing discussion about the similar transcendence of
both world and God. Very much like it is in the case of God, world's being in-itself is not
given. And, Schleiermacher adds, not only because of the infinity of world-process, but
also because one cannot really posit plurality itself without either apprehending it as mere
aggregate that cannot correspond to the idea of world or reducing it to a determinate
unity.175Schleiermacher recapitulates: "All presentations of world that are carried out
really (as, e.g., the division of world in spiritual and corporeal) are just as inadequate and
just as figurative as those of divinity."176 Schleiermacher also thinks that the idea of
world, analogously to the idea of God, is a driving force of thinking as well as willing. 177
The idea of world is also presupposed in things insofar as their essence is conditioned
through their coexistence. As a result, the totality of everything finite as world is likewise
posited in each individual thing.
Interdependence of God and World: The First Canon
As these similarities indicate, and as one can anticipate from the pattern of
Schleiermacher's other metaphysical contrasts, ideas of both God and world must also be
interdependent. I should remind again, that this interdependence is not to be understood
essentially or ontologically, but only noetic ally or epistemologically. 178It is a
presuppositional correlation necessary for proper thinking to take place, thinking that
involves both the ideal and the real, the intellectual and the organic, which both ideas
represent. Schleiermacher's proposition is, "Both ideas of world and God are
correlates." 179It means that one cannot be thought without the other. Thus,
Schleiermacher proposes his "first canon": "No God without world, in the same way as
no world without God.,,180They both are equal presuppositions of real thinking that
strives to become knowing: "God is the presupposition in origination, world is the
presupposition in proceeding" of knowledge. 181"Without the former, there is no unity in
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moment, without the latter, there is no impulse for progression in thinking."182 God is the
principle of construction, world is the principle of combination. 183
Untenability of One-Sided Separation
Again, as in the case of other Schleiermacher's metaphysical contrasts, correlation
determines in advance the rejection of anyone-sided, separate epistemological usage of
the ideas of God or world in which one could be eliminated at the expense of the other.
Also from this perspective, it is precisely the similar transcendence of both ideas that
permits the following dangers of one-sidedness: "If we thus think world without God, we
come upon fate and matter as grounds of being; if we think God without world, God
becomes the principle of non-being and the world becomes contingent.vl'"
Schleiermacher believes that, if the first canon is not taken into consideration, in the case
of its second part, the presentation of world without God remains inadequate, whereas in
the first, God without world, there is no more the idea of God that remains, but "an empty
phantasm" (ein leeres Fantasma).185 "No world without God" because in that case its
formula remains insufficient and wanting, and "No God without world, because one can
only come to God from that which is brought forth in us through world.,,186World
without God remains accidental, and cannot be thought as unity. God can only be
presented in worldly terms; there is no language that describes God directly. As soon as
one thinks of God, God becomes related to world in the human mind. Thinking God can
only take place in finite worldly terms. In separation of God from world, there is nothing
either for knowing or willing. 187Thinking world without God cannot yield knowledge,
whereas thinking God without world gives only indistinguishable value to thoughts,
eliminating the difference between truth and error. 188
Schleiermacher also has several other explanations as to why neither of these
ideas should be thought as self-sufficient, but only as interrelated. For example, thinking
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both the transcendence of God above world, when there is something in God that is not
conditioned by world, and the transcendence of world above God, when there is
something in world that is not conditioned by God, appear untenable to Schleiermacher,
for it violates the necessary interconnectedness of both ideas and their relative activity
and passivity. 189
Another related example is the dispute over whether God is within or beyond
world, namely, the dispute between pantheism and deism.190The latter brings forth an
antithesis between God's self-activity and receptivity, the antithesis that natural
theologies, relying upon the theory of creation, are so full of. The God-world relationship
is then construed in a way that God as the highest being is opposed to world as formless
matter. It is very much like opposing the intellectual and the organic functions of reason.
Pantheism, in tum, makes God natura naturans and world order. Needless to say, both
such cases of one-sidedness are not acceptable to Schleiermacher.
In any event, when one of these fundamental ideas is ignored and the other
overemphasized in the process of knowing, according to Schleiermacher, two kinds of
misconceptions, or faulty metaphysics, happen. The overemphasis on the idea of world is
the "philosophical" or the "worldly wisdom" (philosophische oder weltweisheitliche)
misconception, while the overemphasis on the idea of God is the "theosophical"
(theosophische) misconception.i'" In the latter, both minimum and maximum (termini a
quo and ad quem) are equally posited for itself, and there is no progression found. When
the idea of God gets isolated under these circumstances, it cannot but end, as
Schleiermacher says, "in gymnosophistic navelgazing."l92 The "worldly wisdom," in
tum, if isolated, forfeits the difference between knowing and arbitrary thinking, and
consequently, if proceeding from thinking in the narrower sense, becomes "fantastic"
(jantastisch). Or, in the case of forfeiting the difference between the organic way of
realization, if proceeding from perception, becomes "atomistic" (atomistisch).193
231
To be sure, this untenability of separation of both ideas obliges one to think God
and world as merging (aufgehend) into each other. 194 After all, that is what the first canon
is about. But that is not all. As shown above, there are not only similarities, but also
differences between both ideas. The first canon alone may lead to a different one-
sidedness that should also be avoided. If the ideas of God and world were considered
only identical, as the first canon proposes, it would lead, for example, to pantheism and
the metaphysical formula of natura naturans. And it is no wonder that Schleiermacher
has been endlessly implicated with pantheism. In addition, the difference of the
transcendence and the difference of the limits of thought would disappear, that is, the
transcendent would lose its primordiality iurspriingliche). Instead, it would be considered
as originating from the unification of the contrasts.l'" But most important of all, if both
ideas were identical, the chief dialectical task of establishing thinking that is knowing
would itself be negated. The identity of both ideas would mean that the perfect
knowledge is already attained, whereas for Schleiermacher, knowledge may only be an
endless process of approximation. The idea of God as the final unity of the transcendent
ground represents the goal of all knowing. Therefore, it is the condition of possibility of
knowledge that can never be reached in actuality.
Identity in Difference: The Second Canon
Knowing Schleiermacher's approach, it is clear that there is something required to
correct this subsequent one-sidedness of the identity of God and world. As in the cases of
the former contrasts, it must be identity in difference. And, indeed, Schleiermacher does
not hesitate to add his second "canon": Both ideas of God and world are not the same, are
not identical. 196 This second canon is a necessary correlate of the first canon. Neither the
first nor the second canons can be taken by itself, for that would bring about other
partialities. In the case of the second canon alone, if the divine,
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the terminus a quo, is thought to be beyond everything temporal and never
developing in time, and if the world always being the terminus ad quem, because
always a partial formula which first needs to be filled-in, an unknown entity until
all its individual areas are seen through and together, then the dialectical interest
is satisfied. Whereas the operations themselves would be without any ground if
they did not always come out of God and move to the construction of world; the
same is the case if both were to be completely separated.v'"
Only both ideas of God and world together provide the necessary middle way: neither
their complete identification, nor complete separation.l'"
In addition, Schleiermacher opts for his characteristic middle way not only from
the epistemological, but also from the logical point of view:
We can not really make both identical, because both expressions are not identical;
we also can not completely separate them from each other, because they are only
two values of the same claim; and also apagogically each definite relationship is
untenable, and no true separation takes place without definite relationship.i'"
This quote also is a reminder not to forget that the identity and./in difference in the
relationship between both the ideas God and world ultimately is not a definite expression.
Even saying that they are correlates does not express anything definite. If it is a positive
expression, then only to the extent of setting the limits always to interconnect both. 200
Therefore, a third proposition may be added to the two canons: the relationship between
God and world cannot be positively expressed.r'" Accordingly, the debates of
metaphysical theology, whether God is in or beyond the world, are needless. According
to Schleiermacher's way of overcoming metaphysics, both options are inadequate insofar
as it is only correlation hypothetically presupposed for epistemological purposes, not
having anything to do with reality as such.
The Relativity and Interconnectedness of the Contrasts
It is also in the context of the relationship between God as the unity of all
contrasts and world standing under the form of contrasts where Schleiermacher
introduces another "canon" that applies to all his metaphysical contrasts. Therefore, I will
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conclude this section with it. The canon states "that no contrast is absolute, but only
relative."zoz Thinking that does not take this canon of the relativity of the contrasts into
account, "that isolates an absolute contrast, presents nothing real."Z03
Similarly, in the formal part of the Dialektik, Schleiermacher formulates two
logical rules: one of deduction, the other of induction. The former corresponds to the
formation of contrasts: "No contrast may be so constructed that it has a positive and a
negative side. In that case, one is out of the domain of life and there is no relative
unification possible. That becomes empty abstraction."z04 The latter corresponds to the
construction of being related to the contrasts formed that way: "No being may be so
posited that it would be determined only through one contrast. Rather, the identities of all
other main contrasts must be given with it."zo5I quote these rules here because they
somehow summarize some common traits in the previous discussions of the four
contrasts, at the same time interconnecting them.
Although those discussions were quite diverse, certain similarities characteristic
of all of them emerge as quite obvious. First, the contrasts of each pair reached some
identity between each other, at least to a certain extent. On the other hand, of course, that
could not be a complete identity. They are contrasts after all, therefore different.
Consequently, it was always the identity in difference. As one author points out in this
connection, the appearance of the interconnectedness of contrasts, that is, "the polar
duality in knowledge as well as in being, cannot be resolved into "simple identity" and
"sheer difference."z06 Identity and difference also are mere "boundary concepts" of
thought, or as Schleiermacher calls them, the "asymptotes" of thought, pure abstractions
but not thought proper.Z07It is precisely the identity in difference that makes thought
proper.
The identity in difference, which requires the mutual interdependence of the
contrasts of each pair, is important. It is because of this condition that no one member of
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each pair of the contrasts can exist alone or separated from the other member. That is
basically what the two rules quoted above show: the impossibility of separating the
contrasts and the necessity of interdependence within each pair, and moreover, the inter-
relatedness of all contrasts. Owing to the relativity and interdependence of the contrasts,
both dualism and one-sidedness are avoided.
Even more important, as the above account shows, the interdependence of the
contrasts leads to, as well as is conditioned by, their transcendental ground. Inasmuch as
opposed also means related, it is the dialectical opposition of the contrasts that provides
them with the opportunity of being united under the transcendental presupposition.i'" In
all four of the above cases, the mutual interdependence of the contrasts pointed to their
transcendental ground, which in tum not only makes knowledge possible, but also makes
all of the contrasting pairs related and interdependent.
This chapter explored one level of Schleiermacher's metaphysics: the
metaphysics of contrasts. The presence of the transcendental ground in that metaphysics
already points to the next level of metaphysics, which overcomes even the metaphysics of
the togetherness of the contrasts. That will be the theme of the next chapter.
NOTES
1. I prefer to use the term "contrast," not "opposite," because the former conveys the
interrelatedness of the contrasting elements better.
2. Dialektik (Jonas), 39. "Jedes Wissen ist ein Denken, aber nichtjedes Denken ein Wissen."
3. See Richard B. Brandt, The Philosophy of Schleiermacher: The Development of His Theory of
Scientific and Religious Knowledge (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1968),203. I will return to this subject
later.
4. See Dialektik (Jonas), 53. I will return to this discussion.
5. See Hans-Richard Reuter, Die Einheit der Dialektik Schleiermachers: Eine Systematische
Interpretation (Munich: Kaiser, 1979),45.
6. Dialectic (Tice), 15.
7. Ibid., 17.
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8. Dialektik (Jonas), 43. " ... dem darin gedachten."
9. Dialektik (Odebrecht), 135. "Denken bezieht sich auf ein Sein, und das Seiende ist uberall der
Gegenstand des Denkens, und so wird uns erst darin das Gedachte ein Seiendes."
10. Ibid., 138.
11. Dialektik (Jonas), 461. "auf andre Weise" See also 488. "auf verschiedene Weise"
12. Dialectic (Tice), 17.
13. Dialektik (Jonas), 55.
14. Ibid., 408. "die blosse Negation des wirklichen Denkens ... "
15. Ibid., 497. " ... Iiegt allem wirklichen Denken ... zum Grunde die Voraussezung der
Zusammengehorigkeit der Dinge, in welchem die Gesammtheit des Seins ist, und der Begriffsanfange, in
welchem der Umfang des Denkens ist."
16. Ibid., 54. "Das Correspondiren des Denkens und Seins ist vermittelt durch die reale
Beziehung, in welcher die Totalitat des Seins mit der Organisation steht, und man kann sagen, das ganze
Denken ist ein Wissen, welches die Beziehungen eines bestimmten Seins zur Organisation richtig
ausdrukkt, "
17. Ibid., 487.
18. Ibid., 488. I will also explore another contrast later on, the contrast between thinking and
willing.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., 588.
21. Ibid., 499-500. "Transzendente Voraussezung ist die identitat von Sezung und Entgegensezung
= Identitat des Denkens und Seins fur das Sein, und Identat des Seins und Denkens fur das Denken, beides
fi.ir uns."
22. Ibid., 78.
23. Ibid. "Also konnen wir auch nicht sagen, dass wir die Identitat jener hochsten Differenz
wissen, sondern wir sezen sie nur voraus zum Behuf des Wissens."
24. Dialektik (Jonas), 48.
25. Dialectic (Odebrecht), 129. " ... in welchem die Identitat des Prozesses aller Denkenden
mitgesetz ist." Cf. Dialektik (Jonas), 43.
26. Dialektik (Jonas), 65, 68.
27. Ibid., 48, 451.
28. Ibid., 451.
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29. Ibid., 461.
30. Dialectic (Tice), 17.
31. Ibid.
32. Dialektik (Jonas), 53. " ... absoluter Verschiedenartigkeit und Incornmensurabilitat beider."
33. Ibid. " ... es sei petitio principii ausser dem Wissen ein Sein zu sezen."
34. Ibid., 55. " ... so ist unser Selbstbewusstsein nur in dem relativen Getrenntsein des Denkens
und des Seins, denn unser Bewusstsein ist erst das Beziehen des Denkens auf ein gedachtes."
35. Ibid., 508. "Das Sein fur das Denken ist ein relativ anseinandergetretenes in allgemainem
Zusammenhang, und das Denken fiir das Sein ist das Produziren bestimmter Formen .. ."
36. Ibid., 53. "Man konnte sagen, Beziehung des Denkens auf das Sein sei leer, beides konne nur
absolut getrennt sein."
37. Dialektik (Odebrecht), 270.
38. Dialektik (Jonas), 149. "Der Mensch ist also der Wendepunkt, von welchem allein aus das
Sein unter der Form der Thatigkeit des idealen auf das reale kann angeschaut werden.'
39. Ibid., 461. "Die Gesammtheit des auf das Denken beziehbaren Seins ist das reale (zu welchem
in sofem das denkende Sein auch gehort); die Gesammtheit des auf das Sein beziehbaren Denkens ist das
ideale, wozu also in sofern auch das denkende Sein gehort, in welchem daher diese Identitat unmitelbar
gegeben ist.'
40. Cf. this etymological breakdown to that in Reuter, 42ff.
41. Dialektik (Jonas), 55.
42. Dialektik (Odebrecht), 270; (Jonas), 397.
43. Dialektik (Jonas), 517. " ... der nachste Grund zur Auseinanderbeziehung von Denken und
Sein in uns selbst liege. In uns selbst narnlich ist unmittelbar eine Identitat von Sein und Denken gegeben,
und dies sezt voraus, dass wir uns unseres Seins eben so bewusst sind, als des gegebenen Seins, d.h. als
eines wirksamen. Dadurch konnen wir unser Sein als einen Theil des gesammten Seins ansehen; wir
nehmen unser denkendes Sein als seiendes Denken mit auf in die Einheit der hochsten Kraft. Das ist eben
der lnhalt des Selbstbewusstseins."
44. Hans Joachim Rothert, "Die Dialektik Friedrich Schleiermachers: trberlegungen zu einem
noch immer wartenden Buch,' Zeitschriftfiir Theologie und Kirche 67 (1970),197.
45. Dialektik (Jonas), 413.
46. Ibid., 397.
47. Dialektik (Odebrecht), 139. " ... dass jedes Denken ein gemeinschaftliches Erzeugnis der
menschlichen Vemunft und der mensch lichen Organisation sei."
48. Ibid., 139.
237
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50. Ibid., 72, Dialektik (Odebrecht), 140.
51. Dialektik (Odebrecht), 177.
52. Dialektik (Jonas), 75.
53. Ibid., 64.
54. Ibid., 495. " ... die Bestimmung, Sonderung, also Einheitsezung, zugleich aber auch
Gegensezung."
55. Ibid., 74.
56. Ibid., 391.
57. Ibid., 402.
58. Ibid., 494.
59. Dialektik (Odebrecht), 149.
60. See Dialektik (Jonas), 47.
61. Ibid., 387. "Wie kommt das Denken zum gedachten ... "
62. Ibid., 387. "Durch das Geoffnetsein des geistigen Lebens nach aussen = Organisation kommt
das Denken zum Gegenstand oder zu seinem Stoff, durch eine ohnerachtet aller Verschiedenheit des
Gegenstandes sich immer gleiche Thatigkeit = Vernunft kommt es zu seiner Form, verrnoge deren es immer
Denken bleibt."
63. Ibid., 63.
64. Ibid., 66. Note that this text is also discussed above, in the chapter on Kant.
65. Ibid., 67. "Indifferenz ihrer Prioritat."
66. Ibid., 402.
67. Ibid., 78.
68. Ibid., 498.
69. Ibid., 74.
70. For thinking about nothing, see Dialectic (Tice), 20. For thinking about pure being, see below.
As the limits of thought, they cannot partake in the thought itself.
71. Dialektik (Jonas), 387. " ... die innere Organisation, namlich das innere Ohr und die
Erinnerung."
72. Dialektik (Odebrecht), 159. " ... mehr innerlichen Prozess der Wahrnehrnung ... "
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74. Dialektik (Odebrecht), 141. " ... namlich durch Sprache."
75. Dialektik (Jonas), 52.
76. Ibid., 388.
77. Ibid. "Die lehre Form der Indifferenz des Seins und Nichtseins."
78. Ibid., 389. " ... das blosse Sein ohne Thun."
79. Ibid.
80. Dialektik (Odebrecht), 162.
81. Ibid., 52. "Das Wissen, und hier zunachst das reale, ist also dasjenige Denken, welches nicht
mit der Differenz sondern in und mit der Identitat beider Functionen gesezt, und von beiden aus gleich
urspriinglicb auf das ausser ihm als Sein gesezte bezogen wird."
82. Ibid., 392-93. "Wenn von gleichen Impressionen ausgehend in Bezug auf ein identisches
System von Denkformen die Gegenstande fixirt werden."
83. Ibid., 393. " ... wenn von gleichen Denkformen ausgehend fur identisch erkannte
Impressionen ihnen untergelegt werden ... "
84. Ibid., 388. "Alles wirkliche bestimmte Denken ist also in das Zusammentreffen der Thatigkeit
beider Pole eingeschlossen."
85. Dialektik (Odebrecht), 174ff.
86. David E. Klemm, "The Desire to Know God in Schleiermacher 's Dialektik:" in ed. Ruth
Drucilla Richardson, Schleiermacher on Workings of the Knowing Mind: New Translations. Resources, and
Understandings (Lewiston, N.Y.: Mellen, 1998), New Athenaeum/Neues Athenaeum 5,137. Because of
the chaotic nature of Schleiermacher's own notes, I find Klemm's summary on this subject excellent and
use it in the elucidation of the secondary limits of the organic and the intellectual functions.
87. Ibid., 136.
88. Dialektik (Odebrecht), 178.
89. Klemm in Richardson, Workings of the Knowing Mind, 137.
90. Ibid.
91. Dialektik (Odebrecht), 182. "Raum ist also die organische Weise, dasjenigezusetzen, was in
der intellektuellen Funktion als das Reale gesetzt wird; und Zeit nichts anderes als die organische Weise,
dasjenige zu setzen, was wir auf der intellektuellen Seite als Ideales setzen."
92. Dialektik (Jonas), 79.
93. See the following discussion in Dialektik (Jonas), 61-62,392,498, (Odebrecht), 160.
94. Dialektik (Odebrecht), 159.
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96. Cf. Ibid., 54.
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subjective consciousness (Dialektik [Jonas], 532). See also Thandeka, The Embodied Self: Friedrich
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102. Ibid., 316.
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104. From Klemm's summary in Richardson, Workings of the Knowing Mind, 135.
105. Dialektik (Jonas), 81.
106. Ibid., 467.
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108. Dialectic (Tice), 24.
109. Klemm in Richardson, Workings of the Knowing Mind, 135.
110. Dialektik (Jonas), 81.
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Schleiermacher in seiner Reifzeit," Zeitschrift fur Theologie und Kirche 14 (1933),294.
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CHAPTER 8
METAPHYSICS OVERCOMING THE OPPOSITES/CONTRASTS
The previous chapter explored some of the principal contrasts of Schleiermacher' s
metaphysics. Now it is time to embark on those aspects of his Dialektik that overcome the
metaphysics of contrasts. If I may say so, that would be the proper metaphysics, which
brings its own overcoming to the next level. It is metaphysics beyond metaphysics insofar
as it goes beyond metaphysical contrasts. It is meta-metaphysics. The previous chapter
showed the necessary complementarity and interdependence of the contrasts within each
pair as well as the inter-relatedness of different contrasts themselves. This chapter will
proceed to the next step in which the oscillating interaction of the contrasts opens a gap
or space between them in which, like it was for Derrida, a third element emerges that
overcomes those contrasts. This third element will be related to Schleiermacher's theory
of self-consciousness.
The discussions of Schleiermacher's metaphysical contrasts in the previous
chapter, especially that of thinking and being, already elaborated on self-consciousness as
the ground in which the correspondence between these contrasts can take place. It is
precisely self-consciousness where thinking and being, the ideal and the real, the
intellectual and the organic, concept and judgment, the idea of God and the idea of world
come into view in their coincidence. As Schleiermacher states, it is self-consciousness
that, apart from all determinate content, is nothing else than consciousness of being-one
and belonging-together of the contrasts. I
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Because self-consciousness is such a mediating element, the transcendental or
transcendent ground of knowing comes into view precisely there.2 It also remains for me
to show how the transcendent ground, also conceived as the absolute, the idea of God, or
the divine, comes to manifestation in self-consciousness. That is a very important part of
Schleiermacher's metaphysics. It goes without saying that Schleiermacher does not
interpret the transcendent ground in a metaphysical sense. For him, "the transcendent
ground is not deduced from speculative principles but is presupposed in contrast to the
relativity of knowing.t''' Presupposing does not state anything about the reality of the
presupposed. As I explained in the chapter about Schleiermacher's understanding of
dialectics, metaphysics in this understanding becomes a formal, methodological
discipline that determines the principles that make thinking into thinking that is knowing.
The presupposition of the transcendent ground is part of this project. The idea of God as
the transcendent ground is in the basis of the possibility of knowledge insofar as it,
inconceivable and unidentifiable itself, is the principle of unity in the game of oscillation
of metaphysical contrasts."
In any case, although, according to Schleiermacher, all knowledge depends on
and must be related to the presupposed transcendent ground, although the transcendent
ground always accompanies all gathered knowledge, this ground itself cannot be given in
knowledge.' But it must come into view anyhow. The fact that it can be and is named at
all stipulates it. To this extent, states Schleiermacher, the transcendent ground is "found,"
but found as something that cannot be achieved. He continues that there is "no
expectation to find more of it. Yet, it makes it all the more necessary that we preserve it
for us pure and watch that we, knowingly or unknowingly, do not substitute for it
something that still lies in the area of knowing itself.,,6
I will show how it takes place for Schleiermacher, that is, how the transcendent
ground comes into view, but not as part of knowledge. In the course of this discussion,
247
Schleiermacher's main meta-metaphysical terms will appear, terms that impel us beyond
metaphysical knowledge. Here are some of them: Gefiihl, transition (Ubergang),
oscillation (Oszillation), the point-zero (Nullpunkt). There also are others. However, I
think these are the most important ones, and the first one, Gefiihl, may be the most
prominent of all.
Geftihl and Overcoming Metaphysics
Different Accounts of Gefiihl in the Dialektik and the Glaubenslehre
Before actually proceeding to Schleiermacher's account of Gefiihl in the
Dialektik, I would like to point out how it differs from the account given in the
Glaubenslehre. Although the latter could supplement the discussion of the Dialektik here,
I reserve it for the next part on Schleiermacher's overcoming of metaphysics in theology.
The Glaubenslehre is restricted to its methodological commitment not to deal with
anything other than, in Schleiermacher's words, what is "simply and straight forwardly
empirical," not with "facts of consciousness prior to experience.t" whereas the Dialektik
establishes the metaphysical, transcendental ground of knowledge." And even if this
distinction may be questioned, that is, even if, as I will show later, Gefuhl in the
Introduction to the Glaubenslehre may also be considered an abstract, metaphysical, or
ontological concept, still the difference remains: while the Glaubenslehre intends to deal
with specifically religious Gefiihl of absolute dependence, the Dialektik considers it
metaphysically, as the transcendent ground of the coincidence of the contrasts. So, Gefiihl
in the Dialektik is not qualified as that of "absolute dependence." For that reason, I
separate these expositions. Nonetheless, the account of Gefiihl in the Dialektik
complements that of the Glaubenslehre. In fact, it is this complementation that helps to
refute such notorious critiques of Gefiihl of the Glaubenslehre as Hegel's. The latter
taunted Schleiermacher that his theory binds one to the level of animal consciousness, not
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allowing one to reach the true freedom of human spirit. Hegel alleges that, because of its
Gefuhl of absolute dependence on the master, a dog would be the best Christian!9 This
derision is groundless not only because Schleiermacher clearly distinguishes the animal
and human consciousness in the Glaubenslehre, but also because of the way
Schleiermacher relates the transcendent ground to Gefuhl in the Dialektik. In the
Glaubenslehre, Gefiihl may appear to belong to the realm of receptivity and sensation,
only affected by its "whence." That is why Hegel is able to make his point. That
impression can be precluded if the Dialektik is taken into account. 10 There the
transcendent ground is beyond receptivity and activity, as it is beyond any other contrast.
The Contrast of Thinking and Willing and Its Overcoming in Gefiihl
One more note before proceeding to Schleiermacher's theory of Gefiihl itself in
the Dialektik. Schleiermacher mostly associates Gefiihl with another pair of contrasts that
was just mentioned above, but not discussed in detail. It is the contrast of thinking and
willing. I just want to note once more that this contrast is equivalent to those of thinking
and being, the ideal and the real, etc. Insofar as willing posits or effects human being in
the being of things outside, it rather belongs to the organic, the real, etc., side of the
contrasts. 1 1 The reason that these two terms are contrasts is that thinking internalizes the
outside things as objects of our thinking, posits them in us according to our way, whereas
willing, to repeat, posits our being in things, in outward being, according to our way
insofar as we realize in things our purpose-concepts (Zweckbegrijfe).12 In the activity of
thinking there is co-posited the consciousness of objects, but in the activity of willing-
the consciousness of contrasts. Both complete each other, and their contrast is overcome
in self-consciousness as Gefiihl; the only instance where self-consciousness can be
relatively pure, not dependent on the being of things, as all functions that are contrasts. 13
Although Gefiihl is given in time and always manifests itself in another, that is, in
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particular individuals and their finite, conditioned being, as such, in its essence, Gefiihl is
beyond change, beyond the finite realm of the contrasts, and beyond time-past, present,
or future. 14
Gefiihl As a (Quasi) Place of Overcoming Metaphysics
Schleiermacher gives a proposition that at once brings together such important
terms as the transcendent ground, thinking, willing, and Geftihl: " ... we have the
transcendent ground only in the relative identity of thinking and willing, namely, in
Gefiihl.,,15 This proposition clearly states that the transcendent ground is found in Gefiihl,
immediate self-consciousness, which in tum emerges from the identity and difference of
the contrast of thinking and willing (being). Gefiihl conjointly emerges from both
thinking and willing, thus being posited as both at the same time. Therefore,
Schleiermacher thinks that there can be no other identity of both as in Gefiihl, "which is
the final end of thinking and the beginning of willing in fluctuation.,,16 And it is precisely
this fluctuation from thinking to willing and vice versa that always makes their identity
relati ve. I7
Schleiermacher thinks that thinking is also willing and vice versa. "Each activity
of thinking, viewed from another side, is also an activity of willing.?" When the
distinction between thinking and willing becomes blurred in this way, Gefiihl cannot be
present exclusively in the point of their balance or equilibrium. If the identity of thinking
and willing, in fact, takes place in thinking and willing separately as well, Gefiihl must be
constantly present disregarding the ratios of thinking and willing. As Schleiermacher
states, "And so we find Gefiihl as constant and always accompanying every moment, no
matter whether thinking or willing prevails." 19
It also means that Gefiihl is not only the ground of the identity of thinking and
willing; in fact, Schleiermacher asserts that it is "the carrier of all other functions.?"
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Neither of the contrasting functions can encompass Gefiihl. It is impossible precisely
because they are metaphysical contrasts, and, as such, they cannot grasp what is beyond
contrasts, whereas Gefiihl is beyond all contrasts and beyond metaphysics." Hence, the
constant oscillation between the contrasting functions has at least two effects. On the one
hand, it makes all knowledge relative, including the knowledge of Gefiihl itself. On the
other, it constitutes the precondition for Gefiihl to emerge. Of course, it is to emerge not
in knowledge, but in experience, insofar as Gefiihl cannot be a phenomenon of mind but
is something that is felt, or something one may be conscious of on a deeper experiential
level. The contrasts, being unable to reach beyond metaphysics themselves, create that
beyond in their oscillating interaction. Gefiihl occupies that space, and in Gefiihl,
accordingly, it also is experience that overcomes metaphysics. As one author puts it,
Gefiihl "oscillates between the poles of thinking and willing and constitutes the
experiential point of conjunction between these poles.,,22
Because Gefiihl is beyond all other functions, is totally different from them,
Schleiermacher states that it, also in accord with its oscillating emergence, "either always
is or is not at all" at the same time.23 The other functions are incited through something
outward, and they have a tendency to disappear each moment.i" Gefiihl, in contrast, can
never be evoked by something outward, "for it is not related to any outward affection.,,25
And it never disappears. As immediate self-consciousness, it is permanent, and it always
accompanies all other states of human being, not only those of thinking and willing.
Schleiermacher thinks that Gefiihl may only seem to disappear during such other states as
intuition and action, for example. There are always "traces of willing and sprouts of
thinking" and, therefore, the possibility for Gefiihl to be there.i" Being always there in the
background, Gefiihl is a constant "supplement" (Ergiinzung) even when the unity of life
is being missed." It always works as a supplement (ein Supplement) if there is a "defect"
in some moment, that is, when the whole life is somehow not posited in thinking and
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willing and the identity of their interaction.f Being such a supplement, Gefiihl is beyond
metaphysics. Insofar as it is the link of all moments pertaining to different functions, and
insofar as it is the identity due to its being the link, it is, as Schleiermacher says, "the real
being" (das wirkliche Sein).29 In this case, it is not being as one part of the contrast of
being and thinking. It is transcendent being beyond metaphysics and its contrasts. So,
although here Gefiihl is named the real being, in truth, it does not even have a name.
These names are only provisional, for it is that hardly expressible third entity between the
contrasts, "das schwer sagbare Dritte.,,30 "The circle circles perpetually in itself, without
one of the two poles becoming the ground of that circle. Tertium datur?,,31 Difficult to
answer, for that datur simultaneously is and is not given in some place between the
contrasts. It is a quasi-givenness in a quasi-place that is and is not at the same time.
What Gefiihl Is Not
Schleiermacher also points out what Gefiihl is not, what it should not be confused
with. First, as immediate self-consciousness, it is different from reflective self-
consciousness, which is identical to subjective "I" Uch). In the latter, one becomes the
object for oneself. Therefore, this reflective self-consciousness, unlike Gefiihl, is not
immediate, but is mediated. It only expresses the identity of the subject throughout the
different moments. Second, Gefiihl is also different from sensation (Empfindung), which,
like "I," is posited as subjective and personal in given moments. GefUhl-although it is
something subjective inasmuch as it is a condition (Zustand) of subjectivity-unlike
sensation, cannot be associated with subjective passivity.32 The latter is characteristic to
sensation, which is the reason it can never fulfill the identity of thinking and willing, and,
therefore, cannot be an equivalent for GefUhl.33
252
Gefiihl and Subjectivity
In contrast to sensation, Schleiermacher defines Gefiihl as "the universal form of
having one's own self.,,34Not even the subject-object opposition is applicable to it.35
Gefiihl "dissolves in general self-consciousness just as well as in individual self-
consciousness.v'" Although Gefiihl takes place in individual self-consciousness as having
one's own self, it is clear that it is not just subjective. Gefiihl cannot be subjective
because it carries the representation of the transcendent ground. As Tillich said in
reference to Schleiermacher's notion of Gefiihl in a different context, "Gefiihl may be
subjective, but it is also the impact of the universe upon us and the universe is not
subjective.t' " One could say the same about the transcendent ground instead of the
universe, insofar as this ground is always presuppositionally present in all functions of
self-consciousness. In any case, if Schleiermacher sometimes calls Gefiihl subjective, it is
only because of "the context of the undivided, undifferentiated depth of the subject itself
coming into question in it.,,38Being such, this "subjectivity" is not really subjective,
because these depths of the subject, brought about by Gefiihl, by far outgrow not only
theoretical objectification, but also subjective meaning. For this reason, I think that it is
not quite fair to say that Schleiermacher does not overcome metaphysics insofar as he
falls back into the metaphysics of subjectivity" The claim being entered is that the
subjective self is cancelled in the indecisive middle point, the indifference point between
the contrasts.t" So, Schleiermacher's metaphysics overcomes the metaphysics of
subjectivity as well.
Gefuhl and Overcoming Metaphysics as the Ubergang
The Ubergang
The aforementioned fluctuation between thinking and willing in self-
consciousness also brings the discussion to another one of Schleiermacher's very
253
important terms of overcoming metaphysics, namely, "crossing," or "transition," which I
prefer to leave in German as the Ubergang, Schleiermacher's idea of the Ubergang most
likely comes from the fragment of Plato's Parmenides where he speaks of some "queer
creature" (physis atopos) and calls it "the instant" (exaiphnes), the instant taking place in
the transition (metabole, metaballein) between any two contrasts, the instant that, just like
Gefiihl, "neither is nor is not, and neither comes to be nor ceases to be.,,41
Insofar as immediate self-consciousness is always in the state of oscillation or
fluctuation between the contrasts, and insofar as it represents the timeless unity of the
temporal realizations of finite consciousness, it becomes the ontological condition of the
possibility of the Ubergangt' Since self-consciousness is something that always
accompanies human being, Schleiermacher views life itself to be constantly involved in
the Ubergang, "If we look at life as a sequence," maintains Schleiermacher, "it is an
Ubergang from thinking to willing and vice versa, both considered in their relative
contrast.,,43 Based on this, the being of self-consciousness cannot be static, but rather is
always in transition/" Being, at least conceived as existence (Dasein), and the Ubergang
are identical because this being does not arrive at the Ubergang as something other."
Hence, the Ubergang may be called the essence of existence.
Schleiermacher defines the Ubergang as "stopped thinking and commencing
willing" and thinks that both must be identical." He states that the Ubergang and the
identity between thinking and willing are virtually the same, differentiated only through
time-form, present in the Ubergang, but negated in the identity.47 Yet they are related.
The Ubergang is a never-ending back and forth process: as soon as one ends, the other
must begin, and at that moment, there is no distinction between them. Therefore, it is
equivalent to the moment of identity.
It is also important to distinguish fluctuation (Wechsel) from the Ubergang,
Schleiermacher thinks that both are necessary. If there were only the Ubergang without
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reciprocal fluctuation, zero could not be posited between both activities of thinking and
willing." It is interesting that although the Ubergang itself is the consciousness of zero or
nothing, Schleiermacher believes that it simultaneously is the condition of possibility of
time. If there were no Gefiihl, or self-consciousness or, the Ubergang, as the linking point
between each moment in time, then each moment itself would be negated for us, would
be zero. "Each time without self-consciousness is zero," states Schleiermacher.49
Curiously, the Ubergang, being itself the point-zero, is still needed for time to be
something, to be something more than zero.
Gefiihl As the Ubergang
Gefiihl in its tum, in Schleiermacher's view, is equal to the Ubergang; it is "the
Ubergang between thinking and willing in us."so So, Gefiihl takes place in that elusive
moment of transition, the Ubergang, between thinking and willing, the indefinite moment
that is no longer thinking and not yet willing. Rather, as "having-ceased one and not-yet-
having-started the other," it is a border between them.l' Or rather, a border common to
both of them, "the common border."s2 In both thinking and willing there is consciousness
of something. But the Ubergang, being between them, is consciousness of nothing, or, as
Schleiermacher calls it, "consciousness of zero" (Bewusstsein von Null).s3 Therefore, it
may also be considered to be an a-spatial nonplace (atopon), the quasi-place of the queer
creature (physis atopos), which is Gefiihl.s4
The Ubergang, Gefuhl, and the Transcendent Ground
The Ubergang and the Transcendent Ground
It should also be pointed out that even though I have concentrated here on
Schleiermacher's application of the term Ubergang to the contrast of thinking and
willing, he also uses it in regard to most other contrasts of his metaphysics. Therefore, it
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is fair to say that the Ubergang "is the embodiment of the movement of dialectics in
general.,,55 Moreover, the Ubergang even applies to Schleiermacher's thought in general,
for his thought always evolves around some contrasts, such as, religion and knowledge,
ethics and physics, theology and philosophy, church and state, and others.i"
In all cases, the Ubergang is the way of interaction of the contrasts that transcends
them into something qualitatively new. It means qualitative transformation. It "is
something else than merely quantitative growth in time's flow ... the Ubergang is
exceeding tUberschreiten), transcending what exists, not merely a quasi-natural self-
development from the existing.t" Accordingly, the Ubergang between every contrast
eventually hits the transcendent ground. As a matter of fact, it is in the Ubergang where
the transference (Ubertragungy from the I to the transcendent ground takes place. Hence,
Schleiermacher can even say that God is being-eo-posited in each Ubergang."
Only that Schleiermacher's understanding of dialectics should always be kept in
mind. The transcendent ground can never be known; it can only be presupposed.
Precisely the transcendence of the transcendent ground of knowing and being leads back
to the inter-subjectivity of truth, where the subject is forced "to prove the validity of the
evidence of its cognitions in the field of communication between persons.T"
Gefiihl and the Ungrounded Transcendent Ground
Due to the transcendence of the transcendent ground, Gefiihl, according to
Schleiermacher, is not itself the transcendent ground. Rather, in the Ubergang between
thinking and willing, there can only be, as Schleiermacher says, "the analogy with the
transcendent ground," insofar as it represents the elimination of the contrasts.i" Even
religious Gefiihl, on Schleiermacher's account, cannot be the transcendent ground itself.
The latter, also called the highest being, the absolute, or divinity, cannot be known in
GejUhl.61 It can only be represented in GejUhl.62
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Everything said about Gefiihl applies to the transcendent ground as well, since the
latter manifests itself in the former, or the former is transcendent because of the latter, or
rather, their transcendence is mutually presupposed. Thus both are analogues. The
transcendent ground, in Schleiermacher's perspective, is posited beyond all metaphysical
contrasts, "beyond the beginning of all contrasts (the commencement of thinking) as well
as beyond the combination of all contrasts (the endpoint of thinking in being).,,63 The
transcendent ground is beyond both thinking and being. Schleiermacher maintains: "The
transcendent ground always remains outside thinking and real being, but it always is the
transcendent accompaniment and the ground of both.,,64 "Therefore," he goes on, "there
is no other representation of this idea as in immediate self-consciousness ... ,,65
Schleiermacher also holds that since the transcendent ground lies outside thinking, in any
of its expressions we can have "only the way to the transcendent ground.t''" Presupposing
does not yet mean having it. He asks: "What is that I presuppose in my thinking?,,67 The
answer is simple: "Nothing other than what I deal with in my thinking accordingly.,,68
Although thinking thinks about the transcendent ground, it does not reach it. Thinking
remains thinking that is limited, "bound to the earth." Consequently, as regards the
absolute, Schleiermacher's Dialektik cannot claim to be more than docta ignorantiat"
The highest knowledge it gives about the transcendent ground, or the divine, or the
absolute, is that it is unknown. The section on Schleiermacher's theology below will also
show, there is a resemblance of Schleiermacher's perspective to Cusanus' "learned
ignorance," to the extent that his via negativa is also combined with a positive theology
based on religious experience."
Schleiermacher maintains that the way of speaking about the relationship of
Gefiihl and the transcendent ground is analogical, or representative, or symbolic, for this
speaking does not express the transcendent ground adequately." Klemm illustrates this
point, claiming that the relationship between Gefiihl and the transcendent ground
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provides "a non-arbitrary symbol or representation of the divine essence.,,72 It takes place
in the interconnectedness of the formal "thinkable unthinkability" of God and the
positive, experiential appearance of religious Gefiihl in human self-consciousness." This
is another way to see how one simultaneously has and does not have the transcendent
ground in Gefiihl: in the relationship between religious Gefiihl and the universal,
necessary, transcendent ground of the contrasts. Klemm summarizes it so:
The lack we experience in thinking the unthinkability of the absolute ground, and
the surplus we experience in actual religious Gefiihl ... correspond to each other.
The lack on the one side is reciprocally joined to the surplus on the other; taken
together as the ideal and real, formal and material sides of the essence of God, the
too little and the too much manifest all that can be manifest of the otherness of
God.74
In any case, all these are "ways to" point toward the transcendent ground, but they
cannot contain it metaphysically. Being ways to speak of the transcendent ground, they
rather contain something figurative, although the more figurative, the less expedient the
expression.f It is interesting that Schleiermacher thinks that the best, least figurative
denotations of the transcendent ground are the classical "to ontos on" and the modem
"absolute being" (das absolute Sein).76
Strikingly, Schleiermacher also ascribes a kind of "speculative" meaning to
Gefiihl, at least insofar as he calls it "mirroring" (Abspiegelung}-another term that could
be added to analogical, representative, or symbolic. In Schleiermacher's view, Gefuhl
mirrors being insofar as it overcomes the contrasts of thinking and willing.77 For the same
reason, it allows being to be mirrored in Gefiihl. Gefiihl belongs to both worlds-what is
inside and outside existence-insofar as it transcends both while at the same time
participating in both. As Reuter puts it, Gefiihl "signifies that experience in which the self
becomes one with the universe, because it discovers everything that is outside it as
mirrored in itself, and sees everything that is in it in the mirror of its outside.,,78 Thus
Gefuhl is very similar to the Derridean tain of the mirror. In this regard, I would like to
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quote a passage from Christ's book about Schleiermacher. The quote brings together this
"mirroring" aspect of Gefiihl with the way the transcendent ground manifests in it, aptly
summarizing my following exposition of this relationship in which the transcendent
ground comes into being through Gefiihl, yet remaining concealed as such. The author
imagines Gefiihl as
pure mirror that first becomes so dimmed or altered through sensibility that it
does not reflect the light purely, but rather ever different individually and
concretely. The criterion of the purity of this reflection is not the light in itself-
which is completely concealed to us-but the approaching light. The reflection
that this light gives is humanized. Yet, just when we reflect the light, we have the
moment of impact given to us, in which there is no humanizing. Schleiermacher
calls this in the moment of impact approaching light the original notion of
"God.,,79
Precisely because human being becomes the mirror of the transcendent ground or the
divine, the latter does not become humanized, "so that the mirror would not become
confused with the source of light."sOThe divine as the source itself always remains
unavailable, behind the tain. What is left is only the human mirror, the lustrous side.
Now I proceed to more concrete details of Schleiermacher's understanding of the
transcendent ground in the Dialektik. It is the transcendent ground of thinking and being
arising in the Ubergang between the contrasts that makes Gefiihl God-consciousness,
makes self-consciousness to be God-consciousness at the same time. I give a longer quote
where Schleiermacher brings these elements together:
God-consciousness, insofar as we have it determinate, is the manner and way we
have in our self-consciousness the transcendent ground of being and thinking, the
identity of our being in the Ubergang between one operation to another, and
indeed in the similarity of its relation to both representative thinking and
imaginary thinking in their corresponding relation to being."
Note that this quote also shows the relationship of the transcendent ground to
representative and imaginary thinking--corresponding to organic function, or judgment,
and intellectual function, or concept-thus showing the way it comes into language.
259
Corresponding to this imaginary-representative distinction, elsewhere Schleiermacher
speaks of the transcendent ground as the "supposed coincidence of both forms [thinking
and being] in one act, or the presumed holding together of images and forms.,,82 One
should only keep in mind Schleiermacher's understanding of representative thinking in
regard to the absolute. To repeat, representative for him still means indirect. Therefore,
Schleiermacher's resolving of the problem of the relationship of the transcendent ground
to thinking ultimately remains ambiguous. Even thinking the transcendent ground apart
from human consciousness necessarily brings it into relationship with consciousness.V
As Schleiermacher himself states, the transcendent ground itself is not thinking, yet the
fact that one expresses it at all makes it eo ipso a part of real thinking, inevitably leading
back to its both forms, concept and judgment. 84
Next, I would like to proceed directly to Schleiermacher's question of what
exactly the relationship is between the highest unity (the absolute, the transcendental
ground) and Gefiihl'! His answer is:
The highest unity of the ideal and the real, merely presupposed in thinking and
willing, is really actualized in Gefiihl; there it is immediate consciousness,
original, while the thought of it, insofar as we have it at all, is only mediated
through Gefiihl, is only a figure ofit.85
This quote surpasses the previous one in that it shows how Gefiihl overcomes thinking,
which still played an important role in the first quote, referring back to the necessity of
the anthropomorphization (Vennenschlichung) of the transcendent ground. Thinking
knows the transcendent ground only as a figure, a representation, an image, a symbol,
while in Gejiihl it is, although also represented, but at the same time somehow available
immediately, immediately precisely because it does not arise from "the condition of
contentious consciousness," like thinking. Although it may appear contradictory,
Schleiermacher accordingly conceives the immediacy of Gefiihl to be "mediated
immediacy." On the other hand, repeatedly, this immediacy does not mean some kind of
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direct knowing. It only relates as the unconditioned to the conditioned, for it can only
manifest itself in returning back to what has been and presupposing what is yet to come.
Since the transcendent ground in GefUhl as the Ubergang only precedes and follows all
real, time-filled thinking, it cannot come to appearance in any determinate time." The
transcendent ground as immediate self-consciousness or Gefiihl, as what pertains to
humanity generally (das allgemein Menschliche), only accompanies the real thinking and
the real being in a timeless way (aufZeitlose Weise), itself never being able to appear in
the consciousness of thinking.Y
In the next place, how can the actualization of the transcendental ground, the
ultimate expression of which is the idea of God or the absolute, really take place in that
"persistent unity of the fluctuation of consciousness" between thinking and willing and
Gefiihl as their identity?88 The answer is related to Schleiermacher's via negativa as well
as to the complementarity of the God-world relationship discussed in the previous
chapter. Once again, the absolute cannot be given in-itself, as speculative metaphysical
theology presumes. Insofar as the absolute cannot be known, for Schleiermacher, "a
philosophy of the absolute would be a philosophy of nothing.,,89 It means that all
"knowledge" of God is actually based in human projection and is "anthropoeidistic." For
Schleiermacher, to illustrate the transcendent ground means to "anthropoeidisize"
(anthropoeidizirts it, even in the case where it is posited as the absolute thinking-will
(Denkend-wollen) and willing-thought (Wollend-denken) in their identity in GefUhl.9o The
"anthropoising" (Anthropoisierung) takes place just because self-consciousness is always
mingled with "the consciousness of the finite. ,,91Because of that, "a thoroughgoing
humanization of the transcendent ground" becomes inevitable.92 Consequently, as one
author puts it, Schleiermacher's concept of Gefiihl "brings to expression the
anthropological mediation between God and world and hurnanity.t''" In Gefiihl, human
being becomes the mediation point-the point zero--where the divine comes into the
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worldly being, at the same time always remaining beyond it. Schleiermacher states: "We
only know about the being of God in us and in things, but not about the being of God
outside world or in God's self.,,94He continues:
God's being is given in things insofar as the totality, the transcendent ground, is
posited in each individual through being and togetherness of being, and because
of its agreement with the system of concepts, the identity of the ideal and the real,
as well as the transcendent ground of it, is also posited in each individua1.95
Since it is in each individual, God's being is given in "an other" (an einem andem),
which is "human consciousness of one's own self, of certain human relationships, and so
on.,,96Based on this, Gefiihl may indeed be called "the existential analogy" to the
transcendent ground." In Schleiermacher's opinion, to inquire after a mode of existence
of the absolute other than this worldly one, "means to go into the absolute nothing, which
is the real transcendent," the real transcendent beyond everything." For Schleiermacher,
being that is not for us, is not altogether, in the same way as God outside self-
consciousness is contradiction and absurdity." Speculative theology literally ends up in
"consciousless brooding" when it isolates the idea of God from real, live human
consciousness, "the fresh and living earthly consciousness," as Schleiermacher puts it.1OO
It also seems necessary to remark that the way the transcendent ground comes
into thinking is the reason that "it is absolutely impossible to think of it as dead."lol Since
the transcendent ground manifests itself in immediate self-consciousness, it can only be
presented as living. Inanimate or dead entities simply cannot have consciousness and,
accordingly, cannot represent the transcendent ground or the divine. On these grounds, it
seems to be wrong to say with one critic of Schleiermacher that the God of Dialektik is
more like Kant's postulate, "in all its objectivity and un-liveliness (Unlebendigkeit)."I02
The God of Schleiermacher's Dialektik is not the God of speculation. While speculation
claims the knowledge of God in and for itself, it is a kind of "dead" knowledge, for it has
to do with dead formulae that are not related to living reality. Religion, in contrast to
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speculation, conceives God not in knowledge of God in God's self, but in relationship to
that "other" of God that is human reality, human self-consciousness.l'"
In effect, an interesting coincidence emerges. Human being is the "other" to the
divine, but the divine, in its unknowability, is also, of course, the "other" to human being.
In the situation of these two otherwise mutually exclusive "others," Gefiihl becomes the
ground where they meet. The divine is not really "other" anymore, for Gefiihl becomes
the human site of its manifestation as the "same." 104Since the transcendent position of
the divine is thus conditioned by the structure of subjectivity, as one author puts it, "there
can no longer be any talk of one-sided "dependency.v'l" Such a one-sided dependency,
he goes on, "would reduce the instance of the other to a moment of hierarchical, bipolar
structure and would indeed remove from this instance the sense of opening, the sense of
inaugurating self-understanding as SUCh.,,106The divine, at least in its manifestation, is
also dependent on the human-an important insight complementing the position of
Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre. In a word, Schleiermacher's principle of oscillation and
reciprocity applies to the contrast of the human and the divine as well. Spiegler, in his
book The Eternal Covenant, could consider this aspect of Schleiermacher' s thought
before dismissing the possibility of the divine relativity in it.
In addition, conviction that the absolute can only be expressed in "an other" is
also the reason that religious Gefiihl itself can never be considered pure.I07 To repeat, it is
always immediacy that is mediated. Precisely that makes Gefiihl a suitable analogy of the
absolute. Both are always mediated through world-consciousness. It is noteworthy that
Schleiermacher thinks that that is the reason that Gefiihl can mediate the absolute as
posited in us in just the same way as perception posits outside things in us-yet another
analogy.l'" That is precisely what makes the mediation of the absolute in Gefiihl possible,
including religious Gefiihl as "universal Gefiihl of dependence.t'Y' One ought only to
remember how "the religious element" comes into self-consciousness. Of course, it does
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not have to do with the earthly representations of the absolute. ''The religious element"
that causes the Gefiihl of dependence still emerges via negativa, "originally as negation,
thereupon as dependence on the transcendent ground, which is posited in thinking-willing
self-activity.t'{'" This dependence, based on the negation of all that can be known, brings
about certainty beyond metaphysics, for it goes beyond the identity of intellectual
functions, yet is co-posited in self-consciousness that overcomes metaphysics. III But this
already is the theme of the next part dealing with religious Gefiih! of absolute dependence
and the overcoming of metaphysics in the religious and dogmatic contexts.
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PART FOUR
DOGMATICS OVERCOMES METAPHYSICS
INTRODUCTION
Up to this point, I have examined and interpreted Schleiermacher's overcoming of
metaphysics from a philosophical viewpoint. Now I would like to approach the same
question from the point of view of church theology or dogmatics. It is especially pertinent
to this investigation because Schleiermacher himself claims to exclude speculation from
dogmatics. The Dialektik also deals with the question of God, but from a philosophical
viewpoint. Speculation certainly plays an important role in it, even if it is speculation in
Schleiermacher's peculiar understanding of that discipline. In contrast to the Dialektik,
Schleiermacher wants to completely rule out speculation from dogmatics. At least, it is
his intent to do so. Therefore, dogmatics is supposed to overcome metaphysics, to leave it
behind.
Before embarking on closer analysis, I should point out that the contrasting pair of
speculation and dogmatics in Schleiermacher's thought is related to other similar pairs,
explicit or implicit, such as speculation and devoutness/religiousness iFrommigkeits. I
metaphysics and theology, philosophy and theology. Although these pairs are slightly
different and distinguishable, they are interrelated in Schleiermacher's thought. My
references to them may also not always be clearly differentiated in this chapter. They will
mostly be determined by how they appear in the texts I will concentrate on. It hardly
needs saying that the question of the relationship within the latter pair-philosophy and
theology-has been a continuing issue in the history of theology. Schleiermacher's
position regarding this issue will also be clarified below. It is not an easy task. As it is
apparent throughout this study, Schleiermacher never chooses between contrasts, not
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even between two contrasting views. But, as it also should be evident by now, this
ambiguity is not a flaw. Just the opposite, the possibilities of overcoming metaphysics lay
precisely there.
Although I will consult several of Schleiermacher's works, the principal text of
this inquiry will be his programmatic Introduction to the Glaubenslehre, for there he
methodologically elaborates his position. Therefore, in the chapter below, I will examine
the parts of the Introduction pertinent to this inquiry. The other texts, referred to in the
chapter 10, will reemphasize my points from different angles, drawing some distinct
nuances. I should also remark that this will be more of an explicatory part. An assessment
of Schleiermacher's overcoming of metaphysics in both philosophy and dogmatics will
follow in the next part.
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CHAPTER 9
THE GLAUBENSLEHRE AND METAPHYSICS
Nonmetaphysical Dogmatics As the Discipline of the Church
It is amazing that Schleiermacher has been criticized so much for making his
dogmatics dependent on philosophical presuppositions alien to Christian theology. That
critique not only began among Schleiermacher's contemporaries, but also extended well
into this century, particularly from such so-called dialectical theologians as Brunner and
Barth.2 The latter, even in his older days writes with his characteristic irony about "the
symbiosis of theology and philosophy so characteristic of Schleiermacher" and about
Schleiermacher's "philosophy" locating itself in the vicinity of Plato, Spinoza, and
Schelling and mediating between logos and eros, "a philosophy indifferent as to
Christianity and which would have wrapped itself only accidentally, extrinsically, and
unauthentically in the garments of a particular theology, which here happens to be
Christian.l"
Charges like these appear to be at odds with Schleiermacher's own explicit
separation of the field of dogmatics from that of philosophy. They would be more
pertinent to the Speeches, where Schleiermacher tries to show the relevance of
Christianity to its "cultured despisers" on their own philosophical and cultural grounds.
But for Schleiermacher, dogmatics is exclusively for Christians, "for those who live
within the pale of Christianity," as he says." Any vindication of Christianity outside the
church is irrelevant in this context. He declares: "We entirely renounce all attempt to
prove the truth or necessity of Christianity ... "S
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Schleiermacher holds that a proper Christian theology or dogmatics constitutes a
separate field of knowledge with its own rules, sources, and standards, which are
grounded in particular Christian experience. As such, it is a particular, "positive" science.
Schleiermacher opens his Brief Outline with the definition of this kind of theology:
"Theology is a positive science, whose parts join into a cohesive whole only through their
common relation to a particular mode of faith, i.e., a particular way of being conscious of
God.,,6 Also in the Glaubenslehre, Schleiermacher explains that the term "positive" refers
to the individual content of the religious life within one religious communion, "in so far
as this content depends on the original fact from which the communion itself, as a
coherent historical phenomenon, originated."? This science is "positive" because it
assembles its elements according to their indispensability "for carrying out a practical
task."g In sum, theology or dogmatics is "positive" insofar as it refers to the actual
historical experience of the particular Christian way of being conscious of God within the
given social relationship in order to serve a definite practical function for the domain it
arises from, in this case, for the church and its management."
This peculiar, "positive" discipline, accordingly, has nothing to do with
speculative metaphysics that starts with preconceived ideas and operates on a totally
different, analytical level. In the case of Christian theology or dogmatics, it means that
one does not start with the idea of God, but with the description of how God is
experienced within the Christian community. As Niebuhr puts it, the theologian's task is
"no longer to speculate about the supernatural and to seek to erect time-impervious
ontological systems and hierarchies of being" that would provide eternal metaphysical
justifications for the church. 10 Instead, the task is
to bring together in orderly fashion the elements of the community's religious
consciousness and so to fix in concepts and propositions the Christian identity of
that community and its members, in order thereby the better to enable the church
to give an account of itself both to its own constituency and to the world. I I
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Considerations of this kind lead Schleiermacher to his claim that "there scarcely remains
any point at which speculation could force its way into the system of doctrine." 12
Schleiermacher contends that his approach will correct the previous error of conjoining
pure speculation and dogmatics. As Schleiermacher maintains, his method "will most
easily get rid of all traces of the Scholastic mode of treatment, by which philosophy,
transformed as it was by the spread of Christianity, and real Christian Dogmatics were
frequently mingled in one and the same work.,,13 Both philosophy and Christian doctrine,
in Schleiermacher's opinion, ought to be liberated from each other. He thinks that faith,
returned to its original, experiential source, no longer has any need for the service of
philosophy, even for the dogmatic formulation of the doctrine of the church. Commenting
on his Glaubenslehre, Schleiermacher rejects even the best intentions of philosophy to
help dogmatics to come to that "perfect self-understanding" that it alone can allegedly
give.i" If dogmatics is unable to understand itself in its own terms, "the fault must lie in
something that philosophy cannot provide, so far as it presumes to be more than logic and
grammar in the usual sense of those terms.,,15 Needless to say, the church, too, better
informed of its own interest, is no longer supposed to exert any influence on philosophy.
The idea of a Christian philosophy would be absurd to Schleiermacher. The non-coercive
freedom of philosophy and dogmatics should be reciprocal. Their relation is that there is
no relation.
If one reads these statements in isolation, out of context, an impression could arise
that is diametrically opposed to the critiques charging Schleiermacher of placing theology
under the alien philosophical tutelage. In that case, Schleiermacher would appear to fit in
the camp of those thinkers who, like Barth, insist on the radical separation of the concrete
teachings of the theology of the church from the abstract philosophical theology. Still, the
picture is different in Schleiermacher's case. In fact, there are enough reasons in
Schleiermacher's texts for Barth's ironic statements quoted above. It is not that Barth did
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not know Schleiermacher's dogmatic position regarding philosophy. It is a question of
Schleiermacher's consistency in carrying it out. The Dialektik shows Schleiermacher
honoring the possibility of constructing his own philosophical theology. So, he
apparently does not think that the church's theology or dogmatics is the only way of
doing theology. More than that, even in Schleiermacher's dogmatics, one should also
investigate, as I will do, what he writes here and there between the strong statements that
exclude speculation, like those mentioned above. A special case is the "philosophical"
introduction to the dogmatics. At the very least, for Schleiermacher, neither of these two
opposite approaches-philosophical and dogmatic-are sufficient by themselves.
Eventually, philosophy or speculation will find its way into dogmatics. As the previous
discussion showed, dialectics, after all, is supposed to ground all sciences. Dogmatics, as
a particular, "positive" science of the Christian church, is no exemption. One should only
keep in mind that dialectics is a "foundational" science that itself lacks metaphysical
foundations.
Note that I do not have problems with Schleiermacher's inconsistency toward the
relationship of philosophy and theology. If I mention criticisms like Barth's (there will be
more in Part Five, chapter 11), it is not that I endorse them. Neither do I defend
Schleiermacher against supposedly wrong criticisms. I bring these issues up only to
underscore the undecidability in Schleiermacher's thought. For the project of
metaphysical insideoutness, such indecisiveness and vacillation do not indicate a defect,
but a merit.
Gefuhl as the Reference Point for Nonmetaphysical Dogmatics
The Differing and Related Understandings of Gefiihl
In the previous chapter, I mentioned the differences between Schleiermacher's
accounts of Gefiihl in the Dialektik and the Glaubenslehre. The Gefiihl of the former is
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not yet the main presupposition of religion. It becomes possible only when Gefiihl turns
into the Gefiihl of dependence. Whereas in the Dialektik, Gefuhl is a universal,
experiential, noncognitive point of coincidence of different contrasts resulting in their
transgression, because of the "positive" nature of the Glaubenslehre, there Gefiihl is a
concrete experience of a particular community, the Christian church. According to
Schleiermacher, it is the distinct Gefiihl of absolute dependence that Christians
experience toward the divine. The Glaubenslehre, or dogmatics, insofar as
Schleiermacher makes all its statements measure up to this actual experience, is expected
to be nonmetaphysical. In contrast to classical metaphysical dogmatics, Schleiermacher
does not begin either with the concept of God or with metaphysical localization
(Ortbestimmung) of the role of God-talk, but instead orients himself to experience. 16
Schleiermacher's is a concrete historical, experiential, or empirical theology. So, the
main roles of Gefiihl in overcoming metaphysics are different in the Dialektik and the
Glaubenslehre.
But as the exposition below will show, there are also aspects in these two
accounts that overlap. In fact, I think that they are complementary. Each one of them
contains some details not specified in the other. For instance, the immediacy of self-
consciousness that Schleiermacher emphasizes in the Glaubenslehre is already familiar
from the Dialektik. But the former account informs that the qualification "immediate" is
added to self-consciousness in order to avoid the inclusion of unconscious, accompanying
states, such as the objective-consciousness-like representation of one's own self to
oneself (the I or the ego), already known from the Dialektik. Schleiermacher thinks that
although there are moments in which all thinking and willing retreat behind some
determined form of self-consciousness, that same self-consciousness may also persist
unaltered during a series of diverse acts of thinking and willing, "taking up no relation to
these, and thus not being in the proper sense even an accompaniment of them."!"
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Schleierrnacher exemplifies what he means, differentiating such genuine states of Gefiihl
as joy and sorrow from self-approval and self-reproach, which, resulting from analytic
contemplation, belong to the objective consciousness of the self.
Schleierrnacher's Theory of Immediate Self-Consciousness
Schleierrnacher does not start the exposition of the Glaubenslehre with the Gefiihl
of absolute dependence. On the way to the latter, he first develops a theory of Gefiihl as
immediate self-consciousness, based on what he calls the science of "psychology." The
Gefiihl of dependence in the basis of the experience of the church is a "modification," or
determination (Bestimmtheit), of that broader Gefiihl.18 It is this scientific account of self-
consciousness that is complementary with the account of the Dialektik. But what is more
important is that this theory of self-consciousness adds an important aspect to the
"positivity" of the "science" of dogmatics. That is to say, Schleierrnacher's dogmatics is
elaborated upon "psychology," which from today's perspective appears to be a
phenomenological portrayal of the states of human consciousness. It is phenomenology
overcoming metaphysics in the field of theology, and it is so striking. Schleiermacher
turns out to be a precursor---only in theology---of the twentieth century school of
phenomenology overcoming metaphysics in philosophy. (I will return to this in chapter
12)
Schleiermacher comes to grips with the theory of Gefiihl as immediate self-
consciousness already in §3 of the Glaubenslehre. I have already referred to this
proposition, but now I quote it in full: "The Frommigkeit which forms the basis of all
ecclesiastical communions is, considered purely in itself, neither a Knowing nor a Doing,
but a modification of Gefiihl, or of immediate self-consciousness."!" This proposition is
especially interesting now, after knowing the perspective of the Dialektik. It is significant
that, as it turns out, Schleiermacher locates the Frommigkeit of the church exactly in the
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quasi-space of the transgression between the contrasts. So, it is neither knowing, nor
doing, but the modification of that same Gefiihl that was the point-zero between the
contrast of thinking and willinglbeing in the Dialektik?O
If the states of Gefiihl, knowing, and doing are applied to the Christian religion,
the resulting triad consists of Christian Friimmigkeit, Christian belief, and Christian
action. Now, if the "psychology" of those days teaches Schleiermacher that life alternates
between abiding-in-self (Insichbleiben) and passing-be yond-self (Aussichheraustreten) of
the subject, Gefiihl and knowing pertain to the former, but doing to the latter.r' However,
provided that knowing only becomes real by passing-beyond-self, it is also, in a way,
doing. Therefore, Schleiermacher concludes that only Gefiihl belongs entirely to the
realm of receptivity and is abiding-in-self proper. So, Gefuhl is posited over against
knowing and doing.
Yet, this uniqueness of Gefiihl does not mean that it cannot be related to knowing
and doing. Like the varying proportions of thinking and willing in Gefiihl in the
discussions of the Dialektik, it is also the case here that "the immediate self-
consciousness is always the mediating link in the transition between moments in which
Knowing predominates and those in which Doing predominates ... ,,22 Hence, Gefiihl is a
directing force by means of which knowing is realized into doing, so that different doing
proceeds from the same knowing in different persons with different determinations of
self-consciousness.
However, Schleiermacher goes on that the mediating role of Gefiihl does not grant
any influence of knowing or doing on the Christian Friimmigkeit, The latter belongs to
the realm of Gefiihl only. If the opposite were the case, then the amount or lack of
knowledge or the successfulness or failure of action would measure one's Friimmigkeit,
The only relation that takes place, Schleiermacher believes, is that knowledge is
explicated in virtue of the certainty inherent in the determinations of self-consciousness,
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and that action is devout insofar as the determination of self-consciousness is such.
Schleiermacher's conclusion is that
there are both a Knowing and a Doing which pertain to Frommigkeit, but neither
of these constitutes the essence of Friimmigkeit; they only pertain to it inasmuch
as the stirred-up Gefiihl sometimes comes to rest in a thinking which fixes it,
sometimes discharges itself in an action which expresses it.23
The Gefiihl of Freedom and Dependence
There is another "psychological" or phenomenological step on the way that will
finally lead to the Gefiihl of absolute dependence. This step elaborates "the double
constitution of self-consciousness.Y" adding other contrasting states related to the pair of
"abiding-in-self' and "passing-be yond-self' discussed above. Their first part identifies
with the phenomenon of the I or the ego and its objective representation in consciousness.
The second part, however, involves something more besides the ego, namely, the
consciousness of a variable state of being that does not proceed from the self-identical
(the I). This state, instead, proceeds from something other (das andere), even if this other,
in contrast to the ego, is not objectively presented in the immediate self-consciousness.
This factor gives particular determination to self-consciousness in each moment of time.
Otherwise the variable could not be distinguished from the self-identical. Schleiermacher
gives two more designations to this pair of elements, which are present in every self-
consciousness. They are (1) "a self-posited element" (ein Sichselbstsetzen) and (2) "a
non-self-posited element" (ein Sichselbstnichtsogesetzthaben) or (1) "a Being" (Sein) and
(2) "a Having-by-some-means-come-to-be" (ein Irgendwiegewordenseinir" As intricate
as these terms are, their meaning is simple: "In self-consciousness there are only two
elements: the one expresses the existence of the subject for itself, the other its co-
existence with an Other.,,26
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Next, these two elements of self-consciousness correspond to (spontaneous)
activity (Selbsttiitigkeit) and receptivity (Empfiinglichkeit) in the subject." Both are
related to particular kinds of Gefiihl. It is the Gefiihl of dependence that is common to all
determinations of self-consciousness that express receptivity affected from the other
outside, and it is the Gefiihl of freedom that is common to those determinations that
express spontaneous activity. Schleiermacher proceeds by showing that these two states
make the subject and the other codetermined. Therefore, the Gefiihl of dependence and
the Gefiihl of freedom may be thought as one insofar as the subject and the other may be
the same for both. The total self-consciousness encompassing both Gefiihlen,
accordingly, is one of reciprocity (Wechselwirkung) between the subject and the other.
After that, Schleiermacher applies these insights to the subject's existence in the
world. The outside other may also be thought as totality, as one, and-because of its
containing other receptivities and activities related to the subject-as one together with
the subject, that is, as world. Hence, self-consciousness, as a consciousness of the
existence in or co-existence with the world, is a divided series of the Gefiihl of freedom
and the Gefiihl of dependence. Neither of them can be absolute in temporal existence in
the realm of the world, be it nature, society, etc. That is, neither absolute freedom without
dependence, nor absolute dependence without freedom in relation to the co-determinant.
The former-the Gefiihl of absolute freedom-is impossible in reference to the
world because the spontaneous activity outwards must have an object that has somehow
been given. That givenness could not have taken place without an influence of the object
upon the subject's receptivity, therefore, without the Gefiihl of dependence. Likewise
with the Gefiihl of absolute dependence in the realm of the world, there is no way for that
Gefiihl to arise from an influence of a given object. There would always be a counter-
influence from the subject, therefore, the involvement of the Gefiihl of freedom in a lesser
or greater cxtent.i"
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The Gefiihl of Absolute Dependence
After situating Friimmigkeit in the realm of Gefiihl as immediate self-
consciousness, Schleiermacher distinguishes the religious Gefiihl within the general
account. It is this Gefiihl that constitutes the bedrock of Schleiermacher's non-
metaphysical dogmatics. Before dealing with it, Schleiermacher used "psychology" in
order to differentiate the two states of self-consciousness-spontaneous self-activity and
receptivity-related to the Gefiihl of freedom and the Gefiihl of dependence. He also
showed that these two Gefiihlen, applied to the subject's existence in the world, are
interrelated and therefore self-relativizing, preventing each other to be absolute. That is
Schleiermacher's last step before embarking on his account of the religious Gefiihl.
Schleiermacher summarizes the religious Gefiihl in proposition §4 as follows:
"The common element. . ", the self-identical essence of Friimmigkeit, is. " . the
consciousness of being absolutely dependent, or, which is the same thing, of being in
relation with God.,,29 Although the Gefiihl of absolute dependence is not possible in the
subject's relation to the world, it does not mean that it is not possible at all. Just the
opposite, Schleiermacher declares that it is possible, and that it happens in the self-
consciousness underlying all human existence and negating the Gefiihl of absolute
freedom. Schleiermacher thinks that
it is the consciousness that the whole of our spontaneous activity comes from a
source outside of us in just the same sense in which anything towards which we
should have a Gefiihl of absolute freedom must have proceeded entirely from
ourselves.3o
It only remains for Schleiermacher to show how the absolute dependence identifies with
relation to God, according to the proposition. This is easy for him because this "Whence"
(das Woher) of the absolute dependence, being the "Whence" of all receptive and active
existence, is already implied in the underlying self-consciousness. Since the "Whence" is
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unconditioned and cannot in any way be identified with anything belonging to the realm
of the world, it can also be designated by the word "God.,,31
To make sure that "God" implied in the Gefiihl of absolute dependence is indeed a
non-metaphysical God, Schleiermacher rejects a possibility that this Gefiihl could be
conditioned by some previous intellectual knowledge about God. Moreover, this rejection
is related to Schleiermacher's view of the irrelevance of the knowledge of God that is
original, and conceptual, and independent of any Gefii,hl.32 He believes that such
knowledge has nothing to do with Frommigkeit. It seems that here Schleiermacher
disputes Hegel, because he continues that such claims of the knowledge of God come
close to the Gefiihl of absolute freedom and, consequently, make the proponents of this
view regard the Gefiihl of absolute dependence "as something almost infra-human.t'P
Following that, Schleiermacher anticipates a possible objection, namely, that the
use of the word "God" itself implies at least some conceptual knowledge of it. After all,
"word and idea are always originally one ... ,,34Yet, Schleiermacher insists that even this
idea cannot be anything else than the expression of the Gefiihl of dependence. He
maintains that "God signifies for us simply that which is the co-determinant in this
Gefiihl and to which we trace our being in such a state; and any further content of the idea
must be evolved out of this fundamental import assigned to it.,,35This is precisely the
meaning of the proposition §4 stating that the consciousness of being absolutely
dependent and of being in relationship with God is one and the same. In fact,
Schleiermacher thinks that the Gefiihl of absolute dependence only becomes self-
consciousness simultaneously with the idea of God. It is in this sense that God is "given"
in Gefiihl, and this is Schleiermacher's interpretation of the "original revelation.v" I put
"given" in quotation marks because what Schleiermacher gave with one hand he
immediately takes away with the other. It is pseudo-givenness because this givenness is
actually impossible. It is the "givenness" of the one that cannot be given. It is because
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anything objectively given must be exposed to the subject's counter-influence.Y This
once again leads back to the via negativa. God-talk is purely symbolic, and it is
corruption to consider it as really referring to God. For this reason, again in accordance
with the Dialektik, Schleiermacher maintains that Gefiihl cannot be pure. It is only the
Gefiihl of absolute dependence this time. As §5 states, the highest form of self-
consciousness, the Gefiihl of absolute dependence, in its actual occurrence is never
separated from the lower, sensible, worldly consciousness.f More than that, although
there is no conceptual primacy of the idea of God, the Gefiihl of dependence is not
conceivable without the idea of dependence.f" The latter immediately renders void the
immediacy of this Gefiihl. Hence, the anthropomorphic elements in God-talk are simply
inevitable. Insofar as God-consciousness arises in togetherness with the particular
formations of sensible consciousness, it also carries those determinations with it. They
cannot be metaphysical because they never attain to their object.
Reason and Revelation:
Between Rationality and Supra-Rationality of Christian Theology
There is an interesting discussion in the Introduction to the Glaubenslehre related
to the classical theological issue of the relationship of reason and revelation. I would like
to introduce this discussion here insofar as it is, of course, related to the question of
metaphysics (reason) and its theological overcoming (revelation). Since the Introduction
does not belong to the body of the dogmatics itself, but is a philosophical prolegomenon,
I think this discussion belongs to the genre philosophical theology, similar to that of the
Dialektik. But, in my opinion, it is noteworthy because it exemplifies from a different
viewpoint Schleiermacher's dialectical approach, which refuses to cleave to anyone
metaphysical contrast.
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The Naturally Supernatural Revelation
Corresponding to reason and revelation, Schleiermacher wants to overcome the
one-sidedness of both rational, natural, metaphysical theology and supra-rational,
orthodox, dogmatic theology of the nineteenth century German Protestant churches.
Schleiermacher deals with this subject in connection with the theological problem of the
appearance of the divine revelation in history, that is, in Christ as the Redeemer. His
basic statement is that this revelation is neither absolutely supernatural nor absolutely
supra-rational.l" Schleiermacher begins to explain this proposition with a consideration
that the starting point of every historical existence (Dasein), including that of a religious
communion, comes from outside. That is to say, the emergence of such a historical entity,
in Schleiermacher's view, cannot be explained by the condition of the circle in which it
emerged and developed. Otherwise it would not be a starting point but just a product of
the circular process (Umlauf). Thus, the revelation that initiates the Christian religion
must come from outside; it cannot come forth from the being of the community itself. In
this sense it is a supernatural occurrence.
On the other hand, that is not the whole picture for Schleiermacher; there is a
dialectics of oscillation at work. So, he asserts that, notwithstanding the revelation's
transcending the circle of its appearance, "there is no reason why we should not believe
that the appearing of such a life is the result of the power of development that resides in
our human nature-a power which expresses itself in particular men at particular
points ... ,,41 Accordingly, Schleiermacher appears to allow a universal divine revelation
whose power can manifest itself everywhere: in many places and through many different
agents. Nevertheless, and the dialectical pendulum keeps swinging back and forth, the
revelation in Christ is entirely unique, and it is so precisely because of its universality.
"For everything else is limited to particular times and places, and all that proceeds from
such points is destined from the very outset to be submerged again in Him, and is thus, in
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relation to Him, no existence, but a non-existence.,,42 And yet another swing follows
when Schleiermacher goes on to affirm that even the most radical difference of Christ
from the rest of humanity "does not hinder us from saying that His appearing, even
regarded as the incarnation of the Son of God, is a natural fact. ,,43Schleiermacher gives
two reasons for this affirmation.
First, since Christ accomplished the divine purpose as a human being, there is no
question for Schleiermacher that the capacity of assuming the divine is inherent in human
nature itself. Therefore, the idea that the divine revelation in Christ is something
absolutely supernatural, in Schleiermacher's opinion, cannot be sustained. Second,
Schleiermacher ponders that even if there had only been a possibility of the divine
revelation that resided in the human nature, and its actualization had been a purely divine
act, the temporal appearance of this act in one particular person would have to be
regarded as an action of the original constitution of human nature in general and prepared
by all its past history. It would only be the highest development of its spiritual power.
Otherwise the revelation in Christ would be an arbitrary divine act. To admit that, for
Schleiermacher, is to fall into an anthropopathic view of God, and he wants to avoid this
view. Thus, once again, the only alternative for Schleiermacher is that the revelation in
Christ is a natural occurrence. The fluctuation of the dialectic pendulum between the
supernatural and the natural in the divine revelation finally stops on the latter pole, but, if
one can say so, including in itself the difference of the former.
The Rationally Supra-Rational Revelation
It is much the same with Schleiermacher's treatment of the opposition between
rational and supra-rational in the divine revelation. First, Schleiermacher concedes that
Christ could not be the Redeemer if those elements in his life in which he accomplished
redemption were explicable by means of the universal reason dwelling equally in all. In
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that case, redemption would not be unique; anyone would be able to execute it by
oneself. The states of mind of a redeemed person, for Schleiermacher, are not ingrained
in the mind itself. On the contrary, they can only be invoked and formed by virtue of the
influence of Christ. "Accordingly," Schleiermacher concludes, "the supra-rational
certainty has a place in the Redeemer and the redeemed, and consequently in the whole
compass of Christianity ... ,,44
Yet, as one can already anticipate from the foregoing, this conclusion is not final;
it ought to be dialectically counterbalanced by or subsumed into the other pole of the
contrast. However great the difference between the supra-rational and the common
human reason, Schleiermacher proceeds, "it can never, without falling into self-
contradiction, be set up as an absolutely supra-rational element" simply because the goal
of redemption is a new state of human being that can only be recognized by that same
common reason.45 There must be a pre-understanding of redemption, a consciousness of
the need of redemption prior to the entry of the divine influences in it. Schleiermacher
thinks that, ultimately, it is impossible to distinguish what is effected in the individual by
the divine Spirit and what by the human reason. Moreover, Schleiermacher proceeds that
insofar as the reason is completely one with the divine Spirit, the latter can itself be
conceived of as the highest enhancement of the human reason, so that, finally, "the
difference between the two is made to disappear.T'" Hence, Schleiermacher's final
verdict is that if the human reason already contains that which is produced by the divine
Spirit, the Spirit cannot be understood as going beyond reason. The revelation is rational
though includes also the supra-rational.
Love: The Experienced Natural, but Supra-Rational, Rationality of Dogmatics
Following that, Schleiermacher analogously applies these two conclusions concerning the
divine revelation in Christ to the understanding of theological propositions or dogmas.
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First of all, he points out "the prevalent view," holding that Christian doctrine consists of
two kinds of dogmas: rational and supra-rational. Schleiermacher admits that he sees no
way as to how these two can form one whole, how they can be connected. In like manner,
this same incompatibility takes place with regard to natural theology, which is rational
and, therefore, valid both within and outside Christianity, and supra-rational theology,
valid only within the confines of Christianity. If taken in themselves, both systems
remain separate.
Schleiermacher sees the solution of the problem in his own approach, which, as a
reminder, dialectically unites the natural with the supernatural, the rational with the
supra-rational. So, Schleiermacher proposes, "In one respect all Christian dogmas are
supra-rational, in another they are all rational.,,47 Schleiermacher supports his argument,
contending, and this statement is very important, that the dogmatic propositions are
supra-rational in the same way in which "everything experiential is supra-rational.t'V He
seems to separate here the realm of experience from that of rationality. His distinctive
solution to the problem is to pull down the supra-rational from some metaphysical realm
in the beyond to the realm of experience and Gefiihl. It is the supra-rational in the natural.
Schleiermacher is convinced that proper dogmatic statements must be traced back to the
inner experience, which, for him, is something given, and given outside of human reason.
Henceforth, his method of dogmatics is completely different from that which deduces or
synthesizes its postulates from universally recognizable and communicable propositions.
Schleiermacher even deliberates that if the reverse were true, that is, if dogmatic
propositions could be elaborated in a purely scientific or speculative way, then it would
have to be possible to involve every person in Christianity without their having any
Christian experience. As a result, what Schleiermacher believes to be true appropriation
of Christian dogma can only be brought about by one's aspiration to have the peculiar
Christian experience. As a result, the proper entrance into theology is through "the love
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which wills to perceive.t'''" Needless to say, love is supra-rational, and in this sense "the
whole of Christian doctrine is supra-rational. ,,50
But, as one should already be accustomed to in Schleiermacher, he never gives
one-sided conclusions. According to him, this supra-rational aspect of dogmatic
propositions does not denote that they "are not subject to the same laws of conception
and synthesis as regulate all speech ... ,,51In view of this requirement, even a person who
lacks the fundamental inward Christian experience must be able to understand what is
thought and intended in dogmatics. Thus, Schleiermacher's counter-statement goes as
follows: "It must be answered that in this sense everything in Christian doctrine is
entirely according to reason."S2
In conclusion, Schleiermacher summarizes the dialectic of the supra-rational and
the rational in theology in the following way. Supra-rationality is the measure against
which the dogmas are compared to determine whether they succeed in expressing the
peculiarly Christian element, whereas rationality "is the test of how far the attempt to
translate the inward emotions into thoughts has succeeded.,,53 The monopolar extremes
should be avoided by all means. To assert that what goes beyond reason cannot be
rationally presented is a subterfuge to cover the flaw in the dogmatic method, while to
hold that everything in the Christian doctrine must be based on reason simply covers up
the lack of one's own fundamental religious experience. Both poles of the contrast are
needed for a balanced approach.
Speculative and Dogmatic Theological Propositions
The Nature of Dogmatic Propositions
Schleiermacher also discusses in the Introduction the relation of dogmatics to
Christian Friimmigkeit, He begins with the deliberation that religious doctrines emerge
when believers in any type or level of religion reach the point of development in which it
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becomes possible for them to transcend their own selves and reflect on their affective
states in order to comprehend these in idea (Vorstellung) and retain them in the form of
thought, which also means in language." When this procedure reaches such a point of
cultivation that it is able to represent itself outwardly in definite speech, real propositions
of faith (Glaubenssatz) can be produced. There is no question for Schleiermacher that
Christianity has long since reached this stage of development. Hence, his main
proposition states, "Christian doctrines are accounts of the Christian religious affections
set forth in speech.,,55
Three Kinds of Dogmatic Propositions
Schleiermacher distinguishes three different types of speech in the Christian
religion, which, correspondingly, provide three forms of doctrine: the poetic
(dichterische), the rhetorical (rednerische), and the descriptively didactic (darstellend
beiehrendey." Whereas Schleiermacher evaluates the poetic form as purely descriptive
and the rhetorical as purely stimulative, the highest form of religious doctrine for him is
the strictly reflective descriptively didactic form, for only this form possesses the logical
or dialectical perfection in which the depths of self-consciousness can be disclosed.
Hence, Schleiermacher is convinced that only the statements of this form of doctrine are
dogmatic propositions proper.
The Dogmatic Propositions and Proper Speculation
Needless to say, Schleiermacher's proposition is supposed to rule out the
possibility for the doctrinal statements to originate in abstract, speculative thought. Now,
the question arises: are not these highest doctrinal statements speculative inasmuch as
they are expressed by means of logical and dialectical modes of thinking? Schleiermacher
believes that they are not, or, more precisely, they only appear to be speculative. That is
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to say, they are speculative only formally while materially remaining dogmatic.
Schleiermacher maintains, "A proposition that had originally proceeded from the
speculative activity, however akin it might be to our propositions in content, would not be
a dogmatic proposition. ,,57 Insofar as the task of purely speculative metaphysics is the
contemplation of being (Sein), it either begins or ends with the Supreme Being." For that
reason, it is difficult to distinguish these speculative propositions from the corresponding
ones that arise from the dialectical reflection upon the religious emotions. The idea of the
Supreme Being in one or another way appears in the latter as well.
However, Schleiermacher holds that there is an indubitable criterion for sorting
out the doctrinal propositions. It is the context of thought in which they emerge. Thus,
according to Schleiermacher, the dogmatic propositions always emerge from the devout
disposition (jromme Sinnesan) while the speculative propositions, even if they are of an
ethical character, appear in purely logical or natural-scientific trains of thought. In any
case, recalling the discussion on metaphysics as speculation, dogmatic propositions are in
some sense speculative, but only in Schleiermacher's proper understanding of this word.
They inevitably involve reflection, but it is reflection on experiential religious affections.
Equally important, besides the ecclesiastical value of the propositions, which
consists of its reference to religious emotions themselves, there is a twofold scientific
value of the dogmatic propositions of logical and dialectical kind in Schleiermacher's
system. This approach clearly accords with Schleiermacher's understanding of dialectic
in the Dialektik. It hardly needs saying that this value is not ontological. It only has to do,
on the one hand, with the highest possible definiteness and precision of concepts and, on
the other hand, with the coherence of their interconnection, their fruitfulness in pointing
towards other related concepts, their "intertextuality," so to speak. The latter function,
however, is not a heuristic one because no dogmatic proposition is based on another, but
can only be discovered from contemplation of the Christian self-consciousness.
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Conversely, it is a critical function that enables one to test how one dogmatic expression
harrnonizes with others.59
Three Forms of Doctrinal Propositions
In the Introduction to the Glaubenslehre, Schleiermacher also gives an exhaustive
classification of propositions that the system of Christian doctrine can contain. These
propositions fall into three categories: (1) the descriptions of human states
(Lebenszustande), (2) assertions about the constitution of the world, or (3) the
conceptions of divine attributes and modes of acuon.i" Schleiermacher's argument
proceeds as follows. Since the Gefiihl of absolute dependence can be actualized in time
only insofar as it is aroused by another determination from the part of the sensible self-
consciousness, every formula for that Gefiihl is bound to be a formula for a definite state
of mind (Gemiitszustand) related to that lower form of self-consciousness. For this
reason, first, every dogmatic proposition must be set up as such formula. Furthermore,
the sensible determination always refers to a certain objective determinant outside self-
consciousness. It is this determinant that modifies Gefiihl. Therefore, any modification of
the Gefiihl of absolute dependence may become known by virtue of going back to the
description of that element of existence. Second, the dogmatic propositions thus become
assertions regarding the constitution of the world. Third, since the totality of being from
which all determinations of self-consciousness proceed is comprehended under the
Gefiihl of absolute dependence, the modifications of higher self-consciousness may be
represented by describing God as the basis of this togetherness of being in its various
forms of expression.
Following this classification, Schleiermacher proceeds to establish a proper
relationship between these types of propositions, to ensure that speculation does not find
its way into dogmatics. This fear is not without reason. Obviously, only the propositions
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of the first type are based on the inner experience of the subject, whereas those of the
second type are obviously synthetic, scientific propositions about the world, and those of
the third type may appear to be metaphysical speculations about God's nature.
Schleiermacher's ingenious solution of this hazardous problem is to put the latter two
forms of propositions under the control of the first:
Hence we must declare the description of human states of mind to be the
fundamental dogmatic form; while propositions of the second and third forms are
permissible only in so far as they can be developed out of propositions of the first
form; for only on this condition can they be really authenticated as expressions of
religious emotions."
Of course, there is another possibility of dealing with this problem, namely, to dismiss
the two latter forms altogether. But Schleiermacher thinks that the time is not ripe yet for
this radical step. In that case, the dogmatic work would appear isolated from any
historical support. It would also appear lacking real ecclesiastical character and so could
not fulfill the real purpose of dogmatics. As a consequence, Schleiermacher decides to
carry out his system by means of all three forms of dogmatic propositions, though always
keeping the two latter forms related to the immediate description of the states of mind.
The Speculative Insideoutness:
New Meanings in Old Metaphysical Forms
Interestingly enough, Schleiermacher is of the opinion that the influence of
speculation upon the content of dogmatic propositions in the earliest centuries, except
that from the Gnostic schools, "may be placed at zero (flir nichts zu rechnen)" or equals
to nothing.62 The situation changed in the Middle Ages, when the conglomerate-
philosophy took shape within the Christian church, at the same time influencing the
formation of dogmatic language. A mingling of the speculative with the dogmatic was
inevitable. Fortunately, philosophy soon freed itself from the bondage of ecclesiastical
faith and commenced many fresh starts. Because of this independence, for philosophy the
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problem of ascertaining to which speculative propositions were taken to be dogmatic and
which not was irrelevant. But not so for the Christian church. The church had to obtain
this knowledge since it was not in a position to begin the doctrinal development anew. In
Schleiermacher's view, the separation of the dogmatic propositions from the speculative
ones is of utmost importance for the church. It is the issue of assurance "that speculative
matter ... may not continue to be offered to it as dogmatic.,,63 Schleiermacher further
expounds his position, at the same time even appealing to the authority of the whole
Protestant church:
The Evangelical (protestant) Church in particular is unanimous in feeling that the
distinctive form of its dogmatic propositions does not depend on any form or
school of philosophy, and has not proceeded at all from a speculative interest, but
simply from the interest of satisfying the immediate self-consciousness solely
through the means ordained by Christ, in their genuine and uncorrupted form.64
Schleiermacher proceeds that dogmatic theology will probably sometime be able
to match philosophy in its certainty of standing on its own proper ground and soil.
However, it is not possible until the separation between the speculative and the dogmatic
propositions is so complete that a question of whether the same proposition can be true in
philosophy and false in theology will no longer even be asked. The warrant for this claim
is simple: a proposition cannot appear in one context in the same way as it appears in the
other; "however similar it sounds, a difference must always be assumed.,,65
Schleiermacher complains that, unfortunately, this goal is very far away, for many
theologians still take pains either to base and deduce dogmatic propositions in a
speculative manner or amalgamate the products of speculative activity with the results of
the study of religious affections into a single whole. The question, naturally, is whether
Schleiermacher himself is so innocent as regards this latter flaw.66 At the very least, the
answer is not simple, for the language contaminated by speculation is retained to a
greater or lesser extent. Otherwise that language could not even be identified as
theological language.
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Nevertheless, in my opinion, Schleiermacher goes in the right direction. I think
that this is the most appropriate way of overcoming metaphysics in theology, the way in
which the language of faith is consciously liberated from its speculative implications.
Since the two meanings are historically so intermingled, the most careful analysis of
speculative and dogmatic elements is necessary. Only then can one think of overcoming
metaphysics in theology.
Speculative Consciousness (Metaphysics) and Religious Self Consciousness
(Theology): Conflict or Complementarity?
The Language of Dogmatics: Its Specificity and Boundaries
Another important place in the Introduction where the problematic of the
relationship of metaphysics as speculation to dogmatics appears is the section in which
Schleiermacher further elaborates his "scientific" theory of the dialectical character of the
language and the systematic arrangement of dogrnatics.f By the way, it is in this section
that the above mentioned strong statement appears regarding the impossibility for
speculation to force its way into Schleiermacher's system of doctrine. He starts, however,
with the meaning of the term "dialectical" in his system in order to further clarify the
difference between his approach and that of pure speculation. Once again, in accord with
the account in the Dialektik, he explains that the term is meant exactly in the ancient
sense, according to which, the dialectical character of language consists simply in its
being formed in a technically correct manner, so that it could be used for the
communication and correction of knowledge in this particular field.
Significantly, now Schleiermacher restricts the field of the dogmatic language
proper even more. He thinks that this dialectical understanding of language is
inapplicable not only to the poetic and the rhetorical utterances but even to the
descriptively didactic ones inasmuch as the latter ensue from the first two and, therefore,
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cannot be quite separate from them. Schleiermacher's restricted statement is that the
expressions of the doctrinal system, going back to the religious Gefiihl, form "a special
realm of language within the didactically religious, i.e. the strictest region of it.,,68
Most surprising of all, however, especially if one takes into consideration
Schleiermacher's previous statements, which banish every use of philosophy in
dogmatics, is Schleiermacher's pronouncement that in the questions of the differences in
religious Gefiihl and of its object of reference, dogmatics encroaches upon the subject
matter of psychology, ethics, and metaphysics. This is the way in which the language of
dogmatics acquires the affinity to the scientific terminology of these disciplines. This fact
provides the ground for further distinction of the proper language of dogmatics even from
the general usage of descriptively didactic language in the church, the usage that wants to
know nothing of the scientific terminology.
The variety of views and their expressions in the aforementioned three disciplines
makes the presentation of dogmatic language extremely difficult. Therefore,
Schleiermacher determines the criteria of appropriateness for the terms borrowed from
these sciences for dogmatic use. That is, the only inappropriate views for this end are
those that (1) make no separation between the concepts of God and the world and (2)
those that admit no contrast between good and evil, thus making no distinction between
the spiritual and the sensible in a human being. Schleiermacher is convinced that these
distinctions are the most significant presuppositions of religious self-consciousness
because without them cannot self-consciousness be set in antithesis to God-
consciousness, "nor could one speak of a distinction between a free and an inhibited
higher self-consciousness, nor, consequently, of redemption and the need for it.,,69
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The Inherent Conflict between Speculation and Dogmatics
Even this selective usage of the philosophical disciplines notwithstanding, one is
left wondering whether Schleiermacher has remained faithful to his initial allegiance to
the exclusiveness of the dogmatic enterprise, even if he assigns to these disciplines a
purely instrumental function in theology, and even if their terminology may acquire
different meanings in the dogmatic use. Also, a suspicion may arise as to whether the
experiential character of the dogmatic propositions is not finally lost in Schleiermacher's
approach, at least insofar as he subordinates the immediate, poetic, and rhetorical forms
of religious discourse to the refined, detached, critical, and strictly "scientific"
descriptively didactic reflection, even if the latter is derived from the former two.
Schleiermacher's Resolution:
Speculative/Objective and Religious/Subjective Consciousness
It is significant that Schleiermacher himself mentions this kind of critique in the
context of some general problems related to the paradigm changes in philosophical
disciplines and their impact in the formation of dogmatics. The critique is that the
language of philosophy "is too abstract and too far removed from the immediate language
of religion, for the sake of which alone Dogmatics exists.,,7o
To admit the truth, Schleiermacher's initial refutation of this objection is rather
awkward, if it can be considered a refutation at all. In Schleiermacher's view, this
"complaint" is unfounded simply because only the scientifically educated in the church
are expected to take their bearings from dogmatics in the realm of popular religious
teaching. Accordingly, they are bound to have the key for this task, which can only be
found in philosophical discourse. One is left wondering whether Schleiermacher is not
affirming "the priesthood of speculation" here, the idea which he vehemently rejects
elsewhere."
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Be that as it may, the apex of Schleiermacher's solution to the problem of the
relationship between speculation and dogmatics in this section comes in the last sub-
section. I have already quoted it in chapter 4, on Schleiermacher's understanding of
metaphysics as speculation.i'' Remember, that is where Schleiermacher divides
consciousness into two functions: objective and subjective, related to speculation and
empiricism. Speculative consciousness, according to Schleiermacher, is the highest
objective function of consciousness, while the religious self-consciousness is its highest
subjective function. Both functions are indispensable, and Schleiermacher thinks that
their clash would destroy human nature itself. Consequently, the conflict between
speculation and dogmatics is not only needless, but also detrimental, given the designated
use and understanding of speculation. There is only one problem. As I have already said,
and will repeat later, clarifying the relationship between speculation and dogmatics on the
conceptual level seems to be different from distinguishing between the two functions of
consciousness. It seems that Schleiermacher is not aware of that difference and, in effect,
blurs the two approaches.
Schleiermacher's Commentary on the Glaubenslehre in the Open Letters
The Languages of Dogmatics and Philosophy
In his commentary on the revised edition of The Christian Faith in the form of the
open letters to Liicke, Schleiermacher gives some significant additional remarks related
to the discussions of the Introduction. Prompted by his critics, Schleiermacher gives
special attention to the question of the relationship between philosophy and theology in
his magnum opus. In the first place, a point of major interest appears in his reply to Fries
regarding the status of the language of theology. Fries' viewpoint seems to be that every
theological claim is by its very nature philosophical because of the philosophical
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connotations of theological language itself. In his view, there are only two alternatives for
a theologian: either to speak a language of some philosophical school or to use ordinary
language. According to this scheme, Schleiermacher, certainly, fits the first alternative.
That is, his dogmatics becomes dependent on the principles of his own philosophy,
especially, the philosophical view that the Gefiihl of absolute dependence is basic to
every religious conviction.73
Although Schleiermacher agrees with Fries regarding the inevitability of
philosophical content in theological terminology, he qualifies his agreement that this
point of view is true for philosophical theology only. Schleiermacher completely denies
that such philosophical dependence can take place in the dogmatics of some particular
religious community. Of course, the Glaubenslehre is intended to be this kind of
dogmatics. Schleiermacher's main point of contention against the charge of unconscious
philosophizing is that Christian theology has its own distinctive language. In the first
place, Schleiermacher offers a striking idea for his time, namely, that Christianity from its
very beginnings has been "a language-forming principle" for both philosophical and
ordinary languages.i" It means that the distinctive linguistic expressions of the first
churches, besides creating their own internal language, even including a transformed
language of philosophy, have influenced not only the further development of ordinary
language, but also that of philosophical schools.
In any case, the influence of theology and philosophy has been reciprocal.
Schleiermacher thinks that philosophical language has likewise influenced the
development of theological language. He admits that, since the reflective language of
dogmatics is the sharpest and the most precise level in the linguistic field of Christian
religion and is, accordingly, to a great extent formed by the reinterpretation of the already
available terms, "certain elements of philosophical language could have been taken over
and used for the religious field.,,75 But, and now Schleiermacher delivers the crux of his
299
argument, "these elements are then cut off from their old stems and rooted in new ground
so that the strict meaning of the school is not carried over.,,76
Sacral priestly and juristic languages, for example, in Schleiermacher's opinion,
could be used with the same success as philosophical language. Juristic terms, though,
can only be applied figuratively to describe the human-divine relationship. Priestly
language also cannot be used in its original meaning. Consequently, the end product of
this process of assimilation, according to Schleiermacher, is a language that, like a coin,
has a double imprint.77 There is a picture on the one side of the coin, but one needs to
look at the other side to find out its worth.78 One side of this language is metaphorical,
but the other, dialectical. What remains from philosophical language in dogmatics is its
dialectical coherence. The meaning is metaphorically transformed. Schleiermacher
further maintains that this rule applies not only to the language of theology, but that even
every new philosophical system is bound to create its own language in this way. In any
event, one thing is completely clear to Schleiermacher, namely, that there is no way to
return to the language of the Bible alone to write dogmatics." The alternative of the
ordinary language must also be ruled out. Hence, he assures himself and his readers that
they can embark on the proposed path of pursuing the dogmatic task by means of an
impartial appropriation of the philosophical terminology and conceptuality without any
fear that the latter could somehow distort the distinctiveness of the former.
The Relationship of Religion and Philosophy
In his Sendschreiben to LUcke, Schleiermacher also directly addresses the
question of the relationship between religion and philosophy, or, to use the synonyms
suggested by his challengers, between dogmatics and philosophy, or between the higher
self-consciousness, where he begins, and the original idea of God. This time he alleges to
do the job clearly and explicitly, not just with vague hints.
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Schleiermacher starts with the last pair of these opposites and, just like in the
Introduction to the Glaubenslehre itself, first deals with the religion-philosophy
relationship, not on a conceptual level, but on the level of the phenomenology of
individual consciousness, without pointing out the difference. He begins with the
acknowledgement that such a discussion, of course, cannot be included in the
Glaubenslehre itself for the reason that both its form and content are conditioned by the
presupposition that the idea of God set forth in it is not original but, instead, develops
from reflection on the higher self-consciousness. Schleiermacher reassures his readers
that the original idea of God would lead into the realm of speculation. He goes on to say
that the connection between the original idea of God and the original religious self-
consciousness is the same as that between any other product of the various intellectual
functions at the same level and relation. Therefore, Schleiermacher modestly concedes
that he does not see how there can be any question about how he relates religion and
philosophy. That kind of question is simply superfluous. It goes without saying that
religion and philosophy can coexist very well in the same person.
Immediately following, Schleiermacher goes into some implicit polemics. So, on
the one hand, he argues that philosophy does not need to raise itself above Christ, "as
though Frommigkeit were only immature philosophy and all philosophy were the first
coming to consciousness of Frommigkeit."so "Rather," Schleiermacher proceeds, "a true
phi losopher can be and remain a true believer, and, likewise, one can be [rommig with all
one's heart and still have and exercise the courage to delve into the very depths of
speculation. ,,81
On the other hand, Schleiermacher admits that one can also exist without the
other. Therefore, and here it hardly needs saying that Schleiermacher has himself in
mind, "in some persons Friimmigkeit can come to complete consciousness even in the
strictest form, that is, the form of dogmatics, without a granule of philosophy entering
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into it."s2 And, in reverse order, "some can empty the cup of speculation without
discovering Friimrnigkeit at its bottom."s3 However, and repetitively, Schleierrnacher's
point is that the same could be said of the relationship of Frommigkeit and any other
intellectual activity, and hence, there is no sufficient reason to concentrate just on this one
relationship.
Following that, Schleiermacher turns to the relationship between dogmatics and
philosophy proper and immediately confesses that he prefers to talk about that as little as
possible. At the very least, these little utterances convey the same commitment of the
Introduction to expel any philosophical speculation from the system. Once again, he
appreciates the liberation of philosophy from its slavery to theology. But, the result of
this liberation is that faith, returned to its original source in immediate self-consciousness,
no longer needs philosophy's services, even for the dogmatic formulations. As noted
above, Schleiermacher declines philosophy's help to theology in reaching its "perfect
self-understanding," supposedly unattainable without that help. If theology is unable to
understand itself, philosophy cannot help either, particularly when it "presumes to be
more than logic and grammar.t''" Without doubt, the opposite is also true. The church,
knowing its boundaries, does not claim to influence philosophy. Both dogmatic theology
and philosophy have become completely free of each other. Although they must be in
harmony on one level, on the other "they do not belong together and are not determined
by each other."s5
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CHAPTER 10
SOME REFERENCES TO OTHER WRITINGS
Although I regard the Introduction to the Glaubenslehre to be the key text for this
part, I would also like to make brief references to some other texts that elucidate
Schleiermacher's views concerning the relationship of dogmatics and metaphysics.
Although these texts are different in style, and they approach the issue from different
perspectives, they either confirm the Introduction's discussion or augment it with
interesting nuances.
The Brief Outline
In his Brief Outline on the Study of Theology, Schleiermacher identifies three
pillars of theological study: philosophical theology, historical theology, and practical
theology. All three are indispensable and mutually correlated. Interestingly,
Schleiermacher claims that the Glaubenslehre belongs to historical theology, the task of
which it is "to exhibit every point of time in its true relation to the idea of "Christianity.")
Therefore, it is both the foundation of practical theology and the verification of
philosophical theology. Historical theology is the actual corpus of theological study,
which is also connected to science through philosophical theology and with the Christian
life through practical theology. Schleiermacher acknowledges that genuine knowledge of
Christianity cannot be achieved with the empirical method alone. It is also necessary to
understand the essence of Christianity in contradistinction to other churches and other
kinds of faiths, as well as to understand the nature of Frommigkeit and of religious
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communities in relation to the other activities of the human spirit.i It is philosophy of
religion that carries out these tasks. But the new discipline then, philosophical theology,
in tum, utilizes the framework developed in philosophy of religion and offers general
reflection based on these particular matters. As such, it mediates between faith and
knowledge.' It is noteworthy that philosophical theology, being such individual
reflection, is wholly subjective and personal, and every theologian, according to
Schleiermacher, should produce his or her own philosophical theology." The task of
philosophical theology is to present (1) the perspective on the essence of Christianity,
whereby it can be recognized as a distinctive mode of faith; (2) the form which Christian
community takes; and (3) the manner in which these factors are further subdivided and
differentiated.s The point of departure for philosophical theology, according to
Schleiermacher, can only be taken "above" Christianity, but "above" in the logical sense,
that is, in the general concept of a religious community." In any case, it is clear that the
mutual inter-relatedness of the branches of theology also makes dogmatics as historical
theology connected to philosophical theology and its conceptual subject matter above
Christianity. I would even say that, according to the tasks of philosophical theology listed
above, the Glaubenslehre would belong to the latter as well. At least a clear-cut
distinction is no longer possible.
As with empiricism and speculation in the Dialektik and to religious/subjective
and speculati ve/objecti ve consciousness in the Glaubenslehre, in the Brief Outline,
Schleiermacher appeals again to the two functions of human spirit. But here he calls them
"religious interest" and "scientific spirit.:" Apparently not without certain ambitions
regarding himself, Schleiermacher puts forward his ideal of the church's leader, called "a
prince of the church." This is Schleiermacher's equivalent for the term "church father."
In this "prince," these two functions "are conjoined in the highest degree and with the
finest balance for the purpose of theoretical and practical activity alike ... ,,8
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The Speeches
There is an intriguing discussion in the Speeches in which Schleiermacher directly
touches the issue of the relationship between metaphysics and theology. It appears in the
explanations to the second speech. There Schleiermacher, evidently with Hegel in mind,
contends against the pretension of metaphysical speculation in theology to be the highest
knowledge. He brings up as a case in point the Trinitarian speculations of philosophical
theology. Schleiermacher maintains that the result of these speculations can not be the
Christian Trinity because, "being a speculative idea, it has its origin in another part of the
soul.,,9 Increasingly important, Schleiermacher claims that religion has nothing to do with
knowledge at all. Otherwise it would be sufficient, in order to acquire Frommigkeit, just
to study religion with the scientific, speculative method. If that were the case, perfection
in Christianity would proceed in the following three stages: from (1) philosophy to (2) the
religion of laity as pistis, which would be an imperfect way of having the highest
knowledge; to (3) theology as gnosis, the perfect way of having the highest knowledge.
There is no question that Schleiermacher cannot accept this division, for it would entail
what he elsewhere condemns as the "priesthood of speculation.v'" Therefore,
Schleiermacher admits that he "cannot hold religion the highest knowledge, or indeed
knowledge at all." , , His conviction is that it is surely knowledge that the layman has in
less perfection when compared to the theologian. But, it "is not religion itself, but
something appended to it.,,12
It should be noted that mostly the Speeches do not deal exactly with the issue of
metaphysics and theology, but confront metaphysics in contrast to religion. Since
theology ensues from religion, the following exposes will also not be off the mark.
Throughout his Speeches, Schleiermacher contrasts religion to metaphysics and ethics or
morality. So, in one place, he scorns what his contemporaries designate a "purified"
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Christianity: "the ill put together fragments of metaphysics and ethics.,,13 In another
place, he attacks a "common" tendency: to seek metaphysics and ethics in the sacred
writings. Schleiermacher himself thinks that it is "time to approach the matter from the
other end, and to begin with the clear cut distinction between our faith and your ethics
and metaphysics, between our Frommigkeit and what you call rnorality.?" In yet another
place he speaks of the "original and characteristic possession of religion" which is to
resign at once "all claims on anything that belongs either to science or morality." IS
The most detailed, and also the most expressive, discussion occurs in the first
draft of the second speech. "What does your metaphysics do," Schleiermacher asks to the
cultured despisers, "or, if you will not have that antiquated, too historical name, your
transcendental philosophy'i'l'" It classifies the universe, ascertains the grounds of its
being, deduces the necessity of the actual, and gives the laws of the world. Religion, on
the contrary, has nothing to do with the grounds, deductions, and the first causes. What
does ethics do? It develops a system of duties from human nature and its relation to the
universe; it commands and prohibits actions. Religion, on the contrary, "cannot venture
to use the Universe for the deduction of duties, or to contain a code of laws."l7 Religion
does not seek, as does metaphysics, to determine and explain the nature of the universe.
Neither it seeks, as do morals, to advance and perfect the universe by the power of
freedom and the "divine will of humans." "It is neither thinking nor acting, but intuition
and Gefiihl.,,18 It regards the universe as it is. It is a reverent attention and a childlike
submission to the immediate influences of the universe. Whereas to metaphysics, a
human being is the center of all, the condition of all existence, to religion, sfhe is, like
any other finite being, but a manifestation of the universe. Whereas morals proceed from
the consciousness of freedom and seek to expand it to infinity, "religion regards man as
needing to be what he is ... ,,19
310
Schleiermacher calls this unfortunate mixture of metaphysics and ethics in
religion nothing but "a selection for beginners." He ponders, if this "religion" were
something more and had a principle of union of its own, religion would have to be the
highest in philosophy, with metaphysics and ethics as its subdivisions only.
Schleiermacher's claim is distinctly different from this hierarchy. Notably, and quite
surprisingly in this place, for him, "Religion, morals, and metaphysics are equals,
different but complernentary.r " "Practice is art, speculation is science, religion is sense
and taste for the Infinite."Zl As distinct, they cannot be amalgamated. Yet, being
complementary, everyone of them needs the others. To have speculation and practice
without religion, for Schleiermacher, is "mad presumption." "Without religion, practice
cannot get beyond venturesome or traditional forms, and speculation is only a stiff and
lean skeleton.'.22
The Letter to Jacobi
Perhaps the most interesting expressions of Schleiermacher's attitude toward the
philosophy-theology relationship appear in his letter to Jacobi. In that letter,
Schleiermacher addresses Jacobi's avowal that he cannot but remain a pagan in reason
(Verstand) while being a Christian in Gefiihl. For Jacobi, these two remain separated
"waters." Schleiermacher thinks that, in the field of religion, it is a contradiction in terms,
since religion is a matter of Gefiihl, but dogmatics is nothing else than reason's reflective
translation of that Gefiihl.23 When a person's Gefiihl is Christian, how then can her or his
reason perform the task of interpretation of Gefiihl in a pagan way? The only alternative
Schleiermacher can accept for himself is to be just a philosopher in that place where
Jacobi finds himself to be a pagan: "I am a philosopher with my reason; for that [being a
philosopher] is the independent and original function of reason; but with my Gefiihl I am
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a totally pious person and, as such, am indeed a Christian ... ,,24Schleiermacher thinks
that, in this way, every possible paganism in him is completely overcome.
In a different, incredibly obscure, section of the letter, Schleiermacher turns to
Jacobi's alleged unwillingness to elevate reason over nature. Schleiermacher agrees with
him, yet provided that there are no limits to the natural. In this connection,
Schleiermacher explains that it is possible to keep a perfect balance between the two
"waters," religion and philosophy, in the same way as the balance between the "two
Adams" in Christian understanding." So, Schleiermacher eloquently says that when his
Christian Gefiihl is conscious of the divine Spirit in him, which is something other than
his reason and, therefore, incomprehensible, in no way does he want to give up meeting
that Spirit in the deepest depths of the nature of his being. And, similarly, when his
Christian Gefiihl is conscious of the Son of God, who is different from the best of other
humans, not just in the sense of being "still better," and, therefore, incomprehensible, it
does not make him cease to meet the generating of that Son of God in the deepest depths
of the nature of his being. Schleiermacher avers that these things do not make him cease
saying to himself that he will grasp the second Adam just as soon as the first Adam or
Adams, which he must likewise accept without grasping. It is a reciprocity in which the
latter is elevated and the former lowered.
After that, Schleiermacher gives his famous analogy of the relationship of
dogmatics and philosophy as an ellipse with two foci. He explains that even though
oscillation is a universal form of all finite existence, there is an immediate awareness in
him that this oscillation only corresponds to the two focal points of his own ellipse out of
which also such a fluctuation proceeds. And it is in this undecided state of balance
(Schweben) where Schleiermacher finds "the full abundance of his earthly life.,,26
Schleiermacher maintains that it is the reason his philosophy and his dogmatics are firmly
resolved not to contradict each other, and, yet, even more important, precisely for that
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same reason, both can never be accomplished either. So, he says: " ... as long as I will be
able to think, they will always have to be reciprocally harmonized and, thus, will more
and more approximate to each other.,,27But Schleiermacher would never allow it to
become a circle with a fixed center. In an ellipse, such a center is lost, and everything
proceeds from two focal points, indeed, corresponding to the Ubergang, the middle as
athopon between two contrasts."
Furthermore, at the end of the same letter, Schleiermacher adds that, ultimately,
these two "waters" do not unite. To repeat, the two foci of Schleiermacher's ellipse,
contrary to Barth's charge, do not "draw relentlessly closer to one another," do not tend
to become a circle." Jacobi, on the other hand, desires this unification and, consequently,
has a deep regret because it does not take place. Schleiermacher, instead, offers another
analogy, this time that of a galvanic battery-a popular invention of his time in which
electricity was produced from two dissimilar metals combined with some fluid as a
conducting agent. Thus, he states:
Reason and Gefiihl for me remain beside each other; yet, they touch each other
and form a galvanic battery; the innermost life of the spirit, for me, consists only
in this galvanic operation, in the Gefiihl of reason and in the reasoning of Gefiihl,
whereby both poles still yet remain turned away from each other'"
I think that this analogy is an excellent representation of Schleiermacher's approach to
the contrasting, and yet related, relationship of dogmatics and metaphysics, religion and
philosophy, and the like. I will end this part on this note and give an evaluation in the
next chapter.
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PART FIVE
SCHlEIERMACHER'S OVERCOMING OF METAPHYSICS:
AN ASSESSMENT
INTRODUCTION
In concluding this direct investigation into Schleiermacher's metaphysics, I would
like to assess his overcoming of metaphysics from both philosophical and dogmatic
viewpoints, according to the foregoing presentations. From Schleiermacher's
philosophical perspective, in chapter 11, I will summarize and point out ways in which
Schleiermacher overcomes the existing metaphysics with his own metaphysics, which is
more viable. Next, as shown above, there are some elements in Schleiermacher's
metaphysics that not only overcome the previous metaphysics with a different, more
proper metaphysics, but also reach outside that endless game of one overcoming another.
These are truly metaphysical or, better, "meta-metaphysical" elements that go beyond
metaphysics as such. I will denote some of these once again.
In chapter 12, I will approach the matter from Schleiermacher's dogmatic
perspective. I will first analyze some points in which Schleiermacher, despite his
intentions to leave metaphysics behind, does not fully realize this intention, where
metaphysics perpetually returns in spite of its overcoming. This issue will take more
space, for it has always been both the main apple of discord as well as the stumbling-
block of Schleiermacher research and is essential in a work of this kind. As a reminder, I
do not consider this undecidability as Schleiermacher's flaw. Next, I will review some
points at which Schleiermacher does overcome metaphysics by dogmatic means. Finally,
I would also like to show how Schleiermacher's dogmatic theology may be interpreted as
overcoming metaphysics in the true sense of leaving it behind. I do so through the prism
of the general issue of the theology-philosophy relationship in Schleiermacher's work.
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CHAPTER 11
PHILOSOPHICAL OR DIALECTICAL OVERCOMING OF METAPHYSICS
A Better Metaphysics
Throughout the parts of the dissertation that deal with Schleiermacher, I have
showed different ways in which he overcomes the existing metaphysics. A very
important point that set the tone for all further discussion was Schleiermacher's
understanding of metaphysics as speculation (chapter 4). On the one hand,
Schleiermacher rejected pure speculation. On the other, he maintained the necessity of
speculation for scientific knowing, but not in its pure form. He had to reinvent proper
speculation himself. It was an empirically grounded speculation that overcame pure
speculation. It had to be speculation that grounds essence in existence, Wesen in Dasein.\
In order for knowledge to be knowledge-not just abstractions of absolute identity or
complete chaos-it must be related to life.2
After that, I showed many ways in which Schleiermacher built on the Kant's
already existing overcoming of metaphysics (chapter 5). At the same time,
Schleiermacher found Kant's own project metaphysical in several respects, so that it still
needed overcoming. First and foremost was the split of reason because of its two
disjointed parts: theoretical and practical. Schleiermacher overcame this "gap" in Kant's
system with his conception of Gefiihl. Also, corresponding to the aforementioned
requirement of the togetherness of empiricism and speculation, Schleiermacher rejected
the very possibility of pure apriori synthetic knowledge and, indeed, the possibility of
pure reason itself. Schleiermacher's overcoming of Kant consisted in making
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metaphysics more down to earth, where appearances are real and essences are known as
corresponding to those same appearances.
Unlike Part Two, Part Three did not concentrate on Schleiermacher's relation to a
particular system of metaphysics that would need overcoming. Nevertheless, insofar as it
explicated Schleiermacher's own metaphysics, it also implied the overcoming of
traditional metaphysics, especially in regard to metaphysical opposites (chapter 6). Some
common traits of different kinds of traditional metaphysics are their one-sidedness, being
rooted in one single opposite at the expense of its counterpart, or their dualism, in which
the two are mutually exclusive.' Schleiermacher overcame such metaphysics with his
metaphysics of contrasts, in which not only are the members of each pair interdependent
and complementary, but also the different contrasts are relative, or interrelated among
themselves. In this metaphysics, self-consciousness is that state of consummation, in
which the oscillating, asymptotic identity in difference between the contrasts is reached.
Beyond Metaphysics
Now I turn to what I defined as true overcoming of metaphysics in the sense of
leaving metaphysics behind. As thus far revealed, there were indeed such elements in
Schleiermacher's metaphysics. I would like to point them out once again, as well as add
some additional elucidation.
Dialectics beyond Metaphysics
The first and foremost of Schleiermacher's steps beyond metaphysics is his
understanding of dialectics itself (chapter 6). Schleiermacher considers dialectics
according to its original meaning, that is, not so much a metaphysical but rather a
rhetorical discipline, the art of discourse, the art of conducting conversation, the
Kunstlehre of the linking of thoughts. This understanding, moreover, is closely related to
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Schleiermacher's view of the finitude and inter-subjective changeability of language, as
well as to his pragmatist kind of agreement theory of knowing. Instead of the
individualistic "I think" of transcendental philosophy, Schleiermacher offers a radical
"we think" of changing inter-subjective and linguistic horizons." Just as language is not
individual, truth, for Schleiermacher, cannot be individual, but rather must be tested in a
thinking community that uses a common language. True concepts cannot be verified
metaphysically. Instead, they are "the normatively constituted aims of the activity of
thought in a comrnunity.Y
Consequently, although dialectics in its discourse employs metaphysical concepts,
these concepts cannot have ontological value simply because language itself once and for
all prohibits metaphysics. They have only epistemological value as tentatively assumed
formal principles of the system of knowledge. Hence, even though, in his dialectics,
Schleiermacher deals with the subjects of traditional metaphysics, such as human being,
world, and God, he does not advance a body of metaphysical knowledge about them, but
"rather attempts to justify the original presupposition of the transcendent ground.?"
Especially God, which Schleiennacher also identifies with the transcendent ground,
cannot be known. And it is this transcendence that drives knowledge onto the dialectical
inter-communicative path. The transcendent ground is not deduced, but is presupposed in
contrast to the relativity of knowing, which it grounds. It is presupposed heuristically in
order to establish the possibility of agreement between thinking and being, which, in tum,
establishes the possibility of knowing. Thus, one could say that the metaphysics of
Schleiermacher's Dialektik is a variety of Western-Christian metaphysics, which at least
since Augustine, conceived God as the absolute unity and the ground for the
correspondence of thinking with being.' Yet it is not the same metaphysics. It is the
overcoming of that Western-Christian metaphysics insofar as it is based only on
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provisional presupposing in order to make the system coherent. It is epistemological
overcoming of ontology.
Thus, on the one hand, dialectics is the foundational science of all sciences, the
science of sciences (scientia scientiarum) insofar as it provides their transcendental
presuppositions. Yet, at the same time, paradoxically, it is a non-foundational
foundational science, for those transcendental presuppositions are literally nothing more
than tentative presuppositions. As Schleiermacher admits, the search for the metaphysical
boundaries of thought may be accomplished only by way of fiction, through fiction." In
any event, they are hypothetically presupposed in and for the thinking that claims to be
knowing. Thinking without these principles cannot become knowing. Thinking also
cannot be knowing without being organized. Therefore, Schleiermacher calls dialectics
the organon of all sciences. It follows that dialectics, ultimately, is not metaphysics but
logic. On this account, Schleiermacher subsumes the transcendental aspect of dialectic
under the form of logic. Dialectics as logic overcomes metaphysics.
Gefiihl beyond Metaphysics
The second aspect of Schleiermacher' s overcoming of metaphysics emphasized
his own metaphysics of contrasts, which overcame the one-sided metaphysics of mutually
exclusive opposites. Schleiermacher achieved this by transforming the opposites into
contrasts that are interdependent and interrelated. This was still one metaphysics
overcoming another. But that was not all. This same overcoming also involves some
elements that reach out beyond metaphysics (chapter 8). These are really meta-
metaphysical elements, or perhaps, the elements of true metaphysics insofar as the
meaning of metaphysics is to "go beyond."
The basic mediating element of all contrasts was self-consciousness. Since that
can only be experienced before any reflection on it takes place, it is a case of experience
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overcoming metaphysics. Self-consciousness overcomes the metaphysical contrasts
insofar as it is the experiential point of conjunction between them. But then, in the
depository of self-consciousness, Schleiermacher also finds several other elements, such
as Gefiihl, the Ubergang, oscillation, the point zero. Precisely these are the elements that
overcome metaphysics as such. The overcoming of metaphysics takes place from within
metaphysics, when the metaphysical contrasts themselves, in their fluctuating
reciprocation, create something like a place-although not really a place, for it does not
exist-that accommodates these elements. All of them are interrelated, but the first and
foremost is self-consciousness in its purest form, best expressed as Gefiihl. It cannot be
associated with anything metaphysical. Gefiihl is the area of the transgression of
metaphysical boundaries (Grenziiberschreitungv.' If it has anything to do with being, the
chief metaphysical category, perhaps the only being it can be associated with is existence
(Dasein), for this kind of self-consciousness cannot exist without a being present who
experiences Gefiihl. In this sense, there is a rationale to the charges that Schleiermacher is
bound to be trapped in a metaphysics of subjectivity. It cannot be denied that for this
reason, Schleiermacher's appeals to an absolute ground, the absolute self-consciousness,
"remain inextricably entwined in metaphysics ... , [in] a metaphysics of subjectivity."!" It
is especially so, when the transcendent ground is only presupposed, and presupposed
through the existential analogy to Gefiihl, Yet, things are not so simple in this case, and I
will return to the issue of subjectivity below.
Beyond Metaphysics on Its Hither Side
Finally, I would like to recapitulate some crucial points in Schleiermacher's
philosophical overcoming of metaphysics. As shown above, the oscillating interaction in
the Ubergang between the contrasts in their interdependency, "the inevitable beginning
from the middle" I I of this interaction, created out of that same "middle" some elusive and
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hardly expressible third entity (das schwer sagbare Dritte)12 that overcomes not only the
metaphysical contrasts, but also metaphysics itself. This overcoming of metaphysics, in
the words of Reuter, shows that
there is [es ... gibt] something third between the contrasts, which does not "exist"
['gibt'] in the same way as something exists [gibt], and which "is" ['ist'] no
definable "third": the event [das Sich-Ereigneni of freedom, called "positing."
The domain of freedom is the mysterious between- "space" [Zwischen, mum']
between the contrasts. 13
In this between-space of the contrasts, metaphysics in its self-positing freedom leaps out
of itself in a strange "salto mortale" that "puts aside" (beiseitegesetzt) its categories and
carries out their "funeral" (Beisetzung) at the same time. 14
To reiterate, in this bordering in-between space, which is not really a space, and is
therefore a quasi-space, then, appears that third hardly expressible entity, which yet needs
to be expressed. How can one do it? The words are only words and express what is
expressible. But words need to be used in order to express something; immediacy must
be mediated if it is to be expressed at all. So, Schleiermacher uses customary words that
express human states, like "feeling" (Gefiihl). Once this word becomes related to what
happens in self-consciousness as the in-between meeting place of the contrasts, it
assumes those same bordering and oscillating qualities.
Moreover, to restate this, since Gefiihl is involved in this transgression of the
contrasts in self-consciousness, it also becomes the mediating "point-zero" where the
human being comes in touch with the transcendent ground or the divine. Only it is not an
ontological contact. It is also never immediate, but always mediated, insofar as not only
the transcendent ground or the divine itself can only be mediated, but also Gefiihl can
only be analogical, symbolic, mirroring representation of that inexpressible "queer
creature" emerging in the in-between quasi-space beyond metaphysics.
Consequently, and this is the point I wanted to emphasize, in both cases, Gefiihl
and the transcendent ground, metaphysics is overcome also from the viewpoint of driving
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concept into metaphor. IS Conceptual, abstract, speculative metaphysics cannot endure if
it is not related to real and live life. In this case, it is metaphor that transforms ontology
into biology, speech about living realities, or into anthropology, speech about living
human realities-realities not really metaphysical, on the contrary, realities that are
physical." So, although Schleiermacher, on the one hand, resists every obvious
anthropomorphism, especially in his dogmatics, on the other hand, anthropomorphism is
unavoidable according to his views. Insofar as thought already consists of words,
thinking the divine will be anthropomorphic in one or another way." Theological
knowledge will always be "mediated and broken"; God will only be expressed as God is
mirrored in human existence-as the presupposition of unity of self-, world-, and God-
consciousness. IS A mirror always remains a mirror, never itself becoming what is
mirrored in it. And this is the case not only with expressing the divine, but also with
Gefiihl, and, for that matter, with every materialization of any idea of pure reason. 19
Schleiermacher's view of the anthropomorphic constitution of language itself, although
entailing a kind of metaphysics of subjectivity, ultimately prohibits metaphysics in the
traditional sense. In fact, this constitution of language makes it the carrier beyond
metaphysics, only beyond not on its other, but the hither side, maybe indeed the
subjective, hither side of metaphysics.
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CHAPTER 12
DOGMATIC THEOLOGY OVERCOMES METAPHYSICS
The Impossibility of Overcoming
Before assessing how Schleiennacher's dogmatic theology overcomes
metaphysics, I would also like to point out some problems inherent in this overcoming.
Although I could omit enumerating the problems and the instances of implicit
metaphysics within the thought of Schleiennacher that intends to overcome it, I feel the
need to include such a discussion in this separate section. The context of this whole work
requires it, because it basically deals with the problems, possibilities, and impossibilities
of overcoming metaphysics. I only want to make clear once more that this section should
not be understood polemically, as showing Schleiermacher's failure, but rather as
reaffirming Schleiermacher's own insight. As noted several times above, Schleiermacher
is not naive in this regard, but knows perfectly well himself that there will always be
implicit or explicit metaphysical elements in every overcoming. After all, there will
always be some principles of knowledge involved; also, language as such is bound to
betray the overcoming that can only be expressed in language, and so forth. But this
endurance of metaphysics never stopped thinkers like Schleiennacher from attempting to
overcome it. There are ways out as well. And that is the point of this work-metaphysical
insideoutness-there are ways out from within, the ways out of metaphysics while
remaining inside.
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Dogmatics: "Closed" or "Public" Theology?
To review, one of the basic claims of Schleiermacher' s Introduction to the
Glaubenslehre was to establish the status of dogmatic theology as a separate discipline,
executed according to its own peculiar principles. To use today's terminology, one could
say that this theology works within an autonomous "language game," independent from
other disciplines and thus exempted from entering in a public discourse to justify its truth
claims.' Then, Schleiermacher put a special emphasis on the inadequacy of speculation
for dogmatics. His advice for the church was to examine its dogmatic statements to purge
the dogmatic propositions proper from the layers of speculation accumulated upon them
during the long centuries of the misguided coexistence of theology and philosophy.
But, as has been seen, that is not the whole story. This seemingly closed discipline
is also intended to be a "positive" science-similar to such sciences as biology and
chemistry-only having its own peculiar datum, which is Christian experience.
Moreover, to express itself, the science of dogmatics even affords to use such other
disciplines as ethics, psychology, and, of course, dialectics. As a matter of fact, I would
say that Schleiermacher is actually doing a kind of "public theology.t" This is also
obvious from the section above dealing with reason and revelation. There is no question
that Schleiermacher endeavors to conform theology to the modem epistemological
presuppositions, requiring natural, scientific explanations for religious phenomena.
Schleiermacher's great achievement, his experiential theology, likewise emerges from his
urge to do theology in a "public" way, namely, to create a "positive" theology also in the
sense that it would address his contemporaries in terms of the prevalent presumptions of
the day, in this case, those requiring the experiential verification of scientific proposals.
His attempt to ground theological statements in the givenness of experience or Gefiihl,
that is, outside reason, which has lost its stakes owing to critical philosophy, is
exceptional. His theory of Gefiihl, indeed, established bond between theology and the
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science of his day? Schleiermacher is a pioneer in this regard, and the epithet of "father
of modem theology" is fully merited.
Certainly, the use of the modem metaphysical principle of the experiential
givenness in founding the dogmatic system can be questioned from a theological
perspective. Already Hegel pointed out the formalism, relativity, capriciousness,
contradictoriness, ambiguity, and plurality of feelings that, therefore, cannot form an
adequate experiential basis for knowledge." Yet, Hegel seems to have misunderstood
what Schleiennacher meant by Gefiihl. He did not mean contingent and always changing
emotional feelings, but Gefuhl, the immutable, immediate self-consciousness,
constituting the basis for other functions of human spirit, such as knowing and doing.
Speculati ve or Empirical Theory of Gefiihl?
To recapitulate another discussion from the previous chapter, according to
Schleiermacher, the proper propositions of dogmatics are different from the poetical and
rhetorical forms of religious language. The descriptively didactic dogmatic propositions
are strictly reflective and, therefore, can belong to theoretical speculation.
Schleiermacher's astute solution in this dangerous situation was to specify that while the
dogmatic propositions are formally speculative, materially they are dogmatic inasmuch as
they are derived from reflection upon the religious Gefiihl. Moreover, in this way,
dogmatic propositions become truly speculative in Schleiermacher's own understanding
of the right speculation, that is, the one that includes the empirical element. However,
there is a different dilemma. Schleiermacher's central assumption about the Gefiihl of
absolute dependence, to which he relates the dogmatic propositions, ultimately, itself may
tum out to be a speculative presupposition. Schleiermacher's generalization of
religiousness as the Gefiihl of absolute dependence and its placement at the basis of his
dogmatic system may, in fact, be a speculative procedure since it entails certain
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metaphysical claims. As Curran also argues, "in establishing a concept of Gefiihl and
schlechthinniges Abhiingigkeitsgefiihl as the bedrock of Christian theology, it [the
Glaubenslehre] takes a speculative, not an empirical stance.' The proposition of
immediate self-consciousness itself becomes the new basic metaphysical axiom. In this
sense, despite its claims of communality and inter-subjectivity, Schleiermacher's
approach presents a case of metaphysics of subjectivity."
I would also like to add that Schleiermacher himself would want to see the
theoretical basis of the Glaubenslehre to be consistent with that of the Dialektik. His own
philosophy has inevitable influence on the Glaubenslehre. I already noted the congruity
of the accounts of Gefiihl in both works. Ultimately, the idea of God's causation in
Schleiermacher's nonmetaphysical modification as the Gefiihl of dependence on its
"whence" is similar to the idea of God as the transcendental ground of being. It is
plausible that Schleiermacher came to emphasize the Gefiihl of dependence in religious
experience chiefly for the reason that it enabled him to derive a theological doctrine that
was congenial to his metaphysical theory.' It is still metaphysics influencing dogmatics,
even if Schleiermacher's own metaphysics.
Readers of the Introduction to the Glaubenslehre will be reminded of
Schleiermacher's attempt to elude all possible charges of the influence of metaphysics on
dogmatics, denying that dogmatics itself is in any way based on the theoretical
foundation of the Introduction-the principal place in which the metaphysics is not only
dealt with, but also discerned. But I would question this claim, because it is absolutely
certain that the Gefiihl of dependence is the point to which the dogmatic propositions of
the main body of the Glaubenslehre, must measure up.
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Speculation Tamed?
As it was seen throughout the previous chapter, Schleiermacher does not abandon
philosophy and speculation altogether in the same Introduction that prohibits it in
principle. Indeed, even the fact that Schleiermacher so emphatically stresses the
distinction between the methods of philosophical speculation and dogmatics only makes
one alert to a formidable complication, and, as Ebeling aptly notes, "only shows how
difficult it is to make this distinction in actual practice.:"
One of the most problematic points is Schleiermacher's claim of the innocent use
of speculation. One may start, for example, with questioning Schleiermacher's reference
to the "golden age" of primordial Christianity, in which the influence of speculation was
zero. As Pannenberg, for instance, indicates, in proclaiming the one God, Christianity
appealed almost from the start to philosophy, at the very least, in the forms of Stoicism
and Platonism, and to its criticism of the polytheistic beliefs of other peoples. In
Pannenberg's opinion, this appeal cannot be interpreted externally as an accommodation
to Hellenism, but it reflects the condition for the possibility that non-Jews might come to
believe in the God of Israel as the universal God. Therefore, Pannenberg concludes that
the connection between Christian faith and Hellenistic thought in general-and
the connection between the God of the Bible and the God of the philosophers in
particular-does not represent a foreign infiltration into the original Christian
message, but rather belongs to its very foundations.9
Of course, these statements do not exclude the subjugation of metaphysics to the aims of
Christian experience. Yet, I doubt that it is sufficient for the claim that the influence of
speculation was zero. Is the fact of Christian "domestication" of metaphysics sufficient
for its influence to be terminated?
Similar doubts could be raised against Schleierrnacher's allegedly "innocent" use
of dialectics in its ancient sense. In fact, it was Hegel who already noticed that
Schleiermacher's use of dialectical arguments commits him to tacit positive claims of his
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own about the office of reason and rationality. As Crouter reminds us, Schleiermacher
"too uses reason systematically and constructively, even when he describes this use in his
theology as merely didactic or rhetorical.,,1Q
I would also like to return to Schleiermacher's claim that the same proposition
can convey a speculative meaning in philosophical context, whereas in religious context
its meaning may well be dogmatic. I would repeat that it seems highly dubitable that the
old meanings of the terms of speculative philosophy could be so easily abandoned and
replaced by new ones. How can one determine the clear-cut difference? How can one be
sure that the speculative content is not transferred to the religious usage? Referring to the
Open Letters, it is a question whether Schleiermacher's argument with Fries regarding
the status of theological language can be so easily resolved in Schleiermacher's favor.
Notwithstanding Schleiermacher's timely idea of Christianity as a "language forming
principle," the question is whether it is possible at all to "cut off' the old metaphysical
meanings of theological terminology.
There are theologians like Paul Tillich who do not trunk so. I think that
Schleiermacher would agree with the following, even if he would go further and claim
that the old meanings can be cut off. Tillich starts with reference to non-metaphysical
philosophy and observes that those who most confidently proclaim the demise of
metaphysics usually propose just another variant instead. So, he mentions the pragmatic-
naturalistic line of that philosophical strand which, in spite of its anti-metaphysical
statements, expresses itself in definite ontological terms, such as, life, growth, process,
experience, being. I I Even more important, shifting the focus to the alleged
metaphysically neutral biblical theology, Tillich indicates that even throughout the pages
of the Bible, as in any other religious text, the categories and concepts of the structure of
experience can easily be discerned: time, space, cause, thing, subject, nature, movement,
freedom, necessity, life, value, knowledge, experience, being, non-being. Even the
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ordinary everyday language is not free from these categories, for their philosophical
understanding has influenced it for centuries. 12These remarks also apply to
Schleiermacher's dogmatics. But I would say that it is not a question of cutting off the
old meanings. They can be acknowledged for what they are, and then their potential that
transgresses metaphysics may be sought. Both moments are indispensable: the
affirmation and negation of metaphysics, and Schleiermacher himself proclaims that. As
Tillich again writes, most likely influenced by such texts of Schleiermacher as his letter
to Jacobi: "To live serenely and courageously in these tensions and to discover finally
their ultimate unity in the depths of our own souls and in the depths of the divine life is
the task and the dignity of human thought.,,13
The Metaphysical Encroachment of Dogmatics
Even a bigger problem is Schleiermacher's requirement for dogmatics, in figuring
out the relationship of religious Gefiihl to its object of reference, to encroach upon the
subject matters of psychology, ethics, and, yes, metaphysics itself. For one thing, ethics,
in Schleiermacher's understanding, is a science that gives speculative presentation of
reason in all of its effects. 14For another thing, this move appears to give the "green light"
to metaphysics, even if it is a restricted metaphysics, which is not allowed to declare a
separation between God and the world, a contrast between good and evil, or the
distinction between the spiritual and the sensible in human nature. Although certain
metaphysical schemes may be excluded, it is only in favor to the more appropriate
ones?" By the way, pantheistic philosophy, under these requirements, would also be an
appropriate candidate.
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Metaphysical Nature of Dogmatic Propositions
Likewise, Schleiermacher's determination of the three forms of dogmatic
propositions used in his system is no less problematic. To review, Schleiermacher's range
of the dogmatic propositions comprise the descriptions of the human states, assertions
about the constitution of the world, and the conceptions of the divine attributes and
modes of action. The latter two, to a certain extent, are determined to be propositions of
speculative kind. In order to domesticate them, Schleiermacher attempts to put them
under the mastery of the descriptions of the human states. But can they really provide
such a stable criterion? The background permanence of Gefiihl may be one thing. But the
human states can also be contingent and contradictory, as I have already mentioned in
connection to Hegel's critique of Schleiermacher.
Moreover, where is the guarantee that this control will work? In fact, I would
question if Schleiermacher's dogmatic statements regarding God can be free of any
metaphysical assumptions. In any case, it is not unreasonable to be convinced with
Brandt that Schleiermacher's view of religion as based in the Gefiihl of absolute
dependence does "not rest merely upon empirical analysis of historical religion but upon
the basis of his metaphysics, according to which God is the "source" of all finite being." 16
Very much like the God of metaphysics, it is the absolute undivided unity, the ineffable,
and the absolute causality. 17 God, for Schleiermacher, is always the unconditioned and
the absolutely simple. Even the claim that the attributes of God refer only to human states
is a metaphysical claim.18 Schleiermacher's avowal that it is only a semblance of
metaphysics may not solve the problem of overcoming.
To enlarge upon this issue, one can go as far as to question whether the God that
the Glaubenslehre represents can at all be "the God of faith," or is it rather "the God of
philosophy"? Indeed, this God does not seem to have anything to do with the personal
and individual Christian God. Although Schleiermacher acknowledges the inevitability of
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anthropomorphism in the Dialektik, it does not appear in the Glaubenslehre. The
"whence" of the religious self-consciousness appears, as Fliickiger says, "impersonal"
and "indifferent.,,19 The idea of God becomes absorbed by the metaphysical idea of
totality. This God "is the unity, the absolute ofthe totality, the complete generality ...
This God is not the God of faith, but rather a God of definition, intellect, speculation.v'"
There is also a related question as to whether Schleiermacher's analysis of the
human states in the Glaubenslehre has, as he claims, purely empirical basis. The theory
of the Gefiihl of dependence may be perceived as "ontological analysis of the inner
depths of the human being."Zl The suspicion that the concept of religious Gefiihl is "a
pure ontological construction" is not completely without reason because its object is also
identical with the unity of being?Z Moreover, Schleiermacher himself avows that the
Gefiihl of absolute dependence is only postulated, but not realized, self-consciousness.r'
Therefore, it can hardly be considered empirical-psychological fact?4 Just the opposite, it
is an instance of the classical tripartite metaphysica specialis, that is, a psychologia
rationalis. Even if it is not exactly metaphysics in the classical sense, it is a case of
Christian theology itself producing metaphysical implications of its own.
It leads once more to suspicion regarding successful separation of metaphysics
and dogmatics, for Schleiermacher himself does not even acknowledge that his own
philosophy could have its bearings on the Glaubenslehre. I think it is quite reasonable to
suggest that the Glaubenslehre could only have benefited if Schleiermacher had applied
to it his dialectical rule of complementing the empirical with the speculative. Since he did
not, the Gefiihl of absolute dependence, so related to the Gefuhl of the Dialektik, may
appear as being "cut off from the essence of immediate self-consciousness like a caput
mortum."Z5 The above discussed complementarity of the Dialektik and the
Glaubenslehre, so useful for better understanding both works, remains useless when
334
Schleiermacher himself, trying to remain consistent with his claim to avoid speculation in
the Glaubenslehre, does not acknowledge and does not allow their reciprocal influence.
The Dogmatic Futility of Speculative Function?
Schleiermacher's corollary evaluation of speculation as the highest objective
function of human spirit, but Frommigkeit, as its highest subjective function, may be
most problematic if it is used to clarify the relationship of metaphysics and theology. I
have already pointed out the confusion between the conceptual clarification of the
problem of the metaphysics-theology relationship and the phenomenological analysis of
the functions of consciousness. This categorical mistake occurs frequently in different
texts of Schleiermacher. A peaceful and complementary coexistence of religion and
philosophy is affirmed on one level while their relationship is rejected on the other. That
is to say, on the level of consciousness, there is agreement, even indispensability, while
there is incompatibility on the level of theoretical appropriation of philosophy in
dogmatics.
Furthermore, both elements are required for the fullness of human being. Then,
some people may lack one or another (or, perhaps, both?), and hence, be somewhat
inferior in their development in terms of reaching the full potential of humanity.
Accordingly, some may be "dry," theoretical thinkers who "empty the cup of
speculation" without any devout affections and, therefore, lack something essential. On
the other hand, others may be exemplary Christians in Friimmigkeit without the faculty of
speculative thinking, and likewise lack something essential. Be that as it may, the point is
that, according to Schleiermacher's division, dogmaticians must be perfectly developed
in both speculation and Friimmigkeit. One may ask, why so, if the fruits of speculation
can not be used in dogmatics? Does it not then cause a dilemma for a dogmatician? To
defend Schleiermacher, one could contend that the speculative-religious structure of
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human spirit and the independence of dogmatics are two different things after all. And I
think that they indeed are different. But if there is no relation, if they are different, why
does Schleiermacher bring this discussion in everywhere he considers the relationship of
theology and philosophy?
It is also worth noting that the theoretical ban on speculation appears exclusively
in the Glaubenslehre. It is important to note that in the other texts examined above,
Schleiermacher deals with the problem of the relationship of these disciplines on the
phenomenological level only. Thus, the idea of the complementarity of the two functions
of consciousness reappear under the idea of the "prince of the church" in the Brief
Outline. But the radical separation between dogmatics and speculation does not emerge
there at all. Philosophical theology, with its conceptual and critical foundations, has an
essential role in all fields of theology, including historical theology. Inasmuch as the
Glaubenslehre represents historical theology that reinterprets the idea of Christianity for
Schleiermacher's time, philosophical theology takes part there as well. And it is quite
obvious from the Introduction. The Glaubenslehre also presents the essence of
Christianity as a distinctive mode of faith, which is the first task of philosophical
theology.
The Speeches show a similar pattern. Schleiermacher puts speculation and
Friimmigkeit in different regions of the human spirit. Speculation as thinking, ethics as
acting, and religion as intuition (Anschauung) and Gefiihl, are three completely
autonomous and equal spheres of human existence. In no way can the elements of these
separate spheres be intermingled. Yet, they must complement each other and cannot
subsist separately.
In the same way, the Jacobibrieftreats the philosophy-religion relationship
problem only on the level of consciousness. There is neither a conflict nor a convergence
between these two functions; only a perfect balance on the borderline between the
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undecided back and forth movements from them. They both are necessary for the
richness of life. His analogy of grasping the Adams, in a way resembles the rational-
suprarational and natural-supernatural discussion of the Introduction insofar as his "real
supernaturalism" emerges again here. However, in this opaque fragment, he seems to
invoke some third capacity of human spirit, the capacity that slumbers "in the deepest
depths of the nature of human being or soul" (in den tiefsten Tiefen der Natur der Seele)
and encompasses both Gefiihl and reason (Verstand), Frommigkeit and speculation. I
believe that this third element refers to the same overarching faculty presented in the
Dialektik and in the Glaubenslehre, the faculty that cannot be named, therefore only
provisionally called the immediate self-consciousness or Gefiihl, despite the fact that it
surpasses Gefiihl itself.26 Perhaps it could be the conducting fluid of Schleiermacher's
"galvanic battery"?
The Relationship of the Introduction to the Glaubenslehre Itself
In discussing the Glaubenslehre, I put the main emphasis on its Introduction. It is
a part of Schleiermacher's main dogmatic book. Nevertheless, strange as it is, the status
of the Introduction in regard to the main body of the work itself needs to be clarified.
This issue is by no means simple. But it is very important for this work, for it also
concerns the problem of the relationship of metaphysics and theology. On the one hand,
Schleiermacher strictly determines the preliminary status of the Introduction in regard to
the dogmatics itself. He explains that since the preparatory process of defining the
methods and tasks of the science of dogmatics cannot belong to the science itself, none of
the Introduction's propositions have a dogmatic character.r" So, the Introduction does not
properly belong to dogmatics. In this way, Schleiermacher swiftly escapes the critiques
that accuse his dogmatics of falling prey to the philosophical presuppositions
incompatible with the Christian beliefs.
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On the other hand, it is obvious that this same maneuver implies Schleiermacher's
acknowledgement that the Introduction is a prolegomenon, and as such belongs to
fundamental philosophical theology providing the principles of the science of dogmatics.
From this perspective, it can never be unrelated to the main dogmatic text. As Curran
points out, "apparently a Glaubenslehre cannot be written at all until philosophical
theology has made the Procrustean bed into which it will fit.,,28Although that is true, I
myself would not necessarily share the skeptical attitude of the quotation. In fact, the
relationship of the Introduction to the body of the Glaubenslehre exemplifies just another
instance of Schleiermacher's understanding of the complementarity of speculation and
empiricism. He appears to hold this conviction, but without explicitly acknowledging it in
the Glaubenslehre. The formal, theoretical schema of the Introduction "without the
historical-empirical body is empty and dead and in tum the historical-empirical body
would disintegrate into chaotic multiplicity without the introduction of schematic
order. .. schemata and data delimit each other in testing each other. .. ,,29
The Dogmatic Fulfillment of the Principles Stated in the Introduction
I would like to stop for a moment to examine whether Schleiermacher has
unfailingly carried through the principles of the Introduction into the dogmatics proper.
The limits of my work cannot allow a detailed analysis of the text; I have to restrict it to a
few observations in this subsection.
In the first place, it should be appreciated that Schleiermacher indeed makes a
great effort to keep his promise of restricting his dialectic to the ancient usage. Most of
the book consists of Schleiermacher' s polemical arguments that, indeed, are masterpieces
in dialectics, showing the inconsistencies and contradictions of certain doctrines of the
church or teachings of theologians without recourse to speculative arguments. It is a non-
metaphysical dialectics. I even think another element that adds to that is Schleiermacher's
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irony. It is so entertaining to see how subtly he lampoons many traditional beliefs of both
the church and the academy of his day. Thus, his non-metaphysical dialectics in the
dogmatics even has some mark of sophistry when he points out the contradictions in
these beliefs.
On the other hand, I would like to contend that Schleiermacher's main postulate
in the dogmatic body of the Glaubenslehre has a metaphysical basis. That is, his whole
demonstration rests on a modified ontological argument, the most speculative argument.l"
The constant reference to religious experience only covers the latter. Simplifying to the
extreme, one could say that Schleiermacher uses the same pattern throughout the whole
treatise. He starts with the Gefiihl of absolute dependence as an indispensable Christian
experience. Then, he stipulates that all dogmatic propositions must conform to this
experience. But, in fact-and this, in my opinion, is the point that undermines
Schleiermacher's whole attempt of overcoming speculation in dogmatics-this specific
experience of the Gefiihl of absolute dependence can only take place if God is conceived
as aliquid quo maius nihil cogitari pate st. Only then can God be the whence of the
absolute dependence. The religious Gefiihl presupposes such a God. It is the condition of
possibility of the Gefiihl of dependence. Subsequently, Schleiermacher just uses his
dialectics in the doctrinal construction in order to arrive at the optimally consistent
dogmatic propositions expressing the ultimacy of the divine as it is experienced in the
religious Gefiihl. Every dogmatic proposition in which a trace of contradiction in this
regard can be shown must be discarded, since one's trust cannot be put in such a deity.
Contradictions belong to metaphysics that has nothing to do with religious experience.
Despite that, I think that precisely here all the metaphysical presuppositions about the
divine reenter: unity, simplicity, causality, and so forth. Principally Schleiermacher's
approach differs from Anselm's. Schleiermacher should reject the possibility of moving
from concept to reality, and require just the opposite." But it is so difficult to carry this
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intention through. It is a question of primacy, i.e., the primacy of either Gefiihl or
knowing. It is not so easy to establish the primacy of experience over concept. I believe
that experience cannot be independent of knowing. Or, to be more precise, both knowing
and experience are mutually necessary and interrelated. Theoretical beliefs shape every
concrete religious practice, and vice versa. Neither can be primary, but both are
complementary. Schleiermacher claims to arrive at dogmatic propositions via reflection
on experiencing the Gefiihl of dependence. I would ask, instead, whether there can be
such a religious experience without prior conceptual beliefs about, and knowledge of,
God?
This difficulty also affects Schleiermacher's own theoretical treatment of the
divine attributes. First, he indicates that in no way does his treatment of the attributes
express the being of God in se. Yet, he must admit that all the divine attributes to be dealt
with in dogmatics must go back to the divine causality, "since they are only meant to
explain the Gefiihl of absolute dependence.Y' To be sure, it is a qualified view of the
divine causality, that is to say, causality referring to the relationship between the human
and the divine; it is a relational causality. Could it be that Schleiermacher's operating
with the concept of causality leads back into metaphysics with its idea of God as prima
causa? Can Schleiermacher withstand the dangers from this quarter by holding on to the
situation of the experience of absolute causality instead of the idea of analogy, as Ebeling
suggests'r" Or, is it rather the case that Schleiermacher lets his treatment of the divine
attributes, beginning, to be sure, with the experience of absolute dependence, be shaped
by the philosophical, speculative tradition?34 As Ogden aptly remarks, the situation of
experience of absolute causality cannot so easily be played off against the idea of
analogy, since it is the latter idea that construes the character of that experience"
Furthermore, Ogden may be right that the concept of absolute causality has its history,
which can possibly be traced back to the combination of both emotion and immanence.
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The notion of absolute causality as an idea of interpreting das Woher of the experience of
absolute dependence, accordingly, can be arrived at only in juxtaposing a basic concept
and a qualifier, that is, by simultaneously saying that God is the absolute cause and at the
same time is the cause in some sense ("the whence" of the absolute dependence).
Schleiermacher's interpreting this "whence," as Ogden suggests, may thus be traced back
to the philosophical, speculative tradition.36
Harvey, in his tum, maintains that it is Schleiermacher's violation of his own
methodological principle to rule out speculation that creates incompatibility between the
two sets of God's attributes, namely, between those abstracted from the Gefiihl of
absolute dependence (eternity, omnipresence, omnipotence, omniscience) and those from
the Christian consciousness of redemption (love and wisdomj.I' Harvey also thinks that
Schleiermacher cannot escape speculative metaphysics when assuming uncritically the
idea of God as the unconditioned origin of beingr" Precisely Schleiermacher's own
principles go against themselves by not allowing the Gefiihl of dependence to tell
anything about God in se, but only about the contingency of human being. Therefore, the
idea of God cannot but have a speculative basis. Likewise, the idea of creation cannot be
related to immediate self-consciousness, "since nothing in our self-consciousness has to
do with a past creation of the world.,,39
Thus, the investigation as to the consistency of the Introduction with the main text
renders the same verity: despite Schleiermacher's promises, there remain certain more or
less explicit metaphysical elements, especially in the first part of the dogmatics itself.
Once again, this result is inevitable insofar as Schleiermacher carries out his restricted
use of speculation in the system. The problem lies in the impossibility of keeping the
beast of metaphysics tamed within the walls of the cage determined by Schleiermacher.
The old metaphysical meanings will inevitably break through.
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Dogmatics Overcoming Metaphysics
As I ascertained earlier, the issues of the previous section by no means invalidate
Schleiermacher's accomplishments of overcoming metaphysics in dogmatic theology.
His dogmatics itself is overcoming metaphysics; it is supposed to be non-metaphysical.
Although Schleiermacher uses philosophical categories there, it is only in order "to
interpret the piety of Christian faith, not to establish it.,,4oDialectical interpreting is
different from metaphysical establishing. The similar non-foundational legacy of the
Dialektik is also applicable to the Glaubenslehre. But that is not all. There are other
perspectives from which Schleiermacher's dogmatics may be considered non-
metaphysical. I present some instances below, although they may not be exhaustive. I
start with Schleiermacher's nonmetaphysical doctrine of God, but then continue with
some expositions, on the way making Schleiermacher contemporary, which will
culminate in the concluding remarks of the dissertation. While those will deal with
today's philosophical context, the expositions in this chapter prepare their way in the
sense that they put Schleiermacher within the context somewhere in-between his own
time and today. I think that with the help of additional research it would also be possible
to interpret Schleiermacher's dogmatics in the light of such overcomings of metaphysics
as existentialism and pragmatism. The Gefiihl of absolute dependence is existential
occurrence. In the letters to LUcke, Schleiermacher denotes religious Gefiihl "the original
expression of an immediate existential relationship" (unmittelbares
Existentialverhiiltnisy." I have already pointed out the pragmatic motives in the
Dialektik. Similarly, the task of dogmatics as positive science, according to the Brief
Outline, is purely practical. Schleierrnacher's dogmatic theology is also defined not
through its ontological object, but through its function.Y Here, however, I will consider
more closely only Schleiermacher's phenomenological overcoming of metaphysics.
342
Nonmetaphysical Doctrine of God
Since Schleiermacher intends his dogmatics to be the expression of the Gefiihl of
absolute dependence, it overcomes traditional metaphysical theology. So, while the latter
strives toward ever better conceptual knowing of God, for Schleiermacher, Gefiihl does
not belong to the realm of knowledge and, consequently, does not produce any proper
concept of God.43 Instead of that, Schleiermacher gives phenomenological description of
the reaction to the idea of God in the consciousness of the believer. Hence, contrary to
speculative natural theology, Schleiermacher's dogmatics overcomes the dualism
between God hidden and God revealed, God's being and God's act." Schleiermacher's
interpretation of God's attributes, accordingly, are not like those of the essentialist natural
theology. The dualism of the latter subordinates the worldly and historically determined
elements to abstract speculation about God.45 Schleiermacher does not derive the
concrete from the abstract, but reverses this usurpation of metaphysics upon dogmatics.
However, it is not a question of primacy. If the doctrine of God began with religious
apriori, it would appear to be an instance of natural theology, whether it is derived from
Christian religious consciousness or not. The historically determined elements would
appear to be particular instantiations of the abstract generic scheme, and
Schleiermacher's principle of positivity would be violated. On the other hand, the priority
of the concrete would only appear as intraecclesial fidei sm. To repeat, both historical and
universal elements complement each other in Schleiermacher's theology. The same with
the God hidden and God revealed. God's hiddenness to Schleiermacher is not so much
abstract transcendence as a phenomenological limiting feature of God's self-disclosure.
The hidden God is a primary feature of "what appears" as God revealed. Consequently,
God's hiddenness is experienced and is co-constitutive of the divine attributes.t? In any
case, it is not a complete reversal, but the coincidence of the contrasts in these cases as
well.
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Dogmatics As Empiricism Overcomes Metaphysics
Schleiermacher is most famous for his empiricism in dogmatic theology. It is an
instance of the empiricist principle of overcoming metaphysics, which, instead of asking
metaphysically about some object of inquiry (being, God, etc.), approaches it from an
indirect, non-metaphysical viewpoint of how it is presented in experience. In
Schleiermacher's view, dogmatics, being derived from concrete religious experience, is
independent of metaphysical speculations. Being a "positive" science and, thus, having
its objective datum like all other positive sciences have their data, it cannot be more
dependent on metaphysics than such positive sciences as chemistry or physics.47
Dogmatics just describes and systematizes the given facts of religious Gefiihl in its
particular Christian historical manifestations. It could be called the science of
"Christianness" (Christlichkeit), a term invented by the nineteenth-century church
historian and friend of Nietzsche, Franz Overbeck, and taken over in the twentieth-
century by Heidegger, who, strikingly, in his early lecture "Phenomenology and
Theology" also considers theology as a positive, historical science that is absolutely
different from philosophy." Christianness is that which specifies the essence of
Christianity, which is
a faithful way of being in the world, which arises in response to what is revealed
in the event of faith itself. .. Theology arises when faith and that which is
disclosed from within it are thematized and taken as objects (Gegenstanden).
Christianness, the positum of theology as a positive science, is believing existence
in its relationship to what is believed in.49
Theology then is theoretical description of the empirical datum of Christianness, and as
such it overcomes metaphysics. If this theology can be considered speculative, then it is
only in Schleiermacher's own understanding of the right speculation based in Empirie.
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Dogmatics As Phenomenology Overcomes Metaphysics
I have already clarified Schleiermacher's stance regarding the complementarity of
empiricism and rationality in the discussions about Schleiermacher's understanding of
speculation and his relationship to Kant. This same stance emerges in his theology, as
well. Reformulated theologically, it is, once more, the relationship between immanent
natural and abstract speculative theologies. He finds the way to sail between these Scylla
and Charybdis, and this way is precisely phenomenological. "He can now boldly interpret
the meaning of religions not propositionally but from their phenomenological point of
origin."so The immediate self-consciousness becomes a locus of the divine immanence, at
least to a certain extent. But dogmatics then reflects on the data of this consciousness.
There are several aspects of phenomenology to which Schleiermacher could be a
precursor owing to his dogmatic theology" The starting point of phenomenology, in
Husserl's understanding, is in pretheoretical, prereflective intentionality, and its method
is intentional analysis. Such analysis investigates the intended object (noema) and the
consciousness-act through which the object is given and intended (noesis). It is important
in this analysis that the consciousness-act and its intentional object follow the kind of act-
object under concrete consideration. For this reason, phenomenological method is
different if applied to different subject-matters, including religion, which is
Schleiermacher's field of phenomenological application. And it is noteworthy that as
early as the 1930s Schleiermacher was considered to have prepared the way to modem
phenomenology in his dogmatics. As Wobbermin believes, in his theory of Gefiihl,
noema and noesis-the content and the act of thought-"are correlated, they mutually
supplement and determine each other."s2
Another closely related feature of the phenomenological method, as I explained in
the first part, is phenomenological reduction, the suspension of all judgments, theories,
and presuppositions, especially naive or dogmatic ones, that obstruct direct seeing of
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phenomena. That is the way to things themselves, prior to theories and anticipations. In
Schleiermacher's dogmatics, likewise, direct phenomenological description precedes
objectifying metaphysical formulation. As Williams-a Schleiermacher scholar who
mostly works in the field of phenomenological appropriation of the Glaubenslehre-
notes, predication and language about God cannot take place without a prior grasp of
"religious experience through which God is given to consciousness in an original way.,,53
In order to properly understand theological assertions, one must understand their
pretheoretical foundations in religious experience, that is, both the object as it
originally gives itself to consciousness, and the modes of consciousness
correlative to its self-givenness.i"
Consequently, Schleiermacher overcomes metaphysics by bringing it under the control of
the phenomenologically given.
Husserl's later version of the return to the things themselves is the
acknowledgment of the preconsciously and pretheoretically experienced "life-world"
(Lebenswelt). By means of phenomenological reduction, the meanings of the life-world
are not theoretically explained, as in science and philosophy, but are instead described as
transcendental eidetic structures of lived experience. Thus, phenomenological reduction
is not transcendental in either an a-historical or a-temporal metaphysical sense. Probably
also implying a defense of Husserlian phenomenology against the critiques
(Heideggerian, et aJ.) of his supposed a-historicism, Williams points out that concrete
life-world presumes history and temporality that dissolves "all absolutistic, a-historical,
dogmatic philosophizing. ,,55
At the very least, Schleiermacher's assignment of the locus of religion to Gefiihl,
or immediate self-consciousness, and his interpretation of religion as a concrete historical
and social phenomenon breaks the metaphysical tradition of Cartesian idealism in the
same way as Husserl's phenomenology.l" Like Husserl's project, "Schleiermacher's
"turn to the subject" is a summons back to the things themselves, a return to
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pretheoreticallived experience, and a corresponding approach to theology through the
intentionality of corporate religious consciousness.t''" Gefiihl may well be conceived as
Husserl's originary, pretheoretical mode of world-comprehension, but with the depth
dimension double intentional structure of the life-world and the transcendent "whence.v "
Theology and Metaphysics
Although the issue of Schleiermacher's position with regard to the relationship
between theology and philosophy, between dogmatics and speculation, is present in most
of this chapter, now I would like to concentrate specifically on this "central problem of
Schleiermacher-interpretation.T" And central not only in interpreting Schleiermacher's
thought in general, but especially in interpreting his overcoming of metaphysics. To be
sure, no straightforward answer can be given about his position. As has been seen,
besides the unwanted reappearance of metaphysics here and there, Schleiennacher's
"No" to the question of retaining speculation in dogmatics was partly undone by
accepting metaphysics in a certain way and form. When Schleiermacher proposes
independence of dogmatics from philosophy, the only certain thing it means is the
independence from some particular philosophical system or philosopher. But, dogmatics
learns its dialectical method of connecting thoughts, its discursive intelligibility as a
science, etc., from philosophy. Philosophy lends to dogmatics its tools of universal
articulation. In any case, Schleiermacher takes great pains to render the use of
philosophical speculations in the Glaubenslehre as harmless as possible by impoverishing
or neutralizing them to a technical utilization, or subduing them to the dogmatic
principle, and so forth. But it is clear that he is unquestionably aware that it is impossible
to evade them. Schleiermacher himself "knows full well that a rejection of metaphysics is
itself a strange and inconsistent form of metaphysics.t''" Even the fact that
Schleiermacher has to stress so emphatically the distinction between philosophical and
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dogmatic methods only shows how difficult it is to make this distinction in actual
practice." By the same token, the assertion of the independence from philosophy actually
establishes just the opposite. One "must know what philosophy thinks it is and thinks it
will become" even in achieving the aim of disentangling theology from it.62The
distinction itself implies relation. And here Schleiermacher follows the great theological
tradition of the Middle Ages, which similarly reacted to the skepticism of the new secular
philosophical freedom by exercising expertise in the very modes of thought from which
the Christian religion is supposed to be extricated.I" I agree with Curran's
acknowledgement that the demand to "live in 'two cultures,' in two kingdoms, with two
truths, each fully justified within its own sphere of competence begs the question of how
we are to find their relation.,,64
Anyway, I think that precisely this impossibility of avoiding metaphysics or the
relationship to it is the reason for the aforementioned supposedly neutral uses of
metaphysics. The question is, if there is no need of speculation, why then usher it back
through the rear door as an ancilla of the dogmatic system at all, even in such a limited
way, usus philosophiae instrumentally, as usus organicus'Ti In any event, it is clear that
Schleiermacher's good intentions to forbid speculation in the system of dogmatics are
not, and cannot, be thoroughly realized. Yet, could it be done better under the condition
that the cake of speculation be preserved and eaten at the same time? Schleiermacher did
everything that was possible to such an outstanding mind as his. His "dialectical"
solutions are clever to an eminent degree. His consistency in relating the dogmatic
statements to the Gefiihl of absolute dependence is remarkable even in the face of the
insurmountable difficulties in performing this procedure because of the philosophical
connotations of the language of dogmatics itself. These difficulties are inescapable
inasmuch as Schleiermacher chose to retain speculation in a certain way. Perhaps, he
could somehow escape some of the problems if he had chosen the option to retain only
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the first form of dogmatic propositions. In that case, however, as Schleiermacher himself
noticed, dogmatics would be deprived of any ecclesiastical content, and his main purpose
of addressing the work to the church would be lost. If the doctrines of creation and
preservation, together with the divine attributes, were eliminated, what kind of dogmatics
then it would be?
In any event, it is time to bring together some conclusions about what
Schleiermacher's overall position could be regarding the philosophy-theology
relationship in his magnum opus, as also clarified by the references to his other writings.
Again, it is difficult to give an unequivocal answer, especially given Schleiermacher's
treatment of the problem on the two levels: theoretical and phenomenological. However,
the other texts, which are not primarily dogmatic, show that Schleiermacher, in fact,
derives his theoretical position from the presuppositions of his phenomenology of
consciousness. So, Schleiermacher's overall attitude regarding dogmatics and speculation
is that they do not conflict with each other, with the implication that dogmatic theology
"is both independent from and dependent on speculation.v'" It is some kind of "dependent
independence.t''" They are originally united despite their permanent difference.f On the
one hand, they are two independent disciplines, irreducible to each other, so different that
they cannot even either oppose or contradict each other.69 They freely pursue their
particular goals. But on the other hand, they are also compatible, complementary, and
mutually supporting each other. They are not enemies, but allies and companions. Not
only do they not clash, but they also cannot exist without being in conversation with each
other.
Ultimately, Schleiermacher never chooses either/or between any contrasting
elements, but always holds both/and. Hence, his principle of the complementarity of
contrasts finds its expression also in the contrast of theoretical metaphysics and
empirical, historical, descriptive theology and in the more originary contrast of
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philosophy and religion, or Frommigkeit. Both stand side by side. "The truth resides in
their mutual interpenetration; it is not to be located either merely in the generality of
philosophical studies or in the particularity of specific empirical investigations.v'" What
Sigwart wrote about Schleiermacher in 1857 regarding "duplicity between speculation
and religion," and "undecidability, suspension (Schwebe) between knowledge and faith,"
is as true today." In neither is there the whole truth in a supposedly more adequate form.
Rather, both complement each other, but without equalization.r'
Of course, the complementarity of philosophy and religion is not possible with the
old-style pure speculation. It must be the proper speculation, which Schleiermacher could
not find existing and, therefore, embarked on constructing himself in the Dialektik.73 The
importance of the epistemological presuppositions of the Dialektik for the construction of
the Glaubenslehre cannot be overemphasized, especially as it is not obvious, for the
former was not published in Schleiermacher's lifetime, and, therefore, he could not refer
to it. By all means, Schleiermacher's own philosophical efforts, including his
philosophical theology in the Dialektik, should always be kept in mind. That would help
to avoid many criticisms, such as, for example, Crouter's claim that Schleiermacher's
peace or "contract" between reason and revelation is rhetorical only, for it is based on the
indifference of both sides not coming into contact, whereas philosophy has no right to
think of the transcendent reality." Also, the analogy of the engine moving down two
strictly divided tracks simultaneously, where both are necessary for it to work but must
always remain apart, does not appear to be viable in view of Schleierrnacher's own
theological speculation. Many other examples could be given. But they clearly contradict
Schleierrnacher's last foundation of the Dialektik in the idea of God. At the very least, it
is not correct to say about Schleiermacher that as "theologian, he was not a philosopher,
and as philosopher, he was not a theologian.?"
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Definitely, the outcome may appear confusing from the first glance. David
Friedrich Strauss has pointed out Schleiermacher's betrayal of both philosophy and
theology to each other, which may be considered from the two sides as either "blessed
curse or cursed blessing.t' '" And it is small wonder that Schleiermacher has been the
object of so much scorn, especially from theologians, regarding the seeming
philosophizing of theology.f The influence of many philosophers on Schleiermacher has
been recognized, such as Spinoza, Schelling, Fichte, not to mention Kant. Furthermore,
the influence of philosophy upon Schleiermacher's dogmatic theology is not always
regarded as faulty. Eckert, for example, calls it the "philosophical theology of the Gefiihl
of absolute dependence.v" He considers it a great success of mediation between faith and
reason.79
On the other hand, some accuse Schleiermacher of failing to meet the criteria of
critical scientific rationality not only in his dogmatics, but also in his philosophical
theology, which, being ecclesiastical, does not even raise the critical question of the truth
of Christianity, for example.t'' So, these are two diametrically opposed allegations. It is
also quite understandable that there are such different interpretations concerning the
relationship of theology and philosophy in Schleiermacher's thought. At the very least,
there are three types of interpretation: dependence, independence, and mediation." All of
them have some kernel of truth and find their basis in Schleiermacher's own thought.
The crucial question in all this ambiguity then remains: Why such
Schleiermacher's adamant insistence that speculation be banished from the
Glaubenslehre? The answer is remarkably simple. In the first place, one should always
keep in mind that it is not the question of philosophy and theology in general, but rather
the question of philosophy and dogmatics. Theology and dogmatics are not identical for
Schleiermacher.Y Philosophical theology is also a valid discipline, as Schleiermacher
classified it in the Brief Outline. The term "philosophical theology" itself presupposes the
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use of philosophy in theology. Philosophical theology, according to Schleiermacher, is a
science that examines the permanent essence of Christianity, and does it by philosophical
means. The Introduction to the Glaubenslehre obviously belongs to this science.
Dogmatics, on the other hand, probes the historical expressions of that essence in the
concrete beliefs and practices of the church. Therefore, they cannot be opposed; they are
just different. Knowing this, it is clear that the requirement to separate philosophy and
dogmatics lies in Schleiermacher's conviction concerning the autonomy of these distinct
disciplines: one is theoretical while the other is historically empirical. Moreover, in this
context, the question about the relationship of philosophy and theology somehow
becomes irrelevant. Within the larger system of sciences, it is a question of how any
theoretical science is related to any practical science. It is noteworthy that philosophy is
not the only theoretical science that dogmatics draws upon. The theologian has more
"handmaidens" than one, even though becoming dependent on none of them.83 In a word,
the question of the relationship of philosophy and theology is not central anymore; it is
only a side question within the larger context of the interrelationship of different kinds of
sciences.84
At any rate, all Schleiermacher protests against is the use of one qualitatively
different discipline as a foundation for the other. Speculation is not allowed to determine
dogmatics substantially. It is solely formal, not material, dependence. Although
speculation may regulate the "how" of dogmatics, it is not allowed to decide its "what.,,85
The latter, the content, is under the qualification and authority of the ecclesiastical praxis
alone. And it is not because of the supremacy of the latter, but because of the specificity
of the dogmatic science. Speculation has its role, but it is kept under the control of pre-
metaphysical phenomenological description of the theologically given object of religious
experience and its correlative modes of consciousness.t? Otherwise, his theology is
neither anti-metaphysical nor noncognitive. As Williams maintains, inasmuch as
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Schleiermacher locates theology in prereflective, lived experience, his phenomenological
description of the Gefiihl of absolute dependence "is neither for nor against, but prior to
the objectifying metaphysical enterprise.,,87 I agree with the apt summaries that two
theologians give concerning the whole issue. One is Birkner's:
Schleiermacher's often quoted programmatic explanations of the independence
[of theology from philosophy] does not refer to the whole organism of theological
disciplines, in which to ethics and philosophy of religion appealing philosophical
theology has the function of a grounding discipline, but it rather clarifies his
program of dogmatics: they mark the independence of the contents of the
Christian religion and its presentation in religious speech and teaching from
speculative grounding; however, they expressly presuppose the "accord"
["Zusammenstimmung"] of the philosophical thinking of God and the dogmatic
unfolding of the Christian faith in God.88
The other is Gerrish's:
Schleiermacher's theoretical veto of speculative intrusion into dogmatics should
not be taken as antimetaphysical; nor, on the other side, does his actual use of
speculative categories betray an inconsistency ... it is all a question of
methodological uniformity ... Speculation has its own legitimacy, but it belongs
on the scientific tree at another point than dogmatics. And if the dogmatic
theologians find it useful to appropriate speculative categories, they may do so
only insofar as the content of the categories is determined by their own science,
not by that of the philosophers.t"
I would say in addition that the issue is not so much the relationship of theology
and metaphysics, or theology and philosophy, as Friimmigkeit and speculation. The
theology-metaphysics relationship should be derived from the Frommigkeit-speculation
relationship. According to Schleiermacher, they are two central aspects of human being.
A theologian always works to overcome their opposition, while recognizing, as
Schleiermacher admitted to Jacobi, "that their final reconciliation is something which
forever eludes our grasp.,,90 In much the same way, Schleiermacher "does not expect to
bring the relationship between philosophy and theology "to completion," even while he
strives "to overcome" the dichotomy between them."91 That was also characteristic of
Schleiermacher's own metaphysics of contrasts in the Dialektik. Like in the Ubergang of
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the Dialektik, there appears to be indeterminate, oscillating, suspended complementarity
also between philosophy and dogmatic theology, but in no case one-sided dependence
from one or the other side.92tTItimately, the usual schemes of theology-philosophy
relationship, so often applied to Schleiermacher, do not, in fact, offer suitable clues to his
thought, regardless of whether they are claims of their independence, dependence, or
mutual independence.l" Precisely the confusion itself in this case may be the blessing. As
Curran asserts, exactly this point, namely, Schleiermacher's refusal of any claim to
metaphysical finality, could be the reason for the continuous attractiveness of his
tnought. " And this undecidability is also the reason for the possibility of stepping outside
metaphysics. I turn to it in the following final summary of this part.
Outside of Metaphysics between Theology and Philosophy
The summaries and assessments above recapitulate some points of
Schleiermacher's both not overcoming and overcoming of metaphysics in his dogmatic
theology. As I have repeated several times, there are instances in which metaphysics is
not only present in its legitimate form, but also some old metaphysical elements lurk
behind despite their supposed overcoming. I state once more that pointing out these
instances of more or less implicit metaphysics is not meant to discredit or undermine
Schleiermacher's endeavor. As I have maintained before, the return of metaphysics is
inevitable in every case of its overcoming. There will inevitably be points of return of the
metaphysics that was supposed to be overcome into the metaphysics which is supposed to
overcome. As I tried to show in the general part of this work, this kind of overcoming
metaphysics, where one metaphysics surpasses another, not only always draws from the
resources of the previous metaphysics already containing the seeds of its own
overcoming, but also always replicates in one or another way the elements that yet need
to be overcome. It is an endless game of overcoming in which the principles of the new
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metaphysics are in tum subject to their overcoming with different ones. Schleiermacher's
attempt is no exception from this rule as long as he plays this game, no matter how
successfully he does it. And Schleiermacher himself knows it very well. Therefore, the
instances pointed out of Schleiermacher's not overcoming metaphysics are rather meant
to show the ambivalence of his thought, his hesitation to bring the system to closure. To
repeat, Schleiermacher never makes a clear-cut either/or choice. Also, regarding the
question of overcoming metaphysics: it is an oscillating undecidability between the
possibility and impossibility of overcoming metaphysics. In my opinion, it is much better
than believing either that all attempts of overcoming would fail or that the overcoming
could be accomplished once and for all. It is also here that the position I call
metaphysical insideoutness emerges.
Another important point is that Schleiermacher's dialectical suspension of
contrasts in the indefinite "between-world?" represented by Gefiihl, may also be applied
to the contrast between philosophy and dogmatic theology. The encounter of these
different but complementary disciplines, similarly to the metaphysical contrasts, creates
something beyond both of them. As Schleiermacher indicates in the Dialektik, the
contrasting duality of knowing and being presuppose their transcendent ground. Contrasts
cannot be resolved either in simple identity or in sheer difference. As Spiegler puts it,
"the fundamental given phenomenon is the 'togetherness of opposites.' ... The true
paradox of actuality is not presented by the either/or of simple identity and sheer
diversity, but by the both/and of the 'togetherness of identity and difference.v" This
ultimate mystery of identity in difference also applies to the relationship of philosophy
and dogmatic theology that represent speculation and Frommigkeit, the two main aspects
of the human spirit. Here it may provide a non-metaphysically grounded premise for the
entrance into "the deepest depths of the soul," the realm of immediate self-consciousness.
This is the source of the innermost life of the spirit, the conducting fluid connecting the
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two poles and encompassing the contrasts. The electricity is thus generated: the sparks of
God-consciousness-immediate experience outside metaphysics and independent of any
philosophy or theology.
It is worth noting that Thandeka also comes to similar conclusions, only in regard
to the contrast of religion and philosophy. But dogmatic theology is closely related to
religion, or Friimmigkeit, anyway. She writes: ''The link between philosophy and religion
in Schleiermacher's work is the gap itself.'.97 The gap belongs to neither of the two
contrasts. It cannot be philosophical element, for thinking is cancelled in it. It also cannot
be religious element, for Gefiihl as the middle ground between the contrasts is different
from the Gefiihl of absolute dependence. Instead, the "link between religion and
philosophy is the unbounded Gefiihl of life itself aligned with the mind's unmediated
openness.t''" Hence, the source of Schleiermacher's distinction between philosophy and
religion is that which they both have in common and yet is neither the one, nor the other:
"human nature as the state of subject-less/object-less awareness that is the fundamental
referent for the conviction upon which philosophic and religious thinking reflects.,,99 I
think that Thandeka legitimately relates this element to clearing space for religious
experience, which, in tum, makes Schleiermacher "the father" of modem Protestant
theology. 100 I believe that it is this situation of undecided tension between the two that
makes genuine creativity possible. And perhaps that made Schleiermacher to be, as
Biedermann says, the virtuoso of both reason and Gefiihl.I01 One exemplary outcome of
this creativity is Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre - the masterpiece of metaphysical
insideoutness.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS:
SOMESKETCHESONSCHLEffiRMACHERTODAY
In this conclusion, I will not so much summarize the points of my research and
contentions, for I have already done that above. Instead, I offer just a few intertextual,
resembling sketches, showing some parallels between Schleiermacher's thought and
today-both in philosophy and theology.
The Figures of lnsideoutness in Derrida and Schleiermacher
The apex of my presentation of Derrida' s overcoming of metaphysics in the first
part of the dissertation was his outwitting the metaphysical language with words that,
although they originated in metaphysics, do not belong there anymore, but do overcome
the discourse of metaphysics and its contrasts. These words were either borrowed from
the margins of metaphysics, like khora, or, like differance, devised by means of altering
metaphysical words themselves, in this case "difference." Being such, they belong to the
inside of metaphysics. By virtue of originating in metaphysics themselves, these words
are able to regulate and account for the play of the contrasts, one could say, to "ground"
them. Yet, not in any metaphysical way, for they are timeless, abyssal, and groundless
themselves. But neither they are groundless in any hyper-metaphysical sense, for they
produce the outside of metaphysics from themselves, from inside. Or rather, they operate
on the hinge or the slash between metaphysical contrasts, including that of inside/outside.
Hence, the outside of this meta-metaphysics itself is not somewhere beyond metaphysics,
but, like mirror's tain, between inside and outside, with the visible, lustrous side inside.
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Through a fissure in the tain, the other, unopposed to the same, may be glimpsed, the
other to philosophy and metaphysics.
I see Schleiermacher's Gefiihl as a similar figure of insideoutness. It originates
from within metaphysics and its contrasts, but belonging to neither of them, turns out to
be outside/inside metaphysics. Although the individual contrasts cannot reach beyond
metaphysics, the interaction between two related contrasts creates a non-metaphysical
space in between them, on the slash between thinking/willing, for example. Gefiihl takes
up that space. Insofar as the contrasts are in constant oscillation, Gefiihl is and is not at
the same time. At least, it "is" not in any sense as something "is." Being inside, Gefiihl
grounds the contrasts of metaphysics in an abyssal, groundless way. It is even "the
carrier" of all other functions of human spirit. It is "the most real" being. Yet, Gefiihl is
not even its real name; it is just provisionally given to the "hardly expressible" third
entity in the oscillation of the contrasts. Its naming is symbolic, or analogical, or
representative, mirroring. Gefiihl mirrors being and allows being to be mirrored, but not
behind the tain, for it is mirror's tain itself, it is not reflective itself. The tain does not
belong anywhere beyond existence. Yet, the outside, the dark depths of the divine, or the
nothing, touch the lusterless back side of the tain of Gefiihl. On this boundary of
immediate self-consciousness, the fissured Durchgangspunkt of being, the images of the
totally other can be glimpsed. It is the meta-metaphysical other totally outside of the self-
presencing of self-consciousness.' Yet, it is not a hyper-essential other, but the other
arising from inside, from language, that should bring the other into horizon. One
provisional name for it could be "God," "the utterly empty Other Side of the world's
finitude."z And what if the mirror has no tain? What if it is another Derridean mirror, this
time a tainless mirror, or a mirror whose tain lets "images" and "persons" through'r'
Gefiihl is such a mirror.
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Then, the Ubergang, in which Gefiihl actually takes place, the "queer creature,"
the "point zero," which neither is, nor is not, spatially, and neither comes to be, nor
ceases to be, temporally, because being the "common border" of the contrasts, one of
which is ceased, while the other not yet begun. Timeless, yet necessary for something to
be something in time. Notably, it comes from Plato, like, reinterpreted by Derrida,
Timaeus' featureless "receptacle" (khora) beyond physical things upon which the forms
imprint their patterns.
Schleiennacher and Language
I have made several scattered references to Schleiermacher's conviction of the
linguisticality of all understanding in the Dialektik and the Glaubenslehre. They could be
elaborated upon if I had space for a discussion of his hermeneutics. Even omitting such a
discussion, I would like to make some more allusions concerning Schleiermacher's
contemporaneous understanding of language. In Derridean context, first of all,
Schleiermacher's view that there can be no thinking outside language, that the economy
of language blocks the possibility of pure understanding, entails a similar renunciation of
the transcendental signified, which is precisely that - meaning outside language. This
position is opposed to the classical view that "the linguistic sign is only the external re-
presentation of something internal that is also able to perceive itself in an authentic
manner without the detour via the signifier. .. ,,4 Also, contra Heidegger, and with
Derrida, Schleiermacher would not hypostasize the signifier into an objective force,
would not claim that language speaks by itselt.5
Next, quite unusually for those times, Schleiermacher also considers the
autonomy of writing. "Writing," states Schleiermacher, "has its own history. Changes
take place in it independently of changes in spoken discourse.?" The interpretation of
written texts, because of the absence of living voice, is different from that of speech, and
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it can never be accomplished. Text contains structures, worked on by the "grammatical"
interpretation before any attempts to arrive at individual meanings, which can be
combined ever differently. Both Derrida and Schleiermacher would agree that "there is
no law that limits, either in content or in quantity, the wealth of relationships that can be
established in all directions between the individual elements of the text."? In a word, the
seeds of intertextuality are already found in Schleiermacher's work.
Concerning metaphysics, it is precisely writing that slips away from the individual
poles of all contrasts, "marks the difference from which each emerges, but it is a
difference that at the same time stamps each one with the mark of incompleteness.
Writing (de)generates the series of oppositions, including the one between writing and
speech.t"
The tTber of the Ubergang in Schleiennacher and Heidegger
Heidegger, in his letter to Jiinger, "Concerning 'the Line,''' also speaks of the
Ubergang and the point-zero (Nullpunkt), which I find fascinating. While in
Schleiermacher these words first appeared in the discussion about the extra-metaphysical
transition point of philosophy from fantasy to dialectics as the combination of science
and art, Heidegger refers to the movement of nihilism on the undecided line between two
eras: either ending in negative nothingness, or in the Ubergang to the realm of the new
turning of being." Heidegger's text focuses on the point-zero, or the line-zero, itself,
where the meta or iiber of the Ubergang signifies a nonspace or nonplace similar to
Schleiermacher's point-zero or Ubergang of the birth of dialectics. That is why the
letter's title contains iiber, meaning both as "concerning" (as letter concerning "the line")
and "beyond" (as beyond "the line," Uber "Die Linie ").
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Schleiermacher and DfR/econstructive Theology
I would like to bring up here only one example of an attempt to overcome
metaphysics in theology with the help of Derridean deconstruction, which is so
surprisingly close to Schleiennacher's position despite the lack of the author's
acknowledgement of Schleiennacher's relevance. 10 The attempt I want to mention is
O'Leary's book Questioning Back. 1 I I think that if Schleiermacher were alive today, he
would share O'Leary's claim to fight on a double front: against those who imagine they
have left metaphysics behind by some hermeneutical shortcut and against those who shut
out awareness of the questionability of metaphysics.V O'Leary wants to find "a delicate
middle way between abolition and restoration" of metaphysics.':' For one thing, like
Schleiermacher, he insists on the strict separation of theological and philosophical quests.
He maintains that the former totally differs from the latter and can be retrieved as the
phenomenality of faith and revelation. For another thing, again like Schleiermacher, he
believes that the language of faith has for so long been shaped by metaphysics that it
cannot be simply left behind without conscious and critical struggle with it. Despite their
historical intermingling, a careful questioning of both philosophical and theological
concerns is required in order to undo the metaphysical amalgamations of philosophy and
faith and open a space for a dialogue between the two instead.
On the other hand, in O'Leary's opinion, metaphysics ought to be overcome. It
coincides with Schleiennacher's main contention in the Glaubenslehre. It is theology that
accepts the critique of ontotheology as an element in the quest for an authentic language
of faith. Yet, it is left to philosophy to follow through the implications of that critique in
view of the question of being. 14 The language of being, of course, no longer serves as the
vehicle of a topology of the biblical God. Instead, it shelters the unrecognized subversive
force of the biblical images of God. "That force," O'Leary maintains, "is retrieved not by
a relapse into biblicism, but by reopening the conflict between biblical and metaphysical
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representations in such a way that we are impelled beyond both.,,15 "The true face of
God," he subsequently goes on, "emerges from the mutual deconstruction of the God of
Abraham and the God of the philosophers.?"
So, for O'Leary, fully keeping in mind the prevalence of metaphysics, there still
can be a hope to catch a glimpse outside metaphysics by virtue of conceiving religious
and theological texts as confessions of faith which may subvert even their own
metaphysical forms. As O'Leary claims, there is from the start a certain conscious or
unconscious tension between the language of faith and that of metaphysics. He suggests
"that it is by working along the fault lines this tension leaves in the classical Christian
texts that we can hope to split the tradition open, allowing its repressed counter-
metaphysical potential to emerge.,,17 The protest against metaphysical theology can be
carried out in a new way since deconstructive criticism has taught a subtler philosophical
grasp of the functioning of metaphysical language. This grasp, in O'Leary's view,
permits a more intimate deconstruction of the tradition, in which faith seeks out its own
authentic voice in the texts of the past, overcoming the language of metaphysical reason
which threatens to stifle it forever. I end this exposition with a longer quotation that
delineates the strategy of overcoming:
A deconstructive view of the history of Christian theology need only take as its
theme the constant, ever-varying tension between faith and the metaphysical
horizons of thought in which it was forced to find expression, in order to reveal
the secret splendor of this history as the history of faith maintaining its identity in
exile. If one attends to the thread of faith running through its tapestry one finds
that the history of Christian theology witnesses against itself. Tensions and
contradictions in the text between the explicit statements and its implicit attitude
of faith are what the deconstructionist looks for,jailles or clefts which allow the
apparently monolithic discourse of the classical theologian to be prized open so
that two orientations may be differentiated in the text, one tending to construct a
metaphysical edifice in which elements of faith lose their original contours under
the mighty spell of the Greek Logos, the other representing a biblically inspired
resistance to this development. Any Christian theologian who deserves to be
called a classic may be expected to show this ancient tension between Athens and
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Jerusalem in some form, and to show it textually, allowing wide scope for
deconstructionist detective work.18
No doubt, Schleiermacher is such a classic Christian theologian.
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